Bail cancellation for witness intimidation upheld; same-judge hearing practice is not mandatory absent prejudice.

Bail once granted may be cancelled where the accused misuses liberty by threatening witnesses, tampering with evidence, or obstructing the fair course of investigation or trial. The Court treated cancellation as distinct from refusal of bail and upheld cancellation where the allegation of witness intimidation was supported by an affidavit and was not effectively rebutted. The usual practice of placing a later bail or cancellation application before the same judge is a rule of judicial discipline, not an inflexible mandate, and deviation did not vitiate the order absent shown prejudice. The cancellation was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether bail could be cancelled on the ground that the accused had threatened witnesses and interfered with the course of justice. (ii) Whether the cancellation application ought to have been heard by the same judge who had granted bail.

Issue (i): Whether bail could be cancelled on the ground that the accused had threatened witnesses and interfered with the course of justice.

Analysis: Cancellation of bail stands on a different footing from rejection of bail and is justified where the accused misuses liberty by tampering with evidence, threatening witnesses, or otherwise obstructing the fair course of investigation or trial. The materials before the Court included an affidavit stating that the complainant had been threatened in the court , and there was no effective rebuttal to that allegation before the High Court. The absence of a reference to the threat in the trial evidence did not negate the later allegation, since the evidence being recorded related to the original and not to the subsequent threat incident.

Conclusion: The cancellation of bail on the ground of witness intimidation was sustained, and the issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the cancellation application ought to have been heard by the same judge who had granted bail.

Analysis: The usual practice of placing a subsequent bail or cancellation application before the same judge is a desirable rule of judicial discipline, but it is not an inflexible statutory mandate. Where cancellation is sought on grounds different from those considered at the time of grant of bail, deviation from that practice does not by itself vitiate the order unless prejudice is shown. No such prejudice was demonstrated, and the ground on which bail was cancelled was distinct from the ground on which bail had earlier been granted.

Conclusion: The objection based on allocation to a different judge failed, and the issue was decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The order cancelling bail was upheld because the accused was found to have prima facie threatened witnesses, and the procedural objection regarding the judge hearing the matter did not invalidate the cancellation.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail once granted may be cancelled where the accused misuses liberty by threatening witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice, and the usual practice of placing the matter before the same judge is not mandatory where cancellation is sought on distinct subsequent grounds.

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