Promissory estoppel protected a hill-area electricity rebate until a later statute displaced the concession.

A tariff rebate granted for hill-area industrial units through delegated notifications gave rise to promissory estoppel once investors altered their position by setting up units on that representation. The rebate could not be curtailed before the promised period merely on commercial, fiscal, loss-reduction, theft-control, or higher-cost grounds, as those reasons were insufficient to override the promise in the absence of overwhelming public interest or an express revocation power. However, once the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came into force, the earlier concession could not continue contrary to the later primary statute. The protected benefit therefore operated only until the new statutory regime commenced.

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Issues: (i) whether the power corporation was bound by promissory estoppel to continue the hill-area electricity rebate for the promised period, (ii) whether the rebate could be curtailed on the plea of public interest or on the basis of statutory power under the electricity law, and (iii) whether the concession could survive after the coming into force of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999.

Issue (i): whether the power corporation was bound by promissory estoppel to continue the hill-area electricity rebate for the promised period.

Analysis: The rebate was held out through tariff notifications to induce industrial investment in hill areas, and the consumers altered their position by setting up units on that representation. The subsequent restructuring did not amount to a complete withdrawal in form, but it substantially reduced the promised benefit before the expiry of the assured period. In such circumstances, the equitable principle of promissory estoppel applied against the corporation's attempt to resile from its representation.

Conclusion: The corporation was bound by promissory estoppel, and the rebate could not be curtailed before the protected period expired.

Issue (ii): whether the rebate could be curtailed on the plea of public interest or on the basis of statutory power under the electricity law.

Analysis: The notifications were issued in exercise of delegated power under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The Court distinguished cases where withdrawal of exemption was backed by overriding public interest or by an express statutory power to revoke. On the material placed, the reasons urged, including tariff restructuring, loss reduction, theft concerns, and higher production cost, were treated as insufficient to override the promise made to the industrial units. The Court held that the asserted commercial and fiscal reasons did not amount to the kind of overwhelming public interest required to defeat the estoppel.

Conclusion: The plea of public interest and the statutory argument did not justify withdrawal of the rebate for the earlier period.

Issue (iii): whether the concession could survive after the coming into force of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999.

Analysis: The later enactment was treated as primary legislation and, once it came into force, the earlier concession could not continue contrary to the new statutory regime. The Court therefore limited the benefit to the period before the new Act operated.

Conclusion: The concession survived only until the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came into force.

Final Conclusion: The decision upheld the consumers' entitlement to the promised hill-area rebate for the period prior to the new statutory regime, while recognising that the later legislation displaced the concession thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi: A concession granted by delegated tariff notification, when acted upon by the promisee, cannot be withdrawn before the promised period on the basis of mere commercial or fiscal considerations; it can be curtailed only by overriding public interest or by a later primary statute that displaces the earlier benefit.

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