Inherent criminal jurisdiction and seized property disposal: alternative remedies did not bar intervention, and post-trial delivery provisions did not oust magistrate power.

Section 482 CrPC remains available despite alternative remedies under the Gold (Control) Act and the Criminal Procedure Code when the challenge concerns jurisdiction or abuse of process, so the presence of appeal or revision is not a complete bar. Section 110(2) of the Gold (Control) Act was treated as a post-inquiry delivery provision directed to the police officer, not as an express ouster of a Magistrate's power to dispose of seized property under the Code. On that approach, an order returning the gold to the complainant was not inherently illegal, and separate customs action remained open.

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Issues: (i) Whether the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable despite the availability of other remedies under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether Section 110(2) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 is mandatory for the Magistrate so as to require delivery of the seized gold to the Gold Control Officer, thereby rendering the order returning the gold to the complainant illegal.

Issue (i): Whether the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable despite the availability of other remedies under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The inherent power preserved by Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not excluded merely because a statutory appeal or revision may also lie. Such power is to be exercised sparingly, but it remains available where interference is needed to prevent abuse of the process of court or to secure the ends of justice. The existence of an alternative remedy was therefore not treated as a bar where the challenge was to the very jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable and the preliminary objection was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 110(2) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 is mandatory for the Magistrate so as to require delivery of the seized gold to the Gold Control Officer, thereby rendering the order returning the gold to the complainant illegal.

Analysis: Section 110(2) was read as prescribing the procedure to be followed by the police officer after the conclusion of the inquiry or trial. The language did not curtail the ordinary powers of the criminal court regarding disposal of property, nor did it expressly override a Magistrate's order under the Code. The provision was treated as not ousting the court's jurisdiction, and the impugned order was found to have been passed after consideration of the material on record. The order also left it open to the Customs authorities to initiate separate proceedings if necessary.

Conclusion: Section 110(2) did not prohibit the Magistrate from ordering return of the property to the complainant, and the impugned order was not illegal.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Magistrate's order failed, as no illegality, infirmity, or abuse of process was established in the disposal of the seized gold.

Ratio Decidendi: A provision regulating post-trial delivery of seized gold to customs authorities, when framed in terms directed to the police officer and without express exclusion of the criminal court's powers, does not take away the court's jurisdiction to order disposal of property in accordance with the general criminal procedure.

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