Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the delay of 71 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal deserved condonation.
1.2 Whether the addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained cash deposit under section 69 read with section 115BBE, arising out of cash deposits during the demonetization period, was sustainable on merits.
1.3 Whether the enhanced rate of tax under section 115BBE (60%) was applicable to the addition made in respect of cash deposits made during the demonetization period, or whether only the earlier/normal rate of 30% was applicable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of delay in filing the appeal
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal considered the assessee's condonation petition and supporting affidavit explaining the 71 days' delay. Having regard to the contents of these documents and the relatively small period of delay, the Tribunal accepted the explanation.
Conclusions: The delay of 71 days in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits.
Issue 2: Sustainaibility of addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs under section 69
Legal framework (as discussed): The assessment was framed under section 144. The Assessing Officer had treated Rs. 3.19 lakhs, out of total cash deposits of Rs. 14.19 lakhs during the demonetization period, as unexplained investment under section 69 and subjected the same to tax under section 115BBE.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted from the assessee's replies before the lower authorities that, out of cash deposits of Rs. 14.19 lakhs, the assessee could not establish the sources of Rs. 3.19 lakhs. The Assessing Officer had already granted benefit for the portion explained as agricultural income and restricted the addition to the unexplained balance. Before the Tribunal, no one appeared on behalf of the assessee and no new material was produced to rebut the concurrent findings of the lower authorities or to substantiate the source of the impugned sum.
Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained under section 69, affirming the findings of the Assessing Officer and the appellate authority on this point.
Issue 3: Applicability of enhanced rate of tax under section 115BBE to demonetization-period deposits
Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal considered section 115BBE and the amendment increasing the rate of tax from 30% to 60% with effect from 01.04.2017. It referred to the judgment of the High Court (Madura Bench) in "S.M.I.L.E. Microfinance Ltd. vs. ACIT (WP (MD) No. 2078 of 2020 dated 19-11-2024)". The High Court had examined the objects and reasons of the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 2016, including the Press Information Bureau note explaining the legislative intent behind the changes introduced in connection with demonetization and the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016.
The High Court, after extracting and analysing the objects and reasons, concluded that:
(a) The amendment to section 115BBE enhancing the rate to 60% was effective from 01.04.2017.
(b) The language of the objects and reasons, including the expression "instead of allowing people to find illegal ways of converting their black money into black again", indicated that the enhanced rate was intended to operate prospectively for future transactions from 01.04.2017 onwards.
(c) Consequently, the revenue was empowered to levy 60% tax only on transactions from 01.04.2017 onwards, and for transactions prior to that cut-off date, only the earlier rate of 30% was applicable.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the cash deposits in question pertained to the demonetization period between 08.11.2016 and 30.12.2016. Relying on and respectfully following the above decision of the High Court, the Tribunal held that the higher rate of 60% under the amended section 115BBE could not be applied to such pre-01.04.2017 transactions. Therefore, the addition sustained under section 69 had to be taxed at the normal/earlier rate of 30% and not at 60%.
Conclusions: While sustaining the quantum addition of Rs. 3.19 lakhs as unexplained, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to apply only the normal rate of tax (30%) under section 115BBE and not the enhanced rate of 60%. The appeal was thus partly allowed to the extent of relief in the applicable tax rate.
Issues: Whether reimbursements made by Indian entities to the foreign assessee towards salary paid to seconded employees were liable to be treated as fees for technical services under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the India-Japan DTAA.
Analysis: The record showed that the seconded personnel entered into separate employment arrangements with the Indian entities, were paid salary by those entities, worked under their control and supervision, and had tax deducted at source on the salary payments. The reimbursements were made at cost without markup. On these facts, the payments retained the character of salary reimbursement and did not acquire the character of consideration for technical services. The treaty definition of fees for technical services also excluded payments to an employee, and the cited judicial authorities supported the view that salary reimbursements to secondees cannot be recharacterised as FTS.
Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee. The reimbursements were not taxable as fees for technical services.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reliance by the Adjudicating Authority on the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 to appoint a liquidator other than the resolution professional recommended by the committee of creditors is legally permissible.
1.2 Whether the resolution professional has a vested right to be appointed as liquidator once recommended by the committee of creditors and having given consent under Section 34(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.3 Whether, after commencement and substantial progress of the liquidation process under a liquidator appointed by the Adjudicating Authority, it is appropriate or necessary to substitute that liquidator with the resolution professional originally recommended by the committee of creditors.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Reliance on IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 for appointment of liquidator
Legal framework (as discussed): The Tribunal referred to its earlier decisions, including the order in Manish Jaju v. CoC and others and the batch of appeals in Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. v. Amit Vijay Karia & another, wherein it was held that the IBBI does not have authority to override the statutory scheme for appointment of a liquidator under Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, and that the Adjudicating Authority has no authority to appoint a resolution professional as liquidator overlooking the choice of the committee of creditors.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Adjudicating Authority "apparently has felt bound" by the IBBI letter dated 18.07.2023 when appointing the second respondent as liquidator, and was "not seen to assert any exclusive authority" to appoint a liquidator superseding the right of the committee of creditors to have its chosen resolution professional function as liquidator. In view of the Tribunal's own prior pronouncements, "the cloud over the appointment of the appellant" arising from the IBBI communication stood removed.
Conclusions: The IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 cannot legally override the statutory scheme under Section 34(4) for appointment of a liquidator, nor can it confer on the Adjudicating Authority a power to disregard the choice of the committee of creditors. The Adjudicating Authority's reliance on the IBBI letter as binding was legally misplaced, though this misstep did not, in the circumstances, require reversal of the ongoing liquidation under the liquidator already in place.
Issue 2 - Vested right of the resolution professional to be appointed as liquidator
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal expressly held that the appellant "does not have any vested right to be appointed as the liquidator." The facts that (i) the committee of creditors had resolved to appoint the appellant as liquidator, (ii) the appellant had given written consent in Form AA under Section 34(1), and (iii) no disciplinary proceedings were pending against him, were all noted. However, these factors did not elevate his claim to a legally enforceable or vested right to the office of liquidator. The Tribunal further observed that the third respondent, having more than 92% voting share, had no objection to the second respondent continuing and was focused only on completion of the liquidation process, thereby underlining that the appellant could not insist on "impos[ing] his wish to act as a liquidator" on the majority creditor.
Conclusions: Recommendation by the committee of creditors and the appellant's consent under Section 34(1) do not confer a vested or enforceable right on the resolution professional to be appointed or to continue as liquidator. The appellant cannot compel appointment merely because he was the prior resolution professional and was recommended by the committee of creditors.
Issue 3 - Appropriateness of changing the liquidator mid-process where substantial steps have been taken and majority creditor supports the incumbent liquidator
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the second respondent, appointed by the Adjudicating Authority, had already made "substantial progress" in the liquidation, including preparation of the liquidation estate, asset memorandum, verification of claims, and initiation of steps for sale of assets. It held that "it may not be appropriate to change the liquidator in the middle of the liquidation process as there will be cost implications," especially when the third respondent, holding more than 92% voting share and thus well above the 66% threshold, was "happy with the second liquidator" and keen only to complete liquidation expeditiously. While reaffirming that the Adjudicating Authority cannot overlook the committee of creditors' choice (as clarified in the Omkara Asset Reconstruction decision), the Tribunal stressed the practical and economic consequences of a mid-stream change, and the fact that the creditor with an overwhelming majority had accepted the incumbent liquidator.
Conclusions: Even though the legal "cloud" created by the IBBI letter over the appellant's appointment stood removed, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to dislodge the second respondent as liquidator at an advanced stage of the liquidation. Considering the substantial progress made, the cost and delay implications of a change, and the explicit support of the majority creditor, the Tribunal declined to replace the current liquidator. The appeal challenging the appointment of the second respondent was held to be without merit and was dismissed without costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether there existed a pre-existing dispute between the parties in respect of the claimed operational debt, warranting rejection of the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.2 Whether the defence raised by the corporate debtor to the operational creditor's claim was a mere "moonshine defence" or a plausible contention within the meaning of the law laid down in relation to Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.3 Whether issues relating to alleged deficiencies in services, non-completion of work and warranty disputes between the parties could be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Existence of pre-existing dispute under Section 9 IBC
(a) Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal referred to Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as "Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited", particularly paragraph 51, regarding the scope of "dispute" and the duty of the adjudicating authority while considering a Section 9 application.
2.2 As per the cited ratio, an application under Section 9 must be rejected if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there exists a record of dispute, and the adjudicating authority is only to see whether there is a plausible contention requiring further investigation and that the dispute is not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or a patently feeble argument.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal examined contemporaneous correspondence from 2017 and 2018, including a letter dated 15.01.2018 and earlier communications dated 10.05.2017, 11.05.2017, 27.05.2017, 20.06.2017, 11.08.2017 and 12.08.2017, wherein the corporate debtor consistently raised concerns about delay, pendency and non-completion of works, resulting in substantial generation losses on a daily basis.
2.4 The Tribunal noted that through various emails in August 2017, the corporate debtor reiterated allegations of substandard quality of goods supplied, defective works and materials, suspension of warranty, abandonment of the project without formal handover, and unresolved critical issues such as faulty inverters, defective system designs and oil leakages.
2.5 The Tribunal then considered the operational creditor's email dated 21.02.2019, in which detailed outstanding amounts were claimed in respect of both projects, and the corporate debtor's immediate reply dated 22.02.2019. In this reply, the corporate debtor clearly stated that the operational creditor had not deducted the losses incurred due to non-completion of works and denial of services under warranty and indicated that it would review and revert.
2.6 The Tribunal held that the reply dated 22.02.2019 showed that the claim of the operational creditor was neither admitted nor acknowledged and that disputes were raised at the relevant time regarding losses, non-completion and warranty issues.
2.7 The Tribunal also noted that the demand notice under Section 8 was issued on 11.07.2022, more than three years after the alleged completion of work, and in the backdrop of an already existing chain of correspondence evidencing dispute.
(c) Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal concluded that there was a clear, pre-existing dispute between the parties regarding the alleged operational debt, relating to non-completion of work, deficiencies, losses and warranty issues.
2.9 Consequently, the statutory requirement for rejection of the Section 9 application, in terms of the existence of a "dispute" under Section 9(5)(i)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, stood satisfied.
Issue 2: Nature of the corporate debtor's defence - whether "moonshine defence"
(a) Legal framework
2.10 Relying on the principles in the Supreme Court's decision in "Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited", the Tribunal reiterated that the adjudicating authority is only required to assess whether there is a plausible contention requiring further investigation, and whether the dispute is not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or a patently feeble legal argument; the merits of the dispute are not to be finally adjudicated at the Section 9 stage.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The operational creditor contended that the corporate debtor's reference to losses and warranty issues in the email dated 22.02.2019 was vague, unsupported by particulars, and hence amounted to a "moonshine defence".
2.12 The Tribunal rejected this contention by placing weight on the entire sequence of contemporaneous emails and letters from 2017 and 2018, which consistently recorded complaints about delay, non-completion, defective work, substandard materials, suspension of warranty and resultant generation losses.
2.13 In view of these contemporaneous documents and the corporate debtor's immediate response to the outstanding claim in February 2019, the Tribunal held that the defence was not merely a belated or concocted assertion but was grounded in existing factual correspondence.
(c) Conclusions
2.14 The Tribunal held that the corporate debtor's defence could not be characterised as a "moonshine defence" or as a patently feeble argument unsupported by evidence.
2.15 Applying the test laid down in Mobilox, the Tribunal concluded that there existed a real and plausible dispute which required further investigation and, therefore, the Section 9 application was liable to be rejected.
Issue 3: Appropriateness of Section 9 IBC proceedings for adjudicating underlying contractual disputes
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 The Tribunal noted that the issues raised by the corporate debtor concerned non-completion of work, deficiencies in services, defective goods and designs, generation losses and disputes over warranty obligations, all arising out of the contractual relationship between the parties.
2.17 The Tribunal observed that these issues involved factual and contractual adjudication which could not appropriately be undertaken within the limited, summary scope of proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
(b) Conclusions
2.18 The Tribunal held that the present matter was not fit for resolution through insolvency proceedings under Section 9 but rather by way of appropriate remedies available under the contract and general law.
2.19 While upholding the rejection of the Section 9 application, the Tribunal clarified that such rejection would not preclude the operational creditor from availing contractual and other legal remedies for recovery of its alleged dues.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, under the statutory scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the authority to select and appoint a liquidator upon commencement of liquidation lies with the committee of creditors or with the Adjudicating Authority.
1.2 How Sections 7, 9, 10, 16, 22, 27 and 34 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, read with Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, allocate roles between the committee of creditors, the Board and the Adjudicating Authority in the appointment or replacement of the interim resolution professional, resolution professional and liquidator.
1.3 Whether the Adjudicating Authority possesses any independent or residual power to appoint or replace a resolution professional or liquidator in situations involving fraud, gross misconduct or collusion between the resolution professional/liquidator and the committee of creditors or stakeholders.
1.4 On the facts of the case, whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in appointing liquidators of its own choice, disregarding the candidate proposed by the committee of creditors, and what directions ought to follow for appointment of the liquidator.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Allocation of authority between CoC and Adjudicating Authority for appointment/replacement of IRP, RP and liquidator under the IBC framework
Legal framework as discussed
2.1 The Court examined the scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code from the stage of appointment of an interim resolution professional, referring specifically to Sections 7(3)(b), 9(4), 10, 16, 22, 27 and 34 of the Code, and to Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.
2.2 Under Sections 7(3)(b), 9(4) and 10, the petitioner (financial creditor, operational creditor or corporate debtor, as the case may be) has the choice to recommend an interim resolution professional. Section 16 governs appointment of the interim resolution professional by the Adjudicating Authority, including cases where no interim resolution professional is proposed (Section 16(3)).
2.3 Section 22 empowers the committee of creditors to (a) confirm the interim resolution professional as resolution professional or (b) replace the interim resolution professional with another resolution professional of its choice, subject to written consent and confirmation by the Board.
2.4 Section 27 enables the committee of creditors to replace the resolution professional at any stage, by forwarding the name of another resolution professional with his written consent to the Adjudicating Authority for appointment, subject to confirmation by the Board; no reasons are required to be furnished for such replacement.
2.5 Section 34(1) provides that, upon passing an order for liquidation, "the resolution professional appointed for the corporate insolvency resolution process ... shall, subject to submission of a written consent ... act as the liquidator ... unless replaced by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (4)." Section 34(4)(c) refers, inter alia, to a situation where "the resolution professional fails to submit written consent under sub-section (1)."
2.6 Regulation 31A(11) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 provides that the consultation committee may, by majority, propose to replace the liquidator and shall apply to the Adjudicating Authority for such replacement after obtaining the written consent of the proposed liquidator.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court drew a distinction between (i) selection of an insolvency professional (IRP/RP/liquidator) and (ii) formal appointment by the Adjudicating Authority. It held that the Code consciously separates the selection process from the act of appointment: selection is entrusted to the petitioning creditor/debtor or the committee of creditors (and in some cases to the Board), while the Adjudicating Authority is confined to making the formal appointment of the person so selected.
2.8 Analysing Sections 7, 9, 10 and 16, the Court observed that the Adjudicating Authority is nowhere given an independent authority to select an interim resolution professional of its own choice. Even when the recommended interim resolution professional faces disciplinary proceedings, the Code mandates dismissal of the petition or recourse to a recommendation from the Board, but does not authorise the Adjudicating Authority to choose an interim resolution professional independently.
2.9 From this scheme, the Court inferred a legislative intent to exclude the Adjudicating Authority from the selection process for the interim resolution professional and to deny it any veto over the petitioner's or the Board's choice, limiting its role to formal appointment of the professional so selected and approved.
2.10 At the next stage, under Section 22, the committee of creditors has the exclusive choice to either retain the interim resolution professional as resolution professional or to replace him with another resolution professional. The requirement of written consent of the proposed resolution professional and confirmation by the Board was characterised as procedural; the Adjudicating Authority neither participates in the selection nor overrides the committee of creditors' decision, save for an interim arrangement where the Board's confirmation is delayed.
2.11 Section 27 continues the same pattern: the committee of creditors alone chooses the replacement resolution professional; the Adjudicating Authority only appoints the professional so chosen, subject to confirmation by the Board. The Code does not require the committee of creditors to provide reasons for replacement, underscoring its primacy in the selection process.
2.12 Turning to Section 34(1) and Section 34(4)(c), the Court rejected the construction that the Adjudicating Authority has an exclusive power to select a liquidator whenever the existing resolution professional does not consent to act as liquidator. The Court emphasised that Section 34(1) merely provides that the resolution professional "shall ... act as the liquidator ... unless replaced by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (4)"; this language confers on the Adjudicating Authority a power of replacement, but not a power of initial selection contrary to the statutory scheme.
2.13 The Court held that "replacement of the resolution professional" in Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) must be understood in light of Section 27: the authority to select the replacement resolution professional (who may then act as liquidator) rests with the committee of creditors, while the Adjudicating Authority's role remains to formally appoint the person so selected after Board confirmation.
2.14 Any interpretation that would allow the Adjudicating Authority, in the specific situation where the existing resolution professional refuses consent to act as liquidator, to appoint a liquidator of its own choice, was considered anomalous and inconsistent with the broader legislative design which, at all other stages, denies the Adjudicating Authority an independent selecting role.
2.15 The Court accordingly read Section 34 harmoniously with Sections 22 and 27, holding that the Code does not carve out an exception at the liquidation stage to confer upon the Adjudicating Authority an overarching power to choose a liquidator in preference to the committee of creditors' nominee.
Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.16 The authority to select and propose the person who will act as liquidator upon liquidation lies with the committee of creditors (by application of Section 27 procedures), and not with the Adjudicating Authority.
2.17 The Adjudicating Authority's power under Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) is confined to formally replacing and appointing the resolution professional/liquidator chosen in accordance with the statutory procedure; it does not include an independent power to select a liquidator of its own choice.
2.18 Regulation 31A(11) reinforces the position that stakeholder bodies (consultation committee/CoC) may propose replacement of a liquidator and that the Adjudicating Authority acts on such proposal; it does not vest any original power of selection in the Adjudicating Authority.
Issue 3: Residual or inherent power of Adjudicating Authority in cases of fraud, misconduct or collusion
Legal framework as discussed
3.1 The Court did not identify an express Code provision authorising the Adjudicating Authority to independently select a resolution professional or liquidator in situations of fraud or collusion. However, it considered the general principles flowing from the constitutional role of judicial fora and referred incidentally to Rule 11 of the NCLT and NCLAT Rules as reflecting inherent powers.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.2 The Court recognised that the IBC assigns a minimal and largely formal role to the Adjudicating Authority in the selection and appointment of insolvency professionals, but held that this does not denude the tribunal of its core judicial function to prevent abuse of process and "fraud on the statute."
3.3 It identified a "solitary circumstance" where the Adjudicating Authority may have to act independently of the committee of creditors or the stakeholders' consultation committee: where it has reason to believe, on the basis of tangible and incontrovertible facts, that the resolution professional or liquidator has committed gross misconduct, in connivance or collusion with the committee of creditors or consultation committee, thereby compromising the integrity of the resolution or liquidation process.
3.4 In such a scenario, the Court reasoned that it would be futile and contrary to the public interest for the Adjudicating Authority to rely on the same compromised bodies (CoC/SCC) to propose replacement, since their collusion is part of the mischief. To insist on their initiative would, in effect, compel the tribunal to remain a "mute spectator" to a fraud on the statute.
3.5 Drawing on constitutional and jurisprudential principles, and illustrative dicta from other jurisdictions and contexts, the Court affirmed that no judicial forum can justifiably abdicate its duty to intervene where procedural actors subvert statutory purpose through collusion or misconduct. The power to arrest statutory frauds is inherent in the judicial system and does not depend on express statutory conferment.
Conclusions on Issue 3
3.6 As a rule, the Adjudicating Authority has no original role in selecting a resolution professional or liquidator and must respect the choices made by the committee of creditors and confirmed by the Board, appointing them in terms of the Code.
3.7 Exceptionally, where there is credible and incontrovertible material of gross misconduct or fraud by the resolution professional or liquidator in collusion with the committee of creditors or consultation committee, the Adjudicating Authority may, in exercise of its inherent judicial powers, intervene independently to seek or effect replacement to safeguard the integrity of the process.
3.8 This exceptional power does not dilute the general statutory scheme; it operates only to prevent fraud on the statute and preserve public confidence in the insolvency framework.
Issue 4: Validity of the Adjudicating Authority's appointment of its own liquidators in the present case and consequential directions
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 On the facts, the committee of creditors in both matters had resolved that the corporate debtor be liquidated and had proposed a particular entity as liquidator, which was not the then acting resolution professional.
4.2 The Adjudicating Authority nevertheless appointed, as liquidator, a different person (the second respondent in each appeal), who was neither the resolution professional appointed during the corporate insolvency resolution process nor the candidate chosen by the committee of creditors.
4.3 The liquidators appointed by the Adjudicating Authority argued that because the existing resolution professionals had not given written consent to act as liquidators under Section 34(1), the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive authority to appoint replacements under Section 34(4)(c), and that neither the committee of creditors nor the stakeholders' consultation committee had any role in appointing a liquidator.
4.4 Applying its interpretation of Sections 27 and 34, the Court rejected this contention. It held that even where the existing resolution professional does not consent to act as liquidator, the selection of a replacement resolution professional (who will function as liquidator) remains with the committee of creditors; the Adjudicating Authority cannot bypass the committee's choice and unilaterally appoint a liquidator of its own preference.
4.5 The Court noted the appellant's explanation that the committee of creditors had initially chosen a person other than the then resolution professional as liquidator in the backdrop of an IBBI circular dated 18.07.2023, which required that the resolution professional and liquidator not be the same. Subsequent to the Tribunal's decision in another matter holding that the IBBI could not override Section 34 by such a circular, the basis for insisting on a different liquidator no longer persisted.
4.6 Although the minutes of the meetings in which the resolution professional was replaced did not explicitly record the IBBI circular or the unwillingness of the erstwhile resolution professional, the Court held that this omission did not bar it from recognising the committee of creditors' present choice of liquidator. It reiterated that the right to replace, for the purposes of Section 34(1), lies with the committee of creditors and that the procedure under Section 27 must be followed.
4.7 The Court clarified that the entity chosen by the committee of creditors as liquidator must first be appointed (or recognised) as resolution professional in the manner contemplated by Section 27 and its nomination confirmed by the Board. Upon such confirmation, that entity would then, under Section 34(1), act as liquidator, and the Adjudicating Authority would be obliged to appoint it as such.
Conclusions on Issue 4
4.8 The Adjudicating Authority acted beyond its jurisdiction in appointing liquidators of its own choice and in disregarding the candidate nominated by the committee of creditors; it misapplied Section 34(1) read with Section 34(4)(c) by treating itself as the primary selecting authority for the liquidator.
4.9 The authority to select the replacement resolution professional, who would then act as liquidator under Section 34(1), rests with the committee of creditors, and the Adjudicating Authority's role is limited to formal appointment of that person after confirmation by the Board.
4.10 The orders of the Adjudicating Authority appointing its own nominees as liquidators stand set aside. Upon confirmation by the Board of the entity chosen by the committee of creditors, the Adjudicating Authority is required to appoint that entity as the liquidator in accordance with the Code.
Issues: Whether cement cleared in 50 kg bags for captive consumption to contractors within the factory premises was liable to valuation under section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 on the basis that the packages required affixation of retail sale price, or under section 4(1)(b) of that Act read with rule 8 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the nature of the clearances and the applicable valuation provision. The clearances were made for self-consumption within the factory premises and were invoiced as such. The earlier proceedings between the parties had already determined that such clearances did not attract section 4A valuation because the packages were not intended for retail sale. That view had also been accepted in the prior Tribunal order, which followed the reasoning that the packaged commodities rules requiring retail sale price marking apply only where the packages are intended for retail sale. The earlier decision in the appellant's own case had held that valuation in such circumstances falls under section 4(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with rule 8 of the 2000 Valuation Rules. The Commissioner (Appeals) in the present matter failed to follow that binding and directly relevant determination.
Conclusion: The valuation of cement cleared for captive consumption in 50 kg bags was not governed by section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 but by section 4(1)(b) read with rule 8 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000, and the demand was unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Goods cleared for captive consumption and not intended for retail sale are not subject to section 4A valuation on the basis of retail sale price, and must be assessed under section 4(1)(b) read with the prescribed cost-based valuation rules.
Issues: Whether a High Court, after declining to quash an FIR in a writ petition, may grant blanket protection from arrest to the accused until submission of the police report.
Analysis: The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may exceptionally be used to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse of process, but it cannot routinely substitute proceedings for anticipatory bail. Where statutory pre-arrest bail is available, the accused must pursue the appropriate remedy before the competent Sessions Court. A blanket no-arrest direction during investigation, after finding no case for quashing the FIR, is impermissible and prejudicial to a lawful investigation.
Conclusion: Blanket protection from arrest pending completion of investigation cannot be granted while refusing to quash the FIR.
Issues: Whether a breach of Section 13(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 results in loss of exemption under Section 11 for the trust's entire income or only the income attributable to the non-conforming investment.
Analysis: The proviso to Section 164(2), read with Section 13(1)(d) and Circular No. 387, distinguishes initial eligibility for exemption from its forfeiture following a statutory breach. It confines application of the maximum marginal rate to income that forfeits exemption on account of the breach, rather than all trust income.
Conclusion: A breach of Section 13(1)(d) attracts the maximum marginal rate only on the non-conforming portion of income; exemption under Section 11 is not denied for the entire income. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to submit a fresh representation for amendment of the Bill of Entry, and the respondent was directed to consider it on merits in accordance with law.
Outcome: The petition was disposed of in terms of the earlier order, with a direction to deposit the amount under the statutory pre-deposit provision and pursue the appeal after constitution of the Tribunal.
Issues: Whether the assessment framed under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid in the absence of a satisfaction note expressly recording that the seized material had a bearing on the total income of the other person.
Analysis: For invoking section 153C, the recorded satisfaction must clearly show that the seized documents or material belong to, pertain to, or relate to the other person and that such material has a bearing on the determination of that person's total income. The satisfaction note relied upon did not expressly record this statutory requirement. The Tribunal treated this omission as a substantive legal infirmity rather than a curable technical lapse and held that the initiation of proceedings under section 153C was not supported by a valid satisfaction. The defect went to the root of jurisdiction and vitiated the assessment.
Conclusion: The section 153C assessment was held invalid and unsustainable; the assessee succeeded and the Revenue failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A satisfaction note under section 153C must expressly demonstrate the statutory nexus between the seized material and the determination of the other person's total income, failing which the resulting assessment is vitiated for want of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2015-16 by finding that the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the shareholders were established, and whether a substantial question of law arises for the High Court's consideration.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined and re-appreciated documentary evidence including income-tax returns, certificates of incorporation, final accounts and bank statements of the shareholder companies, and compared the shareholders' net worth with their investments in the assessee company. The Tribunal recorded that share applications were made by account payee cheques and that the shareholders were income-tax assessees; a table of net-worth vis-a -vis investment was placed on record. The High Court reviewed the assessment order, appellate order and the Tribunal's order and found that the factual materials relevant to identity, genuineness and creditworthiness were considered by the Tribunal and were available to the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion: No substantial question of law arises; the appeal by the revenue is dismissed, leaving the Tribunal's deletion of the addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 intact in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Classification of Badla / imitation jari / metallic yarn manufactured from micro-slitting of plain polyester film, metallised polyester film or metallised & lacquered film under Heading 5605 of the Customs Tariff.
1.2 Applicable GST rate and time-period for supplies of such imitation zari thread or yarn in light of Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate), Notification No. 9/2023-CT (Rate), Circular No. 205/17/2023-GST and Notification No. 9/2025-CT (Rate).
1.3 Maintainability of certain questions on distinction between "metalized yarn" and "metallic yarn", refund eligibility, and alternate classification attracting 12% GST, within the scope of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Classification of Badla / imitation jari / metallic yarn under Heading 5605
(a) Legal framework discussed
2.1 The Court examined Heading 56.05 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and its HSN Explanatory Notes describing "metallised yarn, whether or not gimped, being textile yarn, or strip or the like of heading 54.04 or 54.05, combined with metal in the form of thread, strip or powder or covered with metal", including products consisting of a core of plastic film coated with metal dust and sandwiched between plastic films.
2.2 The specific tariff lines under Heading 5605 were noted:
(i) 5605 00 10 - Real zari thread (gold) and silver thread combined with textile thread.
(ii) 5605 00 20 - Imitation zari thread.
(iii) 5605 00 90 - Other.
2.3 Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate), Sr. No. 137 (Schedule II) was considered, covering "Metallised yarn ... such as Real zari thread ... Imitation zari thread" at 12% GST.
2.4 Notification No. 9/2023-CT (Rate) inserting Entry 218AA in Schedule I was examined, specifying tariff item 56050020 as "Imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance" at 5%, and simultaneously amending Sr. No. 137 so as to exclude real zari and imitation zari thread or yarn therefrom.
2.5 Circular No. 205/17/2023-GST dated 31.10.2023 was relied on, clarifying that imitation zari thread or yarn made from metallised polyester film/plastic film falling under HS 5605 are covered by Sl. No. 218AA of Schedule I (5% GST).
2.6 The Court also referred to the minutes of the 15th and 52nd GST Council Meetings, which recorded that:
(i) Embroidery or zari articles like imi, zari, kasab, saima, dabka, chumki, gota, sitara, naqsi, kora, glass beads, badla, gizal are to be taxed at 5%.
(ii) Imitation zari thread or yarn made from metallised polyester film/plastic film is covered by Heading 5605 and leviable to 5% GST.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court differentiated three broad categories in trade: real zari, imitation zari and metallic zari. Metallic zari was found to be made of slitted polyester metallised film and is the prevalent, lighter, cheaper and more durable form, used in place of traditional real or imitation (copper-based) zari.
2.8 On a conjoint reading of:
(i) Heading 5605 and its explanatory notes;
(ii) The structure of tariff sub-headings 5605 00 10, 5605 00 20 and 5605 00 90;
(iii) Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate) and its amendment by Notification No. 9/2023-CT (Rate);
(iv) Circular No. 205/17/2023-GST; and
(v) The GST Council minutes dealing with zari and imitation zari;
the Court concluded that metallic zari thread or yarn made from metallised polyester film/plastic film is nothing but imitation zari thread or yarn for tariff and GST purposes.
2.9 The Court noted that Entry 218AA specifically ties "Imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance" to tariff item 56050020. Having regard to the trade parlance names (including badla, kasab, etc.) and the Council's intention to cover imitation zari made from metallised polyester/plastic film, the Court held that the subject goods fall within 5605 00 20.
2.10 The Court explicitly found that the supply of Badla / Imitation Jari / Metallic Yarn made from micro-slitting of plain polyester film, metallised polyester film or metallised & lacquered film is classifiable as "Imitation zari thread" under tariff item 5605 00 20 and not under the residual 5605 00 90.
(c) Conclusion on Issue 1
2.11 The Court held that the supply of Badla / Imitation Jari / Metallic Yarn made from micro-slitting of plain polyester film, metallised polyester film or metallised & lacquered film falls under HSN 5605 00 20 as imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance.
Issue 2 - Applicable GST rate and time-period for such goods
(a) Legal framework discussed
2.12 The Court analysed the rate structure under Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate) and its amendment:
(i) Prior to 26.07.2023, Sr. No. 137 of Schedule II covered "Metallised yarn ... such as Real zari thread ... Imitation zari thread" at 12% GST.
(ii) Notification No. 9/2023-CT (Rate) dated 26.07.2023:
* Inserted Sr. No. 218AA in Schedule I specifying 56050020 - "Imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance" at 2.5% CGST (i.e., 5% total GST);
* Amended Sr. No. 137 in Schedule II to expressly exclude: (i) real zari thread (gold) and silver thread combined with textile thread and (ii) imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance.
2.13 Circular No. 205/17/2023-GST clarified that imitation zari thread or yarn made from metallised polyester film/plastic film falling under HS 5605 is covered under Sl. No. 218AA attracting 5% GST, and that no refund would be permitted on polyester film (metallised)/plastic film on account of inverted duty.
2.14 The Court further noted that Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate) has been superseded by Notification No. 9/2025-CT (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, effective from 22.09.2025, wherein "Metallised yarn ... including real zari thread (gold) and silver thread combined with textile thread, imitation zari thread or yarn known by any name in trade parlance" is placed at Sr. No. 353 of Schedule I, attracting 5% GST.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 Having held that the goods are classifiable under 5605 00 20 as imitation zari thread or yarn, the Court applied Entry 218AA to such goods for the relevant period under Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate).
2.16 For the period after the supersession of Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate), the Court noted that Notification No. 9/2025-CT (Rate) continues to place metallised yarn including imitation zari thread or yarn in Schedule I at 5%, thereby preserving the concessional rate for the same goods from 22.09.2025 onwards.
(c) Conclusions on Issue 2
2.17 For supplies of Badla / Imitation Jari / Metallic Yarn classifiable under 5605 00 20, the Court held:
(i) GST rate is 5% (Schedule I, Sr. No. 218AA of Notification No. 1/2017-CT (Rate) as amended by Notification No. 9/2023-CT (Rate)) for the period from 27.07.2023 to 21.09.2025; and
(ii) GST rate continues to be 5% (Schedule I, Sr. No. 353 of Notification No. 9/2025-CT (Rate)) with effect from 22.09.2025.
Issue 3 - Maintainability and scope under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act
(a) Legal framework discussed
2.18 Section 97(1) and 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 were reproduced, listing the permissible questions on which advance ruling can be sought, namely: classification of goods/services, applicability of notifications, determination of time and value of supply, admissibility of input tax credit, determination of liability to pay tax, requirement of registration, and whether a particular activity amounts to supply.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.19 The Court examined each of the applicant's questions against the scope of Section 97(2) and concluded:
(i) The general question as to whether any significant difference exists between "Metalized Yarn" and "Metallic Yarn" and what their classification would be, as posed, did not fall within the specific heads enumerated in Section 97(2), and therefore was not required to be answered.
(ii) Questions seeking rulings on eligibility for refund of input tax on inputs such as polyester yarn, lacquered film, chemicals, packing material and coal, and questions contingent on an alternate classification (5605 00 90, 12% GST) were outside the scope of Section 97(2), which does not include adjudication on refund entitlement.
(iii) Once classification under 5605 00 20 and the applicable rate of 5% were determined, the question premised on classification under 5605 00 90 and liability to 12% GST became infructuous.
(c) Conclusions on Issue 3
2.20 The Court held:
(i) The question relating to distinction between "Metalized Yarn" and "Metallic Yarn" and their classification, as framed, was not answered as it did not fall within the ambit of Section 97(2).
(ii) Questions seeking advance ruling on refund of input tax credit on various inputs were not answered as they do not fall within any clause of Section 97(2).
(iii) The question presupposing classification under 5605 00 90 and application of 12% GST was rendered infructuous in view of the finding that the goods fall under 5605 00 20 at 5% GST.
Issues: Whether imitation zari thread or yarn made from plastic film or lacquered coated polyester film with aluminium metal is classifiable under HSN 56050020 and liable to GST at 5%.
Analysis: The applicable tariff entry and GST notifications, read with the explanatory notes and the GST Council clarification, show that metallised yarn or imitation zari thread known by any name in trade parlance, including products made from metallised polyester film or plastic film, falls within heading 5605. After the 2023 amendment, such goods were carved out of the higher-rate entry and placed in the 5% entry. The later notification effective from 22.09.2025 also continues the same treatment for imitation zari thread or yarn in trade parlance.
Conclusion: The product is classifiable under HSN 56050020 and is leviable to GST at 5% from 27.07.2023 to 21.09.2025 and thereafter under the corresponding 5% entry effective from 22.09.2025.
Ratio Decidendi: Imitation zari thread or yarn made from metallised polyester film or plastic film, when understood in trade parlance and supported by the tariff notes and GST clarification, is to be classified as metallised yarn under heading 5605 and taxed at the applicable 5% rate.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether notice issued under section 153A of the Income-tax Act to an assessee who was in judicial custody, without following the mode of service prescribed for persons confined in prison, constituted valid service so as to confer jurisdiction for assessment.
1.2 Whether the approval granted under section 153D of the Income-tax Act was vitiated for being mechanical and treated as a mere administrative formality, particularly when granted for multiple assessees and years in one day, and whether such approval requires independent judicial application of mind.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of service of notice under section 153A on assessee in judicial custody
Legal framework
2.1 The Court noted that section 131 of the Income-tax Act vests tax authorities with powers of a Civil Court in respect of summons, and section 282(b) provides that service of a notice, summons, requisition, order or any other communication under the Act may be made by delivering or transmitting a copy thereof to the person named in such manner as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
2.2 Order V Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, stipulates that when a defendant is confined in a prison, the summons should be delivered or sent to the officer in charge of the prison, who is then responsible for serving the summons on the defendant.
2.3 The Court relied on a decision of a High Court holding that where information is received that an assessee to whom notice has to be served is in judicial custody, an appropriate order should be passed requiring service of notice through the Superintendent of the concerned jail, and that mere appearance of staff or other persons cannot substitute such service.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 It was undisputed that at the time when notice under section 153A was issued and purportedly served, the assessee was in judicial custody and that the Assessing Officer had been informed of this position by the assessee's spouse.
2.5 The Court held that, in view of section 282(b), service of notice in such a situation must conform to the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure for persons confined in prison, i.e., by service through the officer in charge of the prison under Order V Rule 24.
2.6 The contention of the Revenue that there is no specific procedure in the Income-tax Act requiring compliance with Order V Rule 24, and that representation by the assessee's wife cured any defect, was rejected in light of the statutory reference in section 282(b) to the Code of Civil Procedure and the strict interpretation of service provisions adopted by the referenced High Court.
2.7 The Court emphasized that a person in judicial custody is deprived of many constitutional rights and that tax authorities, once informed of such custody, are legally obliged to ensure proper service through the Superintendent of the jail. Failure to do so is a fatal defect and cannot be cured by the mere participation or representation of relatives or others.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court held that notice under section 153A was not validly served on the assessee while in judicial custody, as the mandated mode of service via the prison authorities was not followed.
2.9 Consequently, the assumption of jurisdiction under section 153A was invalid, and the entire assessment proceedings were liable to be quashed. Ground No. 2 was sustained.
Issue 2: Validity and nature of approval under section 153D and requirement of application of mind
Legal framework
2.10 The Court noted that, in search cases, where the Assessing Officer is below the rank of Joint Commissioner, section 153D requires that no order of assessment or reassessment under sections 153A or 153C shall be passed by such Assessing Officer except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner/Addl. Commissioner.
2.11 It was observed that the approving authority is required, in law, to consider all search material including incriminating material, seized documents, appraisal report, enquiries made by the Investigation Wing, enquiries made by the Assessing Officer, and the replies of the assessee, and, after due application of mind, to grant approval to the draft assessment order.
2.12 The Court referred to a High Court judgment which held that different income-tax authorities under section 116 are distinct and must exercise their powers independently; that consultation by the Assessing Officer with superior officers in the course of quasi-judicial functions may vitiate the independent exercise of discretion; and that an order passed under the influence or directions of superior officers is vitiated.
2.13 The Court also relied on a Third Member decision of the Tribunal holding that approval under section 153D is not a mere administrative approval; it can be examined for want of application of mind; and if found mechanical, it cannot be sustained in law.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The First Appellate Authority had treated it as a standard practice that the Addl. CIT remained associated with the Assessing Officer throughout the assessment process, including approving the draft questionnaire, and concluded that approval under section 153D given on a single day in multiple cases did not indicate non-application of mind.
2.15 The Court disagreed with the approach that continuous association of the approving authority with the assessment process converts approval under section 153D into a mere administrative or supervisory formality. It held that such reasoning undermines the legislative purpose of requiring a distinct and independent approval at the stage of the draft assessment order.
2.16 On facts, the Court noted that the draft assessment order was prepared on 28.12.2018; approval under section 153D was granted on 29.12.2018; and the final assessment order was also passed on 29.12.2018. The approval letter showed that approval was granted in 23 cases, including multiple assessment years, on the same day.
2.17 The Court held that it was practically impossible to properly examine 23 draft assessment orders in a single day so as to ensure meaningful scrutiny of search materials, seized documents, appraisal reports, and assessment records for each case. The only way to justify such approval would be to treat it as an empty formality, which is contrary to the statutory scheme.
2.18 The Court emphasized that the purpose of section 153D is twofold: (i) to protect the assessee against undue or irrelevant additions and disallowances by ensuring that a senior officer independently reviews whether proper enquiries and investigations have been conducted on relevant material; and (ii) to safeguard the interest of the Revenue by ensuring the assessment is properly framed on the basis of available material.
2.19 The Court stressed that the word "each" in sections 153A and 153D must be given effective meaning, mandating case-wise, year-wise independent consideration by the approving authority, and that "approval" requires cognizance of the whole assessment record and independent application of mind.
2.20 The Revenue's reliance on a Coordinate Bench decision treating approval under section 153D as administrative was rejected. The Court held that such view was rendered in ignorance of the binding High Court judgment and the binding Third Member decision and, therefore, was per incuriam and could not be relied upon to dilute the quasi-judicial nature of section 153D approval.
2.21 The Court further observed that the very casualness in assumption of jurisdiction under section 153A (invalid service on a person in judicial custody) reflected on how casually the approval under section 153D was also granted.
Conclusions
2.22 The Court held that approval under section 153D is not a mere administrative formality but a substantive safeguard requiring independent judicial application of mind by the approving authority to each case and each assessment year.
2.23 In the present case, the approval under section 153D, having been granted for multiple assessees and multiple years on a single day, without demonstrable independent consideration of each draft order and search material, was held to be not in accordance with law and hence vitiated.
2.24 Ground No. 3 was sustained, and, as a consequence of allowing both Ground Nos. 2 and 3, the assessments stood quashed and the assessee's appeals were allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, having regard to Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the nature of offences alleged under Section 132 of the Goods and Services Tax laws, the applicant was entitled to grant of bail.
1.2 Whether the stage of investigation, nature of evidence, and conduct and background of the applicant required continued custodial detention to prevent absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses.
1.3 What conditions, if any, were necessary and sufficient to secure the applicant's presence and protect the integrity of the investigation while granting bail.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to bail under Section 480 BNSS, 2023 in respect of alleged offences under GST law
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The application was moved for bail under Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in connection with an offence registered under Section 132 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the power to prosecute being described as ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect Goods and Services Tax.
2.2 The Court referred to and considered the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in a recent decision concerning grant of bail in similar economic offence context, and applied those guiding principles to the facts of the case.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the allegations of fraudulent availment and passing of ineligible Input Tax Credit (ITC) involving large amounts were "very serious".
2.4 However, it was undisputed that the case was primarily based on documentary evidence and that the GST officers had already conducted searches of the business premises, seized necessary documents, and recorded the statements of the applicant and other witnesses.
2.5 The Court observed that the applicant had been in custody since his arrest, had responded to the summons of the GST officers, had appeared for recording his statement, and had expressed willingness through pursis to cooperate further with the investigation.
2.6 It was noted that there were no criminal antecedents against the applicant, that the offences under the GST enactments are, subject to certain restrictions, compoundable, that the offence in question is triable by the Court itself, and that directors of other related companies whose statements were recorded in the same matter had already been released on bail.
Conclusions
2.7 Balancing the seriousness of the allegations with the completion of essential investigative steps, the documentary nature of the evidence, the absence of criminal antecedents, the applicant's cooperation, and parity with similarly placed persons, the Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail under Section 480 BNSS, 2023, subject to appropriate conditions.
Issue 2: Necessity of continued custodial detention in light of investigation status, risk of absconding, and possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.8 The Court set out that while dealing with a bail application, it must examine whether, if released, the accused is likely to tamper with the course of further investigation, tamper with evidence, intimidate or influence witnesses, or abscond, and whether the physical presence of the accused is necessary for further investigation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The respondent contended that the investigation was at a crucial stage, that the applicant had allegedly orchestrated a web of fake transactions, and that if released he might abscond or tamper with evidence.
2.10 The Court found that the respondent had already had sufficient opportunity to interrogate the accused; the statements were recorded and the relevant documentary material had been collected and seized from the applicant's possession.
2.11 On the materials placed, the Court considered that the further investigation is primarily in the hands of the Department and would take time, and that the physical presence of the applicant in custody did not appear to be necessary for the continuation of such investigation.
2.12 The Court held that concerns regarding tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses, or fleeing from justice could be effectively addressed by imposing stringent conditions on the grant of bail.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court concluded that continued custodial detention of the applicant was not necessary for the purposes of investigation or to prevent tampering with evidence or absconding, and that the apprehensions of the respondent could be mitigated by appropriate bail conditions.
Issue 3: Appropriateness and sufficiency of conditions to be imposed while granting bail
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 Having held the applicant entitled to bail, the Court turned to the question of conditions to ensure his availability for investigation and trial and to secure against misuse of liberty.
2.15 The Court considered it necessary to impose financial conditions (personal bond and sureties, with provisional cash bail), restrictions on movement (surrender of passport, permission required for foreign travel), and obligations of cooperation (appearance before the authorities when called, non-tampering with evidence and witnesses).
2.16 The Court also directed the applicant to furnish his residential and contact details, as well as the contact details of two nearest relatives with their consent, to enable the authorities and the Court to secure his presence if he failed to appear.
Conclusions
2.17 The Court determined that imposing conditions relating to bond and sureties, provisional cash bail, cooperation with investigation, non-tampering, surrender and regulated use of passport, mandatory presence on intimation, and provision of verified contact details of the applicant and his relatives would be sufficient to balance the interests of investigation and administration of justice with the applicant's right to liberty, and accordingly allowed the bail application on those terms.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, having regard to Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, bail should be granted in a prosecution under Section 132 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
1.2 Whether the stage and nature of investigation, including the primarily documentary character of the case and completion of key investigative steps, justified continued custodial detention of the applicant.
1.3 Whether there existed a real likelihood of the applicant absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses so as to warrant denial of bail.
1.4 Whether the ancillary and compoundable nature of offences under the GST law, absence of criminal antecedents, and parity with other similarly placed accused favoured grant of bail subject to conditions.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Grant of bail under Section 480 BNSS, 2023 in a prosecution under Section 132 of the GST Act
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court considered the bail application under Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in the context of allegations of fraudulent availment and passing of ineligible input tax credit under Section 132 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2.2 The Court noted that, though the allegations of wrongful availment and passing of ineligible ITC involving substantial amounts were "very serious", the assessment for bail had to be guided by the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the relied-upon decision, and not by the gravity of the accusation alone.
2.3 The Court evaluated the period of custody (since 11.11.2025), the stage of investigation, and the nature of the evidence, in light of those guidelines and the statutory discretion under Section 480 BNSS.
Conclusions
2.4 Despite the seriousness of the alleged offence under Section 132 of the GST Act, the Court held that the circumstances of the case, viewed in light of the applicable bail parameters, justified grant of bail with stringent conditions.
Issue 2: Necessity of continued custody in light of the nature and stage of investigation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5 The Court found that the case is "mainly based on documentary evidence" and that the GST authorities had already conducted search of the business premises and seized the necessary documents.
2.6 The Court observed that the statement of the applicant and other witnesses "seems to be completed", and that the respondent had "already collected the documentary evidence from the possession of accused".
2.7 It was noted that the applicant had duly responded to summons, appeared before the officers, and given statements, and that there was "sufficient opportunity" with the respondent to interrogate the accused while in custody.
2.8 The Court observed that investigation in respect of GST transactions for the specified period is ongoing and may take time, but held that the "physical presence of accused/applicant is not seems to be necessary for conducting investigation" further.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court concluded that custodial interrogation was already completed, key documentary evidence had been collected, and, in these circumstances, further detention was not necessary for purposes of investigation.
Issue 3: Risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses
Legal framework as discussed
2.10 The Court expressly stated that, while dealing with a bail application, it must consider whether the accused, if not restricted, is likely to tamper with the course of further investigation, tamper with evidence, or intimidate or influence witnesses, and whether presence of the accused is necessary for further investigation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The respondent expressed apprehension that release on bail could lead to absconding or tampering with evidence, but no prior criminal antecedents of the applicant were shown on record.
2.12 The Court recorded that the applicant is a permanent resident, had appeared in response to summons, had co-operated in the investigation so far, and, through a written pursis, assured continued co-operation.
2.13 The Court held that given these factors and the completion of seizure and recording of statements, the risk of tampering with evidence or fleeing from justice could be adequately addressed through "stringent conditions".
Conclusions
2.14 The Court concluded that there was no demonstrated necessity to keep the applicant behind bars to prevent tampering or absconding, and that appropriate conditions (including bond, sureties, co-operation with investigation, travel restrictions, and contact details) would sufficiently mitigate any such risk.
Issue 4: Effect of the nature of GST offences, absence of antecedents, and parity with similarly placed accused
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The Court recorded that the "power to prosecute the tax payer under GST Act are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect Goods and Services Tax", indicating that prosecution is a means to secure compliance with tax collection.
2.16 It was noted that the offences under the GST Acts, "subject to certain restrictions", are of a compoundable nature and that the offence in question is triable by the Magistrate's Court.
2.17 The Court took into account that no criminal antecedents were shown against the applicant and that directors of other related companies, whose statements were recorded in the same crime, "are already released on bail", thereby invoking parity in treatment.
2.18 Personal circumstances, including the applicant being a permanent resident and a single mother, and her expressed readiness to co-operate, were also noticed as part of the overall assessment.
Conclusions
2.19 The Court held that, viewed cumulatively-the ancillary and compoundable nature of the GST offence, absence of criminal antecedents, the applicant's co-operation, and parity with other similarly placed accused-the applicant was entitled to bail.
2.20 Bail was accordingly granted subject to conditions including execution of bond with sureties or provisional cash bail, non-tampering with evidence or witnesses, co-operation with investigation, appearance as and when called, surrender and regulated use of passport, restrictions on foreign travel without court permission, and disclosure and non-change of residential and contact details (including details of two nearest relatives) without prior intimation.
Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed merely because columns 7 and 8 of Form 38 were left blank during transit of goods.
Analysis: The incomplete entries in Form 38, without more, did not warrant an adverse inference against the dealer. The established decisions on the issue governed the matter.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 54(1)(14) could not be sustained solely on account of the unfilled columns in Form 38; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Issues: (i) Whether the settlement application satisfied the requirement of full and true disclosure under Section 245C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in relation to the disclosed sum of Rs. 80 crores for AY 2017-18; (ii) Whether, after finding absence of full and true disclosure, the Settlement Commission could treat the disclosed amount under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and apply Section 115BBE(1) instead of rejecting the application.
Issue (i): Whether the settlement application satisfied the requirement of full and true disclosure under Section 245C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in relation to the disclosed sum of Rs. 80 crores for AY 2017-18.
Analysis: Section 245C(1) requires disclosure of undisclosed income, the manner in which such income has been derived, and the additional tax payable. The application was accepted only to the extent of the refinery-loss disclosure of Rs. 70.66 crores, but the separate disclosure of Rs. 80 crores as stock-in-trade/business income was unsupported by documentary material. The disclosed stock was stated to relate to a period prior to AY 2011-12, yet no particulars were furnished identifying the years, source, or evidentiary basis for treating it as business stock. In settlement proceedings, full and true disclosure applies to the application as a whole; a partial truthful disclosure does not satisfy the statutory standard if another material part remains unsubstantiated or incorrectly stated. The statutory obligation extends to furnishing sufficient particulars regarding the manner of derivation of the income corresponding to the disclosure made in the application.
Conclusion: The settlement application did not satisfy the requirement of full and true disclosure under Section 245C(1) in respect of the Rs. 80 crores disclosure; this issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether, after finding absence of full and true disclosure, the Settlement Commission could treat the disclosed amount under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and apply Section 115BBE(1) instead of rejecting the application.
Analysis: The settlement mechanism proceeds on the assessee's own disclosure and does not permit the Settlement Commission to recast the head or character of the income once the application is found to be lacking in full and true disclosure. Where the assessee presented the disputed amount as business income taxable at the normal rate, the Commission's role was confined to deciding whether that disclosure met the statutory threshold. Once that threshold failed, the application became liable to rejection in entirety, and the further exercise of classifying the amount as unexplained investment under Section 69B and subjecting it to Section 115BBE(1) lay within the domain of the Assessing Officer in regular assessment proceedings under Section 153A, not within the Settlement Commission's jurisdiction after rejection.
Conclusion: Upon finding absence of full and true disclosure, the Settlement Commission had no power to reclassify the amount under Section 69B or apply Section 115BBE(1); the only permissible course was rejection of the settlement application in entirety. This issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The rejection of the settlement application was sustained because the statutory precondition of a complete and truthful settlement disclosure was not met, and the disputed tax treatment of the Rs. 80 crores amount was left to be examined, if necessary, in regular assessment proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 245C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a settlement application must contain a complete and truthful disclosure of undisclosed income together with a proper disclosure of the manner of its derivation; if any material part of that disclosure fails this standard, the Settlement Commission cannot recharacterise the income under another head for taxation but must reject the application as a whole.
Note
Bookmark
Share
Download
Don't have an account? Register Here
Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
TaxTMI