Appeal as of right in contempt matters lies only after jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised, not on refusal to initiate proceedings.

An appeal as of right under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 arises only from an order passed after the High Court has assumed and exercised jurisdiction to punish for contempt. A private motion or a motion with the Advocate General's consent is only a means of drawing the Court's attention to alleged contempt; if the High Court refuses to initiate proceedings, it has merely declined to assume that jurisdiction. Such a refusal is therefore outside section 19(1), and the proper remedy in an appropriate case is special leave under article 136.

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Issues: Whether an appeal as of right lay under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against an order of the High Court refusing to initiate contempt proceedings on a motion by a private person.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of sections 15, 17 and 20 shows that a motion by the Advocate General or any other person with the Advocate General's consent is only a means of drawing the Court's attention to alleged contempt. The Court enters upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt only when it decides to take action and initiates proceedings. A refusal to act on a motion, therefore, is a refusal to assume or exercise that jurisdiction and is not an order made in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such an order does not fall within the opening words of section 19(1). The proper remedy in an appropriate case is recourse to special leave under article 136.

Conclusion: No appeal as of right lay under section 19(1) against the High Court's refusal to initiate contempt proceedings; the preliminary objection was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: The right of appeal under section 19(1) arises only from an order or decision made after the High Court has assumed and exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and not from a discretionary refusal to initiate contempt proceedings.

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