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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
i) Whether interest under Section 244A(1A), already determined as payable in the orders giving effect for the relevant assessment years, had to be released to the assessee when it remained unpaid.
ii) Whether interest under Section 244A(1) and Section 244A(1A) on the refund had to be computed and paid up to the actual date of refund payment (and not merely up to the date of the order giving effect), requiring rectification of the orders giving effect.
iii) Whether the assessee was entitled to interest/compensation for delayed payment of the interest component (i.e., delay in paying interest already determined), and if so, the applicable rate and period.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Non-payment of interest under Section 244A(1A) despite determination in orders giving effect
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court proceeded on the basis that interest under Section 244A(1A) had been determined as payable in the orders giving effect for the relevant assessment years.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the revenue did not dispute the factual position that the orders giving effect had determined interest under Section 244A(1A) for the concerned years, but that this determined interest remained unpaid. Since the amount stood determined as payable and no justification for non-payment was established, the relief had to follow.
Conclusion: The Court directed the revenue to pay the entire unpaid Section 244A(1A) interest amounting to Rs. 7,58,77,348/- as determined in the orders giving effect for the three assessment years.
Issue (ii): Whether interest under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A) must run till the date of actual refund payment, and rectification of the orders giving effect
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court addressed the computation of statutory interest on refunds under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A), in the context of the admitted timing mismatch between (a) computation in the orders giving effect and (b) the actual dates of refund payment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found it undisputed that the orders giving effect computed interest only up to August 2023, whereas the refunds were actually paid later (May 2024 for one year and July 2024 for the other years). The Court held that interest is required to be calculated up to the date of payment of the refund and not merely up to the date of passing the order giving effect. Since the existing orders computed interest only till the order date, the Court accepted the necessity of rectification so as to extend the interest computation period to the date of actual refund payment.
Conclusion: The Court directed the revenue to rectify the orders dated 23.08.2023 to grant and pay (a) further interest under Section 244A(1) and (b) further interest under Section 244A(1A), in each case computed up to the actual date of refund payment for the respective assessment years.
Issue (iii): Entitlement to interest/compensation for delayed payment of the determined interest amount
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court considered whether interest/compensation could be awarded for delay in paying the interest component that had already been determined as payable, and referred to judicial principles treating refund dues (including the interest element) as amounts retained by the revenue warranting compensation for undue retention.
Interpretation and reasoning: The revenue contended that no provision permitted "interest on delayed payment of interest." The Court rejected this objection. It held that where statutory interest has been determined as payable but remains unpaid for a prolonged period, the assessee is entitled to further interest/compensation for the delay. The Court reasoned that the unpaid interest forms part of the total amount refundable due to the assessee, and non-payment results in wrongful retention by the revenue. The Court adopted the approach that such payment is not impermissible "compounding," but compensation for non-payment of the full refundable amount. It further held that, even assuming a lack of express provision, interest is payable as compensation for use and retention of money that is debt-owed and payable by the revenue.
Conclusion: The Court directed payment of interest/compensation at 6% per annum on the delayed payment of the determined interest amount of Rs. 7,58,77,348/-, for the period from 01.08.2023 until the date of payment of that interest amount, to be calculated in accordance with Section 244A.
Compliance direction material to relief: All monetary directions (payment of unpaid Section 244A(1A) interest, rectification and payment of further interest under Sections 244A(1) and 244A(1A), and interest/compensation for delayed payment of interest) were ordered to be complied with on or before 30 January 2026.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether, when the statutory second appellate remedy exists but the Appellate Tribunal is not constituted/functional and the filing timelines have been extended by notification and administratively structured by advisory, the tax authorities may lawfully initiate or continue recovery of the disputed demand before expiry of the permitted appeal-filing period.
(ii) Whether interim protection against recovery should be granted on the condition of the taxpayer completing the statutory pre-deposit contemplated for stay of recovery during pendency of the second appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Recoveries during the extended/structured period for filing second appeal when Tribunal is not functional
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that the statutory right to file a second appeal is provided under Section 112 of the applicable GST enactment, but the Tribunal was not available due to non-constitution/non-functionality. The Court further relied on (a) a governmental notification extending the time up to which appeals may be filed before the Appellate Tribunal for orders communicated within the specified period, and (b) an administrative user advisory prescribing a staggered e-filing window and stating that filing would in any event be available up to the notified outer date.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the inability to approach the Tribunal as not attributable to the taxpayer. It reasoned that once the statute provides an appellate right, the State must make that remedy meaningfully available before initiating coercive recoveries. In light of the notification extending the appeal-filing timeline and the advisory operationalising filing windows, the Court expressed serious doubt that the administration could proceed to recover the disputed tax during the period in which the second appeal could still be filed. Allowing recovery in such circumstances would be contrary to the statutory scheme, inequitable and plainly unfair, and would also offend the constitutional scheme as articulated by the Court.
Conclusion: The Court ordered that, subject to satisfaction of the pre-deposit condition addressed separately, no further recoveries shall be made pursuant to the disputed adjudication demand until the relevant timeline, and bank garnishee proceedings shall remain in abeyance. The Court also directed the State to obtain and disclose its stand on recoveries and expected issuance of administrative instructions consistent with the notification and advisory; if a contrary stand is taken, reasons were required to be placed on record.
Issue (ii): Conditional interim protection based on completion of statutory pre-deposit for stay during second appeal
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 112(8) for obtaining the benefit of protection against recovery during pendency of a second appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that the taxpayer had already deposited a substantial part of the required amount but had not yet deposited the full sum contemplated for availing statutory protection. Balancing the taxpayer's inability to access a functional Tribunal with the statutory pre-deposit scheme, the Court granted protection against further recovery, while conditioning that protection upon deposit of the remaining balance within the outer limit linked to the appeal-filing timeline or earlier upon actual filing.
Conclusion: Interim restraint on further recoveries (including keeping bank garnishee proceedings in abeyance) was granted subject to deposit of the balance pre-deposit amount by the earlier of (a) the date of filing the second appeal, or (b) the specified outer date aligned with the extended filing period.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the Court should entertain the petitions despite availability of an alternate statutory remedy, given that the GST Tribunal was not operational in the circumstances.
(ii) Whether the impugned orders rejecting the refund claim and upholding such rejection should be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication because the authorities had not considered the impact of a subsequent binding decision holding that omission of Rule 96(10) was without any saving for pending proceedings, and because related questions (including Rule 86(4B) retrospectivity and other objections) required reconsideration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Entertaining the petitions notwithstanding alternate remedy
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the objection that an alternate remedy lay before the GST Tribunal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that, as of the date of decision, the GST Tribunal was not operational. In these "peculiar facts" and considering the nature of the order proposed (setting aside and remanding), relegating the petitioner to the alternate remedy would serve no useful purpose.
Conclusion: The Court proceeded to entertain the petitions and did not dismiss them on the ground of alternate remedy.
Issue (ii): Setting aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh decision in light of subsequent decision concerning Rule 96(10) and to reconsider connected contentions
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The dispute involved allegations that the petitioner had breached Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017, and the impugned orders also addressed Rule 86(4B), holding that it could not be given retrospective effect. The Court also noted a subsequent decision of the same Court holding that Rule 96(10) was omitted without any saving provision for pending proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the petitioner had been called upon to return refunded amounts inter alia on the basis of an alleged breach of Rule 96(10), and that Rule 86(4B) issues were also involved. Since the adjudicating and appellate authorities did not have the benefit of the later decision regarding the omission of Rule 96(10), that decision would have "some impact on the issues raised." At the present stage, the Court declined to make observations on the merits or on the precise effect of that later decision, but held that the interests of justice required that the impugned orders be set aside and the matter remanded so the refund application and show cause notice could be decided afresh after examining that impact. The Court further directed that the authority must hear parties, consider written submissions, and also consider all other contentions, including objections regarding retrospectivity and the bar (if any) on filing two refund claims.
Conclusions: The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority to decide afresh the refund application and show cause notice, after considering the impact of the later decision and all other contentions. The authority was directed to complete the exercise expeditiously and in any event within six months from uploading of the order, after granting hearing and considering written submissions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered after the original order of the Tribunal, can constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" so as to justify rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1.2 What is the scope and limitation of the Tribunal's rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly vis-à-vis change in law or subsequent judicial precedents.
1.3 Consequentially, whether the rectification order passed by the Tribunal under Section 254(2) sustaining the disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI was valid, and what relief, if any, should be granted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Subsequent Supreme Court judgment as "mistake apparent from the record" and scope of Section 254(2)
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court noted that Section 254(2) empowers the Tribunal to rectify any "mistake apparent from the record" in its order. This jurisdiction is limited and akin to, though more restricted than, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct mistakes apparent on the face of the record.
2.2 The Court referred to and relied upon a prior Division Bench decision which had examined Section 254(2) in the context of the same Supreme Court judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., and which in turn had discussed: (i) the principle that change in law or subsequent decisions/judgments of a coordinate or larger Bench cannot, by themselves, be grounds for review as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation; and (ii) the reiteration of this principle by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Agrawal v. State Tax Officer (1) and Another.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found as an admitted position that, on the date of the Tribunal's original order (4 August 2022), the Tribunal had followed the then prevailing law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court in Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd., which itself followed the Supreme Court's decision in Alom Extrusions Ltd. Under that legal position, deduction for employees' share of PF/ESI was allowable if deposited before the due date of filing the return under Section 139(1).
2.4 The Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., which overruled the earlier proposition in Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd. and held that employees' contributions are deductible under Section 36(1)(va) only if deposited within the time prescribed under the respective statutes, was rendered on 12 October 2022, i.e., after the Tribunal's original order.
2.5 The Tribunal, in allowing the Revenue's rectification application and sustaining the disallowance, had relied solely on this subsequent judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. as the basis for invoking Section 254(2).
2.6 The Court held that a subsequent change in the legal position by a later judgment, which did not exist when the original order was passed, cannot be treated as a "mistake apparent from the record." The Tribunal cannot be said to have overlooked or failed to follow a Supreme Court or High Court decision that was not in existence at the time of its original decision.
2.7 Applying the ratio of the earlier Division Bench decision (involving the same Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. judgment), and following the principles laid down in Beghar Foundation and Sanjay Kumar Agrawal, the Court reiterated that:
(a) Change in law or subsequent judicial decisions by themselves cannot be grounds for review; and
(b) The rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is even more restricted than review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and cannot be used to reopen or revisit decisions based solely on subsequent changes in the law.
2.8 The Court also noted its agreement with a Tribunal decision in ANI Integrated Services Ltd., which had rejected similar miscellaneous applications by the Revenue seeking rectification under Section 254(2) on the basis of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., applying the same principles on the limited scope of rectification jurisdiction.
2.9 The Court further observed that its view is consistent with other Bench decisions which have quashed rectification orders under Section 254(2) passed in an identical factual and legal backdrop (including decisions subsequently following the same Division Bench ruling).
Conclusions on Issues 1 & 2
2.10 A subsequent Supreme Court judgment rendered after the Tribunal's original order does not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" and cannot be a valid ground for exercising jurisdiction under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2.11 The Tribunal's rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is narrow and cannot be equated with a power to review its own order on account of subsequent change in law or later judicial pronouncements. Such later decisions cannot, by themselves, justify rectification.
2.12 On the date of the original order (4 August 2022), the Tribunal had correctly applied the then prevailing legal position; hence, there was no mistake apparent from the record, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain and allow the rectification application filed by the Revenue.
Issue 3: Validity of the rectification order and consequential relief
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 Since the only ground for rectification was the subsequent judgment in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., and such subsequent decision could not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record," the Tribunal's order passed under Section 254(2) sustaining the disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI was held to be without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable.
3.2 The Court therefore considered that the appropriate relief was to quash and set aside the impugned rectification order and restore the Tribunal's original order allowing the deduction, which had been passed in accordance with the law then prevailing.
3.3 At the same time, the Court clarified that by setting aside the rectification order and restoring the original order, the Revenue is not precluded from availing any statutory remedy of appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act against the original Tribunal order, if otherwise permissible in law.
Conclusions on Issue 3
3.4 The rectification order passed by the Tribunal under Section 254(2), based solely on the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd., is invalid and is quashed and set aside.
3.5 The original order of the Tribunal dated 4 August 2022, granting deduction for employees' contribution to PF/ESI as per the law then prevailing, is restored.
3.6 The Revenue retains liberty, if otherwise entitled in law, to challenge the restored original Tribunal order by way of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption on inter se sales of aluminium sole moulds and cutting dyes under the cited notifications, and whether those items could be treated as raw materials, packing materials or consumables; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption on inter se sales of aluminium sole moulds and cutting dyes under the cited notifications, and whether those items could be treated as raw materials, packing materials or consumables.
Analysis: The claim under the 1994 notification failed because it was confined to inter-unit sales within the Madras Export Processing Zone, whereas the assessees were not located in that zone. The 1997 notification applied generally to sales of raw materials, packing materials and consumable goods to 100% export oriented units, but the items in question were not consumed in the manufacturing process; they were only aids or implements. The ordinary meaning of consumables, as reflected in the EXIM policy, supported the revenue's case, and the exemption notifications could not be stretched beyond their clear language.
Conclusion: The exemption claim was rejected and the issue was answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 was sustainable.
Analysis: Penalty under Section 16(2) required proof of willful non-disclosure of assessable turnover. All material facts were already on record, and the dispute turned only on the legal interpretation of the notifications. In those circumstances, the statutory condition for penalty was not met.
Conclusion: The penalty was set aside and the issue was answered in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The tax exemption claim failed, but the penalty component was annulled, leaving the appeals successful only to that limited extent.
Ratio Decidendi: An exemption notification in a fiscal statute must be confined to its clear terms, and penalty for escapement cannot be sustained where the dispute is only one of legal interpretation and there is no willful non-disclosure.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the refund directed by the Appellate Authority under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be withheld on the ground that an appeal against such order is contemplated.
1.2 Consequences, including liability for additional interest and recovery from responsible officers, for non-compliance with an appellate refund order not stayed or set aside.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Withholding of refund on the ground of a contemplated appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Appellate Authority, by order dated 21 August 2025, had directed refund of Rs. 7,27,83,010/- to the petitioner along with applicable interest under Section 56 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2.1.2 The Court recorded the petitioner's plea that the first respondent declined to grant the refund on the ground that an appeal against the said appellate order was contemplated.
2.1.3 The Court relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in "Mr. Brij Mohan Mangla vs. Union of India & Ors." which held that authorities cannot ignore or withhold implementation of orders passed by the Appellate Authority merely because they have decided, or are contemplating, to file an appeal; such a practice would be debilitating to the rule of law.
2.1.4 The Court held that so long as the Appellate Authority's order dated 21 August 2025 is neither set aside nor stayed, the first respondent is bound to comply with it and cannot refuse refund on the basis of a proposed appeal.
Conclusions
2.1.5 The Court concluded that the withholding of the refund solely on the ground that an appeal is contemplated is impermissible, and the first respondent is obliged to implement the appellate refund order in the absence of any stay or setting aside of that order.
2.2 Directions on refund, additional interest, and recovery from responsible officers
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 Having held that the respondents are bound by the appellate order, the Court directed the first respondent to refund the amount of Rs. 7,27,83,010/- to the petitioner within 10 days from the date of uploading of the Court's order, along with the statutorily applicable interest under Section 56 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2.2.2 The Court further directed that, if the refund is not made within the stipulated period, the first respondent shall, over and above any statutorily payable interest, pay additional interest at 6% per annum to the petitioner.
2.2.3 The Court mandated that such additional interest shall first be paid to the petitioner by the respondents, and thereafter the respondents shall conduct an inquiry, determine liability, and recover the additional amount from the officer or officers responsible for the delay in implementing the appellate order.
2.2.4 The Court emphasized that under no circumstances should the State or Central Exchequer be made accountable for payment of such additional amounts from taxpayers' funds.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court allowed the petition, made the Rule absolute, and imposed a time-bound direction for refund, with a clear regime of additional interest and personal liability of erring officers to ensure compliance with appellate refund orders and to protect public revenue from bearing the burden of delays caused by officials.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the statutory preconditions under Section 147 read with Sections 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for reopening assessment on the ground of "income escaping assessment" were satisfied in respect of the relevant assessment year.
1.2 Whether the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer, namely third-party investigation findings and portal-based risk information concerning another assessee, constituted a valid "reason to believe" that the petitioner's income had escaped assessment, notwithstanding full disclosure of transactions in the original return and audited accounts.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment proceedings under Sections 147, 148 and 148A; existence of "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment
Legal framework (as discussed by The Court)
2.1 The Court reproduced Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, emphasizing that reopening can be undertaken only if the Assessing Officer "has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" for any assessment year, subject to Sections 148 to 153.
2.2 The Court noted the settled position that in assessment proceedings the assessee's obligation is to make full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for assessment for that year, and that all requirements stipulated by Section 147 must be given due and equal weight.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court found as undisputed that:
(a) The assessee filed its return of income for the relevant assessment year, declaring its net income and paying tax thereon.
(b) The total turnover was subjected to tax audit under the Act; regular books of account are maintained, audited every year, and uploaded on the portal.
(c) All transactions, including those with the third party (Vasudev Babubhai Kapadia and entities related to him), were disclosed and are reflected in the profit and loss account, as also stated in the reply dated 10.04.2025.
2.4 On examining the detailed reply to the show-cause notice under Section 148A(1), the Court recorded that the assessee had:
(a) Matched and reconciled the data provided by the department with its own books of account.
(b) Explained that the amount of Rs. 73,31,671/- did not figure in its books of account.
(c) Clarified that Rs. 1,73,89,827/- related to sales of rough diamonds to Vaibhav Enterprise (proprietorship of Janakbhai Vasudev Kapadia) pertaining to the earlier assessment year 2018-19, with supporting details offered.
2.5 The Court observed that, despite such categorical explanations, the Assessing Officer merely stated that the matters "would be looked into in detail during the assessment proceedings", thereby treating the explanation regarding Rs. 73,31,671/- cursorily and perfunctorily.
2.6 From the order under Section 148A(3) / Section 148, the Court found that the allegations of bogus purchases were entirely based on investigation in the case of the third party (Vasudev Babubhai Kapadia), where:
(a) Suspicious transactions and an undisclosed bank account were noticed.
(b) Discrepancies between his bank account and his own ITR were identified.
(c) His GSTR-1 data showed large purchases and sales, and he failed to furnish documentary evidence during inquiry.
(d) The investigating authority treated his unaccounted purchases as his unaccounted income.
2.7 The Court held that the reopening against the assessee was triggered solely because the third party and another related individual (Janakbhai Vasudev Kapadia) allegedly engaged in bogus purchases and did not cooperate with the investigation. The Assessing Officer, on that premise and portal-based risk information, sought to implicate the assessee for "bogus purchases and sales" aggregating to Rs. 5,66,44,146/-.
2.8 The Court reasoned that, where the assessee has already disclosed all the relevant transactions in its audited books and ITR, including the very transactions with the third party, and has given a detailed, transaction-wise explanation in response to the Section 148A notice, the statutory condition of "reason to believe" that the assessee's income has escaped assessment is not satisfied merely because:
(a) The third party is alleged to have unaccounted income; or
(b) The third party failed to cooperate with the revenue authorities.
2.9 The Court found that the order did not record any independent or specific satisfaction by the Assessing Officer that income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee had escaped assessment. Instead, the authority had misdirected itself by transferring suspicions arising from the third party's case onto the assessee, despite full disclosure by the latter.
2.10 The Court also inferred that the reliance on portal-based information and the Risk Management Strategy of the CBDT, without objective evaluation of the assessee's books and explanations, resulted in a "fishing and roving inquiry" rather than a reasoned formation of belief based on tangible material indicating escapement of income of the assessee.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court concluded that:
(a) The statutory preconditions under Section 147 for reopening were not satisfied, as there was no proper "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee had escaped assessment.
(b) The proceedings under Section 148 were "uncalled for", being founded on misdirection in assessing the transactions of third parties, notwithstanding the assessee's full and true disclosure of its own transactions and income.
(c) The perfunctory manner in which the Assessing Officer dealt with the assessee's explanation, particularly in relation to Rs. 73,31,671/-, further showed absence of a legally sustainable belief of escapement of income.
2.12 Accordingly, the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(3) for the relevant assessment year were quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.
Issues: Whether the applicant, as complainant in a complaint case ending in acquittal, was entitled to have the leave to appeal treated as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The application was examined in the light of the later authoritative ruling recognising that, in a complaint case, the complainant answers the description of a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and that such victim may prefer an appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372. The earlier debate whether recourse lay only under Section 378(4) stood concluded by that ruling. Following the same approach adopted in subsequent decisions of the Court, there was no basis to take a different view in the present matter.
Conclusion: The leave to appeal was rightly directed to be treated as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to be heard by the Sessions Court on merits.
Final Conclusion: The application resulted in a direction that preserved the complainant's appellate remedy against acquittal and required merits-based consideration before the competent appellate court.
Ratio Decidendi: In a complaint case, the complainant is a victim for the purposes of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and may maintain an appeal against acquittal before the Sessions Court.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the seizure of imported bulk liquid cargo declared as "Distillate Oil" is justified on the basis of the CRCL Test Report vis-à-vis the requirements of IS 16731:2019 and IS 1460:2025.
1.2 Whether the petitioners are entitled to release or provisional release of the seized cargo on the ground of parity with other consignments of Distillate Oil released at Kandla, and on the basis of the interpretation adopted in the decision in Gastrade International.
1.3 Whether the respondents are justified in treating the imported goods as mis-declared diesel / HFHSD, taking into account the density and distillation characteristics and alleged end-use pattern of similar imports.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Justification of seizure based on CRCL Test Report and Indian Standards
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The seizure and detention were effected under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 on the basis of alleged mis-declaration of the imported bulk liquid cargo declared as "Distillate Oil".
2.1.2 The parties proceeded on the basis of compliance or non-compliance with Indian Standards IS 16731:2019 (Distillate Oil / Distillate Marine Fuel) and IS 1460:2025 (Automotive Diesel Fuel), as reflected in the CRCL Test Report dated 30.09.2025.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court recorded that the entire case of the respondents "hinges on" the CRCL Test Report dated 30.09.2025, which examined 14 specified characteristics/parameters of the sample drawn from the cargo.
2.1.4 The Test Report stated that, with respect to Cloud Point, the sample did not meet the requirement of Distillate Oil as per IS 16731:2019, and with respect to a distillation parameter, it did not meet the requirement of Automotive Diesel Fuel as per IS 1460:2025. It also recorded that the samples "have the characteristics of diesel fraction with a small amount of a heavier fraction of hydrocarbons."
2.1.5 The petitioners highlighted, and the Court noted, that out of 14 parameters, only specific parameters (including Cloud Point) were indicated to be non-compliant, while several others such as total acid number, ash content, carbon residue and cetane index were within the specified ranges, as reflected in the chart relied on in the Court's analysis.
2.1.6 The respondents stressed that, according to the Test Report, the imported goods did not conform to Indian Standards for Distillate Oil, and further relied on density values at 15°C (0.8203 g/cm³ and 0.8347 g/cm³) as being closer to typical diesel ranges rather than Distillate Marine Fuel under Indian Standards.
2.1.7 The Court observed that the sample had been collected under panchanama, sent to CRCL, and that the Test Report set out and evaluated 14 parameters/characteristics which "the sample has to satisfy in order to declare whether the import by the petitioners is Distillate Oil or not." The Court reproduced the parameter-wise chart as the central evidentiary basis for adjudging the nature of the product.
Conclusions
2.1.8 The Court treated the CRCL Test Report dated 30.09.2025, and the 14-parameter chart derived therefrom, as the foundational material for assessing whether the seized goods were in fact "Distillate Oil" or had been mis-declared, and proceeded to examine the legality of seizure by reference to conformity or otherwise with IS 16731:2019 and IS 1460:2025.
2.2 Claim of parity with consignments released at Kandla and reliance on Gastrade International
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.2.1 The petitioners relied on Public Notice No. 76/2020 (New Customs House, Mumbai) and Public Notice No. 14/2017 (Commissioner of Customs, Kandla) concerning testing and release of such cargo, and on the Supreme Court's decision in Gastrade International, contending that similar products had been treated as Distillate Oil and released.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.2 The petitioners asserted that in an identical consignment of Distillate Oil detained at Custom House, Kandla, CRCL had communicated that "Distillate Oil or any other Distillate Oil in reference to fraction of hydrocarbons in the Distillate Marine Fuels or any other Distillate Oil is of no consequence, as all these products are diesel fraction," and that on such opinion the Commissioner of Customs, Kandla directed provisional release.
2.2.3 On this basis, the petitioners argued that their cargo, having comparable parameter-compliance, could not be treated differently, and that the Test Report in the present case did not conclusively state that the product was not Distillate Oil; hence, seizure was arbitrary and discriminatory.
2.2.4 The respondents opposed parity, contending that the subject goods, as per the present Test Report, were diesel/HFHSD and not Distillate Oil, and that the case of the petitioners was "materially different" from the consignment released at Kandla. They further submitted that the reliance placed on Gastrade International by the petitioners and by Kandla Customs for other consignments would not apply here because of failure of specific parameters and the clear diesel-like characteristics recorded in the current Test Report.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court recognised the petitioners' plea of parity with Kandla consignments and their reliance on Gastrade International, but also noted the stand of the respondents that the present Test Report and parameter failures distinguished the petitioners' consignment from those previously released, necessitating a fact-specific scrutiny based on the 14-parameter analysis.
2.3 Characterisation of the product as diesel / HFHSD, policy restrictions, and end-use allegations
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.3.1 The respondents referred to Policy Condition No. 5, Chapter 27 of Schedule-I of the Import Policy - ITC (HS) 2022, under which import of diesel / High Flash High Speed Diesel (HFHSD) is a restricted activity.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.2 On the strength of the Test Report, the respondents argued that the imported goods did not meet IS 16731:2019 requirements for Distillate Oil and instead had characteristics of diesel fraction, thereby constituting mis-declaration as to the true nature of the goods.
2.3.3 They contended that mis-declaring diesel / HFHSD as Distillate Marine Fuel / Distillate Oil enabled circumvention of import restrictions and resulted in loss of revenue due to higher tax incidence on diesel and potential wrongful availment of input tax credit, since diesel is outside the GST regime.
2.3.4 The respondents further asserted that, on verification of past end-use, goods earlier imported and declared as Distillate Oil by similarly placed entities were supplied to goods transport agencies and construction companies and were used as diesel in trucks, excavators, and as light diesel oil in construction, which, according to them, reinforced the inference that the present goods were in substance diesel/HFHSD.
2.3.5 The petitioners, in rejoinder, disputed these allegations as "bald" and "ill-conceived," pointing out that one of the petitioners was importing Distillate Oil for the first time with no pending inquiry; that another had around thirty past imports since September 2023 with only one earlier detention which ended in release on payment of duty; and that the third had over one hundred such imports since 2023 with only one earlier detention, also followed by release on duty payment. They contended that there was no established misuse or mis-declaration history justifying adverse inferences in the present case.
Conclusions
2.3.6 The Court noted the respondents' reliance on policy restrictions applicable to diesel/HFHSD imports and on alleged end-use patterns, but also took on record the petitioners' detailed rebuttal that there was no proven history of misuse or mis-declaration in their past imports, thereby framing the controversy as one turning primarily on the scientific characterisation of the goods through the CRCL Test Report and the parameter-wise compliance with Indian Standards.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the seizure of the imported bulk liquid cargo declared as "Distillate Fuel Oil SRFO / Distillate Oil" under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, based on the CRCL (Delhi) Test Report dated 30.09.2025 and Seizure Memo dated 01.10.2025, was legally justified.
1.2 Whether, on the basis of the competing laboratory test reports (CRCL Vadodara and CRCL Delhi) and the parameters under IS 16731:2019 and IS 1460:2025, the imported goods could be treated as "Distillate Oil / Distillate Marine Fuel" or as "Automotive Diesel Fuel / HFHSD", and whether there was mis-declaration.
1.3 Whether the petitioner was entitled to release (or provisional release) of the seized cargo, including on the basis of Public Notices governing testing and release at ports and alleged parity with other traders whose similar goods were released by customs authorities at Kandla, and the applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Gastrade International.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of seizure under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court records that the petitioner imported bulk liquid cargo declared as Distillate Fuel Oil SRFO under specified Bills of Entry and that samples were initially drawn by Customs and sent to CRCL, Vadodara, which, vide Test Report dated 27.08.2025, opined that the samples met the requirements of Distillate Marine Fuel as per IS 16731:2019.
2.2 The Court notes that after the cargo was transferred to customs-bonded tanks, DRI officers drew fresh representative samples in triplicate on 01.09.2025 and detained the cargo under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 based on information of possible mis-declaration.
2.3 The Court further notes that the petitioner complained that the cargo was not released and that test results of samples drawn on 01.09.2025 were not furnished, despite completion of discharge and sample drawal and despite Public Notices prescribing testing and release procedures. Subsequently, the CRCL (Delhi) Test Report dated 30.09.2025 was issued, stating that the imported goods do not meet the requirements of Distillate Oil as per IS 16731:2019 and have characteristics of Automotive Diesel Fuel as per IS 1460:2025, leading to the Seizure Memo dated 01.10.2025.
2.4 The petitioners contend that seizure solely on the basis of the Delhi Test Report is unjustified because (i) an earlier consistent report in their favour exists from CRCL Vadodara; (ii) the Delhi report relies only on deviation in one parameter (Cloud Point) while all other key parameters are within the specified limits for Distillate Oil; and (iii) the report does not conclusively state that the goods are not Distillate Oil or are definitively Automotive Diesel Fuel.
2.5 The respondents argue that the Delhi Test Report constitutes a specific finding that the imported cargo does not conform to IS 16731:2019 for Distillate Oil and bears characteristics of Automotive Diesel Fuel, thereby justifying the inference of mis-declaration and seizure under Section 110.
Conclusions
2.6 From the available portion of the judgment, the Court identifies and sets out the rival contentions and the factual basis of the seizure, including the reliance on the Delhi Test Report and the earlier Vadodara Test Report. However, the extracted text does not contain the Court's final determination on whether the seizure under Section 110 was valid or liable to be quashed.
Issue 2: Classification of the imported product and allegation of mis-declaration
Legal framework
2.7 The Court records that the Delhi Test Report evaluated the sample against IS 16731:2019 (Distillate Marine Fuel) and made reference to its characteristics vis-à-vis IS 1460:2025 (Automotive Diesel Fuel). Fourteen parameters/characteristics were tested, including "Cloud Point" and density at 15°C.
2.8 The respondents refer to Policy Condition No. 5, Chapter 27 of Schedule-I of the Import Policy - ITC (HS) 2022, under which diesel / High Flash High Speed Diesel (HFHSD) is a restricted item for import, in contrast to Distillate Marine Fuel/Distillate Oil.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The petitioners emphasize that, as per the Delhi Test Report itself, out of 14 characteristics, all parameters are satisfied except Cloud Point (Sr. No. 14), which is recorded as -4.6°C, and that on this solitary parameter the opinion has been formed that the product does not meet IS 16731:2019 and has characteristics of Automotive Diesel Fuel. They contend that the report does not conclusively classify the product as diesel and that multiple parameters, including density, kinematic viscosity, distillation (IBP and recovery), Cloud Point, and flash point, are within acceptable ranges for Distillate Oil, consistent with other traders' consignments treated as Distillate Marine Fuel.
2.10 The petitioners rely on the Supreme Court decision in Gastrade International, arguing that where the overwhelming majority of test parameters align with the declared product, minor deviations or overlapping characteristics do not justify re-classification as diesel and consequent penal consequences.
2.11 The respondents counter that the Delhi Test Report unequivocally notes that the "sample has the characteristics of Automotive Diesel fuel" and also that the goods do not meet IS 16731:2019 for Distillate Oil. They particularly stress that density at 15°C-a parameter expected to be higher for Distillate Marine Fuel and lower for diesel-is consistent with diesel, and combined with the failed Cloud Point parameter, establishes that the imported goods are diesel/HFHSD and hence mis-declared.
2.12 The respondents add that end-use verification has shown that similarly described "Distillate Oil" has been supplied to goods transport agencies and construction companies and used as diesel in trucks, excavators, and as light diesel oil, reinforcing the belief that the goods are in fact diesel, restricted under the import policy.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court recognises the existence of two conflicting laboratory reports (Vadodara and Delhi) and sets out in detail the competing arguments on the relevance of individual parameters, especially Cloud Point and density, to the classification as Distillate Oil versus Automotive Diesel Fuel, and the allegation of mis-declaration. The provided extract, however, does not disclose the Court's ultimate finding on classification or on whether mis-declaration was established.
Issue 3: Entitlement to release / provisional release; parity and applicability of Gastrade International
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The petitioners argue that, in view of the favourable CRCL Vadodara report, the predominance of parameters supporting Distillate Oil in the Delhi report, and Public Notices governing port procedures, the customs authorities were obliged to release the cargo, or at least consider provisional release. They further claim parity with other traders whose goods, allegedly of identical or similar description and quality, were provisionally released by customs authorities at Kandla, with reliance placed on the Supreme Court's ruling in Gastrade International.
2.15 The respondents submit that the petitioner cannot claim parity with consignments released at Kandla because the goods in those cases are materially different from the petitioner's consignment. They also maintain that the authorities at Kandla may have treated other consignments based on their own factual matrix and test results, and that the Supreme Court decision in Gastrade International is distinguishable and inapplicable given the specific findings of the Delhi Test Report and the failure to meet certain parameters.
2.16 The respondents further contend that unauthorized import of diesel disguised as Distillate Marine Fuel results in loss of government revenue (owing to the higher tax structure applicable to diesel) and allows unlawful claims of input tax credit that would not be available if the supplies were treated as diesel outside the GST regime, thereby justifying a stricter approach and refusal of release.
Conclusions
2.17 The Court notes the petitioner's reliance on parity and on the Supreme Court's decision in Gastrade International, and records the respondents' contention that the said decision and prior releases at Kandla are not applicable to the petitioner's case. The segment of the judgment provided does not set out the Court's final decision on entitlement to release or provisional release, or on the applicability of Gastrade International to the facts at hand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the samples of imported Distillate Fuel Oil drawn on 30.09.2025 by the Customs authority at Hazira and on 08.10.2025 by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Jamnagar, complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether test reports based on samples drawn in contravention of Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962 could validly be relied upon to seize the imported goods.
1.3 Consequences for the seizure order and future investigation when the foundational sampling of goods is found to be contrary to Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Compliance of sampling with Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework
2.1 The Court reproduced Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962, noting in particular that the proper officer may take samples "in the presence of the owner thereof" for examination or testing or for any other purposes of the Act, and that this requirement is couched in mandatory terms.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court found, on the basis of the affidavit dated 09.12.2025 and the preliminary investigation report produced in sealed cover, that the sample initially drawn by the Customs authority at Hazira and sent to CRCL, Vadodara, was not drawn in the presence of the proper officer and was expressly disowned as "authentic" by the Department itself, which admitted that it was not drawn in the presence of the proper officer.
2.3 The Court further held that the sample subsequently drawn by DRI, Jamnagar, on 08.10.2025 was also taken in the absence of the owner/importer. The Department treated this sample as authentic only on the ground that it was drawn in the presence of panch witnesses, though no such alternative mode is prescribed under the Act.
2.4 When queried, the Department was unable to point to any other statutory provision or administrative instruction authorising Customs or DRI officers to draw samples in the absence of the importer/owner contrary to Section 144.
2.5 The Court rejected the Department's attempt to approbate and reprobate by disowning the Hazira sample as unauthentic (for non-compliance with statutory requirements) while simultaneously treating the DRI, Jamnagar sample, also drawn in the absence of the owner, as authentic. It held that no distinct or superior legal status attaches to a sample only because it is drawn in the presence of panch witnesses when the statute mandates presence of the owner.
2.6 The Court held that the mandate of Section 144-that the proper officer must draw samples "in the presence of the owner"-was violated in respect of both the samples drawn on 30.09.2025 (by Customs, Hazira) and on 08.10.2025 (by DRI, Jamnagar).
Conclusions
2.7 Both samples relied upon in the matter were drawn de hors Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962, because they were not taken in the presence of the owner/importer; accordingly, they could not be treated as lawful or authentic samples for the purposes of further action under the Act.
Issue 2: Validity of reliance on test reports and legality of seizure based on samples drawn in contravention of Section 144
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The Court noted that the entire controversy turned on two conflicting test reports: one from CRCL, Vadodara (favourable to the importer) and another, obtained through DRI, Jamnagar, from Visakhapatnam Laboratory (adverse to the importer). It held that both reports were fundamentally vitiated because the underlying samples were drawn in violation of Section 144.
2.9 The Court held that once the taking of samples itself is contrary to the statutory mandate, any test report generated from such samples "will have no consequence" in law and cannot be invoked to justify coercive action such as seizure of goods.
2.10 The Court thereby rejected the Department's reliance on the adverse test report obtained through DRI, Jamnagar, and held that the seizure based on such a report, resting on illegally drawn samples, could not be sustained.
Conclusions
2.11 Since the foundational act of sampling was non-compliant with Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962, neither the favourable nor the adverse test reports could be validly relied upon. Consequently, the seizure of the petitioner's goods under the impugned Seizure Memo, founded upon such defective sampling and testing, was declared illegal and was quashed and set aside.
Issue 3: Consequences for ongoing investigation and future sampling
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 While quashing the seizure, the Court refrained from making detailed comments on the preliminary investigation into the conduct of officers but noted that officers had disowned responsibility for the irregular sampling, and that the Department had already initiated a process of seeking clarification from the concerned officers.
2.13 The Court clarified that invalidity of the sampling and seizure does not bar continuation of the investigation. It held that the authorities remain free to proceed in accordance with law, including by drawing fresh samples, provided that the statutory conditions, particularly those of Section 144, are strictly complied with.
2.14 The Court also directed that the petitioner file an undertaking before the Customs authority and clarified that the respondents may undertake a fresh sampling exercise under Section 144 in the presence of the petitioner, to which the petitioner had expressed no objection.
Conclusions
2.15 The seizure having been set aside, the authorities were directed to release the goods forthwith. At the same time, the Court left it open to the Department to (a) continue investigation, (b) fix accountability of erring officers and take appropriate action under relevant provisions, rules, regulations or administrative instructions, and (c) re-initiate sampling and testing strictly in conformity with Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962, in the presence of the owner/importer.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the services relating to digitalisation and monitoring of water supply schemes, enhancement of Jal Mitra application, digitisation and GIS mapping of piped water supply schemes, data management and documentation, organisation of orientation programmes, and other related technical consultancy services provided to the Public Health Engineering Directorate qualify as "pure services" exempt under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.
1.2 Whether the services relating to acquisition of field-level data, designing and development of mobile and web applications for Unique Tap Water Identity (UTWID), upkeep and hosting of WhatsApp bot platform, preparation of maps and other technical consultancy services provided to the Public Health Engineering Directorate qualify as "pure services" exempt under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.
1.3 Consequentially, whether any question of classification and rate of tax arises if the above services are held to be exempt under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Exemption for services relating to digitalisation, monitoring, Jal Mitra enhancement, GIS, data management, and orientation programmes under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), which exempts "pure services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority or a Governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution."
2.2 The Court reproduced and relied on the definitions/concepts of:
(a) "Pure services" as understood from the Notification - supply of services not involving any supply of goods and not being works contract or other composite supplies involving goods; and
(b) "Composite supply" as defined in section 2(30) of the GST Act.
2.3 The Court referred to Article 243G and the Eleventh Schedule (specifically entry 11 - "Drinking water") and to Article 243W and the Twelfth Schedule (specifically entry 5 - "Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes"), to identify the constitutionally entrusted functions relevant for Sl. No. 3.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court noted that the applicant had been awarded work orders by the Public Health Engineering Directorate (PHE Directorate) of the Government of West Bengal for various activities, broadly categorised as:
(A) Comprehensive digital transformation and monitoring of mega schemes, including design and development of mobile applications, field data collection, and GIS-based data preparation and visualisation of water supply scheme components.
(B) Enhancement, maintenance, upgradation and modification of the Jal Mitra Android and web application for functionality assessment of household tap connections.
(C) Digitisation of transmission and distribution systems and assets of piped water supply schemes, conversion to .kml for PM Gati Shakti portal, and digitisation/upload of lithologic drawings.
(D) Collection, scanning and digitisation of printed distribution drawings into geo-referenced CAD files, their upload to the Scheme Drawing & Litholog module, and development of GIS tools and data entry panels for technical attributes.
(E) Organisation of orientation programmes for Implementation Support Agencies, DPMU staff and Engineer Officers on functionality assessment (through Jal Mitra application), including training infrastructure, training materials, documentation and reporting.
2.5 The Court found, on examination of these work orders, that all such activities were directed to digitalisation, monitoring, data management, GIS integration and training in relation to implementation and monitoring of piped water supply schemes and Functional Household Tap Connections (FHTCs) under the Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM).
2.6 As to the recipient condition, the Court held that all services were provided to the State Government, represented by the PHE Directorate, which controls and implements water supply schemes. The second condition of Sl. No. 3 (service provided to Central/State Government, Union Territory, local authority or Governmental authority) was thus satisfied.
2.7 As to the functional nexus requirement, the Court observed that:
- The PHE Directorate's primary function is delivery of safe and reliable drinking water to rural households through piped water supply schemes as part of JJM.
- The services in question relate to monitoring of FHTCs, PWSS asset mapping, GIS-based coverage analysis, functionality assessment, and capacity-building of field functionaries.
- These activities are integrally connected to the function of "Drinking water" under entry 11 of the Eleventh Schedule (Article 243G) and "Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes" under entry 5 of the Twelfth Schedule (Article 243W).
The Court therefore held that the third condition of Sl. No. 3 (activity in relation to a function entrusted under Articles 243G/243W) was fulfilled.
2.8 On the nature of supply, the Court, after a detailed review of all relevant work orders, concluded that:
- The activities involved software/application development, digitalisation, GIS mapping, data processing, documentation and training-related services.
- No transfer or supply of goods of any kind formed part of these contracts.
- The work orders did not constitute "works contracts" or "composite supplies" involving goods.
Consequently, the services were characterised as "pure services" within the meaning of Sl. No. 3.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that the services relating to digitalisation and monitoring of mega schemes, enhancement and maintenance of Jal Mitra application, digitisation and GIS processing of piped water supply schemes, data management and documentation, and organisation of orientation programmes and related technical consultancy services provided to the PHE Directorate:
(i) Are pure services without any supply of goods;
(ii) Are provided to the State Government (PHE Directorate); and
(iii) Are activities in relation to drinking water / water supply functions entrusted under Articles 243G and 243W.
Accordingly, such services are classifiable under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and are exempt from GST.
Issue 2 - Exemption for services relating to field data acquisition, UTWID application, WhatsApp bot platform, and mapping/technical consultancy under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate)
Legal framework
2.10 The Court applied the same three cumulative conditions under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate): (a) pure services (no works contract or composite supply involving goods), (b) provided to specified Government/Governmental entities, and (c) in relation to functions entrusted to Panchayats/Municipalities under Articles 243G/243W.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court noted that, although initially described by the applicant as "potential services", the applicant had subsequently obtained and produced work orders covering these activities, which the Court took into account. These works were categorised, inter alia, as:
(F) Designing and development of mobile and web applications for generation of Unique Tap Water Identity (UTWID) numbers for FHTC beneficiaries, including Web-GIS based monitoring, data validation tools, dashboards and analytical reporting.
(G) Up-keeping and hosting of a WhatsApp bot platform for optimising data accessibility, service delivery and operational efficiency, including programmable messaging infrastructure, backend/system maintenance, AI/LLM model enhancement, and integration with Jal Mitra and WBJJM dashboards.
(H) Validation of field-level data of FHTCs and acquisition of field-level data of distribution systems and transmission mains, GNSS-based pipeline surveys, mapping of assets (intake points, WTPs, pump houses, reservoirs, etc.), and preparation/uploading of scheme-wise AutoCAD and .kml maps into the WB-JJM dashboard and PM Gati Shakti portal.
2.12 The Court observed that these activities are all tools and processes for:
- Creation and maintenance of an accurate, geo-tagged database of water supply assets and household tap connections;
- Real-time and post-implementation monitoring of FHTC coverage and functionality; and
- Improved service delivery and grievance handling in rural water supply schemes.
Their purpose and use are therefore directly linked to the planning, implementation, monitoring and sustainability of drinking water supply systems under JJM.
2.13 On the "recipient" condition, the Court found that these services too were provided to the PHE Directorate of the Government of West Bengal, and therefore to the State Government, satisfying the second condition of Sl. No. 3.
2.14 On the "functional nexus" requirement, the Court held that the activities pertaining to UTWID, WhatsApp bot and field-level data acquisition/validation are all integral to the management and monitoring of piped drinking water supply to rural households under JJM. These are functions squarely falling under:
- "Drinking water" (entry 11, Eleventh Schedule, Article 243G); and
- "Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes" (entry 5, Twelfth Schedule, Article 243W).
Accordingly, they meet the third condition that the service be "in relation to" a function entrusted under Articles 243G/243W.
2.15 On the nature of supply, the Court again analysed the work orders and found:
- The contracts involve software/application design and development, digital data handling, AI/LLM configuration and hosting, and survey / data-validation services;
- No supply of goods is embedded in these contracts; and
- The contracts are not works contracts and do not constitute composite supplies involving goods.
They are therefore to be treated as "pure services" as used in Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that the services relating to acquisition and validation of field-level data, design and development of UTWID mobile and web applications, upkeep and hosting of the WhatsApp bot platform, preparation of maps and other related technical consultancy services provided to the PHE Directorate:
(i) Constitute pure services without any associated supply of goods;
(ii) Are provided to the State Government through the PHE Directorate; and
(iii) Are activities in relation to the constitutionally entrusted drinking water/water supply functions under Articles 243G and 243W.
Accordingly, these services are covered by Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and are exempt from GST.
Issue 3 - Necessity of classification and rate determination if exemption applies
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The applicant had framed alternate questions on classification and rate of tax assuming that the services might not qualify under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). The Court, having answered Issues 1 and 2 in the affirmative and held that the impugned services are exempt as pure services in relation to drinking water functions, found that the contingency underlying the alternate questions did not arise.
Conclusions
2.18 The Court held that, in view of its findings that all the relevant services are exempt under Sl. No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), no issue of further classification under specific SAC codes or determination of applicable positive tax rates arises, and the alternate questions are rendered redundant.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether transfer of business assets and liabilities from the proprietorship concern to the applicant constitutes a "service by way of transfer of a going concern, as a whole or an independent part thereof" and is exempt under Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
1.2 Consequences for classification and rate of tax if the transfer is not treated as an exempt "transfer of a going concern".
1.3 Whether, post-transfer of business, supplies/invoices issued in furtherance of, or as an extension of, work orders originally issued in the name of the transferor would (a) retain identical taxability for the transferee, including in light of an earlier advance ruling in favour of the transferor, and (b) whether specified services under sample work orders qualify as exempt "pure services" under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Characterisation of business transfer as "transfer of a going concern" and exemption under Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined Section 7(1) and 7(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 defining "supply" in an inclusive manner, covering all forms of supply such as sale, transfer, etc., for consideration in the course or furtherance of business, and providing that activities constituting a supply are to be treated as supply of goods or supply of services as per Schedule II.
2.2 The Court referred to Schedule II, Entry 4(c), which deems goods forming part of business assets to be supplied immediately before a person ceases to be a taxable person, unless "the business is transferred as a going concern to another person" - in which case such transfer is not treated as a supply of goods but as a supply of services.
2.3 The Court relied on Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), exempting "services by way of transfer of a going concern, as a whole or an independent part thereof".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court held that, given the inclusive nature of Section 7(1), transfer of a business, even if not strictly "in the course or furtherance of" the transferor's ongoing business, constitutes a "supply" under the GST Act.
2.5 The Court noted that, under Schedule II, a transfer of business "as a going concern" is not treated as a supply of goods but as a supply of services, falling within the scope of services contemplated by the Act.
2.6 As the GST Act does not define "going concern", the Court adopted the expression in its ordinary and financial sense, identifying key features such as:
- continuity of operations without imminent liquidation;
- financial stability and ability to meet obligations;
- consistent revenue streams and profitability;
- absence of intention to materially curtail operations; and
- preparation of financial statements on the basis of continued use of assets.
2.7 On facts, the Court found that:
- all business assets and liabilities (other than personal buildings and investments) of the proprietorship concern were to be transferred to the applicant;
- immovable property, goods, employees, goodwill and unexecuted orders, including ongoing works for the Public Health Engineering Directorate, would move to the applicant; and
- the applicant would continue to run the same business, executing pending and ongoing work orders.
2.8 The Court relied on financial statements of the transferor for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 showing:
- turnover increase from Rs. 6.66 crore to Rs. 9.23 crore;
- gross profit increase from Rs. 2.60 crore to Rs. 3.72 crore; and
- significant fixed assets (furniture, plant and machinery) and rising sundry debtors.
2.9 These indicators were treated as evidence of a financially healthy enterprise with no indication of imminent liquidation and capability of continued operations, satisfying the attributes of a "going concern".
2.10 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the transaction constituted a transfer of business as a going concern, and, by virtue of Schedule II and Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), such transfer is to be treated as a supply of services exempt from GST.
Conclusions
2.11 The transfer of business assets and liabilities from the proprietorship concern to the applicant constitutes a "service by way of transfer of a going concern" within the meaning of Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and is exempt from GST.
2.12 Since the transfer is so exempt, the question of alternative classification and applicable rate of tax does not arise.
Issue 2 - Effect of prior advance ruling and taxability of post-transfer supplies under existing and sample work orders
Legal framework
2.13 The Court referred to Section 103(1) of the GST Act, which provides that an advance ruling is binding only on (a) the applicant who sought it, and (b) the concerned or jurisdictional officer in respect of that applicant.
2.14 Section 103(2) was noted, which makes an advance ruling binding unless the law, facts, or circumstances supporting the original ruling have changed.
2.15 The Court considered Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), exempting:
"Pure services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority or a Governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution."
2.16 In that context, the Court outlined:
- the concept of "pure services" as services not involving works contract or any composite supply with goods;
- the definition of "composite supply" in Section 2(30) of the GST Act; and
- relevant constitutional provisions: Article 243G read with Eleventh Schedule (including Entry 11: "Drinking water") and Article 243W read with Twelfth Schedule (including Entry 5: "Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes").
2.17 The Court also considered the statutory and policy background of Jal Jeevan Mission and the role of the Public Health Engineering Department/Directorate in providing safe and reliable drinking water, directly linked to the constitutional functions relating to drinking water and water supply.
Interpretation and reasoning - Effect of earlier ruling for the transferor
2.18 The Court recorded that an earlier advance ruling dated 11.12.2024 had been issued in favour of the transferor (proprietorship concern) holding that specified services under particular work orders were exempt as "pure services" under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
2.19 The applicant contended that, after business transfer, supplies/invoices for such work orders executed by the applicant should retain identical taxability as earlier determined for the transferor.
2.20 The Court held that, under Section 103(1), the previous advance ruling is binding only on the original applicant (transferor) and its jurisdictional officer, not on the applicant (transferee), who is a distinct taxable person with a separate GSTIN.
2.21 The Court further held that, by virtue of Section 103(2), the underlying facts and circumstances have changed due to transfer of business from the transferor to the applicant, and therefore the earlier ruling cannot automatically extend to the applicant.
2.22 Consequently, the Court concluded that the advance ruling dated 11.12.2024 is not applicable or binding in respect of the applicant or its jurisdictional officer, and identical tax treatment cannot be claimed purely on the basis of that earlier ruling.
Interpretation and reasoning - Taxability of services under sample work orders post-transfer
2.23 The Court distinguished two categories of work:
(a) work items described in para 4.9, in respect of which the earlier ruling had already been rendered in favour of the transferor; and
(b) additional work items described in para 4.10, on which no previous ruling had been sought or given.
2.24 For the category (a) items (para 4.9), the Court reiterated that the previous ruling remains confined to the transferor and does not bind or govern the applicant. No transposition of that ruling's binding effect to the applicant was recognised.
2.25 For the category (b) items (para 4.10), the Court undertook an independent analysis of the sample work orders, which broadly related to:
- digital transformation and monitoring of mega schemes;
- enhancement of Jalmitra application and related Android/Web modules;
- digitisation and asset mapping of Piped Water Supply Schemes;
- geo-referenced digitisation of drawings and data validation;
- field-level validation of Functional Household Tap Connection (FHTC) data;
- orientation programmes for implementation and monitoring stakeholders; and
- development/maintenance of applications and platforms for unique tap water identity generation and data access.
2.26 The Court found, after detailed examination, that these activities:
- do not involve any works contract; and
- do not involve composite supplies with any element of supply of goods.
2.27 Accordingly, the services under the sample work orders in para 4.10 were characterised as "pure services".
2.28 The Court further observed that these services are provided to the Government of West Bengal, represented by the Public Health Engineering Directorate, which is a governmental department engaged in water supply schemes under Jal Jeevan Mission and related programmes.
2.29 The Court held that these services are directly in relation to the function of providing drinking water and water supply to households, which are functions entrusted to Panchayats under Article 243G (Eleventh Schedule, Entry 11) and to Municipalities under Article 243W (Twelfth Schedule, Entry 5).
2.30 All three cumulative conditions under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) were thus found to be satisfied for the work items listed in para 4.10:
- the services are "pure services" (no works contract or supply of goods);
- the recipient is the State Government (through the PHE Directorate); and
- the activities are in relation to functions constitutionally entrusted to Panchayats/Municipalities regarding drinking water and water supply.
2.31 However, the Court limited its ruling to the specific sample work orders placed on record, clarifying that the exemption would apply only if actual work orders issued to the applicant remain the same as those samples in all material respects.
Conclusions
2.32 The earlier advance ruling dated 11.12.2024 in favour of the transferor is not binding on the applicant (transferee) or its jurisdictional officer. It cannot be automatically invoked to govern the taxability of supplies made by the applicant post-transfer.
2.33 As regards the work items in para 4.9, the previous ruling remains confined to the transferor, and the applicant cannot claim its binding effect; separate determination is necessary, and the earlier ruling does not apply to the applicant by operation of law.
2.34 As regards the work items in para 4.10, if, after the business transfer, the applicant executes those works under work orders identical in content and scope to the sample work orders examined, the services provided qualify as exempt "pure services" under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), subject to the conditions identified by the Court.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the proposed road transport services under the new business model constitute "Goods Transport Agency" services.
1.2 Whether Goods Transport Agency services so provided to unregistered customers through an electronic commerce operator's portal are exempt under Sl. No. 21A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Characterisation of the proposed services as "Goods Transport Agency" (GTA) services
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined the definition of "goods transport agency" in the rate and exemption notifications, which provide that a "goods transport agency" means any person who provides service in relation to transport of goods by road and issues a consignment note, by whatever name called.
2.2 It also referred to Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), Sl. No. 18, which exempts transportation of goods by road except when provided by (i) a goods transport agency, or (ii) a courier agency.
2.3 As "consignment note" is not defined in the GST law, the Court applied Rule 4B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, treating the concept as pari materia. A consignment note is a serially numbered document issued by a GTA against receipt of goods for transport by road, containing the name of consignor and consignee, registration number of the goods carriage, details of goods, origin and destination, and person liable to pay tax.
2.4 The Court relied on Circular No. 234/28/2024-GST, clarifying that ancillary or incidental services such as loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, trans-shipment and temporary warehousing provided in the course of transportation of goods by road are to be treated as a composite supply of transport of goods by a GTA.
2.5 The Court also took note of tribunal decisions under the erstwhile service tax regime and accepted the principle that issuance of a consignment note is a sine qua non for classification as GTA services, and that mere road transportation without issuance of a consignment note does not amount to GTA.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Court identified the essential elements of GTA: (i) a "person" as per section 2(84) of the GST Act; (ii) provision of service of transport of goods; (iii) transport of goods by road; and (iv) issuance of a consignment note, thereby creating a lien and responsibility over the goods until delivery.
2.7 On facts, the applicant is a company and thus a "person". Under the proposed model, it undertakes transport of goods by road from a Source Mother Hub to the end-customer's delivery address, including return movements, using trucks, vans, two-wheelers or a combination thereof, but exclusively by road.
2.8 The applicant issues a single consignment note for each movement from Source Mother Hub to delivery address, covering the entire road journey regardless of intermediate hubs or multiple vehicles. Specimen consignment notes produced show serial numbering, names of consignor and consignee, vehicle registration, details of goods, origin and destination, and identification of the person liable for charges.
2.9 The Court accepted that issuance of the consignment note shifts lien and responsibility for safe delivery to the applicant, and that this satisfies the decisive condition for GTA classification. It further held that the actual carriage may be done either by the applicant itself or by engaging third-party transporters without affecting the GTA character, as the consignment note and obligation to deliver rest with the applicant.
2.10 The Court considered that ancillary services (loading, unloading, packing, unpacking, trans-shipment, temporary warehousing) are performed, where necessary, only in the course of and in relation to a specific transportation, and that, in light of Circular No. 234/28/2024-GST, these must be treated as part of a composite supply of GTA service and not as separate taxable supplies.
2.11 The Court distinguished courier agency services, noting that courier agencies generally provide door-to-door transportation of time-sensitive documents, goods or articles, often using multi-modal transport and generally without issuing a consignment note in GTA form. The proposed activity is exclusively by road and accompanied by a consignment note, and thus cannot be treated as courier agency services. The Court endorsed prior circular clarifications that even time-sensitive road delivery with a consignment note remains GTA service.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court concluded that the applicant, under the proposed model, satisfies all statutory elements of a "goods transport agency", and the services of transportation of goods by road with issuance of consignment note constitute GTA services.
Issue 2 - Exemption for GTA services provided to unregistered customers under Sl. No. 21A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)
Legal framework
2.13 The Court examined Sl. No. 21A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), which grants NIL rate exemption to "services provided by a goods transport agency to an unregistered person, including an unregistered casual taxable person", except where the recipient falls within specified categories (factory, registered society, co-operative society, body corporate, partnership firm/AOP, or registered casual taxable person).
2.14 The concept of "recipient" was examined with reference to section 2(93) of the GST Act: where consideration is payable for the supply of services, the recipient is the person liable to pay that consideration.
2.15 The Court also took cognisance of Circular No. 234/28/2024-GST to hold that ancillary or incidental services forming part of the composite GTA supply follow the same tax treatment as the principal GTA service.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 Under the Terms of Use on the e-commerce platform, the end-customer, at the time of ordering goods, concurrently engages a transport service provider (facilitated by the e-commerce operator) for movement of goods from seller to buyer. The contract of sale remains between seller and buyer; the transporter is only a logistics and delivery service provider and never the owner of goods.
2.17 The applicant enters into a principal-to-principal arrangement with the e-commerce operator for providing transportation services to end-customers. The applicant issues the consignment note in the name of the end-customer and raises a tax invoice or bill of supply for transportation charges in the name of the end-customer.
2.18 The consideration for GTA services is contractually payable by the end-customer. Payment may be routed (a) through the e-commerce operator who collects from the customer online and remits to the applicant, or (b) directly from the customer to the applicant in cash on delivery. In both forms, the person liable to pay the consideration is the end-customer.
2.19 Applying section 2(93), the Court held that the end-customer is the "recipient" of the GTA services, as the party liable to pay consideration, irrespective of the collection channel used by the e-commerce operator.
2.20 The Court noted that end-customers on the platform comprise (i) registered persons purchasing for business (eligible for business purchase tagging), and (ii) individual customers who are not registered under GST. For the latter category, they are unregistered persons unless they fall within the specific excepted classes listed in Sl. No. 21A.
2.21 Once the applicant is characterised as a GTA and the end-customer is identified as the recipient, the only remaining enquiry is whether the recipient is unregistered and not within any of the excluded categories under Sl. No. 21A. Where this condition is met, the service qualifies for the NIL-rated exemption.
2.22 The Court further held that, by virtue of Circular No. 234/28/2024-GST, any ancillary or incidental services provided by the applicant in the course of a specific transportation (loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, trans-shipment, temporary warehousing, etc.) form a composite supply of GTA services, and therefore share the same exempt status under Sl. No. 21A when the main GTA supply is exempt.
Conclusions
2.23 The Court concluded that, under the proposed model, the recipient of the applicant's GTA services is the end-customer who is liable to pay the transportation charges.
2.24 Where such recipient is an unregistered person who does not fall within any of the specified excluded categories under Sl. No. 21A, the GTA services provided by the applicant are exempt from GST at NIL rate under that entry.
2.25 Ancillary or incidental services forming part of the composite GTA supply to such unregistered recipients are also covered by the same exemption.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the assumption of jurisdiction under Sections 147, 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to reopen the assessment for Assessment Year 2021-22 on the basis of a loan transaction with a third party, was valid when such transaction and the related interest income were already disclosed in the return and books of account.
1.2 Whether a reassessment notice and order under Sections 148 and 148A(3), founded solely on an allegation that the counterparty to a disclosed loan transaction is non-genuine or non-cooperative, without disputing the assessee's disclosure of the transaction and interest income, can be sustained as "income having escaped assessment" within the meaning of Section 147.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment proceedings under Sections 147, 148 and 148A where the impugned loan transaction and interest income were fully disclosed
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of the statutory scheme under Sections 147, 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empower the Assessing Officer to reopen an assessment where income chargeable to tax has "escaped assessment", after issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 148A(1), consideration of the assessee's reply, and passing of an order under Section 148A(3) deciding whether it is a fit case for issuance of notice under Section 148.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that: (i) for Assessment Year 2021-22, the assessee filed its return of income which was processed under Section 143(1); (ii) the reopening was triggered by information on the Insight Portal regarding a transaction of Rs. 58,62,61,000/- with M/s. Astro Gems & Jewellery Pvt. Ltd.; (iii) the assessee, in detailed replies, specifically explained that a loan of Rs. 29,31,29,000/- had been advanced and repaid, and that interest at 13% per annum amounting to Rs. 1,91,85,520/- was received, duly credited to the Profit and Loss Account and offered as income in the return for Financial Year 2020-21; and (iv) the respondents did not dispute the assessee's disclosure of the interest income and accounting of the loan transaction in the books.
2.3 The Court noted that, while issuing the show-cause under Section 148A(1) and in forming the belief of escapement of income, the Assessing Officer confined himself only to the figure of Rs. 58,62,61,000/- and did not even advert to the interest income of Rs. 1,91,85,520/- which, on the assessee's case, formed part of the same loan transaction and was already offered to tax.
2.4 The foundation for reopening, as advanced by the revenue, was that: (i) the Investigation Wing had reported that the banking transactions of M/s. Astro Gems & Jewellery Pvt. Ltd. were bogus; (ii) the assessee had no business relationship with that party, rendering the unsecured loan as an "accommodation entry"; and (iii) the said party did not cooperate in the inquiry. On this basis, the loan and its repayment were treated as non-genuine, and therefore, according to the revenue, indicative of escaped income.
2.5 The Court held that the central factual premise-that the loan and related interest were undisclosed-was incorrect. The material on record, including the assessee's replies and the admitted position that the interest was reflected in the Profit and Loss Account and return, showed that the loan transaction had been fully disclosed and subjected to processing under Section 143(1).
2.6 The Court reasoned that a transaction which is already on record, disclosed in the return and accounted for in the books, and whose income component has been duly offered to tax, cannot, without more, be treated as "income that has escaped assessment" merely because the counterparty does not have business relations with the assessee or does not cooperate with the departmental inquiry.
2.7 The Court found that the impugned notice and order proceeded "solely" on the allegation that the counterparty was non-genuine and non-cooperative, without properly examining or dealing with the assessee's explanation that the entire transaction, including interest, was disclosed, and without disputing that disclosure. Such an approach was characterised as ignoring the "correct factual position" and thus being "vague" and "arbitrary".
2.8 On this reasoning, the Court concluded that the precondition for valid assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147-namely, a reasoned belief that income chargeable to tax had in fact escaped assessment-was not satisfied when the very transaction relied upon had been disclosed and considered in the original processing of the return.
(c) Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that:
(i) The loan transaction with M/s. Astro Gems & Jewellery Pvt. Ltd. and the consequent interest income having been fully disclosed in the books and return, and the interest having been offered to tax, such transaction could not legally be treated as "escaped income" within the meaning of Section 147 solely on the basis of alleged non-genuineness or non-cooperation of the borrower.
(ii) The impugned order under Section 148A(3) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were arbitrary, based on an incorrect appreciation of facts, and issued without proper jurisdictional foundation.
(iii) The notice dated 28.06.2025 under Section 148 and the order of even date under Section 148A(3) were therefore quashed and set aside, and the rule was made absolute.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(a) Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued directing State authorities/employer-agencies to reimburse or pay to the contractor the GST/VAT amounts and differential tax burden arising from transition from KVAT regime to GST regime in respect of works contracts.
(b) Whether the methodology and guidelines laid down by earlier decisions of the Court and Government Circulars dated 03.01.2020 and 14.12.2020 governing tax computation for pre-GST and post-GST portions of works contracts are applicable to the present case.
(c) Whether the existence of arbitration or other contractual dispute resolution clauses and other objections raised by the respondents preclude exercise of writ jurisdiction in directing tax reimbursement/differential tax adjustment.
(d) Whether the contractor can be permitted to file or revise GST returns without interest, penalty or limitation consequences and be protected from precipitative action by GST authorities pending implementation of the Court's directions on differential tax calculation and reimbursement.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(a) Mandamus for reimbursement/payment of GST/VAT and differential tax burden
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court notes that the relief sought is "akin to" what has been decided in an earlier batch of writ petitions, where class-I contractors executing works contracts with State agencies were faced with additional tax burden due to the shift from KVAT and Service Tax to GST with effect from 01.07.2017. In that earlier case, after examining State Government Circulars dated 03.01.2020 and 14.12.2020 and judgments from other High Courts under similar factual situations, the Court held:
- Tax component in such contracts is an independent component; it is a statutory payment which the contractor does not retain as profit and which must ultimately be borne by the employer.
- Where works contracts were entered into during KVAT regime but executed partly or fully post-GST, or where tenders were invited under KVAT/old schedule of rates and finalized/paid under GST regime, the employer is required to determine the "differential tax burden" and reimburse/pay the contractor accordingly.
- Detailed directions were given to segregate pre-GST and post-GST works, assess under KVAT/COT/VAT for pre-GST, recompute GST liability for balance works after deducting embedded KVAT/Service Tax, factoring input tax credit, and then compute "tax difference" to be reimbursed or adjusted.
Subsequent co-ordinate Bench decisions, dealing with contractors seeking reimbursement of GST or refund of differential GST (difference between VAT and GST), have unreservedly followed the above view and either:
- Directed reimbursement of the quantified GST/differential GST amounts within specified time; or
- Directed consideration of representations and refund in accordance with the earlier directions and Government Circulars.
In the present case, the Court records that the controversy and the nature of contracts are identical, and that the earlier judgments have already addressed the same category of works contracts and tax transition impacts. The Court, therefore, finds it appropriate to "follow suit" and apply the same directions/guidelines to the petitioner's contracts.
Conclusions
- The State and Government agencies that have entered into works contracts with the petitioner are obliged to determine and bear the differential tax burden arising from the transition from KVAT/Service Tax to GST, in terms of the methodology earlier prescribed by the Court and in alignment with the Government Circulars.
- A mandamus is issued directing respondents to:
* Calculate works executed pre-GST (prior to 01.07.2017) and payments received; assess such payments under KVAT (COT or VAT, as applicable).
* Calculate balance works completed or to be completed post-01.07.2017; derive material/KVAT item rates; deduct KVAT and Service Tax components; add applicable GST; compute input tax credit and set it off against output GST.
* Compute "tax difference" for post-GST works separately, decide whether the agreement needs variation, and, if required, enter into supplementary agreements fixing GST-inclusive values.
* Where revised GST-inclusive work value for balance work exceeds the original agreement value, or where pre-GST works are paid post-GST, reimburse/pay the contractor the resulting differential tax amount.
(b) Applicability of Government Circulars and prior decisions on methodology
Legal framework discussed
The Court relies on the following, as already discussed and applied in earlier decisions:
- State Government Circular dated 03.01.2020 prescribing steps for distinguishing pre-GST and post-GST portions of works, removing KVAT/Service Tax components, applying GST, and adjusting input tax credit.
- State Government Circular dated 14.12.2020 clarifying that:
* Turnover relating to supplies before 01.07.2017 is taxable under earlier laws (KVAT, Service Tax), including uncertified work already executed.
* Only the portion executed after 01.07.2017 is liable under GST.
* Tax difference must be calculated for each work separately; departments must then decide whether to amend contract agreements.
- Judgments from other High Courts (Orissa, Madras, Gujarat) recognizing that GST regime change cannot unfairly burden the contractor; requiring recalculation of contract price/tax components, execution of supplementary agreements, and reimbursement/refund or recovery depending on comparative tax incidence pre- and post-GST.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court notes that these Circulars and external precedents were examined in detail and expressly adopted in the earlier co-ordinate Bench judgment as providing a workable and equitable methodology for dealing with tax impact on pre-GST works contracts spilling over into the GST period. That methodology has since been consistently applied by subsequent Benches in multiple writ petitions involving the same issue.
In the present case, the Court observes that the factual matrix aligns with those earlier cases, including:
- Works contracts entered into under KVAT regime but executed and/or paid in the GST regime; and
- Contractors having discharged GST obligations while the contractual pricing or payments did not fully reflect the changed tax structure.
Given this identity of circumstances and the absence of any distinguishing features or challenge to the correctness of the earlier decisions or Circulars, the Court holds that the same methodology and guidelines govern the present dispute.
Conclusions
- The computation and adjustment of tax liabilities in the petitioner's case shall strictly follow the directions/guidelines set out earlier, which reproduce and give effect to the Government Circulars dated 03.01.2020 and 14.12.2020.
- Respondent departments/employers must apply this methodology to each contract, decide on modification of agreements, and execute supplementary agreements where necessary to reflect GST-inclusive values and differential tax reimbursement.
(c) Effect of arbitration clause and other objections on maintainability of writ
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court records that in a prior writ (referred to in the present order), similar contentions were raised by respondents, including:
- That the contracts contain dispute resolution/arbitration clauses, and, therefore, tax reimbursement or rate disputes must be referred to arbitration or other contractual mechanisms.
- Other objections touching on maintainability or the nature of contractual claims.
The Court notes that those contentions were already "taken note of and an order is passed" by the earlier co-ordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.9721 of 2019 and connected cases, and the same contentions, now "identical" in the present case, stand effectively addressed in that precedent. The Court chooses to follow that binding co-ordinate Bench view, which proceeded to issue mandamus and detailed directions despite the existence of arbitration and other contractual clauses, particularly because the issue centers on statutory tax liability and its proper allocation between contractor and employer under the changed tax regime.
Conclusions
- The presence of arbitration/dispute resolution clauses and other contractual objections does not bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the core question is allocation of statutory tax liability (VAT/GST) and the contractor's right to reimbursement/differential tax adjustment, governed by Government policy/circulars and prior judicial directions.
- The writ petition is maintainable and is disposed of on merits with detailed directions, without relegating the petitioner solely to contractual remedies.
- However, liberty is expressly reserved to the petitioner to challenge any subsequent orders/decisions of respondents/authorities and to take recourse to such other remedies as available in law.
(d) Permission to file/amend GST returns and protection from coercive action
Interpretation and reasoning
In the earlier batch decision, the Court had taken note that because of the pendency of writ petitions and interim orders, some contractors had not filed GST returns for the relevant period after 01.07.2017. Recognizing that the computation of differential tax and reimbursement under the prescribed methodology may necessitate fresh or corrected disclosures, the Court allowed filing of returns or amended returns without interest, penalty or limitation, and restrained GST authorities from taking precipitative action for a limited period.
In the present case, the Court finds the situation indistinguishable and expressly adopts the same protective directions, linking them to the recalculation exercise that respondents and the petitioner are directed to undertake.
Conclusions
- If the petitioner has not filed GST returns for the period after 01.07.2017, he is permitted to file returns/amended returns pursuant to calculation of differential tax as per the Court-directed procedure under GST regime, without insistence on interest, penalty or limitation.
- GST authorities are directed not to take precipitative action against the petitioner for a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
(e) Procedural directions: representations, consideration and timelines
Interpretation and reasoning
Following the earlier co-ordinate Bench, the Court structures the relief through a representation-and-consideration mechanism, rather than immediate quantification in the writ itself. The rationale is that:
- Determination of differential tax requires contract-wise and work-wise factual computation (segregation of pre- and post-GST work, KVAT/GST rates, ITC, etc.) which is best performed by the employer departments/agencies.
- Contractors must first place comprehensive particulars before the competent authorities; those authorities must then apply the Court's methodology and Government Circulars and pass appropriate orders within a fixed timeframe.
Conclusions
- The petitioner must submit comprehensive representations to the respective employer departments/respondents, covering all relevant contracts and works, within four weeks from receipt of the order.
- On receipt of such representations, the respective employers/respondents must consider and dispose of them, applying the directions/guidelines on differential tax computation, within eight weeks from submission.
- All contentions of both parties, beyond the issues decided and directions issued, are left open, preserving their rights in subsequent proceedings if any adverse orders are passed following this exercise.
Issues: (i) Whether an adjudication order passed in summary form without relevant facts, reasons, and hearing could be sustained in law; (ii) whether service of notices and orders through the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal was proper and whether the consequential bank attachment could survive.
Issue (i): Whether an adjudication order passed in summary form without relevant facts, reasons, and hearing could be sustained in law.
Analysis: Section 75(6) of the WBGST Act, 2017 requires the proper officer to set out the relevant facts and the basis of the decision in the adjudication order. An order passed by a quasi-judicial authority must also be informed by reasons. Where the order communicated to the taxpayer remains in summary form, contains no factual particulars, and is passed without affording the required hearing under Section 75(4), the order violates the statutory mandate and the principles of natural justice. An order without reasons cannot withstand scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when civil consequences follow.
Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable and was set aside.
Issue (ii): Whether service of notices and orders through the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal was proper and whether the consequential bank attachment could survive.
Analysis: Notice and order service through the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal was treated as improper. Since the show cause notice lacked the factual and other details necessary for a meaningful reply, the proceedings could not be allowed to stand on that basis. The bank attachment was founded on the impugned adjudication order, and once that order failed, the attachment could not be retained.
Conclusion: The writ petition was entertained, the consequential bank attachment was lifted, and fresh proceedings were permitted from the stage of a detailed show cause notice.
Final Conclusion: The impugned tax adjudication was annulled for want of reasons and denial of hearing, consequential coercive action was withdrawn, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A quasi-judicial tax adjudication must be a reasoned speaking order complying with the statutory requirement to record facts and the basis of decision and must be preceded by a fair opportunity of hearing; a summary, unreasoned order passed in breach of natural justice cannot be sustained, and consequential enforcement action based on it must also fall.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether proceedings for determination of tax liability under Section 73 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can validly be initiated and concluded in the name of a person who had died prior to issuance of the show cause notice.
1.2 Whether Section 93 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises determination of tax liability against a deceased person and recovery thereof from the legal representative without issuing notice to such legal representative.
1.3 Whether, in case of death of the proprietor, issuance of show cause notice and conduct of proceedings against the legal representative is a sine qua non for valid determination of tax, interest or penalty.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of proceedings under Section 73 initiated and concluded against a deceased person
Legal framework
2.1 The proceedings were initiated under Section 73 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by issuance of a show cause notice dated 30.11.2024, followed by a determination order dated 25.02.2025 raising demand against the deceased proprietor.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that the proprietor had died on 26.04.2021 and that the show cause notice, reminders and determination of tax were all made subsequent to his death.
2.3 The Court noted that once it is known that the proprietor has died and the registration of the firm has been cancelled, there was no occasion for passing an order in the name of the deceased.
2.4 The Court treated proceedings conducted in the name of a deceased person, without addressing the legal representative, as fundamentally defective and not sustainable in law.
Conclusions
2.5 Proceedings for determination of tax liability under Section 73 cannot validly be initiated or concluded in the name of a person who was already dead at the time of issuance of the show cause notice.
2.6 The determination order passed against the deceased proprietor is void and cannot be sustained.
Issue 2: Scope and effect of Section 93 regarding liability of legal representatives and determination against a deceased person
Legal framework
2.7 Section 93 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was extracted and considered. It provides for "special provisions regarding liability to pay tax, interest or penalty in certain cases" where a person liable under the Act dies, and stipulates liability of the legal representative or other person either where the business is continued or where it is discontinued, "whether such tax, interest or penalty has been determined before his death but has remained unpaid or is determined after his death."
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 The respondents invoked Section 93 to justify recovery from the legal representatives even where determination is made after the death of the proprietor.
2.9 The Court examined Section 93 and held that the provision only deals with the liability to pay tax, interest or penalty in cases where, after the death of the person, the business is either continued by the legal representative/other person or is discontinued, and the estate is made liable to the extent it can meet the charge.
2.10 The Court clarified that Section 93 does not address, nor does it authorise, the making of a determination itself against a dead person; it only regulates from whom and to what extent previously determined or subsequently determined dues may be recovered.
Conclusions
2.11 Section 93 cannot be construed to permit initiation or completion of adjudication and determination proceedings against a deceased person.
2.12 Section 93 only governs the liability and recovery from legal representatives or the estate; it does not validate determinations made in the name of a dead person.
Issue 3: Necessity of issuing show cause notice to legal representatives upon death of proprietor
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The Court observed that once the statute (Section 93) deals with the liability of a legal representative on account of death of the proprietor, it becomes a sine qua non that the legal representative must be issued a show cause notice.
2.14 It was held that only after issuing such notice and obtaining a response from the legal representative can any lawful determination of tax, interest or penalty be made.
2.15 In the present case, no show cause notice was issued to the legal representative; all steps, including determination, were taken in the name of the deceased.
Conclusions
2.16 Issuance of a show cause notice to the legal representative and affording an opportunity of response is mandatory for valid determination where the person originally liable has died.
2.17 Since the determination was made solely against the deceased without notice to the legal representative, the order dated 25.02.2025 is liable to be quashed.
2.18 The impugned order was set aside, with liberty to the authorities to initiate appropriate proceedings afresh in accordance with law, including by issuing proper notice to the legal representative if so advised.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the demand order passed under Section 74 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, by demanding tax, interest and penalty in excess of the amount specified in the show-cause notice, is contrary to Section 75(7) of the Act.
1.2 Whether the absence of a specified date of personal hearing in the show-cause notice, and the assessee's non-awareness of the uploaded notice, vitiated the proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.
1.3 Consequentially, whether the appellate and original orders could be sustained.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Demand in excess of amount specified in show-cause notice under Section 75(7)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which provides that the amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in the order shall not be in excess of the amount specified in the notice and that no demand shall be confirmed on grounds other than those specified in the notice.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that the show-cause notice indicated a consolidated amount of Rs. 32,11,470/- representing tax, interest and penalty.
2.3 The Court further noted that the demand actually raised in the order under challenge, qua tax, interest and penalty, was Rs. 60,54,984/-.
2.4 The Court held that this enhancement of the aggregate demand in the order, beyond the amount specified in the show-cause notice, was ex facie contrary to Section 75(7) of the Act.
Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that the impugned demand order was unsustainable on account of violation of Section 75(7) of the Act.
Issue 2: Alleged violation of principles of natural justice regarding personal hearing
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The assessee contended that, while the show-cause notice and reminder fixed dates for filing reply, the column pertaining to the date of personal hearing mentioned "NA", which was alleged to be violative of principles of natural justice.
2.7 The Court observed that the assessee's own case was that it was unaware of the issuance of the show-cause notice as it had been uploaded under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab and no response was filed.
2.8 In this backdrop, the Court held that, once the assessee claimed non-awareness of the notice itself, the indication of a date for filing reply and the marking of "NA" against the date of personal hearing would lose significance, and the notice could not be said to be vitiated on that ground alone.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court did not set aside the proceedings on the independent ground of denial of personal hearing arising from the contents of the show-cause notice, but directed a fresh opportunity of hearing in consequence of setting aside the demand order for violation of Section 75(7).
Issue 3: Sustainability of the appellate and original orders and consequential relief
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The appellate order had rejected the assessee's appeal on the ground of delay. The Court, having found the original demand order to be contrary to Section 75(7), examined the sustainability of both the orders.
2.11 Since the foundational demand order itself was held unsustainable, the appellate order upholding the same (by declining to entertain the appeal) could not stand.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the demand order dated 11.02.2025 and the appellate order dated 13.10.2025, and remanded the matter to the original authority to permit the assessee to file a response to the show-cause notice and, after granting an opportunity of hearing, to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
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Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
TaxTMI