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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether disallowance of depreciation on Passive Infrastructure assets transferred under a court-approved demerger, treated as "gift", was justified.
1.2 Whether network site rentals paid to an associated infrastructure company were excessive/not incurred wholly and exclusively for business, warranting disallowance.
1.3 Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was permissible where no exempt income was earned, and consequences for section 80IA and section 115JB.
1.4 Whether national and international roaming charges paid to other telecom operators attracted tax deduction at source under section 194J, justifying disallowance under sections 40(a)(ia) and 40(a)(i).
1.5 Whether trade discounts on prepaid products to distributors constituted "commission" attracting section 194H and consequent disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).
1.6 Whether Service From India Scheme (SFIS) income and other incidental incomes from telecom operations qualified for deduction under section 80IA(2A), including the relevance of the "derived from" test.
1.7 Determination of the initial assessment year and applicability of amended provisions of section 80IA, and rate of deduction for a telecom undertaking.
1.8 Whether foreign exchange gain, cell site sharing and IRU revenue, bad debts written back, and other ancillary revenues were eligible for deduction under section 80IA(2A).
1.9 Proper year of taxability of receipts from prepaid services and permissibility of the assessee's revenue recognition method for unutilised talk time.
1.10 Character of licence fee paid to the Department of Telecommunications post-migration to revenue sharing regime and its treatment under sections 35ABB and 37(1).
1.11 Character of spectrum/WPC royalty charges and their eligibility as revenue expenditure under section 37(1) vis-à-vis section 35ABB.
1.12 Allowability under section 36(1)(iii) of interest on external commercial borrowings used for acquisition of capital assets.
1.13 Validity of transfer pricing adjustment on brand royalty payments for use of "Vodafone" and "Essar" brands.
1.14 Validity of adding section 14A disallowance while computing book profits under section 115JB.
1.15 Maintainability of ground against mere initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Depreciation on Passive Infrastructure assets transferred as "gift"
Legal framework discussed: Sections 2(47), 45, 47(iii), 50D, 95; concept of "gift" by company; prior Tribunal decision in group case.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that in a sister concern's case, on identical facts involving transfer of PI assets to the same infrastructure company under a court-approved demerger, it was held that the transfer constituted a genuine "gift" recognised under section 47(iii), not a sham or colourable device. Corporate power to gift and High Court approval of the scheme, after considering Revenue's objections, were treated as determinative. Revenue could not show any change in facts or law.
Conclusions: The transfer of PI assets was a genuine "gift" covered by section 47(iii), not a taxable transfer; the AO could not impute deemed consideration or disallow depreciation by reducing WDV. Disallowance of depreciation was deleted; assessee's Ground No.1 allowed.
2.2 Network site rentals paid to infrastructure company
Legal framework discussed: Sections 37(1), 40A(2)(b).
Interpretation and reasoning: The AO originally invoked section 40A(2)(b); DRP held that provision inapplicable but treated a substantial portion of rentals as not "wholly and exclusively" for business under section 37(1) due to perceived lack of value addition and abnormal increase over earlier IRU receipts. Assessee contended that post-transfer, the infrastructure company incurred running/maintenance, power, security, repairs, etc., and that earlier own costs had reduced accordingly. These factual contentions and whether such costs were earlier recovered from the infrastructure company had not been examined by lower authorities.
Conclusions: Matter required detailed factual verification of cost structures and value addition. Issue remanded to AO for de novo adjudication after examining assessee's submissions and records; Ground No.2 allowed for statistical purposes.
2.3 Disallowance under section 14A and effect on 80IA and 115JB
Legal framework discussed: Section 14A; Rule 8D; section 10(34); section 80IA; section 115JB and Explanation 1(f).
Interpretation and reasoning: The assessee had investments but earned no exempt income and claimed no exemption under section 10(34). Following its own earlier year's Tribunal order (which applied jurisdictional High Court precedent holding that section 14A disallowance cannot be made absent exempt income), the Tribunal held that no disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be sustained. For MAT, the Special Bench in Vireet Investments was followed, holding that computation under Explanation 1(f) to section 115JB has to be made independently, without importing section 14A/Rule 8D methodology.
Conclusions: Section 14A disallowance of Rs. 92.75 lakh deleted; Ground No.3 allowed. Consequent claim of 80IA on such disallowance rendered academic and left open. Addition of this amount in book profit under section 115JB directed to be deleted; Ground No.7 allowed.
2.4 Roaming charges and TDS under section 194J (sections 40(a)(ia)/(i))
Legal framework discussed: Sections 194J, 9(1)(vii), 40(a)(ia), 40(a)(i); characterization of roaming services and "fees for technical services".
Interpretation and reasoning: AO held roaming involved continuous human technical intervention and thus "fees for technical services", requiring TDS under section 194J; disallowance was made for both domestic and international roaming charges. Tribunal noted that in assessee's own earlier year, and in sister concerns' cases, it had been held that roaming services are automated network facilities not amounting to "technical services" to the payer; therefore section 194J did not apply and disallowance under sections 40(a)(ia)/(i) was unwarranted. Revenue showed no distinguishing facts or adverse higher-court ruling.
Conclusions: Roaming charges did not attract TDS under section 194J; disallowances under sections 40(a)(ia) and 40(a)(i) deleted. Assessee's Ground No.4 allowed.
2.5 Trade discount to prepaid distributors - section 194H and section 40(a)(ia)
Legal framework discussed: Sections 194H, 40(a)(ia); nature of trade discount vs commission.
Interpretation and reasoning: AO treated the margin between MRP and distributor price for SIMs/recharge coupons as "commission", on footing that only services are rendered and distributors act as agents. Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision holding that cellular operators are not obliged to deduct TDS under section 194H on the income/profit component received by distributors from third-party customers on sale of prepaid products and that such margins are trade discounts, not commission.
Conclusions: Section 194H was not attracted to trade discount to prepaid distributors; consequential disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) deleted. Assessee's Ground No.5 allowed.
2.6 SFIS income and other telecom-related incomes - deduction under section 80IA(2A)
Legal framework discussed: Sections 80IA(1), 80IA(2), 80IA(2A), 80IA(4)(ii); nature of SFIS incentives.
Interpretation and reasoning: The assessee, a telecom undertaking covered by section 80IA(4)(ii), claimed 80IA deduction on SFIS income (duty credit scrips on export of services). AO applied "derived from" test of section 80IA(1) and treated SFIS as export incentive not having first-degree nexus. Tribunal analysed section 80IA(2A), which, by a non obstante clause, grants deduction of "hundred per cent of the profits and gains of the eligible business" to telecom undertakings, without using "derived from" language. Following High Court authority, it held that telecom undertakings under section 80IA(2A) form a distinct category not subject to the stricter "derived from" test in section 80IA(1). Similar reasoning was followed (in assessee's and group cases) to extend 80IA(2A) benefit to foreign exchange gains, cell site sharing/IRU revenues, bad debts written back, advertisement income, scrap sale, and sharing of switches/ports, as long as they arose from the telecom business.
Conclusions: (a) SFIS income is part of profits and gains of the eligible telecom business and qualifies for deduction under section 80IA(2A); AO's disallowance deleted; assessee's Ground No.6 (SFIS component) allowed. (b) Revenue's Grounds Nos.3, 4, 5, and 6, challenging 80IA deduction on foreign exchange gain, cell site sharing/IRU revenue, bad debts written back, and other ancillary incomes, dismissed; DRP's grant of 80IA deduction on these items upheld.
2.7 Initial assessment year and applicability of amended section 80IA
Legal framework discussed: Section 80IA (pre- and post-amendment from AY 2000-01); section 80IA(4)(ii); concept of "initial assessment year".
Interpretation and reasoning: Earlier Tribunal orders in assessee's own case had conclusively held, based on contemporaneous records, that the assessee started providing telecom services only in the period relevant to AY 1997-98, and that the Department had accepted this position. The Tribunal also earlier held that the amended section 80IA (from AY 2000-01), allowing 100% deduction for specified period and providing option regarding block of years, was applicable to undertakings that had started telecom services on or after 1.4.1995; restrictive interpretation by Revenue was rejected.
Conclusions: (a) AY 1997-98 is the initial assessment year for section 80IA; Revenue's Ground No.1 dismissed. (b) Amended provisions of section 80IA (applicable from AY 2000-01) apply and assessee is entitled to 100% deduction of current year profit as directed by DRP; Revenue's Ground No.2 dismissed.
2.8 Prepaid receipts and timing of revenue recognition
Legal framework discussed: Section 145; accrual concept; recognition of income from prepaid telecom services.
Interpretation and reasoning: AO treated entire amount received from prepaid customers as income of the year, on basis that payments are non-refundable and represent outright purchase of recharge, irrespective of usage. Assessee recognised revenue based on actual usage/expiry of validity and carried unutilised portion as liability. DRP accepted that selling prepaid vouchers imposed a corresponding obligation to render services during validity period; non-refundability of amount did not negate this obligation, and therefore income accrued only on usage/expiry. Tribunal followed earlier decision in another telecom case (affirmed by High Court and Supreme Court) which accepted similar revenue recognition, but required AO to verify that unutilised talk time was recognised as income in the year in which it lapsed.
Conclusions: Mode of recognising revenue on basis of actual usage/expiry upheld in principle; AO directed to verify that unutilised talk time is recognised as income in the year of expiry, and, if no discrepancy is found, no adjustment is to be made. Issue remanded for this limited verification; Revenue's Ground No.9 allowed for statistical purposes.
2.9 Licence fee to Department of Telecommunications - capital vs revenue (sections 35ABB and 37(1))
Legal framework discussed: Sections 35ABB, 37(1); nature of licence under NTP-94 and migration under NTP-99; Supreme Court ruling on telecom licence fee.
Interpretation and reasoning: Initially, assessee capitalised fixed licence fee (pre-1.8.1999) and claimed amortisation under section 35ABB; post-migration (NTP-99) variable annual revenue-share licence fee was claimed as revenue expenditure under section 37(1). AO held all licence fees, including revenue-share, as capital; applied section 35ABB and disallowed balance. DRP, following earlier Tribunal order in assessee's own case, treated revenue-share as revenue expenditure. Subsequently, Supreme Court held that even annual variable licence fee payable under the revenue-sharing regime is capital in nature and amortisable under section 35ABB; resulting impact is timing difference, not permanent disallowance. Tribunal, following this later binding authority and the group case where similar computation had been remitted, accepted that annual licence fees must be amortised under section 35ABB over remaining licence term. Assessee furnished working of net disallowance required for the year.
Conclusions: Annual licence fee under revenue-sharing regime is capital expenditure within section 35ABB; deduction to be allowed only on amortisation basis. AO directed to verify assessee's working and recompute disallowance strictly in line with the Supreme Court decision, including consequential amortisation over remaining licence period. DRP's order modified; Revenue's Ground No.10 partly allowed and matter remanded for computation.
2.10 Spectrum/WPC royalty charges - revenue vs capital
Legal framework discussed: Sections 35ABB, 37(1); nature of spectrum/WPC charges.
Interpretation and reasoning: AO treated WPC payments (calculated as a percentage of adjusted revenue and paid periodically for spectrum use and possession of wireless equipment) as capital expenditure for obtaining licence rights, eligible only for amortisation under section 35ABB. DRP followed a High Court decision in assessee's own case holding that WPC charges are periodic payments for continued use of spectrum and wireless equipment, incurred for carrying on operations, and allowable as revenue expenditure. No change in facts or contrary higher-court ruling was shown.
Conclusions: WPC/spectrum charges are revenue in nature and deductible under section 37(1); disallowance deleted. Revenue's Ground No.11 dismissed.
2.11 Interest on ECB loans for capital assets - section 36(1)(iii)
Legal framework discussed: Sections 36(1)(iii), 43(1) Explanation 8; Supreme Court decision on interest deductibility.
Interpretation and reasoning: AO capitalised interest on ECBs used to acquire capital assets (treated as capital WIP) relying on section 43(1) Explanation 8. DRP, and earlier Tribunal order in assessee's own case, applied Supreme Court authority holding that Explanation 8 to section 43(1) does not govern allowability under section 36(1)(iii); interest on capital borrowed for purposes of business is deductible regardless of whether borrowing is for capital or revenue purposes and even for period up to asset being put to use, unless covered by specific proviso. Revenue did not show application of the later proviso or any extension of business.
Conclusions: Interest on ECB loans used for acquisition of capital assets for existing business is deductible under section 36(1)(iii); disallowance deleted. Revenue's Ground No.12 dismissed.
2.12 Transfer pricing adjustment on brand royalty ("Vodafone" and "Essar")
Legal framework discussed: Sections 92, 92C, 92CA; Rule 10B; CUP vs TNMM; scope of TPO's examination of commercial expediency.
Interpretation and reasoning: Assessee paid royalty at stated percentages of net service revenue to associated enterprises for use of "Vodafone" and "Essar" brands; benchmarked primarily under CUP with third-party royalty rates and alternatively under TNMM at entity level. TPO (a) determined ALP of Essar brand royalty as Nil, citing lack of evidence of benefit and absence of Essar telecom brand in Gujarat, and (b) benchmarked Vodafone brand royalty using a single Virgin brand agreement at 0.25% of gross sales. DRP held: (i) brand value cannot be denied merely because the brand is not associated locally with telecom; Essar is a well-known diversified group with presence including in telecom; (ii) TP law does not require formal cost-benefit analysis; TPO cannot question commercial expediency, consistent with binding judicial precedents; (iii) earlier DRP order on identical facts had accepted royalty rates as arm's length. In the earlier year on substantially identical facts, Tribunal had rejected the TPO's approach of using related-party agreements as comparables under CUP and accepted the DRP's deletion of TP adjustment.
Conclusions: TPO's determination of ALP for Essar brand at Nil and his CUP analysis based on related-party/unsuitable comparables were unsustainable; arm's length nature of royalty payments as accepted by DRP was upheld. TP adjustment deleted in full. Revenue's Grounds Nos.13 and 13(a)-13(j) dismissed.
2.13 Addition of section 14A disallowance to book profit under section 115JB
Legal framework discussed: Section 115JB(2), Explanation 1(f); Special Bench ruling.
Interpretation and reasoning: Following the Special Bench decision, the Tribunal held that the adjustment under clause (f) to Explanation 1 to section 115JB must be computed on its own terms and cannot be mechanically equated with or imported from disallowance worked out under section 14A read with Rule 8D.
Conclusions: AO directed to recompute book profits without importing the section 14A/Rule 8D disallowance; assessee's Ground No.7 allowed.
2.14 Deduction under section 80IA on items disallowed under section 40(a)(ia)
Interpretation and reasoning: Revenue challenged DRP's directions to allow 80IA deduction on amounts disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) relating to roaming charges and discounts to prepaid distributors. As in the assessee's appeal, underlying disallowances under section 40(a)(ia)/(i) were themselves deleted (no TDS obligation under sections 194J/194H). Once primary additions were deleted, the question of 80IA on such disallowances became academic.
Conclusions: Revenue's Grounds Nos.7 and 8 dismissed as academic in view of deletion of the base disallowances.
2.15 Initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c)
Interpretation and reasoning: Challenge was only to initiation of penalty proceedings in the assessment order, not to any penalty order. Such ground was treated as premature at this stage.
Conclusions: Ground against initiation of penalty proceedings dismissed as premature; assessee's Ground No.8 rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether a solitary/composite show-cause notice issued under Sections 73/74 of the CGST/KGST Acts can validly club/consolidate/bunch multiple tax periods/financial years into one proceeding.
(ii) Whether the impugned show-cause notice covering financial years 2019-20 to 2023-24 under Section 74 suffered from lack of jurisdiction/invalidity on account of such clubbing, warranting writ interference and quashing, with liberty to issue fresh notices year-wise.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity of composite show-cause notice clubbing multiple financial years under Sections 73/74
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined the statutory scheme of the CGST/KGST Acts as reflected in provisions governing maintenance/retention of accounts (Sections 35-36), periodic and annual returns (Sections 37, 39 and 44), time limits tied to annual return dates, and the determination provisions under Sections 73 and 74, including the limitation architecture in Sections 73(2), 73(10), 74(2) and 74(10). The Court also referred to Section 16(4) to note that input tax credit entitlement is financial-year bound and subject to year-specific cut-offs. The Court treated the statutory structure as being built around financial-year-specific "assessment universes".
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the architecture of GST compliance and adjudication is intrinsically tied to distinct financial years: registration compliance, accounts, return filing (monthly/quarterly), and the annual return and reconciliation are structured year-wise, and limitation for adjudication is pegged to the due date for furnishing the annual return for the specific financial year to which the demand relates. A composite notice "collapses" this framework and creates jurisdictional illegality because (a) the limitation clock and end-point under Sections 73(10)/74(10) vary year-to-year; (b) the statutory requirement that notices be issued at least three/six months prior to the limitation end cannot be meaningfully applied across multiple years in one notice without curtailing statutory time for some years; and (c) the assessee's right to furnish year-wise explanations, reconciliations and legal defences is prejudiced, resulting in violation of principles of natural justice.
The Court further reasoned that allowing composite notices risks blurring the distinct statutory regimes of Section 73 (non-fraud; shorter limitation) and Section 74 (fraud etc.; longer limitation), enabling an impermissible "colourable exercise of power" by effectively extending limitation for years that might otherwise fall under Section 73. The Court also rejected reliance on a departmental communication/circular asserting permissibility of composite notices, finding it contrary to the Act's scheme. The Court additionally addressed the maintainability objection, holding that where the defect goes to inherent jurisdiction, a writ can lie even against a show-cause notice because the jurisdictional fact necessary to invoke Sections 73/74 is absent when the notice itself is issued in a manner not recognized by the statute.
Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that clubbing/consolidation/bunching/combining of multiple tax periods/financial years in a single/composite show-cause notice under Sections 73/74 is illegal, invalid, impermissible and without jurisdiction, being contrary to the statutory framework of the CGST/KGST Acts.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned notice for FY 2019-20 to FY 2023-24 warranted quashing
Legal framework (as applied): Applying the above construction of Sections 73/74 and the year-specific limitation and adjudication scheme, the Court examined the impugned notice's coverage across multiple financial years under Section 74.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found, on the face of the notice, that it encompassed multiple financial years (2019-20 to 2023-24) and therefore fell within the jurisdictional prohibition declared under Issue (i). Because the defect was foundational-issuance of a composite notice not contemplated by the Act-the notice and all consequential proceedings were held vitiated. The Court therefore exercised writ jurisdiction to prevent continuation of proceedings initiated without authority of law.
Conclusion: The Court held that the impugned show-cause notice and all further proceedings pursuant thereto were illegal, invalid, arbitrary and without jurisdiction, and accordingly quashed them, while reserving liberty to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law (i.e., by issuing separate/independent notices as permissible under the statutory scheme).
Issues: Whether, pending the statutory appeal against the assessment order, the respondents were required to consider the petitioner's representation under section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and refund the amount recovered in excess of the 20% threshold.
Outcome: The respondents were directed to consider the representation on merits within six weeks and to refund any amount recovered in excess of 20%.
Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid; (ii) whether the addition for alleged suppressed production / illegal mining was sustainable; (iii) whether the disallowance under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for alleged illegal expenses was justified.
Issue (i): Whether reassessment under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid.
Analysis: The reassessment was founded entirely on the Justice M.B. Shah Commission report without independent verification of the underlying facts. The record showed that the original assessment had already examined the production and expenditure details, and the reopening notice was issued beyond four years from the end of the assessment year. In such a case, the proviso to section 147 required a showing that escapement of income was attributable to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. That precondition was not satisfied, and the material relied upon did not provide the requisite rational nexus for forming the belief that income had escaped assessment.
Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and the reassessment was rightly quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition for alleged suppressed production / illegal mining was sustainable.
Analysis: The addition was made only on the basis of alleged discrepancy in production figures derived from the Shah Commission report. The appellate record showed that the production figures in Form H-1 submitted to the mining authorities and in the tax audit report tallied, and no independent evidence was brought to establish unrecorded production or unaccounted sales. The finding of alleged illegal mining was therefore not supported by reliable evidence.
Conclusion: The addition for suppressed production / illegal mining was unsustainable and stood deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for alleged illegal expenses was justified.
Analysis: Disallowance under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) applies where expenditure is incurred for a purpose which is an offence or prohibited by law. The payments in question were business payments for mining-related activity, and no penalty or statutory finding of offence was shown against the assessee under the mining or environmental laws. The assessing authority merely estimated "illegal expenses" from the alleged mining dispute, which did not satisfy the statutory test for disallowance.
Conclusion: The disallowance under section 37(1) was not justified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed on all substantive issues, and the appellate relief granted to the assessee was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment beyond four years must be founded on independently verified material showing failure to disclose material facts, and a commission report by itself cannot sustain additions or disallowances without a direct evidentiary nexus to escaped income or statutorily prohibited expenditure.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether an order/communication of the Customs Department that does not reflect the name and designation of the officer who actually passed it, and is digitally signed/communicated by another officer, is procedurally improper so as to warrant judicial directions ensuring accountability and authenticity.
(ii) Whether the requirement that the name of the officer passing an order be clearly mentioned (as contained in an SOP earlier approved by the Court for baggage cases) should be applied to all orders and communications issued by the Customs Department, and what operative directions should follow.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity/propriety of Customs orders not reflecting the actual decision-maker
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined administrative law requirements of transparency and accountability in governmental decision-making, in the context of Customs orders. It treated the identification of the decision-maker and proper signing as essential to the integrity of the process and to avoid doubts about authenticity.
Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned order was dated 26 July 2025 but was signed later, and the officer who digitally signed/communicated it was stated not to be the officer who actually passed it. The Court found it "strange" that the name and designation of the person actually passing the order were not reflected in the order. The responsible officer appeared and admitted passing the order, explaining staffing shortages and workload as the reason for requesting a Superintendent to communicate it. The Court held that such explanation is not a justifiable reason for not signing the actual order. It emphasized that while communication can be carried out by another official for administrative convenience, the order must clearly reflect the identity of the actual officer who passed it; otherwise, there is "no way of knowing as to who has passed the order," undermining accountability and enabling doubts as to genuineness.
Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that orders must be signed by the officer who passes them and must clearly mention the name and designation of that officer; communication may be done by others, but the identity of the decision-maker cannot be absent or misrepresented.
Issue (ii): Extension of SOP requirement (naming the officer passing the order) beyond baggage matters; operative directions
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court referred to an SOP earlier approved by it for Customs handling of baggage cases, which required that the name of the officer passing the order be mentioned in full along with designation, and noted that the SOP had been published by the competent authority. The Court treated this SOP requirement as embodying a broader principle applicable to Customs administration generally.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasoned that the safeguard of clearly identifying the officer passing an order cannot be confined to baggage matters alone. Since Customs orders and communications affect rights and entail legal consequences, the same minimum standards of identification, signing, and traceability must apply across Customs matters to preserve accountability and prevent doubts about authenticity.
Conclusion and directions: While accepting the explanation for purposes of the present case, the Court issued a binding prospective direction that in future, in all Customs matters, all communications and orders must be signed with the name and designation of the officer who passed the order being mentioned. The Court further directed that preferably physical or digital signatures should be affixed; otherwise doubts may arise as to the genuineness of the order. It clarified that other officials may communicate orders for administrative convenience, but the name/designation of the actual officer cannot be misrepresented.
Issues: (i) Whether the coal block allocation letter constituted property and could form the basis of proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the share application money and share premium collected by the appellant were proceeds of crime liable to attachment notwithstanding the timing of receipt, the absence of mining, and their deployment for business purposes.
Issue (i): Whether the coal block allocation letter constituted property and could form the basis of proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The definition of property under Section 2(1)(v) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is expansive and includes intangible rights and interests. The allocation letter conferred a valuable commercial right on the appellant and was treated as property involved in the offence. In view of the proved scheduled offences of cheating and criminal conspiracy, the allocation obtained by misrepresentation was held to be property derived from criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence and therefore within the ambit of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act.
Conclusion: The coal block allocation letter was rightly treated as property and as tainted property/proceeds of crime.
Issue (ii): Whether the share application money and share premium collected by the appellant were proceeds of crime liable to attachment notwithstanding the timing of receipt, the absence of mining, and their deployment for business purposes.
Analysis: The Court held that the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not confined to direct gains from actual mining. The money raised by share capital and premium was found to have been collected on the strength of the prospect of coal block allotment and was inextricably linked to the tainted allocation. The fact that some receipts preceded the formal allotment, that no coal was mined, or that the funds were deployed for legitimate business purposes did not alter their character where they were traceable directly or indirectly to the criminal activity relating to the scheduled offence. The broad definitions of property and proceeds of crime, together with the proved predicate offences, supported the attachment.
Conclusion: The share application money and share premium were correctly treated as proceeds of crime and remained attachable.
Final Conclusion: The attachment was upheld, and the appellant's challenge failed because the connected property and funds were held to be derived, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to the scheduled offences.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, intangible rights arising from a tainted allocation and any funds derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence constitute proceeds of crime, even if no separate physical exploitation of the asset occurred and even if the funds were later used for legitimate purposes.
Issues: Whether the assessment order under Section 73 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required interference for non-consideration of the petitioner's reply, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication.
Analysis: The petitioner's reply to the show cause notice was not considered before passing the impugned order. In view of that procedural lapse, the assessment was not sustained on merits and the matter was sent back for fresh consideration. The Court also directed a pre-deposit of 50% of the disputed tax, with any amount already recovered to be adjusted towards the pre-deposit, and required the petitioner to cooperate in the de novo proceedings.
Conclusion: The matter was remanded for fresh orders on merits, subject to compliance with the directed pre-deposit and participation in the proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside to the extent necessary and the dispute was restored to the assessing authority for de novo consideration, with interim protection linked to compliance.
Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order that is passed without considering the assessee's reply to the show cause notice warrants remand for fresh decision on merits.
Issues: (i) Whether the impugned GST order should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication despite expiry of the statutory appeal period. (ii) Whether the bank account attachment should be vacated on compliance with the directions imposed by the Court.
Issue (i): Whether the impugned GST order should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication despite expiry of the statutory appeal period.
Analysis: The petitioner had not replied to the show cause notice or attended the personal hearings, and the statutory appeal remedy had also become time-barred. To balance the interests of the assessee and the Revenue, the Court directed remand for fresh consideration, while requiring the petitioner to file a reply and make a cash deposit of 50% of the disputed tax within the stipulated period.
Conclusion: The matter was remitted to the respondent for passing a fresh order on compliance with the specified conditions.
Issue (ii): Whether the bank account attachment should be vacated on compliance with the directions imposed by the Court.
Analysis: The directions tied vacating the attachment to timely compliance with the pre-deposit and filing of reply, and made clear that the attachment would not continue once the stipulated conditions were satisfied and no other arrears remained.
Conclusion: The bank attachment was directed to stand automatically vacated upon compliance with the conditions.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by granting conditional relief to the petitioner in the form of remand and consequential lifting of attachment upon compliance, while preserving the respondent's right to proceed in accordance with law in case of default.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer has not participated in the adjudication and the statutory appeal remedy is time-barred, the Court may grant conditional remand with pre-deposit safeguards to balance the interests of the assessee and the Revenue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act for the relevant assessment year, on the ground of excess deduction under Section 80HHC, was invalid as being based on a mere change of opinion.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of a scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) that is wholly silent regarding a particular claim (here, deduction under Section 80HHC), a presumption of prior consideration and formation of opinion arises so as to bar reassessment on that issue.
1.3 Whether Explanation 2(c)(iii) to Section 147 applied to justify the assumption of jurisdiction for reassessment on the ground that the assessee had been granted "excessive relief" under the Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reopening under Section 147 and allegation of change of opinion; presumption of prior consideration in a silent scrutiny order
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empowers reassessment where the Assessing Officer has "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, subject to Sections 148 to 153.
2.2 The Court referred to the general presumption, in the context of assessments under Section 143(3), that official acts are regularly performed and that issues arising from the return are presumed to have been considered, with reference to the principle that judicial and official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The original assessment under Section 143(3) was admittedly a scrutiny assessment, but the assessment order was "wholly silent" regarding the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80HHC. The order contained no discussion, computation, or even reference to Section 80HHC.
2.4 The assessment order also did not indicate any issuance of notice under Section 143(2) or any questionnaire under Section 142(1) specifically raising or examining the Section 80HHC claim, nor any discussion with the assessee on that aspect. The Court found "no such correspondence" or indication of enquiry in the assessment order.
2.5 The Court accepted that, generally, in a scrutiny assessment, there can be a presumption that issues arising from the return of income have been considered by the Assessing Officer. However, it held that this presumption operates "if supported by some evidence of discussion" on those issues, such as references in the order or in notices under Sections 143(2) or 142(1).
2.6 In the present case, because the assessment order was "singularly silent" on Section 80HHC and did not even mention the claim in the body of the order or in the computation, the Court held that there was no material basis to presume that the Assessing Officer had applied his mind to, or formed any opinion on, the deduction under Section 80HHC.
2.7 The Court reasoned that, had the Assessing Officer at least mentioned or partially dealt with the Section 80HHC claim, such mention might have supported a presumption that it was considered, even if briefly. In the complete absence of any reference, the Court concluded that there was no formed opinion on the issue at the original assessment stage.
2.8 Consequently, the Court rejected the assessee's contention that the reopening was merely based on a "change of opinion", because the necessary pre-condition for a change of opinion - an earlier formed opinion - was not established on the record.
2.9 The Court also noted that, in the appellate proceedings before the first appellate authority, the assessee had not raised any ground regarding non-furnishing of reasons for reopening, and held that it was "too late in the day" for the assessee to rely on that ground at this stage. The only ground consistently pursued in appeals related to assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 and eligibility for the Section 80HHC relief.
2.10 The Court distinguished the decisions cited by the assessee (including those where reassessment was invalidated as based on change of opinion) on the factual basis that, in those cases, the original assessments were preceded by specific notices and detailed correspondence on the very issues later sought to be reopened. Those materials showed application of mind and formation of opinion in the original assessments, unlike the present case where no such prior discussion or enquiry was found.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court held that the original assessment order did not show any consideration or formation of opinion regarding the deduction under Section 80HHC.
2.12 Accordingly, the reassessment could not be characterised as a reopening based on change of opinion, and the assessee's argument that the reassessment was bad in law on that ground was rejected.
2.13 The assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was upheld, and the substantial question of law, framed as to whether the reopening was invalid as a change of opinion, was answered against the assessee.
Issue 3: Applicability of Explanation 2(c)(iii) to Section 147 and justification of jurisdiction on ground of "excessive relief"
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.14 The Court reproduced and relied upon Explanation 2 to Section 147, particularly clause (c), which deems certain situations to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, including:
(i) under-assessment of income;
(ii) assessment at too low a rate;
(iii) income made the subject of "excessive relief" under the Act; and
(iv) computation of excessive loss or allowance.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The reasons recorded for reopening, as extracted in the first appellate order and noted by the Court, showed that the Assessing Officer had examined the computation of deduction under Section 80HHC and concluded that the assessee had omitted to factor in a negative figure arising from one component of the statutory formula. This led to a conclusion that the assessee had claimed "excess deduction" under Section 80HHC to a quantified extent.
2.16 The Court noted that, although an assessment under Section 143(3) had been completed earlier, the computation of income had, by then, resulted in the assessee being given a deduction under Section 80HHC that, on the Department's subsequent working, clearly constituted "excessive relief" under the Act.
2.17 The Court emphasised that the computation in the reassessment order, with respect to the quantum of deduction under Section 80HHC, had attained finality, as the assessee had not succeeded in getting the merits of the computation examined in appeal, and the only surviving question was the legality of the assumption of jurisdiction.
2.18 On these facts, the Court held that the case squarely fell within Explanation 2(c)(iii) to Section 147 - namely, a situation where income had been made the subject of "excessive relief" under the Act - which is expressly deemed to be a case of income escaping assessment.
Conclusions
2.19 The Court concluded that, in light of Explanation 2(c)(iii), the grant of excessive relief by way of deduction under Section 80HHC constituted a statutorily recognised ground for treating the case as one where income had escaped assessment.
2.20 Therefore, the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the consequent assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 were valid and justified in law.
2.21 On this basis, the substantial question of law was answered in favour of the Revenue, and the appeal was dismissed, affirming the reassessment and the concurrent findings of the lower authorities on jurisdiction.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a draft assessment order issued under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the name of an amalgamating company which had ceased to exist on account of amalgamation, is void ab initio.
1.2 Consequentially, whether the Revenue may initiate assessment proceedings against the amalgamated (successor) company, subject to law.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of draft assessment order issued in the name of a non-existent amalgamating company
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court referred to Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 governing draft assessment orders, read with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of Section 143(2), Section 170 (succession to business otherwise than on death), and Section 292B.
2.2 The Court extracted and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., wherein it was held that (i) a notice under Section 143(2) issued to a non-existent amalgamating company and an assessment order passed against such a company constitute a "substantive illegality" not curable under Section 292B; (ii) upon amalgamation, the amalgamating entity ceases to exist; (iii) jurisdictional notices must be correctly issued in the name of the successor entity; and (iv) participation in the proceedings by the successor cannot operate as an estoppel against law.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3 It was undisputed before the Court that the concerned company, in whose name the impugned draft assessment order was issued, had amalgamated with another company with effect from 01.04.2021 and had ceased to exist thereafter.
2.4 The draft assessment order dated 05.03.2025 for AY 2022-23 was issued under Section 144C(1) in the name of the amalgamating company and on its PAN, despite the amalgamation having taken effect much earlier.
2.5 The Court applied the ratio of Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., holding that assessment proceedings cannot be initiated or continued against a non-existent amalgamating company, and that such initiation/continuation is a substantive illegality and not a curable procedural defect.
2.6 The Court also noted that counsel for the Revenue was unable to show anything contrary to the position of law relied upon by the petitioner.
Conclusions:
2.7 The draft assessment order dated 05.03.2025 issued under Section 144C(1) for AY 2022-23 in the name of the amalgamating company, which had stood amalgamated with effect from 01.04.2021, is invalid and is set aside as void ab initio.
Issue 2: Liberty to initiate proceedings against the amalgamated (successor) company
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.8 Having set aside the draft assessment order on the ground that it was issued in the name of a non-existent entity, the Court considered the appropriate consequential order regarding assessment of the successor company.
Conclusions:
2.9 The Court granted liberty to the Revenue to initiate proceedings against the amalgamated company, M/s SMS India Pvt. Ltd., if permissible in law.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal's order required to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh decision on whether the Commissioner's order under Section 52(2) of the Sales Tax Act should operate prospectively or retrospectively.
Analysis: The earlier order relied upon by the Tribunal had already been interfered with, and the High Court had specifically held that the question of prospective effect under Section 52(2) had not been dealt with and therefore required independent adjudication. Since the Tribunal's decision in the present reference was founded on that earlier order, the basis of the Tribunal's disposal no longer survived. The proper course was to restore the matter to the Tribunal so that the limited question of prospectivity or retrospectivity could be decided afresh, and, if necessary, together with the connected remand proceedings already pending or decided.
Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh decision on the limited issue of prospective or retrospective operation of the Commissioner's order under Section 52(2) of the Sales Tax Act.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether protective additions under section 69A could be sustained in the hands of a job worker in respect of seized gold when substantive additions on the same gold had already been made in the hands of the suppliers treated as real owners.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Sustainability of protective additions under section 69A in hands of job worker when substantive additions made in suppliers' hands as real owners
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The assessment in the case of the assessee was made under section 143(3) read with section 153C. The seized gold was treated as "unaccounted investment" and added under section 69A on a protective basis in the assessee's hands, with the understanding that substantive assessment would be made in the cases of the suppliers/consignors. Section 69A and the concept of protective and substantive assessments are applied in this context.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee was engaged in manufacturing of gold ornaments on job work basis and trading in gold jewellery, and that, as per the record, the seized fine gold was claimed to have been sent by two Delhi-based entities to the assessee for job work.
2.3 It was noted that the Assessing Officer had made a protective addition of the total value of seized gold in the assessee's hands, explicitly on the footing that substantive additions would be made in the hands of the consignor entities, who were treated as real owners of the gold.
2.4 In appellate proceedings, it was shown that, in the case of one consignor, the assessment order for the relevant year reflected that the seized gold (including the specific quantity meant for the assessee) was held to be not part of stock, but unaccounted and acquired from undisclosed sources, and the entire value of such gold was added to that consignor's income under section 69A.
2.5 The first appellate authority accepted that, since the amount representing the gold sent by that consignor to the assessee had already been brought to tax substantively in the consignor's case, the corresponding protective addition in the assessee's hands "did not survive" and deleted that portion of the addition.
2.6 Regarding the balance quantity allegedly sent by the other consignor, the first appellate authority had sustained the protective addition in the assessee's hands on the ground of absence of documentary evidence from the assessee substantiating the consignor's ownership.
2.7 Before the Tribunal, it was shown from the assessment order of the second consignor for the relevant year that the Assessing Officer had treated the seized gold (including the quantity claimed to have been sent to the assessee) as "unaccounted income" of that consignor and added its value under section 69A read with section 115BBE.
2.8 The Tribunal considered this assessment order and found that a substantive addition had already been made on the same gold in the hands of the consignor, who had been treated as the real owner and had accepted ownership of the seized gold.
2.9 On that factual foundation, the Tribunal reasoned that where the same quantity of seized gold has already been subjected to substantive addition in the hands of the real owner, a parallel protective addition in the hands of another person (here, the job worker/assessee) cannot be sustained.
2.10 The Tribunal also emphasized that the assessee was only a job worker and not the owner of the gold, and that the department itself had proceeded against the consignor as the real owner by making substantive additions in that case.
Conclusions
2.11 In respect of the gold sent by the first consignor, the deletion of the protective addition by the first appellate authority was implicitly affirmed, as the Tribunal proceeded on the admitted position that substantive addition had been made in the consignor's case.
2.12 In respect of the gold allegedly sent by the second consignor, the Tribunal held that, since substantive addition for the same gold had already been made in the hands of the real owner (the consignor) under section 69A, the corresponding protective addition in the assessee's case was not justified and must be deleted.
2.13 The Tribunal thus concluded that no protective addition on account of the seized gold and jewellery could be made or sustained in the assessee's hands once the same amounts had been substantively taxed in the hands of the real owners, and accordingly allowed the assessee's appeal in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be made in excess of the assessee's suo motu disallowance without recording satisfaction under section 14A(2) and in light of the actual nature of investments, exempt income, and expenses.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity and extent of disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal referred to section 14A(2) and Rule 8D and noted that the Assessing Officer cannot invoke Rule 8D unless he is not satisfied with the correctness of the assessee's claim of expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income, such satisfaction having to be recorded "having regard to the accounts of the assessee".
2.2 The Tribunal relied on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Maxopp Investment Ltd. v. CIT that before applying the method of apportionment under Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer must record satisfaction that the suo motu disallowance made by the assessee is not correct, after examining the nature of investments and related financing.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The assessee had earned dividend income, interest on tax-free bonds and had also reported net gain on sale of investments, and made a suo motu disallowance of Rs. 94,147/- (Rs. 4,147/- as direct expenditure and Rs. 90,000/- towards indirect expenditure on account of salary).
2.4 The Assessing Officer rejected the quantum of the suo motu disallowance as being "very low" and computed a higher disallowance of Rs. 21,00,383/- by applying Rule 8D, comprising direct expenditure of Rs. 2,41,147/- and 1% of average monthly investments of Rs. 18,59,236/-, resulting in incremental disallowance of Rs. 20,06,236/-.
2.5 On examination of the factual matrix, the Tribunal found that, in relation to "expenditure directly related to exempt income", the actual items were: (i) Ask Wealth Management Fees - Rs. 8,950/-, (ii) Performance Fees - Forefront Alternative Equity Scheme - Rs. 2,23,747/-, and (iii) Custodian Charges - Rs. 4,147/-, aggregating to Rs. 2,36,844/-.
2.6 It was shown that fees paid to Ask Wealth Management related to investment in debentures yielding taxable income, and the investment in Forefront Alternative Equity Scheme also yielded taxable income. The Tribunal accepted that these payments did not relate to earning exempt income and hence were not to be considered as direct expenses for section 14A purposes.
2.7 As to Custodian Charges of Rs. 4,147/-, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had already suo motu disallowed this amount as direct expenditure, and the Assessing Officer's inclusion of the same in the Rule 8D computation amounted to double disallowance.
2.8 The Tribunal further found that the Assessing Officer had treated net gain of Rs. 3,09,74,898/- on sale of investments as exempt income, whereas, as per the computation of income, this was offered to tax as Short Term Capital Gain and was taxable. Thus, the Assessing Officer's assumption regarding the quantum and nature of exempt income was factually incorrect.
2.9 The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had already disallowed Rs. 90,000/- suo motu towards indirect expenses (salary). Apart from a general remark that the disallowance was low, the Assessing Officer had not demonstrated, by reference to the accounts, why this working was incorrect.
2.10 The Tribunal emphasized that under section 14A(2), the sequence required is: first, to examine the assessee's claim regarding expenditure relating to exempt income; if satisfied, no further disallowance is warranted; only if not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, and after recording reasons based on the accounts, can the Assessing Officer invoke Rule 8D.
2.11 From the profit and loss account, the Tribunal observed that, except for employee benefit expenses, all other expenses related to the assessee's construction business and did not have a bearing on exempt-income-related disallowance. The assessee had already factored a portion of employee cost (Rs. 90,000/-) in its suo motu disallowance as indirect expenditure.
2.12 From the balance sheet, particularly Note No. 9 on non-current investments, the Tribunal noted that a substantial investment (Rs. 17,65,03,064/-) was in equity shares of an unlisted sister concern. It was submitted, and not controverted, that such investment in a group company did not require market expertise, regular monitoring, or reporting to the extent presumed in a typical portfolio management situation, indicating limited administrative expenditure relatable to such investment.
2.13 The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had not, anywhere in the assessment order, recorded a cogent dissatisfaction with the correctness of the assessee's working under section 14A, nor had he engaged with the assessee's explanations or the specific nature of expenses and income; instead, he merely termed the amount disallowed as "very low" and directly applied Rule 8D.
2.14 On these facts, the Tribunal held that the mandatory precondition under section 14A(2), namely proper recording of satisfaction, having regard to the accounts, that the assessee's claim is incorrect, was not fulfilled. Consequently, the mechanical application of Rule 8D was impermissible.
(c) Conclusions
2.15 The Tribunal held that Rule 8D is not automatic and can be applied only after the Assessing Officer records dissatisfaction, based on a proper examination of the accounts, regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim under section 14A.
2.16 As the Assessing Officer had made factual errors regarding the nature of income (treating taxable STCG as exempt), mischaracterised certain expenses as directly relatable to exempt income, and failed to record the requisite satisfaction under section 14A(2), the disallowance made by invoking Rule 8D was held to be untenable and bad in law.
2.17 The Tribunal restricted the disallowance under section 14A to the amount suo motu disallowed by the assessee (Rs. 94,147/-) and deleted the incremental disallowance of Rs. 20,06,236/-.
2.18 The ground challenging the disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was allowed, and the appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether failure to issue a draft assessment order under section 144C(1) in the second round of assessment proceedings, after a fresh reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer and proposed variation prejudicial to the assessee, renders the final assessment order void.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Validity of assessment order for non-compliance with section 144C(1) in second round of proceedings
Legal framework
Section 144C(1) mandates that where the Assessing Officer proposes any variation in the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to an eligible assessee, a draft assessment order shall be forwarded to the assessee before passing the final assessment order. The judgment discusses judicial precedents holding that this requirement applies even in remand or second-round proceedings, and that non-compliance is not curable under section 292B.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal noted that in the first round a draft assessment order had been issued, but the transfer pricing adjustment was later set aside by the Tribunal and remitted to the Assessing Officer/TPO for de novo examination.
(b) Pursuant to the remand, the Assessing Officer made a fresh reference to the TPO, after obtaining the approval of the prescribed authority, and the TPO again proposed a transfer pricing adjustment prejudicial to the assessee.
(c) The Tribunal held that, in such circumstances where a fresh exercise of determining arm's length price is undertaken and a prejudicial variation is proposed, a draft assessment order is "mandatorily required" under section 144C(1).
(d) Relying on decisions of the jurisdictional High Court, including those holding that during remand proceedings it is mandatory to pass a draft assessment order under section 144C and that failure to do so is not a defect curable under section 292B, the Tribunal concluded that the statutory procedure must be strictly followed even in the second round of assessment.
(e) The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that a draft order issued in the first round dispensed with the requirement in the second round, and did not accept the plea that any lapse was merely procedural and salvaged by section 292B.
Conclusions
(a) In a remand/second-round assessment where a fresh reference is made to the TPO and a variation prejudicial to the assessee is proposed, issuance of a draft assessment order under section 144C(1) is mandatory.
(b) Failure to issue such a draft assessment order vitiates the final assessment order; the defect is not curable under section 292B.
(c) The assessment order passed under sections 254/143(3) read with section 144C without first issuing a draft assessment order was held to be invalid and was quashed.
(d) In view of this legal infirmity, the appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal did not proceed to adjudicate the remaining grounds on the merits of the transfer pricing adjustment.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the cash deposit of Rs. 26,73,000 made during the demonetization period in the assessee's agricultural credit account constituted "unexplained money" liable to addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition under Section 69A in respect of cash deposit of Rs. 26,73,000 during demonetization
(a) Legal framework (as noticed and applied by the Tribunal)
2.1 The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that under Section 69A, the onus initially lies on the assessee to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding the nature and source of money found to be in his possession, and that once a plausible and supported explanation is furnished, the Revenue must bring adverse material to rebut such explanation before treating the sum as "unexplained money".
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal noted that the assessee was an agriculturist with seven acres of self-owned agricultural land and additional agricultural land taken on lease (17 acres from one lessor and 11.63 acres from another), and that the assessee's only claimed source of income was agricultural activities.
2.3 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee held an agricultural credit/crop loan account with a bank, that a working limit of Rs. 30 lakhs had been sanctioned on hypothecation of crops, and that on 26.04.2016 the assessee withdrew Rs. 30 lakhs in cash from this account; thereafter on 10.11.2016 he deposited Rs. 26,73,000 in cash in the same bank account during the demonetization period.
2.4 The Tribunal took into account documentary evidences produced and certified as filed before the lower authorities and the bank, namely: (i) crop loan sanction and hypothecation agreement showing land details and crop financing; (ii) agreements/records evidencing leasehold agricultural land; (iii) copies of J-Forms evidencing sale of agricultural produce; and (iv) copies of fard jamabandi evidencing landholding and agricultural use.
2.5 On appreciation of these documents, the Tribunal concluded that agricultural activities were "indeed carried out" by the assessee and that he "also derives income from agriculture", and further that the cash withdrawal of Rs. 30 lakhs formed part of the sanctioned crop loan facility.
2.6 The Departmental Representative contended that the cash of Rs. 30 lakhs withdrawn in April 2016 must have been utilized for agricultural expenses and therefore could not be available in full for redeposit in November 2016, but did not dispute or question the evidences of landholding, lease arrangements, jamabandi, J-Forms and agricultural operations produced by the assessee.
2.7 The Tribunal reasoned that, even if it were assumed that a part of the Rs. 30 lakhs withdrawn in April 2016 was utilized towards agricultural expenditure, the income from agricultural activities generated up to November 2016 would also be available as cash with the assessee. On a combined consideration of (i) the unutilized portion of the April 2016 withdrawal and (ii) the agricultural income earned during the relevant period, the Tribunal held that the explanation for the deposit of Rs. 26,73,000 was reasonable and consistent with the proved factual matrix.
2.8 The Tribunal emphasized that the assessee did not maintain books of account and that in such a case, where existence of substantial landholdings and actual agricultural operations stood proved "beyond doubt", a "reasonable and logical view" ought to be taken as to the availability of agricultural income and earlier withdrawals to explain the cash deposit, particularly in the absence of any material brought by the Revenue to show diversion or different utilization of the withdrawn cash.
(c) Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal held that the source of the cash deposit of Rs. 26,73,000 in the assessee's bank account during the demonetization period was satisfactorily explained as having arisen partly from the cash withdrawn (Rs. 30 lakhs) from the same bank account on 26.04.2016 and partly from agricultural income earned during April to November 2016.
2.10 The Tribunal found that the Revenue had not discharged the onus of disproving or rebutting the assessee's explanation, nor had it produced any material to show that the cash withdrawn had been spent elsewhere or that agricultural income as claimed was not available.
2.11 Consequently, the addition of Rs. 26,73,000 made under Section 69A as unexplained money was deleted, and the assessee's appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was validly invoked on the ground that the assessment order allowing deduction under Section 80G in respect of donation to a particular trust was "erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue" in view of specific information with the Department about bogus donations.
1.2 Whether mere furnishing of donation receipts and general enquiry by the Assessing Officer was sufficient to preclude action under Section 263 when specific adverse information regarding the donee entity was available but not examined.
1.3 Whether Explanation 2 to Section 263 applied in treating the assessment order as erroneous due to lack of requisite enquiry or verification by the Assessing Officer.
1.4 Whether reliance placed by the assessee on a prior Tribunal decision concerning deduction under Section 80GGC was applicable to the present facts involving deduction under Section 80G to the concerned trust.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Validity of Section 263 revision where AO allowed Section 80G deduction on donation to a trust alleged to provide bogus donations
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The Court referred to Section 263 governing revisionary powers of the Principal Commissioner where an order is "erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue".
2.1.2 Explanation 2 to Section 263 was specifically invoked, which deems an order to be erroneous and prejudicial if it is passed without making enquiries or verifications which should have been made.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The assessee had claimed deduction under Section 80G in respect of donation of Rs. 12,00,000/- to a trust, and furnished evidence/receipts before the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer accepted the claim and completed assessment under Section 143(3) without making any further enquiry regarding the genuineness of the donation in light of adverse information.
2.1.4 The Department was already in possession of information, emanating from a search and seizure action under Section 132 conducted on 02.02.2021 on political parties and charitable organizations including the said trust, that the trust was involved in a scam related to bogus donations and tax evasion.
2.1.5 The Court held that mere furnishing of receipts does not establish genuineness of the donation and corresponding deduction; in the presence of specific incriminating information about the donee's involvement in bogus donations, further enquiry by the Assessing Officer was mandated.
2.1.6 It was noted that, despite such information being available during the pendency of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer did not conduct any enquiry or verification regarding the genuineness of the donation or the correctness of the deduction claimed under Section 80G.
2.1.7 Applying Explanation 2 to Section 263, the Court interpreted that where the Assessing Officer fails to make enquiries or verifications which he ought to have made in the given factual context, the assessment order is deemed to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.
2.1.8 The contention of the assessee that the Assessing Officer had taken a "plausible view" after due verification was rejected, as the record showed only acceptance of receipts without any enquiry in the backdrop of the specific information on bogus donations.
(c) Conclusions
2.1.9 The Court held that, given the information on record about the trust's involvement in providing bogus donations and the admitted absence of enquiry by the Assessing Officer in that backdrop, the assessment order allowing deduction under Section 80G was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.
2.1.10 The invocation of Section 263 and the setting aside of the assessment with directions to reframe the assessment after proper enquiry into the donation and the Section 80G claim were upheld as valid.
2.2 Application of Explanation 2 to Section 263 and adequacy of AO's enquiry
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The assessee argued that the assessment under Section 143(3) was framed after detailed scrutiny and necessary enquiry, and that Section 263 could not be invoked merely because the Principal Commissioner opined that further enquiry was warranted.
2.2.2 The Court distinguished between a case where an Assessing Officer has taken a possible view after enquiry and a case where he has not conducted the enquiry that was clearly called for in light of available information.
2.2.3 The Court emphasized that Explanation 2 to Section 263 expressly deems an order to be erroneous and prejudicial if passed without making enquiries or verifications that should have been made, and that this applied squarely where known adverse information about the donee existed but was not examined.
2.2.4 The Court accepted the Revenue's stand that the Assessing Officer had merely accepted the assessee's submission without meaningful verification or application of mind to the specific risk of bogus donations from the trust in question.
(b) Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court concluded that the failure of the Assessing Officer to make required enquiry in light of specific incriminating information attracted Explanation 2 to Section 263, thereby justifying the Principal Commissioner's assumption of jurisdiction and revision of the assessment order.
2.3 Relevance of prior Tribunal decisions and distinction between cases
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The assessee relied on a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench involving deduction under Section 80GGC in respect of donations to a political party, contending that once the Assessing Officer had examined the claim and taken a view, Section 263 could not be invoked.
2.3.2 The Court held that the facts of that case were distinguishable, as the deduction there was under Section 80GGC and did not involve the same entity or the same pattern of information regarding bogus donations as in the present case.
2.3.3 The Court instead followed another Co-ordinate Bench decision involving the same trust and deduction under Section 80G, where identical circumstances existed: information from a search demonstrating the trust's involvement in bogus donations, and absence of specific enquiry by the Assessing Officer despite such information being available.
2.3.4 In that earlier decision involving the same trust, it was held that failure to examine the Section 80G claim in the light of the adverse information rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial, warranting revision under Section 263; the Court considered itself bound to follow that reasoning on materially identical facts.
(b) Conclusions
2.3.5 The Court rejected the assessee's reliance on the decision relating to Section 80GGC as inapplicable to the present factual matrix, and instead adopted the reasoning of the Co-ordinate Bench decision concerning the same donee trust and Section 80G deduction.
2.3.6 Consequently, all grounds raised by the assessee against the assumption of jurisdiction and order under Section 263 were dismissed, and the revisionary order was upheld in full.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the resolution professional could, in law and on the facts, classify the appellant's pre-CIRP claim as a contingent claim and admit it at a notional value of Re. 1 under Regulation 14 of the CIRP Regulations.
(2) Whether the Adjudicating Authority, and in appeal the Tribunal, had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality and validity of water drawl and generation loss charges that are the subject-matter of a pending writ petition before the High Court.
(3) Whether the appellant was entitled to payment for water supply and alleged generation loss charges during the CIRP period, including month-to-month payments as part of CIRP costs, notwithstanding the subsisting disputes and the High Court proceedings.
(4) Whether the appellant suffered any prejudice or legal injury by classification of its claim as "contingent" and by non-admission of the full amount in the context of a resolution plan which accords nil value/payment to all operational creditors and unsecured financial creditors.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Legality of classifying the appellant's claim as contingent and admitting it at Re. 1
Legal framework discussed
(a) Section 18 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - duties of the interim resolution professional to "receive and collate" claims.
(b) Regulations 10, 13(1) and 14 of the CIRP Regulations - substantiation, verification and determination/estimation of claims, including where claims are not precise due to contingency.
(c) Judicial precedents discussed: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court held that, under Section 18 read with Regulations 10 and 13(1), the resolution professional's role is to collate and verify claims based on documents and information, and that he does not exercise adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers as to the legality or enforceability of those claims. Adjudication is the exclusive domain of the Adjudicating Authority or other competent fora.
(b) Regulation 14(1) specifically permits the resolution professional, where the amount claimed is not precise due to any contingency or other reason, to make the "best estimate" of the claim based on information available and to revise it upon receipt of additional information.
(c) The Court applied the ratio of Essar Steel, where the Supreme Court approved admission of disputed claims only at a notional value of Re. 1 when the underlying liability was subject to pending disputes before other authorities. The Supreme Court set aside NCLT/NCLAT directions to admit such claims in full and upheld the resolution professional's treatment of them as contingent/notional.
(d) In the present case, the Court found that the appellant's pre-CIRP invoices (for water drawl and generation loss charges) are admittedly under challenge in a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad, and earlier before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The right and locus of the appellant to levy such charges, and the validity of the impugned invoices, are thus sub judice and inherently contingent upon the High Court's decision.
(e) The Court noted that the resolution professional recorded the appellant's full claimed amount in the creditors' list, but admitted only Re. 1 as a contingent claim with a specific note invoking Regulation 14. This was treated as a "best estimate" pending adjudication of the underlying dispute.
(f) The appellant's argument that the resolution professional had exceeded his powers by "adjudicating" the claim and that the invoices were "crystallised" was rejected. The Court held that treating a disputed and sub judice claim as contingent at a notional value is an administrative estimation expressly contemplated by Regulation 14, not adjudication on merits.
Conclusions
(a) The appellant's claim, being subject to pending writ proceedings challenging the very legality of the invoices, was a contingent claim under Regulation 14.
(b) The resolution professional acted within his statutory powers in admitting the claim at a notional value of Re. 1 as contingent, in line with Essar Steel.
(c) No legal error or excess of jurisdiction by the resolution professional was found in the classification and quantification of the appellant's claim.
Issue (2): Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority/Tribunal vis-à-vis the High Court writ proceedings
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court noted that: (i) the Corporate Debtor had earlier challenged the appellant's levy of water and generation loss charges before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which granted interim protection against coercive action; (ii) that writ was disposed of only on territorial jurisdiction, with liberty to approach the appropriate High Court; and (iii) thereafter, Writ Petition No. 12331 of 2020 was filed before the High Court of Allahabad, prior to admission of CIRP, challenging the same invoices and the appellant's right to levy such charges.
(b) The subject-matter of the writ petition includes the legality and validity of the impugned invoices, the locus of the appellant to levy charges on water allocated from Madhya Pradesh's share under the Bansagar Project, and the claim for generation loss. These core issues directly overlap with the appellant's claim in CIRP.
(c) The Adjudicating Authority had held, and the Court affirmed, that where a transaction/claim is already the subject-matter of a writ petition before the High Court, the Adjudicating Authority has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute or to pronounce on the validity of the invoices or the appellant's entitlement. Doing so would amount to usurping or encroaching upon the High Court's judicial domain.
(d) The Court accepted the contention that granting the appellant's prayer to treat the claim as crystallised and directing full admission/payment would effectively pre-empt and undermine the High Court's adjudication on the same controversy.
Conclusions
(a) The Adjudicating Authority correctly declined jurisdiction to adjudicate the substantive dispute on the appellant's entitlement under the impugned invoices, as the matter is sub judice before the High Court of Allahabad.
(b) The Tribunal likewise cannot grant relief that would treat the appellant's claim as finally crystallised or determine its legality, as that would usurp the High Court's jurisdiction.
Issue (3): Entitlement to CIRP-period payments and month-to-month charges for water and generation loss
Legal framework discussed
(a) Section 14(2) of the Code and the scheme regarding essential services and CIRP costs.
(b) The concept that continued supply of essential services (such as water) is required to keep the corporate debtor as a going concern during moratorium.
(c) Reference to Dakshin Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. and other precedents, though the Court's reasoning turned on the factual disputes and High Court proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) It was undisputed that water is an essential service for operation of the Corporate Debtor's plant and that the resolution professional wrote to the appellant requesting non-interruption of supply during CIRP.
(b) However, the Court found that the underlying liability to pay the appellant for such water use and for alleged generation loss during CIRP is inseparably linked to the very question whether the appellant is entitled to levy any charges at all, given that the water is drawn out of Madhya Pradesh's allocated share and that payments have been regularly made to the Madhya Pradesh Water Resources Department under a separate agreement.
(c) The Court accepted the respondents' contention that, as long as the appellant's locus and entitlement to charge for this water and for generation loss remain under challenge before the High Court, there is no basis to direct payments to the appellant for the same quantum of water for which payment is being made to MPWRD.
(d) The Court also noted that the Adjudicating Authority had recorded that payments for water during CIRP were being made to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, and that it could not adjudicate competing claims over the same subject-matter while the writ petition is pending.
(e) As regards the appellant's plea that it could not be compelled to supply water without payment, the Court held that the Adjudicating Authority had correctly recognised the necessity of continued essential services for resolution, and that the question of the appellant's entitlement to consideration for such supply is bound up with the High Court dispute and cannot be decided in CIRP proceedings.
Conclusions
(a) The appellant is not entitled, in these proceedings, to any direction for month-to-month or CIRP-period payments, including for alleged generation loss, as its entitlement is sub judice and disputed.
(b) The Adjudicating Authority rightly refused prayers seeking admission and immediate release of CIRP-period dues, holding that such claims require no consideration in view of the pending High Court proceedings and the payments already being made to MPWRD.
Issue (4): Alleged prejudice to the appellant from contingent classification and nil payment under the resolution plan
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court examined the overall claim matrix and resolution plan treatment: secured financial creditors received approximately 20.69% of their claims; unsecured financial creditors and operational creditors (including the appellant) were allotted nil value.
(b) The appellant's total claim (approx. Rs. 12.09 crore) was found to constitute only about 0.0006% of the total claims. The Court emphasised that while all claims are important, they must be assessed in the context of the resolution plan approved by the CoC and the Adjudicating Authority.
(c) It was noted that, even if the appellant's claim had been fully "admitted" as a crystallised operational debt rather than as a contingent Re. 1, the treatment under the approved resolution plan would still have been nil, as the plan provides nil distribution for all operational creditors and unsecured financial creditors.
(d) The Court put a specific query to the appellant as to how its rights were prejudiced, when all operational creditors receive nil and it would in any event receive nil under the resolution plan and even by reference to liquidation value. The appellant's suggestion that full admission might have influenced the CoC's decision was found speculative and unconvincing, especially given the magnitude of total claims wiped out.
(e) The Court also reiterated that under the Code and Regulations, a creditor's entitlement is limited to what is available with reference to liquidation value, and in the present case, on that parameter too the appellant would receive nil.
Conclusions
(a) The appellant has not suffered any demonstrable prejudice by its claim being recorded as contingent at Re. 1, since all operational creditors, including the appellant, receive nil payment under the approved resolution plan and would in any event be entitled to nil on liquidation benchmarks.
(b) The speculative argument that a different CoC decision might have emerged if the claim were shown in full was rejected.
(c) The appeal disclosed no ground to interfere with the resolution plan or with the treatment of the appellant's claim, and the appeal was therefore dismissed as devoid of merit.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case that the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements are fabricated and not duly executed loan/investment agreements.
1.2. Whether the contemporaneous email correspondence and draft Memorandum of Understanding support the plaintiff's plea that the actual agreed terms differed materially from those recorded in the impugned Memorandum of Agreements.
1.3. Whether the mention of specific cheque numbers in the impugned Memorandum of Agreements, in light of the bank certificates regarding issuance dates of the relevant cheque books, indicates fabrication of those agreements.
1.4. Whether, applying the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, the defendants should be restrained from acting upon or enforcing the impugned Memorandum of Agreements, including for proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Prima facie case of fabrication of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1. The Court examined the plaintiff's case that he was doing coal supply business through a partnership firm, that defendant no.2 agreed to invest in his business through defendant no.1, and that documents signed by him under coercion/misrepresentation were later misused to manufacture the impugned Memorandum of Agreements showing financial assistance of Rs. 15,00,000/-, Rs. 1,15,00,000/- and Rs. 40,00,000/-.
2.2. The Court contrasted this with the defendants' stand that the three Memorandum of Agreements were duly executed and notarized in 2019 pursuant to the plaintiff's request for financial assistance, that the plaintiff defaulted in repayment, and that subsequent dishonour of cheques led to Section 138 proceedings, to which the present suit was allegedly a counterblast.
2.3. On the material placed, the Court focused on two key aspects indicating inconsistency with the defendants' version: (i) the terms relating to interest and returns as reflected in the contemporaneous draft Memorandum of Understanding and emails, and (ii) the reference to specific cheque numbers in the impugned agreements which, according to bank certificates, could not have existed at the stated dates of execution.
2.4. These circumstances, taken cumulatively, led the Court, at the interim stage, to doubt the authenticity of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements and to treat them as prima facie fabricated or manufactured documents, allegedly deployed when the defendants decided to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Conclusions
2.5. The Court held that, on a prima facie view, the plaintiff has made out a credible case that the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements appear to be fabricated and not reflective of the actual transaction or agreed terms.
Issue 2 - Effect of contemporaneous draft MOU and email correspondence on the agreed financial terms
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6. The Court scrutinized the email trail involving the plaintiff, defendant no.2 and the Chartered Accountant, Mr. Chandan Ghosh, including:
(a) Email dated 12 August 2019 from Mr. Ghosh indicating his engagement to draft the agreement on a concessional fee, showing his connection with defendant no.2.
(b) Emails where the plaintiff clearly asserted that the assured return to defendant no.1 would be a minimum of 18% per annum.
(c) Email dated 15 August 2019, by which Mr. Ghosh circulated a draft MOU dated 14 August 2019, recording that defendant no.1 would be entitled to 50% profit from the plaintiff's business, subject to a minimum of 18% per annum on Rs. 1,00,00,000/-.
(d) Email dated 16 August 2019 from a witness, also providing for interest at 18% per annum.
2.7. Clause 3(i) of the draft MOU dated 14 August 2019, as reproduced by the Court, explicitly provided for a minimum return of 18% per annum on Rs. 1,00,00,000/- or 50% of profits, whichever is higher, i.e., simple interest at 18% per annum on capital contributed.
2.8. The Court contrasted this with the clauses in the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements, which stipulate interest at 2.5% per month on a compoundable basis, along with additional specified profits, thereby drastically increasing the financial burden on the plaintiff.
2.9. The Court reasoned that, since the parties were negotiating and circulating drafts containing a term of simple interest at 18% per annum as late as mid-August 2019, it "completely defies logic" that within a day the terms would be unilaterally and drastically altered to compound interest at 2.5% per month and substantial additional profits, which materially prejudiced the plaintiff.
2.10. The Court further relied on an email dated 9 October 2019 from the plaintiff to defendant no.1 enclosing another draft MOU, again providing a guaranteed share of not less than 18% on the outstanding financial assistance, which email was duly acknowledged by defendant no.2. This indicated that the MOU was still under discussion and not executed at least till 9 October 2019, whereas the defendants' case was that the impugned Memorandum of Agreements had already been executed on 20 March 2019 and 17 August 2019.
Conclusions
2.11. The Court concluded that the contemporaneous draft MOU and email correspondence support the plaintiff's plea that the agreed terms contemplated simple interest at 18% per annum and profit sharing, not compound interest at 2.5% per month with additional profit payments, thereby reinforcing the prima facie inference that the impugned Memorandum of Agreements do not reflect the original understanding and appear suspect.
Issue 3 - Cheque numbers and bank certificates as indicators of fabrication
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12. The Court examined Clause 9 of the two impugned Memorandum of Agreements dated 17 August 2019 (with defendant no.1 and defendant no.3, respectively), which both recite that the plaintiff has "handed over" specified banker's cheques drawn on HDFC Bank Ltd., Ranchi Branch, and J&K Bank, Ranchi Branch, to secure the financial transaction and enable recovery in case of default.
2.13. The impugned clauses specifically refer to cheque numbers in the HDFC series (e.g., 000086, 000112, 000113, 000126, 000127, 000133) and J&K Bank series (e.g., 133442, 133443, 186444, 186445).
2.14. The plaintiff produced a certificate from HDFC Bank showing that cheques bearing serial numbers 000126 to 000150, including some of those mentioned in the impugned agreements, were issued only on 15 October 2020.
2.15. The plaintiff also produced a certificate dated 28 August 2023 from J&K Bank stating that cheques bearing serial numbers 186401 to 186450, which include the J&K Bank cheque numbers cited in the impugned agreements, were issued only on 4 December 2020.
2.16. The defendants argued that the cheques mentioned in the impugned documents were only recorded for security and were not actually handed over at the time of execution, and further relied on the plaintiff's admission that the cheque numbers relate to his own HDFC and J&K Bank accounts, suggesting that such details could only have come from him.
2.17. The Court held that this explanation is "plainly contrary" to the express language of Clause 9 in both agreements, which clearly states that the cheques have been "handed over" to the lenders at the time of execution, not merely noted as future securities.
2.18. At the interim stage, the Court found no reason to doubt the genuineness of the bank certificates. On the face of these certificates, the relevant cheque books were issued in October and December 2020, rendering it impossible for the plaintiff to have handed over those cheques on or before 17 August 2019 as recorded in the impugned agreements.
Conclusions
2.19. The Court held that the chronological impossibility arising from the bank certificates, when read against the clear recitals in Clause 9 of the impugned agreements, strongly supports the plaintiff's contention that the agreements were created or modified later and are prima facie fabricated.
Issue 4 - Entitlement to interim injunction restraining enforcement of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements
Legal framework (as applied by the Court)
2.20. The Court applied the settled threefold test for grant of interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: (i) existence of a prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) likelihood of irreparable loss, harm or injury to the applicant if relief is denied.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.21. On prima facie case, the Court relied on (a) the inconsistency between the negotiated terms in the draft MOU/emails and the onerous terms in the impugned agreements, and (b) the bank certificates disproving the existence of the cheques at the time when the impugned agreements purport to record their handing over. These factors cumulatively indicated that the impugned agreements were, at least prima facie, fabricated or manufactured.
2.22. On balance of convenience, the Court noted that allowing the defendants to act upon the impugned agreements, including by relying on them in criminal complaints and other proceedings, would seriously prejudice the plaintiff, especially when the very validity and authenticity of those agreements is under substantial, prima facie supported challenge.
2.23. On irreparable loss, harm and injury, the Court held that if the defendants continued to file and prosecute cases against the plaintiff on the basis of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements pending adjudication of their validity, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable consequences that could not be adequately compensated by damages.
Conclusions
2.24. The Court concluded that the plaintiff has established a strong prima facie case, that the balance of convenience lies in his favour, and that he would suffer irreparable harm if interim protection is not granted.
2.25. Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendants, till final adjudication of the suit, from acting upon or enforcing the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements, namely:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated 20 March 2019 (Rs. 15,00,000/-);
(b) Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 August 2019 with defendant no.1 (Rs. 1,15,00,000/-);
(c) Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 August 2019 with defendant no.3 (Rs. 40,00,000/-).
2.26. The Court clarified that all observations are confined to the adjudication of the interim application and shall not affect the final decision in the suit.
Outcome: The appeals were disposed of after the limited issue on remand no longer survived for adjudication.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the rejection of the application for cancellation of registration by the tax authority was in accordance with law.
1.2 Whether subsequent initiation of proceedings for cancellation of registration ab initio rendered the challenge to the rejection order infructuous.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality of rejection of application for cancellation of registration
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court confined itself to examining whether the order dated 30.11.2024 rejecting the application for cancellation of registration was legally sustainable, without entering into the merits of the petitioner's claim for cancellation from the date of the Agreement.
2.2 On perusal of the impugned order, the Court noted that the only reason recorded by the authority was that the reply filed by the petitioner had been examined and was "not found to be satisfactory". No further reasoning, basis, or consideration of the material on record was disclosed.
2.3 The Court held that such an order is a "non-speaking order" as it does not disclose any intelligible reasons or grounds for rejection, and therefore suffers from a legal infirmity.
Conclusions
2.4 The order dated 30.11.2024 rejecting the petitioner's application for cancellation of registration is a non-speaking order and is not in accordance with law.
2.5 The impugned order dated 30.11.2024 is quashed and set aside on the ground of being a non-speaking order.
Issue 2: Effect of subsequent proceedings for cancellation ab initio on maintainability of the petition
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The State contended that issuance of a subsequent show-cause notice dated 28.04.2025 in Form REG-17 proposing cancellation of registration ab initio rendered the present petition infructuous, as the authorities had already initiated separate proceedings.
2.7 The Court rejected this contention, holding that the illegality attached to the impugned non-speaking order would not be cured by the mere issuance of a subsequent show-cause notice. The defect in the earlier order remained a live issue requiring adjudication.
2.8 The Court clarified that it was not adjudicating the validity or merits of the subsequent show-cause notice dated 28.04.2025 and that such proceedings would be independently adjudicated by the competent authority.
Conclusions
2.9 The petition does not become infructuous merely because proceedings for cancellation of registration ab initio have been initiated by issuance of a subsequent show-cause notice.
2.10 The petitioner is at liberty to raise all available contentions before the authority in the proceedings arising from the notice dated 28.04.2025, including issues relating to the effective date and nature of cancellation.
2.11 The Court's interference is confined to quashing the non-speaking rejection order dated 30.11.2024, with no opinion expressed on the merits of the pending cancellation proceedings.
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Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
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