Issues: (i) Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions; (ii) Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit; and (iii) Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Issue (i): Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions.

Analysis: The governing methodology for real-estate projects rejects a comparison of input tax credit with turnover because construction expenditure, credit accrual and buyer collections do not have a direct correlation throughout a project. It requires the total GST-related saving for the project to be determined and allocated over the total project area to derive a uniform per square foot benefit. The revised computation quantified the additional input tax credit against project purchase value, determined the project-level saving, divided it by total area, and applied the resulting per square foot figure to the sold area. Purchase value was used to measure credit against project expenditure, not as a substitute for turnover or for allocating benefit according to buyer collections. Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 does not permit replacement of a fair and reasonable factual computation accepted by the specialised Tribunal absent jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or non-compliance with the binding remand directions.

Conclusion: The methodology was consistent with the remand directions and was validly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns the benefit of input tax credit actually accruing to the supplier and its passing on to recipients. The pre-GST returns recorded nil CENVAT credit actually availed, while substantial GST input tax credit was availed after GST. A credit that was only legally available but remained unclaimed cannot be treated as having reduced the pre-GST tax incidence, since that would compare actual post-GST benefit with a hypothetical pre-GST benefit. The benefit was not restricted to credit on goods, as the post-GST credit on input services was also actually availed.

Conclusion: Unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit could not be notionally set off against the post-GST input tax credit; the determination based on actual availment was upheld, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Analysis: GST collected on the enhanced consideration resulting from non-passing of the tax benefit forms part of the profiteered amount because it represents tax collected on the additional realisation. The direction to pay interest at 18% was part of the statutory anti-profiteering consequence, and no independent jurisdictional infirmity was established.

Conclusion: Addition of GST at 12% to the profiteered amount and the direction for interest at 18% were valid, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The project-specific calculation founded on actually availed incremental input tax credit, allocated on a per square foot basis and inclusive of GST collected on the excess realisation, remains enforceable with interest payable to the affected recipients.

Ratio Decidendi: In real-estate anti-profiteering proceedings, incremental input tax credit actually availed after GST must be determined as project-level savings and allocated by area; unavailed pre-GST credit cannot be imputed as a notional offset.

Issues: Whether imposition of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bills had expired and their validity was not extended under Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 permits demand of tax and penalty for contraventions during transportation, while Rule 138(10) prescribes the validity period of an e-way bill. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST distinguishes serious and substantive contraventions from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by invoices, lorry receipt, e-way bills and a test certificate; the invoices charged integrated tax and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy in the goods. Expiry of the e-way bills was the sole defect, and no tax evasion or intention to evade tax was established. The explanation for the incorrect destination entry and consequential validity period was relevant while deciding whether Section 129 could be invoked.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the expired e-way bills was invalid and unjustified; the levy of integrated tax and penalty was set aside.

Issues: Whether statutory interest consequential to confiscation and redemption of imported goods may be computed from the original assessment of the Bill of Entry when the liability arising from the confiscation proceedings was determined only by a subsequent adjudication order.

Analysis: Under Section 125(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, the obligation to pay duty and charges consequent upon redemption arises in the context of exercise and acceptance of the redemption option. The resulting duty liability is required to be assessed and determined through the machinery of Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, after which statutory interest may apply in accordance with law. The original assessment was based on the declared description of the goods, whereas the goods were seized and the description, classification, confiscation consequences, redemption fine, penalties and duty consequences were determined only through the adjudication order dated 28.02.2023. Delay in adjudication does not by itself extinguish statutory interest; however, a liability that had not yet been determined cannot be treated as an amount in delayed payment for the preceding period.

Conclusion: Interest could not be computed for the period from the original assessment in May 2015 until 28.02.2023. The interest liability must be recomputed from the date of determination under the adjudication order, after accounting for the subsequent reassessment and payments or appropriations already made; interest for the subsequent period remains payable if attracted under the applicable law.

Issues: Whether penalty upon a director under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable where the imported goods were not available for confiscation or imposition of redemption fine, and the duty demand against the importer arising from the same order had already been set aside.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 111. Although the adjudication order recorded that the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(m), no redemption fine under Section 125 was imposed because the goods were not physically available. The duty demand and penalties against the importer, founded on the same reclassification, had also been set aside in the importer's appeal. These circumstances left no legal basis for fastening penal liability upon the director.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed upon the appellant under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); (ii) Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Issue (i): Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI).

Analysis: Rule 57C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 denied credit on inputs used in manufacture of exempt or nil-rated final products. The second proviso to Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994 confined AED (GSI) credit to payment of excise duty leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, on final products. TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI), while tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); consequently, no dutiable final product under that enactment existed against which the credit could be utilised. The subsequent CENVAT amendment and circular could not apply to the 1998-99 period. The retrospective amendment under Section 88 of the Finance Act, 2004 applied only to AED (GSI) paid on or after 1 April 2000.

Conclusion: The assessee was not eligible to avail or utilise AED (GSI) credit towards basic excise duty. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Analysis: Refund under Rule 57F(13) depended upon valid entitlement to the underlying AED (GSI) credit. Since the credit itself was unavailable under Rule 57C and Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994, export of the tyres did not create entitlement to refund of that credit.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to refund of the disputed AED (GSI) credit. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: AED (GSI) credit under the MODVAT regime could be used only against liability under the same additional-excise-duty enactment; later CENVAT provisions did not alter the position for the earlier disputed period.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit of a specified additional excise duty is unavailable where no final product is liable to that duty, and cannot be diverted towards payment of a different excise duty unless the governing credit scheme expressly permits it.

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be maintained despite the appellant's failure to challenge the portal-uploaded notice and final tax order through the available statutory remedy.

Analysis: The appellant acknowledged receipt of the notice through the portal but asserted, without corroboration, that it had not seen the notice or the consequential order until recovery proceedings commenced. Any objection that the notice was only an electronic summary or lacked required particulars ought to have been raised by a timely reply before the final order was made. The appellant's continued inaction, particularly when it had accessed the portal for input tax credit purposes, did not justify invoking writ jurisdiction after the final order.

Conclusion: The rejection of the writ petition for non-availment of the alternative statutory remedy was upheld; the appellant could not challenge the notice and final order on the asserted ground after remaining silent during the proceedings.

Issues: Whether recovery of drawback, initiated more than seven years after its payment under a rule containing no prescribed limitation period, was commenced within a reasonable period.

Analysis: Rule 16 of the Customs, Central Excise Duties and Service Tax Drawback Rules, 1995 does not prescribe a limitation period for recovery of erroneously or excessively paid drawback; consequently, the recovery power must be exercised within a reasonable period having regard to the circumstances. There was no allegation of fraudulent availment or suppression of material facts, and no satisfactory explanation was furnished for initiating recovery more than seven years after the drawback had been availed.

Conclusion: The delayed recovery proceedings were not initiated within a reasonable period and were unsustainable; the recovery order was set aside and the drawback amount was directed to be refunded.

Issues: (i) Whether interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) was sustainable on an advance to a group concern when the assessee's own funds exceeded the advance and the interest-bearing borrowings arose later; (ii) Whether deletion of the share-premium addition under section 68 was sustainable without an investor-wise examination of evidence under the statutory framework applicable to the assessment year.

Issue (i): Whether interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) was sustainable on an advance to a group concern when the assessee's own funds exceeded the advance and the interest-bearing borrowings arose later.

Analysis: For disallowance of interest under section 36(1)(iii), a nexus between borrowed funds and the impugned advance must be established. The assessee possessed own funds substantially exceeding the advance, and the advance was made before issuance of the non-convertible debentures. The presumption of utilisation of own funds therefore applied, and deployment of the subsequent borrowings for the advance could not be presumed.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of the share-premium addition under section 68 was sustainable without an investor-wise examination of evidence under the statutory framework applicable to the assessment year.

Analysis: Under section 68, the initial burden of proof requires establishment of the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of cash credits; for the applicable post-amendment framework, the source of source requirement also required consideration. The appellate finding was general rather than based on investor-wise verification of financial capacity, bank records, returns and supporting financial documents. The regulatory status of Alternative Investment Funds was relevant but did not by itself establish creditworthiness or genuineness for each investment.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition could not be sustained on the existing findings. The section 68 issue was remanded for fresh investor-wise adjudication after examination of the requisite evidence; the Revenue succeeded for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The interest deduction is restored, while the share-premium credit issue requires a fresh determination on investor-specific evidence under the applicable statutory framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Where adequate own funds exceed an advance and the alleged borrowings were raised subsequently, utilisation of borrowed funds for that advance cannot be presumed for disallowing interest.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged cash returned by builders or paid to builders in purported builder-financing transactions was taxable as unexplained money or unexplained investment under sections 69A and 69B; (ii) Whether alleged interest from purported builder-financing transactions was taxable; and (iii) Whether the stamp-duty-value differential on acquisition of property was taxable under section 56(2)(x)(b) without determination of fair market value by the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Issue (i): Whether alleged cash returned by builders or paid to builders in purported builder-financing transactions was taxable as unexplained money or unexplained investment under sections 69A and 69B.

Analysis: Section 69A requires unexplained money, while section 69B concerns investment exceeding the amount recorded in the books. The alleged cash returned by builders was traced to advances initially made through accounted banking channels. No independent unexplained source, asset, income, or accretion corresponding to the alleged return was established. The alleged cash payment by the assessee to builders was likewise not sustainable on the materially identical search material and transaction pattern.

Conclusion: The additions for alleged cash received from, or paid to, builders under sections 69A and 69B were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged interest from purported builder-financing transactions was taxable.

Analysis: The addition was founded on the inferred builder-financing arrangement and electronic material. The property transactions were also consistent with acquisition for capital appreciation and rental income, with the related rental income and capital gains having been offered to tax and accepted. The material did not justify sustaining a separate addition for alleged interest income.

Conclusion: The alleged interest-income additions were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the stamp-duty-value differential on acquisition of property was taxable under section 56(2)(x)(b) without determination of fair market value by the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(x)(b) applies where immovable property is acquired for consideration below the stamp duty value beyond the statutory threshold, irrespective of the characterisation of the transaction as builder financing. Where the stamp duty value is disputed, the valuation mechanism under section 50C requires determination of fair market value through the Departmental Valuation Officer before finalising the addition.

Conclusion: The exclusion of section 56(2)(x)(b) merely because the transactions were characterised as builder financing was rejected against the assessee; the issue of valuation, quantum, and ultimate taxability was remitted for fresh determination after Departmental Valuation Officer valuation.

Final Conclusion: The alleged cash-flow and interest additions were unsustainable, while the stamp-duty-value differentials require valuation-based reconsideration under the statutory mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: An alleged return of an assessee's own accounted advance cannot be separately assessed as unexplained money or investment without evidence of an independent unexplained source or accretion.

Issues: (i) Validity of reassessment initiated under Sections 148A and 148, including issuance of notice by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer; (ii) Whether disputed purchases warranted full disallowance or only an addition for embedded profit, and the appropriate rate; (iii) Whether paragraph 3.1(c) of CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 required vacatur of the appellate order and remand for fresh assessment.

Issue (i): Validity of reassessment initiated under Sections 148A and 148, including issuance of notice by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The post-2021 reassessment regime applied. Reassessment jurisdiction was supported by specific transaction-based information identifying the assessee, supplier and purchase amount, followed by notice under Section 148A(b) and an order under Section 148A(d). The assessee had not responded at the Section 148A stage. Section 147A, retrospectively applicable from 1 April 2021, governed the meaning of Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A; consequently, the earlier position concerning issuance by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer did not invalidate the reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment is valid; the issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disputed purchases warranted full disallowance or only an addition for embedded profit, and the appropriate rate.

Analysis: The supplier's non-existence at the stated address, non-compliance with notice under Section 133(6), and accommodation-bill information created doubt regarding purchases from that supplier. However, purchase invoices, e-way bills, banking evidence, GST records and quantitative details were produced; the corresponding sales were accepted; and no cash-back of purchase payments was established. In these circumstances, the burden of proof for treating the entire amount as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C was not discharged. An embedded profit addition through estimation of profit was appropriate. The past gross-profit history, averaging about 5.58%, supported restriction of the addition to 6% of the disputed purchases.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to 6% of the disputed purchases, amounting to Rs. 2,12,480; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether paragraph 3.1(c) of CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 required vacatur of the appellate order and remand for fresh assessment.

Analysis: Paragraph 3.1(c) creates an exception to monetary limits for departmental appeals involving information from specified law-enforcement or intelligence agencies. It concerns maintainability of the appeal and does not require vacatur of the appellate order or remand for a fresh assessment.

Conclusion: No remand or fresh assessment is warranted under the Circular; the issue is against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment remains sustainable, while the disputed-purchase addition is confined to the estimated profit element at 6%, without a fresh assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documented purchases correspond with accepted sales and no return of funds is established, deficiencies concerning the named supplier justify only an estimated embedded-profit addition rather than full disallowance as unexplained expenditure.

Issues: Whether maritime education and training activities qualify the assessee for exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee's primary objects and activities comprise structured maritime education and training for seafarers under the regulation of the Director General of Shipping. Seminars, technical publications, research programmes and related activities are incidental and integral to those educational objects. The generation of surplus, where applied towards educational purposes, does not render the activities commercial. In the absence of any material factual distinction from the earlier years, the activities cannot be treated as objects of general public utility attracting the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The assessee exists for educational purposes, the proviso to Section 2(15) does not apply, and exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available.

Issues: Whether the share capital and share premium received from a corporate subscriber constituted unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee furnished its books of account and bank statements, along with the subscriber's PAN, address, bank statements and audited financial statements. The subscriber's investment and banking trail were supported by documentary material, and its source of investment had also been examined in its assessment. This discharged the initial onus regarding identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction. The addition rested only on an investigation report, without identifying any defect in the evidence or conducting effective contrary verification.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment was sustainable where audited three-year weighted-average comparable margins, after a verified working-capital adjustment, placed the assessee's margin within the arm's-length range; (ii) Whether an alleged duplicate disallowance of income-tax interest under Section 37(1), after voluntary disallowance under Section 40(a)(ii), required deletion; (iii) Whether delayed employees' provident-fund contribution was deductible under Section 36(1)(va) merely because it was paid before the due date for filing the income-tax return.

Issue (i): Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment was sustainable where audited three-year weighted-average comparable margins, after a verified working-capital adjustment, placed the assessee's margin within the arm's-length range.

Analysis: Audited annual-report data provides a reliable basis for comparability analysis. The verified weighted-average margins and working-capital adjustment showed that the assessee's margin of 4.11% fell within the working-capital-adjusted arm's-length range of 3.08% to 5.81%. Under Rule 10B(1)(e)(iii), net margins must be adjusted for differences between the controlled and comparable uncontrolled transactions, including working-capital differences.

Conclusion: No transfer-pricing adjustment was called for; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an alleged duplicate disallowance of income-tax interest under Section 37(1), after voluntary disallowance under Section 40(a)(ii), required deletion.

Analysis: The claim was that the same interest amount had already been voluntarily disallowed in the return under Section 40(a)(ii) and was again disallowed under Section 37(1). Verification of the return and assessment records was necessary to determine whether a duplicate disallowance occurred.

Conclusion: The matter was remitted for verification, with a direction to delete the further disallowance if the voluntary disallowance is established.

Issue (iii): Whether delayed employees' provident-fund contribution was deductible under Section 36(1)(va) merely because it was paid before the due date for filing the income-tax return.

Analysis: The governing test is deposit of employees' contribution within the due date prescribed under the relevant provident-fund statute, rather than the due date for filing the income-tax return. The factual compliance with that statutory due date required verification.

Conclusion: Payment before the income-tax-return due date alone does not establish deductibility; the issue was remitted for determination under the applicable provident-fund due-date test.

Final Conclusion: The arm's-length determination is governed by the verified adjusted comparable range, while the two non-transfer-pricing claims require verification under the stated statutory standards.

Ratio Decidendi: Under TNMM, audited comparable data and adjustments for material working-capital differences must be used to determine whether the tested party's margin falls within the arm's-length range.

Issues: (i) Whether proportionately allocated common expenses attributable to taxable receipts from non-members could be disallowed or restricted on an ad hoc basis; (ii) Whether rent received for permitting installation of a cellular tower on the premises is assessable as income from house property rather than income from other sources.

Issue (i): Whether proportionately allocated common expenses attributable to taxable receipts from non-members could be disallowed or restricted on an ad hoc basis.

Analysis: Receipts from members were accepted as exempt on the principle of mutuality, whereas receipts from non-members were taxable. The expenditure comprised common outgoings, including staff costs, utilities, maintenance, security and administrative expenses, which were not shown to have been incurred exclusively for members. The genuineness of the expenditure was not disputed. The assessee consistently apportioned common expenses between member and non-member receipts based on their relative quantum. The restriction of expenditure to estimated percentages lacked disclosed material or a cogent basis, and the reasoning for complete disallowance under section 57 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The proportionately allocated common expenses were allowable and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rent received for permitting installation of a cellular tower on the premises is assessable as income from house property rather than income from other sources.

Analysis: Letting space forming part of the premises for installation and operation of a cellular tower constitutes letting of a part of the house property. No material established that any independent services or facilities, apart from the letting of space, were provided to the cellular operator. The rental receipt was therefore governed by the head of income from house property, with the statutory deduction under section 24(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 available.

Conclusion: The cellular-tower rental income is taxable under the head income from house property and statutory deductions are allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Taxable income is to be recomputed by allowing the consistently apportioned common expenditure against non-member receipts and by assessing the cellular-tower rent under the head income from house property.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority could direct the assessing officer to apply an unspecified gross-profit percentage after holding Section 69C inapplicable. (ii) Whether the penalty proceedings were invalid for want of recorded satisfaction and specification of the applicable limb of Section 271(1)(c). (iii) Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was sustainable on the disallowance of sundry balances/bad debts written off. (iv) Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was sustainable on interest disallowed under Section 43B.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority could direct the assessing officer to apply an unspecified gross-profit percentage after holding Section 69C inapplicable.

Analysis: Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required the first appellate authority to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; it had no power during the relevant period to leave an essential component of the addition for fresh determination by the assessing officer. Section 250(6) required a reasoned appellate determination stating the points decided, decision and reasons. Having found Section 69C inapplicable, any gross-profit-based addition required identification of the applicable rate, its basis, comparable transactions and the resulting quantum. A gross-profit method also could not be mechanically applied to capitalised purchases and staff-uniform expenditure.

Conclusion: The indeterminate direction to apply an unspecified gross-profit percentage was unsustainable and required fresh reasoned adjudication by the first appellate authority. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty proceedings were invalid for want of recorded satisfaction and specification of the applicable limb of Section 271(1)(c).

Analysis: The assessment order recorded satisfaction with reference to the relevant disallowances and invoked the charges of concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars. Since the penalty initiation was founded on the recorded charges for the respective items, the common notice under Section 274 did not invalidate the proceedings in the circumstances of the case.

Conclusion: The challenge to the validity of penalty initiation failed. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was sustainable on the disallowance of sundry balances/bad debts written off.

Analysis: Assessment and penalty proceedings are distinct. The written-off balances were disclosed in the audited accounts, supported by ledger accounts and accompanied by an explanation of their nature. The disallowance arose from failure to establish the conditions for deduction under Sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(2), without any finding that the disclosed figures, entries or particulars were false, fictitious or inaccurate.

Conclusion: Penalty on the disallowance of sundry balances/bad debts written off was deleted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was sustainable on interest disallowed under Section 43B.

Analysis: The interest liability and finance cost were recorded in the accounts, and the payment particulars supplied by the assessee enabled computation of the unpaid interest. The disallowance under Section 43B resulted from the statutory actual-payment condition, not from a finding that the expenditure or liability was fictitious. The erroneous NIL entry in the tax-audit report, viewed with the disclosed underlying particulars, did not by itself establish deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Conclusion: Penalty on the interest disallowance under Section 43B was deleted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The gross-profit direction could not stand without a complete, reasoned appellate determination, and the two disputed penalty components lacked the necessary finding of false or inaccurate particulars; the foundational objections to penalty initiation were not accepted.

Issues: Whether penalty for contravention of the restriction on cash repayment of deposits was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 269T of the Income-tax Act, 1961 restricts repayment of deposits otherwise than through prescribed banking modes, and Section 271E provides for penalty upon its contravention. The assessee did not deny the cash repayments, establish that the amounts constituted chit bid amounts paid to successful subscribers, or show reasonable cause within Section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for making the repayments in cash.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rightly sustained; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether, after a search initiated on or after 1 April 2021, an assessment could validly be completed under section 143(3) rather than by following the procedure under section 147 read with section 148.

Analysis: Explanation 2(i) to section 148 deems the Assessing Officer to possess information suggesting escapement of income where a search is initiated after 1 April 2021. The search-triggered assessment mechanism under sections 147 and 148 is the special statutory route and prevails over the general scrutiny-assessment procedure under section 143(3). Once the search had occurred, the Assessing Officer was required to discontinue the section 143(3) proceedings and initiate proceedings under section 148. Non-compliance with the prescribed statutory procedure constituted a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment of a completed scrutiny assessment on the alleged bogus long-term capital gain from sale of shares was valid.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits reassessment only upon a reason to believe founded on tangible material and does not authorise a review on a mere change of opinion. Where the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3), the statutory protection against reopening after the prescribed period also requires failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts. The original scrutiny had considered the assessee's share transactions and supporting purchase, demat and sale documents; while an addition was made regarding another scrip, the long-term capital gain from the relevant scrip was accepted. The subsequent investigation report neither specifically identified the assessee nor was reconciled with the material already on record. Full and true disclosure by the assessee remained uncontroverted.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid as it was based on a mere change of opinion without fresh tangible material establishing escapement of income; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the ex parte GST demand and the appellate order could stand where there was no material establishing service of the show-cause notice upon the registered person.

Analysis: A notice under Section 73(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 142(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 must be served in a manner recognised by Section 169 of the Act. The record contained no material showing service of the show-cause notice through the GST portal, registered post, or e-mail. The demand was consequently confirmed without allowing the registered person to submit objections or be heard, contrary to the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication and the consequential appellate order could not be sustained. The registered person was entitled to receive the show-cause notice, file objections, and obtain fresh adjudication after an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the sanction under Section 151 for reopening assessment was valid; (ii) Whether a recorded loan/advance received through banking channels could be assessed as unexplained investment under Section 69 and sustained under Section 68 without enquiry into the creditor's creditworthiness.

Issue (i): Whether the sanction under Section 151 for reopening assessment was valid.

Analysis: The assessee had not filed a return of income and the approval recorded satisfaction on the basis of available information and material indicating escaped income. The cited decisions concerned assessees that had filed returns and undergone assessment and were factually distinguishable. The recorded satisfaction reflected application of mind and did not establish mechanical approval.

Conclusion: The sanction for reopening was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a recorded loan/advance received through banking channels could be assessed as unexplained investment under Section 69 and sustained under Section 68 without enquiry into the creditor's creditworthiness.

Analysis: Section 69 concerns investments not recorded in the books of account. The impugned sum was a loan/advance recorded in the books and received through banking channels, supported by documentary material that was neither rejected with reasons nor rebutted by adverse evidence. No enquiry was made from the creditor before concluding that the creditor lacked creditworthiness; consequently, sustaining the addition under Section 68 could not cure the unsupported addition.

Conclusion: The addition was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reopening remains valid, but no addition can be retained in respect of the recorded loan/advance.

Ratio Decidendi: A recorded loan or advance cannot be treated as unexplained investment under Section 69, and an adverse finding on the creditor's creditworthiness requires supporting enquiry or evidence.