Retrospective tenancy law upheld where legislative competence, separation of powers, and rational classification satisfied constitutional review.

The State amendment was upheld as within legislative competence under the doctrine of pith and substance, because its substance fell within fields relating to property transfer, contracts, civil procedure, and land or landlord-tenant regulation. It was also held not to be colourable legislation, since the law altered the legal basis of occupation rather than directly overruling prior judicial decisions, and therefore did not breach separation of powers. The classification of requisitioned premises and their occupants was found rational and linked to preventing sudden eviction and homelessness, so the amendment was not arbitrary and did not offend Article 14. The constitutional challenge failed, and the earlier contrary view was set aside.

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Issues: Whether the State Legislature had legislative competence to enact the impugned amendment; whether the amendment was a colourable exercise of power or an impermissible interference with earlier judicial decisions; whether the amendment was arbitrary or unreasonable and offended Article 14.

Issue (i): Whether the State Legislature had legislative competence to enact the impugned amendment.

Analysis: The impugned measure was examined by applying the doctrine of pith and substance. The field of legislation was held to fall substantially within the entries dealing with transfer of property, contracts and civil procedure, and, to the extent necessary, within the State power relating to land and landlord-tenant relations. The Court treated the conversion of the occupants' status and the regulation of eviction as incidental to a valid legislative field and relied on the settled principle that entries in the Lists must receive a broad and effective construction.

Conclusion: The impugned amendment was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment was a colourable exercise of power or an impermissible interference with earlier judicial decisions.

Analysis: The Court applied the settled test that colourable legislation is judged by substance, object and effect, not by legislative motive. It held that the amendment did not directly overrule prior decisions but altered the legal basis of occupation by converting the earlier arrangement into statutory tenancy under the rent law. Since the Legislature was competent to enact such a law and had removed the earlier basis on which the prior judgments operated, the measure was not treated as an encroachment on judicial power.

Conclusion: The amendment was not colourable legislation and did not violate the separation of powers.

Issue (iii): Whether the amendment was arbitrary or unreasonable and offended Article 14.

Analysis: The Court upheld the classification of requisitioned premises and their occupants as a distinct class requiring protection from sudden eviction. It found a rational nexus between the classification and the legislative object of preventing homelessness and preserving public interest. The Court reiterated that rent control and tenancy measures may validly impose restrictions on property rights if the classification is intelligible and linked to the purpose of the law.

Conclusion: The amendment was not arbitrary or unreasonable and did not violate Article 14.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge to the impugned amendment failed, the High Court's contrary view was set aside, and the amendment was upheld, with the clarification that the earlier mandate concerning vacating requisitioned premises remained unaffected.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective tenancy and eviction-regulating law will be valid if it falls within the Legislature's competence, alters the legal basis of the earlier arrangement without directly overruling a judicial decision, and rests on a rational classification consistent with Article 14.

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