Statutory electricity rebate could be withdrawn; promissory estoppel and contract could not bar lawful tariff revision.

A company cannot invoke Article 19 through Article 32, though it may challenge discriminatory State action under Article 14. A statutory electricity rebate granted by notification can be varied or rescinded by a later notification under the governing law and the General Clauses Act, so no vested right to perpetual continuation arises. Promissory estoppel cannot prevent withdrawal of a statutory concession where the enabling framework permits change. A tariff clause requiring payment at rates in force from time to time did not freeze the rebate, and the Court would not interfere with a non-arbitrary State policy or regulator-fixed tariff.

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Issues: (i) whether a company could invoke Article 32 to challenge withdrawal of an electricity rebate and rely on Article 19 rights; (ii) whether the hill development rebate granted by statutory notifications could be withdrawn by a later statutory notification and whether promissory estoppel could be invoked against such withdrawal; (iii) whether the contractual tariff clause bound the respondent to continue the rebate notwithstanding revision of tariff; and (iv) whether the Court could interfere with the State policy and tariff fixed under the regulatory framework.

Issue (i): whether a company could invoke Article 32 to challenge withdrawal of an electricity rebate and rely on Article 19 rights.

Analysis: A company is not a citizen and cannot claim fundamental rights under Article 19. A petition under Article 32 by a company cannot be maintained for enforcement of Article 19 rights, though a company can invoke Article 14 where discriminatory State action is alleged. The maintainability of the petition therefore had to be examined only on the footing of Article 14.

Conclusion: The petition was not maintainable insofar as it rested on Article 19, but it could still be examined on the limited question of Article 14.

Issue (ii): whether the hill development rebate granted by statutory notifications could be withdrawn by a later statutory notification and whether promissory estoppel could be invoked against such withdrawal.

Analysis: The rebate had been granted and later reduced or withdrawn through statutory notifications issued under the governing electricity enactments. The Court held that the power to issue a notification carries the power to vary or rescind it under Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, unless a contrary intention appears. A concession granted by notification does not create an indefeasible right to continue it for all time. Promissory estoppel cannot operate against a statute or prevent withdrawal of a statutory concession where the law permits the authority to vary or rescind the benefit.

Conclusion: The rebate could validly be withdrawn by a subsequent statutory notification, and promissory estoppel could not be invoked against the withdrawal.

Issue (iii): whether the contractual tariff clause bound the respondent to continue the rebate notwithstanding revision of tariff.

Analysis: The agreement itself provided that the consumer would pay electricity charges at the rates enforced from time to time and that revised rates would apply when altered by the supplier. The contract did not freeze the tariff or guarantee permanent continuation of the rebate. In these circumstances, the petitioners could not rely on the contract to prevent revision of tariff in accordance with the statutory power.

Conclusion: The contractual clause did not prevent revision of tariff or entitle the petitioners to insist on continuation of the 33.33% rebate.

Issue (iv): whether the Court could interfere with the State policy and tariff fixed under the regulatory framework.

Analysis: Whether to grant rebate to industries located in a particular area was treated as a policy decision in the fiscal sphere. The revised policy was not shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Further, the licensee could not alter tariff fixed by the regulator, and the Court could not direct the authority to act contrary to the statute or substitute its own view for the policy choice of the State.

Conclusion: No ground was made out for judicial interference with the policy or the tariff structure.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the withdrawal of the hill development rebate failed on merits as no enforceable right to continue the concession survived against the statutory and contractual framework.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory concession granted by notification may be varied or rescinded under the enabling law and the General Clauses Act, and neither promissory estoppel nor contract can compel continuation of the concession contrary to statute or valid policy.

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