Delay alone cannot quash serious railway property prosecution where accused caused the delay and discharge test was not met.

Criminal proceedings under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 could not be quashed solely for delay where the accused had materially contributed to that delay. The offence was treated as serious, and the delay had to be assessed with the procedural history, including the accused's challenges and non-appearance. Because the trial court had proceeded as a warrant case and recorded evidence under Section 244 CrPC, discharge under Section 245 CrPC was available only if no case was made out or the charge was groundless. The High Court's quashing order was unsustainable because it did not apply that statutory test and relied only on pendency.

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Issues: Whether criminal proceedings for an offence under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 could be quashed solely on the ground of delay when the accused themselves had materially contributed to the delay.

Analysis: The offence under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 was a serious one and the delay in the case could not be viewed in isolation. The record showed that a substantial part of the delay resulted from the accused challenging orders and not appearing before the trial court, while the trial court had proceeded under the warrant-case procedure and had collected evidence under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, discharge after such evidence could follow only when no case was made out or the charge was groundless. The High Court had not applied that statutory test and had quashed the proceedings merely because the case had remained pending for several years.

Conclusion: The quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground of delay was unsustainable, and the accused were not entitled to that relief.

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