Discharge under criminal procedure requires judicial scrutiny, not automatic relief for delay or complainant absence.

Discharge under Sections 245(2) and 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a reasoned judicial assessment and cannot be granted mechanically for delay or the complainant's absence. The High Court held that Section 245(2) applies only where the Magistrate records reasons and finds the charge groundless, and that a pending complaint with available investigative material did not justify automatic discharge. It further explained that Section 249 is discretionary, not mandatory, so absence of the complainant alone does not compel discharge, especially in a serious, cognizable and non-compoundable matter. The discharge order was therefore set aside and the case restored for trial on merits.

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Issues: (i) whether the order discharging the accused under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was justified on the ground that the complaint had remained pending for a long time and the complainant had not effectively prosecuted the case; (ii) whether the accused could be discharged merely because the complainant was absent on the hearing date under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): whether the order discharging the accused under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was justified on the ground that the complaint had remained pending for a long time and the complainant had not effectively prosecuted the case.

Analysis: Section 245(2) permits discharge at a previous stage only when the Magistrate records reasons and considers the charge to be groundless. The power is not arbitrary and must rest on material showing that no offence is made out. In the present case, the prosecution had not expressed any inability to adduce evidence, and the complaint disclosed materials including statements recorded during investigation. The discharge was therefore treated as automatic and not based on a judicious assessment of whether the charge was groundless.

Conclusion: The discharge under Section 245(2) was unsustainable and is set aside.

Issue (ii): whether the accused could be discharged merely because the complainant was absent on the hearing date under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The discretion under Section 249 is not mandatory or mechanical. It must be exercised judicially and not in a capricious or routine manner. Absence of the complainant does not by itself compel discharge, particularly where the offence is serious, cognizable and non-compoundable, and where the case had already remained pending for years with the accused having absconded for a substantial period.

Conclusion: The accused could not be discharged merely for the complainant's absence, and the order of discharge was wrongly passed.

Final Conclusion: The revision was allowed, the discharge order was annulled, and the criminal case was restored to the trial court for disposal on merits within the time fixed.

Ratio Decidendi: Discharge under Sections 245(2) and 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is permissible only on a reasoned judicial assessment and cannot be made mechanically for delay or a complainant's absence when the charge is not shown to be groundless.

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