Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Issues: (i) Whether the applicant is eligible to avail input tax credit (ITC) of GST paid on works contract services for construction of the breakwater wall adjacent to its jetty.
Analysis: The Authority examined the factual scope of the contract (composite works contract by Larsen & Toubro) and the statutory scheme in Section 17(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which blocks ITC for works contract services supplied for construction of immovable property (other than plant and machinery). The Authority reviewed the definition of "plant and machinery" in the Explanation to Section 17(6), the distinction between "plant and machinery" and "plant or machinery" as addressed by the Supreme Court, and the subsequent retrospective legislative amendment (Section 124 of the Finance Act, 2025 and Notification No. 16/2025-Central Tax dated 17.09.2025) which substituted "plant and machinery" into clause (d) and introduced Explanation 2. The technical record (Engineers India Ltd. report) and contract scope show the breakwater as an integrated, permanently embedded civil structure composed of core, armour and accropodes, constructed on the seabed and functioning collectively to dissipate wave energy. The Authority found the services obtained were works contract services for construction of an immovable civil structure; individual constituent items (rocks, accropodes) lose separate character once integrated into the permanent structure. The Authority further considered invoice non compliance (absence of requisite SAC/HSN digits under Rule 46) and the time limit for claiming ITC under Section 16(4). The Authority also declined to answer the question on classification of the contractor's supply under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) because a ruling on that point would affect rights of the supplier who is not a party to the AAR proceeding.
Conclusion: The applicant is not eligible to avail input tax credit of GST paid on the works contract services for construction of the breakwater wall; no ruling is given on the contractor's classification under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim filed on 24.03.2015 is time-barred for clearances of Jan-2014 and Feb-2014 and whether the refund for March-2014 is maintainable; (ii) Whether the appellant can re-open or challenge the question of dutiability/self-assessment and relevant-date determinations made in the earlier Commissioner (Appeals) order dated 26.03.2019 (res judicata/appealability issue).
Issue (i): Whether the refund claim is time-barred for Jan-2014 and Feb-2014 and whether refund for Mar-2014 is allowable.
Analysis: The Tribunal considered the dates of filing ER-1 returns and statutory payment deadlines under Rule 8(1) and the explanations to Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Commissioner (Appeals) had determined the date of filing as 24.03.2015 (electronic filing) and held that for the clearances in Jan-2014 and Feb-2014 the one-year limitation expired before that date, whereas the claim portion for March-2014 fell within one year of the relevant payment date. The adjudicating authority on remand examined ER-1 filing dates and last dates for refund claims and allowed the March-2014 portion while rejecting Jan-2014 and Feb-2014 portions as time-barred.
Conclusion: Partly in favour of Appellant (refund for March-2014 of Rs.38,24,252 upheld; refunds for Jan-2014 and Feb-2014 barred by limitation).
Issue (ii): Whether the appellant may re-agitate or challenge final assessment/self-assessment and the related findings on relevant date despite the Commissioner (Appeals) order dated 26.03.2019.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined the Commissioner (Appeals) order which had held that the issue of rate of duty was not part of the provisional/final assessment and therefore the relevant date for the refund was the date of payment; that order was not appealed by either party and thereby attained finality for purposes of the remand proceedings. The Tribunal applied principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and related precedents to conclude that issues finally decided in the earlier appellate order could not be reopened in the present appeal. The Tribunal therefore declined to entertain arguments contrary to the Commissioner (Appeals) findings and held that the appellant was barred from re litigating those points.
Conclusion: In favour of Respondent (appellant barred from re-agitating the earlier findings; issues on dutiability/self-assessment and relevant-date determination stand final).
Final Conclusion: The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed; the refund claim is allowed only to the extent of the March-2014 portion while other portions are time-barred, and the appellant cannot reopen issues conclusively decided by the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 26.03.2019.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellate order on legal and factual issues attains finality because it is unchallenged, parties are barred by res judicata from re litigating those issues in subsequent proceedings; refund claims must be adjudicated having regard to the statutory relevant date under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and limitation is to be computed accordingly.
Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of service tax, interest and penalty paid voluntarily during departmental inquiry for FY 2014-15 and 2015-16, or whether the voluntary payment and intimation under Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 concludes proceedings and precludes refund.
Analysis: The issue is governed by Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 which permits a person to pay service tax on his own ascertainment and inform the Central Excise Officer, and provides that on receipt of such information no notice under subsection (1) shall be served in respect of the amount so paid; the proviso preserves the officer's right to determine any short payment and recover it with the limitation period counted from receipt of the information. The appellant paid service tax with interest and penalty during the course of an inquiry and informed the department seeking closure under Section 73(3) and relying on departmental instructions. Prior Tribunal precedent was applied to hold that once proceedings are concluded by voluntary payment and intimation under Section 73(3), the issue stands closed, the department cannot issue a notice in respect of the amount so paid, and the assessee cannot later seek refund of that amount. The appellant's reliance on the Delhi High Court decision cited was found factually distinguishable and inapplicable.
Conclusion: The voluntary payment and intimation under Section 73(3) concludes the proceedings and precludes the refund claim; appeal dismissed. (In favour of Revenue)
Issues: Whether the impugned GST assessment orders require fresh adjudication because the petitioners contentions about alleged transcription errors in GSTR-09 and supporting documents were not dealt with by the assessing authority.
Analysis: The assessment orders for the tax periods (except 20222023) do not refer to or deal with the petitioners replies and additional submissions which assert that Input Tax Credit was misstated due to transcription between 'inputs' and 'input services' in Form GSTR-09. The petitioners filings and the annual returns prima facie indicate a possible mistake that warrants detailed consideration. Given the substantial disputed amounts and incomplete adjudication of the petitioners explanations and documents, the matter requires reconsideration on merits with opportunity to furnish all invoices, GSTR-2A, GSTR-2B, GSTR-3B and complete e-way bills and transport documents. The Court conditions de novo adjudication on the petitioner paying specified costs and furnishing proof of compliance, and provides consequential directions regarding lifting of attachment upon compliance.
Conclusion: The assessment orders are set aside and the matters are remitted to the assessing authority for de novo adjudication after the petitioner complies with stipulated conditions including payment of costs and submission of full documentary proof; on compliance the assessing authority shall decide the cases on merits and the bank account attachment shall be lifted.
Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order and appellate rejection should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration; (ii) Whether the attachment of the bank account should be vacated subject to conditions including pre-deposit.
Issue (i): Whether the assessment order and the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation grounds should be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration.
Analysis: The Court examined the adequacy of the petitioner's reply to the show cause notice, the respondent's duty to record proper findings and, if necessary, call the petitioner for personal hearing, and the sequence of rectification and appeal proceedings. Balancing the interests of both sides, the Court found that the respondents should be directed to redo the exercise afresh on merits, subject to compliance by the petitioner with an additional pre-deposit requirement.
Conclusion: The Court remitted the matter for fresh consideration and re-adjudication on merits, subject to the petitioner making an additional pre-deposit. This conclusion is partly in favour of the Assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the bank account attachment should be lifted upon compliance with stipulated conditions including the additional pre-deposit.
Analysis: The Court considered the petitioner's prior pre-deposit and the effect of further deposit on ongoing recovery measures. The Court ordered that upon deposit of the stipulated additional amount and subject to verification that no other arrears exist, the attachment shall stand vacated and any amounts already recovered may be adjusted towards the pre-deposit.
Conclusion: The Court ordered vacation of the bank attachment conditional on the petitioner complying with the deposit and verification requirements. This conclusion is in favour of the Assessee.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed by remitting the matter to the assessing authority for fresh adjudication on merits, subject to the petitioner making the additional pre-deposit and complying with the stipulated conditions; overall the decision is partly in favour of the Assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment and appellate order are challenged on adequacy of consideration and hearing, a court may remit the matter for fresh consideration on merits while protecting revenue recovery by conditioning relief on a specified pre-deposit and verification, and ordering suspension of recovery measures upon compliance.
Issues: Whether, in respect of invoices/debit notes pertaining to financial years 2017-18 to 2020-21, the petitioner is entitled to avail Input Tax Credit notwithstanding belated claim under the time-limit in Section 16(4), in view of Sections 16(5) and 16(6) inserted by Finance Act (No.2), 2024, and whether the impugned ex parte order confirming demand should be quashed and remitted for fresh adjudication.
Analysis: The Court examined the effect of the statutory amendments introduced by Finance Act (No.2), 2024 which inserted subsections 16(5) and 16(6) into Section 16 of the GST enactments and operate with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017 for the relevant financial years. The amendments prescribe a specific entitlement to take input tax credit in returns filed up to 30 November 2021 for invoices/debit notes pertaining to FY 2017-18 to 2020-21 and provide rules for cases where registration cancellation is revoked. The Court held that where the petitioner satisfies the other requirements of Section 16, the entitlement to claim ITC under the newly inserted provisions arises even if rectification applications were not filed in terms of the earlier interpretation of Section 16(6). Applying these provisions, the Court found that the portion of the demand relating to belated availment of ITC is governed by the statutory intervention and therefore cannot survive without fresh consideration on merits. The Court therefore quashed the impugned ex parte order insofar as it relates to ITC and remitted the matter to the respondent for fresh adjudication, subject to the petitioner depositing specified amounts (penalty for belated filing of annual return, amounts for belated monthly returns and non-submission of documents) within 30 days and filing a proper reply to be treated as rectification for the purposes of Sections 16(5) and 16(6).
Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to avail Input Tax Credit in respect of invoices/debit notes pertaining to FY 2017-18 to 2020-21 if the other statutory requirements of Section 16 are satisfied; the impugned order is quashed insofar as it relates to ITC and the matter is remitted to the respondent for fresh orders. The decision is in favour of the assessee on the ITC issue and otherwise the petition is disposed of subject to the deposit and procedural conditions imposed.
Issues: Whether the GST paid on supply, installation, testing and commissioning of the fire-fighting system and public health engineering for expansion/commissioning of a new factory is eligible as Input Tax Credit or is blocked under Section 17(5)(c) and (d) of the CGST/TNGST Acts; and whether the secondary question on timeline to avail ITC on the advance component requires separate adjudication.
Analysis: The Appellant sought ITC contending the installations constitute "plant and machinery" (apparatus, equipment or machinery) used for making outward supply and/or are movable. The provisions governing entitlement and restrictionsSection 16(1) (entitlement subject to conditions and restrictions) and Section 17(5)(c) & (d) (blocking ITC on works contract services and goods/services for construction of immovable property other than plant and machinery)and the definition of "plant and machinery" (apparatus, equipment and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support and used for making outward supply) are determinative. The contractual scope ('deliver the Permanent Work to the owner') and the cost-abstract show a composite works contract for supply and installation integrated into the factory infrastructure. Applying established tests (nature/object of annexation, intention of parties, functionality, permanency and marketability), the Authority finds the installations become assimilated into the building and serve permanent beneficial enjoyment of the immovable property; several components are tailor-made and not marketable independently. Even where items may be detachable physically, the contract and the manner of integration indicate they form part of immovable property and are not "plant and machinery" for the purposes of Section 17. Given this conclusion, the ITC is blocked under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5). As the primary query is answered against ITC eligibility, the question on timeline for availing ITC on the advance component is rendered academic and need not be answered.
Conclusion: The GST paid on supply, installation, testing and commissioning of the fire-fighting system and public health engineering for the new factory is not eligible as Input Tax Credit and is blocked by Section 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d) of the CGST/TNGST Acts; appeal dismissed (in favour of Revenue).
Issues: (i) Whether Input Tax Credit (ITC) is eligible on electrical works carried out for expansion of factory for manufacturing activity; (ii) Whether and on what basis the timeline arises to avail ITC on tax invoice raised by supplier to bill the 'advance component' of the contract and subsequent adjustment in service bills.
Issue (i): Whether the electrical installation works (including LT panels, busducts, LT electrical works, lightning protection, light fixtures and associated civil works) qualify as 'plant and machinery' or otherwise fall outside the scope of blocked credits under Section 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d) of the CGST/TNGST Acts, thereby permitting availment of ITC.
Analysis: The Authority examined the statutory entitlement under Section 16(1) and the blocking provisions in Section 17(5) including the Explanation defining 'plant and machinery'. It analysed the contractual terms (including delivery of 'permanent work'), the nature and purpose of annexation, and applied judicial tests (nature of annexation, object of annexation, intendment of parties, functionality, permanency and marketability). The Authority considered submissions and comparative rulings and distinguished cases where items directly related to transmission or outward supply were held to be plant and machinery. It concluded that the electrical installation as a whole and its components do not constitute equipment, machinery or an 'apparatus' as contemplated in the Explanation, that the object and intendment indicate permanent beneficial enjoyment by the immovable property, and that the items lack independent marketability or independent functional existence in the instant facts.
Conclusion: ITC on the electrical installation works for the new factory is not eligible and is blocked under Sections 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d) of the CGST/TNGST Acts; the AAR ruling disallowing ITC is upheld in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the timeline to avail ITC on the 'advance component' billed by the supplier requires determination given the contract and invoices in question.
Analysis: The Authority treated the timeline issue as subordinate to the primary question of ITC eligibility. Having held that ITC on the contract is not available on merits, the factual and temporal question regarding the treatment of advance invoices and subsequent adjustments becomes moot in the context of this contract.
Conclusion: The question on the timeline to avail ITC on the 'advance component' does not arise and is not answered because the main query on ITC availability has been answered in the negative.
Final Conclusion: The Advance Ruling No.32/ARA/2025 dated 18.08.2025 is upheld and the appeal is dismissed; the electrical installation works in the facts of this case form part of immovable property and ITC thereon is blocked under Section 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d).
Ratio Decidendi: Where electrical installations cease to have independent existence, are intended for permanent beneficial enjoyment of the immovable property, and do not satisfy the Explanation to Section 17 as 'plant and machinery' (apparatus, equipment or machinery fixed to earth and used for making outward supply), the ITC on such supplies is blocked under Sections 17(5)(c) and 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act, 2017.
Issues: (i) Whether the fair market value (FMV) of the land as on 01.04.1981 fixed at Rs.5 per sq. meter by the assessing authorities/first appellate authority for computation of long-term capital gain is sustainable; (ii) Whether the deduction under section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 claimed at Rs.3,05,16,220/- (including land levelling and fencing expenses) is allowable in full or is restricted to Rs.80,62,820/- as held by the first appellate authority, and specifically whether land levelling and fencing expenses of Rs.27,54,400/- form part of cost of acquisition for section 54B.
Issue (i): Whether the FMV of the land as on 01.04.1981 fixed at Rs.5 per sq. meter is to be disturbed.
Analysis: The assessing officer referred the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer whose expert valuation was accepted in part by the first appellate authority. Valuation as on a historical date is essentially a matter of estimation. Where the determination is grounded on expert valuation and reasonably appreciated by the appellate authority, interference is permissible only if perversity or demonstrable error is shown. The appellate authority considered the DVO report and other material and adopted Rs.5 per sq. meter.
Conclusion: The adoption of FMV at Rs.5 per sq. meter is upheld. This conclusion is against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether deduction under section 54B should be allowed to the extent of Rs.3,05,16,220/- claimed (including land levelling and fencing) or restricted to Rs.80,62,820/- being registered purchase price plus incidental expenses, and whether land levelling and fencing expenses of Rs.27,54,400/- qualify as part of cost of acquisition.
Analysis: The first appellate authority held in principle that the asset transferred was agricultural land and that the assessee was eligible for deduction under section 54B, but restricted the allowable deduction to the amount recorded in registered sale deeds plus stamp duty, registration and legal charges. The findings of the assessing officer and the first appellate authority on the quantum were contemporaneous and reasoned, interpreting the statutory expression "purchase" in section 54B and relying on registered documents. However, the record shows the levelling and fencing expenses were incurred to make the agricultural lands fit for cultivation, were explained on oath, and were not disbelieved by the authorities. Authorities have recognised that such expenses, when intrinsically connected to acquisition, form part of the cost for section 54B purposes.
Conclusion: The restriction of deduction under section 54B to Rs.80,62,820/- is affirmed except that land levelling and fencing expenses of Rs.27,54,400/- are held to form part of the cost of acquisition and are allowable. This conclusion is partly in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by upholding the FMV determination for computation of long-term capital gain and by sustaining the restriction on deduction under section 54B except that land levelling and fencing expenses aggregated to Rs.27,54,400/- are to be included in the cost of acquisition for section 54B purposes, producing a net partial relief for the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Where historical valuation is supported by an expert DVO report and reasonably appreciated on the facts, appellate interference is not warranted; and expenses incurred for levelling and fencing that are integral to making agricultural land fit for cultivation constitute part of cost of acquisition eligible for deduction under section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issues: Whether the adjudication order and the appellate order under the GST law were liable to be set aside for want of adequate opportunity, and whether the matter deserved remand for fresh consideration.
Analysis: The material showed that the assessee had not replied to the show-cause notice and the adjudication proceeded to confirm tax, interest, and penalty, followed by dismissal of the statutory appeal. The Court accepted the assertion that the failure to respond and contest the proceedings was attributable to bona fide reasons and sufficient cause. In view of the need to afford a fair opportunity before finalising the demand, a justice-oriented approach was adopted and the impugned orders were interfered with.
Conclusion: The impugned adjudication and appellate orders were set aside and the matter was remitted for reconsideration from the stage of reply to the show-cause notice.
Final Conclusion: The assessee secured reopening of the GST proceedings for fresh adjudication, with liberty to file replies and documents and for the authority to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax demand is confirmed without affording a meaningful opportunity to respond, the resulting order may be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication to secure procedural fairness.
Issues: Whether revisional powers under Section 108 of the GST law can be invoked to revise an audit observation or audit report without first initiating proceedings under Sections 73 or 74, and whether a writ petition is maintainable against such notice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Analysis: The audit process had culminated in an audit report, and no proceedings under Sections 73 or 74 had been initiated when the revisional notice was issued. Section 65(7) contemplates that when an audit reveals unpaid tax, short payment, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit, the proper course is action under Sections 73 or 74. On that footing, invoking Section 108 to revise an audit report or audit observation was held to be impermissible and without authority of law. The availability of a reply to the show cause notice did not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction where the notice itself was issued without jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The revisional notice was quashed as being without jurisdiction, and the petition was allowed, with liberty reserved to the respondent to proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A revisional power cannot be used to revise an audit report where the statute requires the revenue to proceed, if at all, under the specific recovery provisions triggered by audit findings; a notice issued in breach of that statutory sequence is liable to be struck down in writ jurisdiction notwithstanding alternate remedy.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the reassessment notices issued under Section 148 by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, after the coming into force of the faceless scheme under Section 151A and the relevant notification, suffered from lack of jurisdiction, warranting quashing of the notices and all consequential proceedings for the relevant assessment years.
(ii) Whether, upon quashing of the Section 148 notices and consequential reassessment orders/demand/penalty notices on the jurisdictional ground, the pending statutory appeals should be directed to be disposed of as academic/infructuous, with liberty to both sides to seek revival/restoration if required.
(iii) Whether liberty should be reserved to the Revenue to seek revival of the writ petition depending upon the outcome of pending proceedings before the Apex Court, while keeping all rival contentions open.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to issue notices under Section 148 post Section 151A faceless scheme
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court proceeded on the basis that Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the notification issued pursuant thereto provided for issuance of notice under Section 148 only by the faceless authority, and not by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the controversy was covered by a binding decision of a co-ordinate Bench which had quashed show cause notice(s) on the ground that the jurisdictional Assessing Officer did not have jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 148 in light of Section 151A and the notification implementing the faceless scheme. The Court expressly applied that ratio to the present facts, holding that the same jurisdictional defect vitiated the impugned notices and the proceedings taken pursuant to them.
Conclusion: The impugned Section 148 notices for the concerned assessment years were held to be without jurisdiction and were quashed; consequently, all further proceedings and consequential orders/notices arising from such initiation were also quashed.
Issue (ii): Fate of consequential reassessment orders, demand and penalty notices; and effect on pending statutory appeals
Interpretation and reasoning: Having found the initiation itself defective on the jurisdictional ground and having disposed of the petition in terms of the co-ordinate Bench decision, the Court quashed the consequential reassessment orders (including rectification orders), demand notices issued pursuant thereto, and penalty notices for the relevant assessment years as consequences of the invalid initiation.
Conclusion: The Court directed the appellate authority to dispose of the pending appeals for the relevant assessment years as having become academic/infructuous due to the quashing of the foundational notices and consequential proceedings, while expressly reserving liberty to both sides to seek revival/restoration of the appeals if the occasion arises.
Issue (iii): Liberty to revive proceedings depending on the Apex Court's decision; preservation of rival contentions
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the co-ordinate Bench approach reserved liberty to the Revenue to seek revival contingent upon the outcome of matters pending before the Apex Court. Following the same course, the Court reserved liberty to the Revenue to seek revival of the writ petition after disposal of the pending Apex Court matters, clarifying that all rival contentions were kept open and no opinion was expressed on those issues at this stage.
Conclusion: Liberty was reserved to the Revenue to seek revival after the Apex Court's decision; additionally, if revival occurs, all contentions of both sides were kept open, including the petitioner's contention regarding validity of search, seizure and inspection proceedings, on which the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether, in the circumstances asserted, the Court should set aside the adjudication order passed under Section 73 of the KGST Act, 2017 and the appellate order passed under Section 107(11) of the KGST Act, 2017, and remit the matter to the adjudicating authority to provide one more opportunity to file reply to the show-cause notice and contest the proceedings.
2. On what conditions and safeguards (including costs and appearance directions) remand and restoration of opportunity should be granted, and whether non-appearance on the fixed date should result in automatic recall of the remand order.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Setting aside Section 73 adjudication order and Section 107(11) appellate order; remand for fresh consideration
Legal framework (as noticed by the Court): The Court considered that the show-cause notice and adjudication were under Section 73 of the CGST/KGST Act, 2017, and the appellate rejection was under Section 107(11) of the KGST Act, 2017.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the adjudication order confirming demand was passed because no reply was submitted to the show-cause notice. The petitioner specifically asserted that the omission to reply and contest was due to "bonafide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause," and sought one more opportunity to respond and participate. The Court, having regard to this assertion, held that a "justice oriented approach" was warranted and that it was just and appropriate to provide one further opportunity by remitting the matter to the adjudicating authority from the stage of filing reply to the show-cause notice.
Conclusions: The Court set aside (i) the adjudication order passed under Section 73 of the KGST Act, 2017 and (ii) the appellate order passed under Section 107(11) of the KGST Act, 2017, and remitted the matter to the adjudicating authority for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law from the stage of submission of reply to the show-cause notice.
Issue 2: Conditions for remand-costs, appearance, opportunity of hearing, and automatic recall on default
Interpretation and reasoning: To balance granting a renewed opportunity with procedural discipline, the Court imposed a monetary cost and fixed a specific appearance date before the adjudicating authority without awaiting further notice. The Court also directed that replies, documents, and submissions must be considered and that "sufficient and reasonable opportunity" be provided before proceeding further in accordance with law. To ensure compliance, the Court added a consequence that failure to appear on the specified date would result in the present order standing "automatically recalled."
Conclusions: Remand was made conditional upon payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- to the High Court Legal Services Authority within six weeks. The petitioner was directed to appear before the adjudicating authority on a fixed date, with liberty to file replies and documents to be duly considered after reasonable opportunity of hearing. Non-appearance on the specified date would automatically recall the Court's remand order without further orders.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the impugned show cause notice issued under Section 73 for the same tax period was without jurisdiction on the ground that an earlier intimation/show cause notice sequence existed for that tax period and a prior court order had set aside an earlier summary show cause notice.
(ii) Whether, under the scheme of the GST enactments, issuance of multiple show cause notices for the same tax period is impermissible, and if permissible, whether overlap/duplication requires quashing of the later notice at the threshold.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Jurisdictional validity of the impugned Section 73 show cause notice in light of earlier proceedings and the prior order
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court treated determination of tax liability as arising under Section 73 (and not under the scrutiny mechanism), and considered the relationship between scrutiny/intimation and subsequent adjudicatory proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court compared the subject-matter of the earlier show cause notice (which had been set aside in its summary form) and the impugned show cause notice. It found that, barring one common element relating to exempt supplies/value of outward supplies (Rs. 19,001), the impugned notice raised different discrepancies (including unreconciled turnover and credit notes). The Court held that the mere fact that an explanation was furnished to an intimation does not, by itself, bar issuance of a show cause notice under Section 73; the proper course is adjudication on merits. The prior order setting aside the earlier summary show cause notice did not operate as a prohibition against initiating a distinct Section 73 proceeding on different issues for the same tax period.
Conclusions: The impugned show cause notice was not shown to be without jurisdiction merely because earlier proceedings existed for the same tax period and a prior order had intervened. The challenge on this ground was rejected.
Issue (ii): Permissibility of multiple show cause notices for the same tax period and treatment of overlap
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined the GST scheme and observed that principles akin to res judicata/constructive res judicata and related procedural bars under the Code of Civil Procedure are not incorporated in the GST enactments. It accepted the view that multiple show cause notices are not barred where they concern different subject-matters.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that there is no bar to issuance of multiple show cause notices for the same tax period if they relate to different and separate issues. It distinguished the situation where multiple notices involve overlapping proposals on the same subject, observing that if overlap exists between two pending proceedings, the demand must be dropped in one of them upon adjudication, rather than quashing the later notice at the threshold. The Court expressly accepted the view that multiple notices are permissible when addressing different subject matters and found the cited interim stay order relied upon by the petitioner to have no precedential ratio applicable to decide otherwise. It further held that general civil procedure doctrines (including estoppel/res judicata-type constraints) do not strictly apply in the tax law context under the GST scheme as considered in the judgment.
Conclusions: Multiple show cause notices for the same tax period are permissible under the GST scheme when they address different issues. Any duplication/overlap is to be dealt with in adjudication by dropping the duplicated demand in one proceeding, not by treating the later notice as jurisdictionally invalid. On the facts, since the impugned notice was substantially different, it was sustained.
Final disposition and operative direction (material to decision): The writ petition challenging the impugned show cause notice was dismissed. Liberty was granted to submit a reply to the impugned notice within 30 days from receipt of the order, with the authority directed to proceed to a final order on merits thereafter; failing compliance, the authority was left at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether a loan advanced to a concern, which was not a shareholder in the lender company, could be taxed as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 merely because the same individual was a beneficial shareholder in both entities.
Analysis: The provision covers loans or advances to a shareholder who is a beneficial owner of requisite voting power, and also to a concern in which such shareholder has the prescribed interest. On the facts, the assessee was not a shareholder in the lender company, even though the common individual shareholder held substantial interest in both companies. The issue was governed by the settled interpretation that deemed dividend cannot be assessed in the hands of a non-shareholder concern merely because of common shareholding linkage.
Conclusion: The addition under section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the impugned deemed-dividend addition was deleted.
Ratio Decidendi: A loan or advance cannot be treated as deemed dividend in the hands of a recipient concern unless the recipient itself is a shareholder in the lender company; the existence of a common beneficial shareholder is insufficient by itself.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in disallowing the entire claimed business loss on the premise of lack of profit motive and allegedly concessional pricing to a group customer, despite no rejection of audited books or specific defects.
(ii) Whether ESOP cross-charge paid to a non-resident holding company constituted allowable revenue expenditure under section 37(1), and whether non-deduction of tax at source under section 195 attracted disallowance under section 40(a)(i).
(iii) Whether manpower supply expenditure could be disallowed merely because the vendor (and its sub-vendors) was not traceable later and did not respond to notices, despite contemporaneous documentary evidence, banking payments, and TDS compliance.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Allowability of business loss; impermissibility of disallowing "loss" by importing notional income / questioning business prudence
Legal framework: The Court considered computation of business income/loss with reference to section 28 and the principle that, where audited accounts are accepted and no specific defects are found (including no invocation of section 145(3)), taxation must proceed on real income and not on hypothetical income; and the Revenue cannot substitute its perception of business prudence for that of the assessee.
Interpretation and reasoning: The disallowance was founded on allegations that services were rendered to a group entity at below-market rates while higher rates were paid to third-party vendors, implying absence of profit motive. The Court found that, on evidence (rate charts), the rates charged to the group customer and to unrelated customers were the same for the relevant year (and also shown for subsequent years). Consequently, the factual foundation for treating the arrangement as a deliberate discount to a related party was not sustained. The Court further accepted that the e-commerce logistics sector was highly competitive and that early-year losses could not, by themselves, justify treating losses as abnormal or as tax avoidance. Importantly, the Court noted that the expenses were recorded in audited accounts; no suppression of revenue, inflation of expenditure, breach of section 40A(2), or defect in books was established. The Court held that the mere comparison between customer billing and vendor payments could not be the sole basis for rejecting the loss, because the business model involved multiple additional unavoidable costs (freight, delivery vehicles, outside contracted services, statutory levies), which could independently explain losses even if there were parity in certain rate components. The approach of disallowing the entire loss was held to be based on conjecture and not supported by any specific statutory disallowance provision.
Conclusions: The Court held that the complete disallowance of business loss was arbitrary and contrary to law, and directed deletion of the disallowance; the same conclusion was applied to the identical business-loss issue in the subsequent assessment years considered.
Issue (ii): Deductibility of ESOP cross-charge; TDS under section 195 and disallowance under section 40(a)(i)
Legal framework: The Court examined section 37(1) for allowability of business expenditure and addressed section 195 withholding and section 40(a)(i) consequences, focusing on whether the payment carried an income element chargeable in India or was a cost-to-cost reimbursement.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court upheld allowance of ESOP cross-charge as an employee compensation cost. It accepted that, under the cost-sharing arrangement, ESOP costs relatable to employees of the assessee were cross-charged and that such cost was treated as employee benefit expense with corresponding credit to the holding company, involving actual outflow. The Court rejected the premise that the expense was merely notional or belonged exclusively to the holding company, and treated it as incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes to attract and retain employees. On withholding, the Court held that the payment to the non-resident holding company was not for receipt of services, but reimbursement of the proportionate ESOP expenditure attributable to employees of the assessee, and the claim that the reimbursement was on a cost-to-cost basis was not shown to be incorrect by the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the Court held that section 195 withholding was not required on such reimbursement and therefore section 40(a)(i) disallowance could not be sustained.
Conclusions: ESOP cross-charge was held allowable under section 37(1). No TDS obligation under section 195 arose on the cost-to-cost reimbursement in the facts found, and the Revenue's challenge was dismissed.
Issue (iii): Disallowance of manpower expenses due to vendor non-traceability; sufficiency of contemporaneous evidence
Legal framework: The Court considered allowability of business expenditure on the test of genuineness and business purpose, and whether third-party non-compliance/non-traceability, by itself, can justify disallowance when the assessee produces contemporaneous records and payments are through banking channels with TDS.
Interpretation and reasoning: The disallowance was sustained by the first appellate authority primarily because the vendor and sub-vendors were not found at their addresses during later inquiries and notices under section 133(6) remained unanswered, and some invoices were computer-generated/unsigned. The Court found this insufficient to negate the assessee's contemporaneous evidence for the year of claim. It emphasized that the assessee produced agreements, invoices, payroll registers, statutory compliance records (including PF/ESI-related documents), and bank payment advices, and that TDS under section 194C was deducted. It also noted that manpower costs from numerous other vendors in the same year were accepted after verification, and there was no material showing cash-back, inflation, or tax evasion motive; additionally, the assessee was already reporting large losses, reducing any plausible incentive to fabricate expenses. The Court held that later non-traceability of the vendor may raise doubt but cannot, by itself, override contemporaneous evidence of services actually availed and paid for.
Conclusions: The manpower expense disallowance was held unjustified and the addition was directed to be deleted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the adjudication order confirming tax, interest and penalty, passed ex parte under Section 73(9) of the CGST/KGST Act for the relevant tax period, warranted interference and remand to enable the taxpayer to file reply/documents and be heard.
(ii) Whether, in view of the pending adjudication before the Supreme Court concerning the validity/effect of notifications relied on for extension of limitation under Section 73(10), the adjudicating authority should be directed to pass a fresh adjudication order only after the Supreme Court's decision, and how limitation should be protected in the interregnum.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Interference with ex parte adjudication and grant of opportunity
Legal framework: The Court noted that the show-cause notice was issued under Section 73(1) and the adjudication order was passed under Section 73(9) of the CGST/KGST Act for the relevant tax period, on the allegation of excess ITC claimed in GSTR-3B as compared to GSTR-2A.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court proceeded on the basis that the taxpayer had not replied to the notice and the adjudication culminated in an ex parte demand. The taxpayer asserted that the notices went unnoticed, resulting in non-filing of reply/documents, and sought an opportunity to submit reply and supporting material. Considering the circumstances and submissions, the Court formed the view that one more opportunity ought to be granted by setting aside the impugned adjudication order and remitting the matter for reconsideration in accordance with law.
Conclusions: The Court allowed the petition to the extent of setting aside the impugned adjudication order and remitting the matter to the adjudicating authority for fresh consideration and a fresh adjudication order in accordance with law.
Issue (ii): Effect of pending Supreme Court proceedings on limitation-extension notifications; timing of fresh adjudication; exclusion of time for limitation
Legal framework: The taxpayer contended that the proceedings were barred by limitation under Section 73(10) of the KGST Act, while the revenue contended that limitation stood extended by notifications. The Court considered the submission that the validity of such notifications was seized of by the Supreme Court in a pending special leave matter, which would have a bearing on the impugned proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting orders, the Court determined that the adjudicating authority should reconsider and issue a fresh adjudication order only after the Supreme Court disposes of the pending special leave matter, since that decision may impact the limitation question and the proceedings founded on the asserted extension.
Conclusions: The Court directed the adjudicating authority to pass a fresh adjudication order in accordance with law after the Supreme Court's disposal of the pending special leave matter. It further directed that the period between the date of the impugned adjudication order and the date of disposal of the special leave matter by the Supreme Court shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the scrutiny notice issued under section 143(2) by an Income Tax Officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction under CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 rendered the notice invalid.
(ii) Whether an assessment framed under section 143(3) pursuant to such invalid/non-jurisdictional notice could be sustained, or was liable to be quashed as invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity of notice under section 143(2) issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal): The Tribunal considered CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 (dated 31.01.2011) prescribing pecuniary limits for assigning cases between ITOs and ACs/DCs, including that for non-corporate returns in metro cities the ITO's jurisdiction is "upto Rs. 20 lacs" and above that lies with AC/DC. The Tribunal treated this instruction as governing the jurisdictional competence relevant to issuance of the section 143(2) notice in the facts before it.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that the returned income was Rs. 20,45,560, i.e., above Rs. 20 lacs, and the assessee was assessed in Kolkata (a "metro city" under the Instruction). On these facts, it held that the section 143(2) notice dated 24.09.2018 issued by an ITO was in violation of the pecuniary jurisdiction laid down by CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 and was therefore issued by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer.
Conclusion: The section 143(2) notice issued by the ITO was held to be invalid for want of jurisdiction in view of the applicable CBDT Instruction and the returned income exceeding the prescribed limit.
Issue (ii): Effect of invalid/non-jurisdictional notice on the validity of the assessment under section 143(3)
Legal framework (as applied by the Tribunal): The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that a valid scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) requires a valid, jurisdictionally competent notice under section 143(2), and treated the absence of such valid notice as fatal to the assessment's sustainability.
Interpretation and reasoning: Having concluded that the section 143(2) notice was issued by a non-jurisdictional officer, the Tribunal held that the assessment framed under section 143(3) was "dehors" the mandatory notice and could not be sustained. The Tribunal relied on decisions it considered supportive on the point that a scrutiny notice issued without valid jurisdiction vitiates the consequent assessment, and applied that approach to the present facts.
Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) was held invalid and was quashed; the appeal was allowed on this jurisdictional ground.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a delay of 172 days in filing the appeal should be condoned on the facts placed before the Tribunal.
2. Whether the entire bank deposits (cash deposits and a time deposit) could be treated as "unexplained money" and added as income under section 69A, in the circumstances where the assessee was a registered co-operative society carrying on member-related deposit and lending activities and reflected a loss in its income and expenditure account.
3. Whether non-filing of return of income, by itself, justified denial of deduction under section 80P and/or supported sustaining the addition of the bank deposits as income.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Condonation of delay in filing appeal
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal considered the explanation offered for the 172-day delay and noted that the Revenue did not object to condonation. On appraisal of the record, the Tribunal found the reasons to be bona fide and genuine.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication.
2. Sustainability of addition of entire bank deposits as unexplained money under section 69A
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the nature of the assessee's activities and materials on record, including that it was a registered co-operative society operating under its by-laws, accepting deposits from members and advancing money to members while earning and paying interest. The Tribunal also noted that the income and expenditure account for the year reflected a loss (excess of expenditure over income). Against this factual backdrop, the Tribunal found it untenable that the entire deposits in the bank account and the time deposit could be treated as income merely because they appeared as deposits, and stated it was unable to understand how such deposits, as such, could be added as income. The Tribunal thus found the approach of treating aggregate deposits as unexplained money and bringing them to tax as income to be incorrect on the facts considered.
Conclusion: The addition of the aggregate deposits as unexplained money was held not correct; the appellate order sustaining it was set aside and deletion of the addition was directed.
3. Effect of non-filing of return on claim of deduction under section 80P and on the addition
Legal framework (as applied in reasoning): The Tribunal addressed the proposition that a return must be filed to claim deduction under section 80P, and relied on the view that denial of deduction for non-filing is not attracted to section 80P in the manner applied by the lower authorities.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal rejected the proposition that it was necessary for a co-operative society to file a return of income to claim deduction under section 80P, and held that the lower authority's denial of deduction on the ground of non-filing was not justified. Further, given that the assessee reflected a loss for the year, the Tribunal reasoned that no addition was called for on the facts as assessed.
Conclusion: Non-filing of return was held not to justify denial of section 80P deduction in the manner adopted, and did not support sustaining the impugned addition; the addition was directed to be deleted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(a) Whether the cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-filing of returns for six months ought to be revoked in writ jurisdiction when the assessee attributes the default to financial constraints and undertakes to file returns and discharge dues.
(b) If revocation is granted, what enforceable conditions should govern restoration, including timelines for compliance and restrictions on utilisation of any available Input Tax Credit (ITC).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a): Revocation of cancellation of GST registration
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the registration had been cancelled for continuous non-filing of returns for six months. The petitioner explained the default as arising from financial constraints and expressed willingness to file all pending returns and to pay the entire tax liabilities along with applicable interest and penalty. The Court formed the view that the reason furnished for non-compliance within the prescribed time "appears to be genuine", and therefore considered it appropriate to intervene and restore the registration.
Conclusion: The Court revoked the cancellation order and restored the GST registration, subject to compliance with specified conditions.
Issue (b): Conditions for restoration; timelines and ITC restrictions
Interpretation and reasoning: While granting revocation, the Court imposed conditions to ensure prompt statutory compliance and to safeguard revenue. It required a fixed monetary payment as a condition precedent, directed the respondent to enable filing on the GST portal upon proof of such payment, and prescribed a strict time window for filing all pending returns and paying dues. The Court expressly restricted payment/adjustment of tax, interest, fine/fee from any unutilised or unclaimed ITC, and further directed that any ITC remaining unutilised must not be used unless and until scrutinised and approved by a competent departmental officer; only approved ITC could be used for future liabilities. The Court also provided that non-compliance with any condition would result in the benefit of restoration automatically ceasing to operate.
Conclusions (operative conditions): (i) A payment of Rs. 1,000/- was mandated as a prerequisite. (ii) Upon proof, the respondent must take steps, including instructing the GST Network, to enable portal changes to allow return filing and payment within four weeks. (iii) The petitioner must file all returns up to date and pay tax dues with interest and belated filing fee within four weeks from restoration. (iv) Payments under this process cannot be made/adjusted from ITC; any ITC cannot be utilised until departmental scrutiny and approval, and only approved ITC may be utilised thereafter. (v) Failure to comply with any condition causes the restoration benefit to automatically cease.
Note
Bookmark
Share
Download
Don't have an account? Register Here
Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
TaxTMI