Requisition cannot be used as permanent occupation; prolonged control may amount to de facto acquisition without lawful proceedings.

An order of requisition is not invalid merely because it omits an express recital of public purpose, if that purpose is otherwise established. Requisition is inherently temporary and cannot be continued for an indefinite or unreasonably long period; where the underlying purpose is permanent or effectively so, acquisition rather than requisition is required. A requisition lasting about 30 years was treated as an abuse of the requisitioning power and as a de facto acquisition without lawful acquisition proceedings. Payment of rent by the allottee to the original owner, even if accepted, did not create a direct tenancy or displace the requisition.

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Issues: (i) Whether an order of requisition is invalid merely because it does not expressly recite the public purpose for which it is made; (ii) whether a requisition order can lawfully continue for an indefinite or unreasonably long period such as about 30 years; (iii) whether payment of rent by the allottee to the original owner, with acceptance of such payment, converts the allottee into a direct tenant and displaces the requisition.

Issue (i): Whether an order of requisition is invalid merely because it does not expressly recite the public purpose for which it is made.

Analysis: The legal requirement is that requisition must in fact be made for a public purpose. The omission to state that purpose in the order is not by itself fatal if the public purpose is otherwise established to the satisfaction of the Court. The absence of recital does not determine validity; what matters is proof of the public purpose supporting the exercise of power.

Conclusion: The omission to recite the public purpose did not, by itself, invalidate the requisition order.

Issue (ii): Whether a requisition order can lawfully continue for an indefinite or unreasonably long period such as about 30 years.

Analysis: Requisition and acquisition are conceptually distinct. Requisition is an exercise of control over property for a transitory public purpose and is inherently temporary, whereas acquisition transfers title permanently. If requisition is allowed to continue indefinitely, it may in substance amount to acquisition without recourse to the law of acquisition and compensation applicable thereto. Where the public purpose is permanent or likely to subsist for an indefinite period, the property must be acquired and not requisitioned. A requisition continuing for about 30 years was held to exceed any reasonable duration and to amount to a misuse of the requisitioning power.

Conclusion: The requisition could not lawfully continue for such a long period and had ceased to be effective after the lapse of a reasonable time.

Issue (iii): Whether payment of rent by the allottee to the original owner, with acceptance of such payment, converts the allottee into a direct tenant and displaces the requisition.

Analysis: The allottee entered into occupation only under the requisition order. Payment described as rent to the owner, even if accepted by the owner, did not terminate the requisition or alter the legal source of possession. The allottee remained in occupation under the requisition scheme, with compensation payable in the manner attributable to the requisitioning arrangement, and such payment could not create a direct tenancy in the face of the subsisting requisition.

Conclusion: The allottee did not become a direct tenant of the owner and the requisition remained legally operative until it ceased by lapse of reasonable time.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the requisition succeeded on the ground that the power of requisition could not be used as a substitute for acquisition or continued indefinitely, and the order of the High Court directing derequisition and restoration of possession was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Requisition of property is inherently temporary and cannot be sustained for an indefinite or unreasonably long period where the underlying purpose is permanent or transitory in name only; continued occupation in such circumstances amounts to a misuse of requisitioning power and a de facto acquisition without lawful acquisition proceedings.

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