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ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether the prior binding declaration that customs duty could not be levied on electrical energy cleared from a Special Economic Zone to the Domestic Tariff Area was limited to a particular notification/period or applied in principle to subsequent periods on the same statutory footing.
2. Whether, during the later period under consideration, any material change in law or relevant facts justified a different outcome from the prior declaration, despite later notifications prescribing different (specific) rates.
3. Whether relief (including refund) could be denied solely because later notifications were not separately and specifically challenged, when the petition sought enforcement of an earlier declaration that the levy lacked authority of law.
4. Whether a co-ordinate Bench could refuse to apply the earlier binding decision by confining it to an earlier notification/period, without referring the matter to a larger Bench.
5. What consequential directions were required once the levy was held to be without authority of law (refund, restraint on further demands, and conditions such as interest and timeline).
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Scope and effect of the earlier declaration striking down the levy
Legal framework: The Court examined the charging basis under Section 12 of the Customs Act, the parity/deeming clause in Section 30 of the Special Economic Zones Act, and the limits of delegated power under Section 25 of the Customs Act, along with constitutional constraints under Articles 14 and 265, as applied in the earlier decision.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the earlier decision was not a notification-specific or time-bound indulgence. It rested on four foundational determinations: absence of a lawful taxable event for "import into India" in such SEZ-to-DTA electricity clearances; impermissible use of an "exemption" notification to create a levy; impermissibility of retrospectively fastening the levy through delegated action; and arbitrariness/double burden given the existing mechanism for neutralising duty benefits on inputs. These determinations formed the ratio decidendi and, absent change in the statutory setting, governed later periods as well.
Conclusion: The earlier declaration was a principle-based exposition that, on the then-existing framework, customs duty could not be levied on electrical energy transmitted from an SEZ to the DTA; it therefore applied to subsequent periods standing on the same legal footing.
Issue 2: Whether later notifications/rates and the later period rested on a materially changed legal or factual basis
Legal framework: The Court applied the requirements of a valid fiscal levy: a clear charging provision, an identifiable taxable event, and statutory rate-making authority; and it construed Section 30 of the SEZ Act as a parity clause rather than an expansion of the customs charging event. It also considered Rule 47(3) of the SEZ Rules as already providing for neutralisation of duty benefits on inputs when power is supplied to the DTA.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found no material change in law or relevant facts during the later period: Section 30 remained unchanged; imported electrical energy continued at a nil customs duty rate; and constitutional parameters remained constant. Later notifications merely altered the form/rate (from ad valorem to per-unit) and operated prospectively, but did not cure the basic defect-absence of authority to levy customs duty on such clearances. The "recoupment of duty-free input benefits" rationale was rejected because Rule 47(3) already neutralised input duty benefits; imposing a further duty on the electricity output amounted to double counting and unfairness. The Court reaffirmed that Section 25 is a power to exempt from duty otherwise leviable, not a power to create a levy; therefore, changing the rate/structure did not validate an unauthorised tax.
Conclusion: No statutory or factual change justified departure; the later-period levy under subsequent notifications remained without sanction in law.
Issue 3: Necessity of separately challenging later notifications to obtain relief/refund
Legal framework: The Court relied on the remedial nature of constitutional jurisdiction and administrative law principles that when the foundation of a levy is declared ultra vires, derivative continuations of the same levy cannot be sustained absent a materially new statutory basis.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court characterised the later petition as a sequel seeking enforcement of the earlier binding declaration and restitution of amounts paid under protest. It rejected the contention that the absence of a fresh, specific challenge to each later notification barred relief, holding that constitutional adjudication must look to substance over form; otherwise, the State could perpetuate an invalid levy by reissuing it through successive notifications and force repetitive litigation. Since the commodity, movement (SEZ to DTA), asserted source of power, and foundational defect remained the same, the notifications did not create a new cause requiring fresh adjudication of the same illegality.
Conclusion: Relief and refund could be granted without requiring separate challenges to each later notification continuing the same unauthorised levy.
Issue 4: Binding effect of the earlier decision on a co-ordinate Bench
Legal framework: The Court applied the doctrine of judicial discipline and stare decisis: a co-ordinate Bench is bound by an earlier co-ordinate Bench decision on the same question of law and, if doubting correctness/applicability, must refer the matter to a larger Bench rather than narrowing or bypassing it.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the later Bench impermissibly confined the earlier ruling to an earlier notification/period to deny relief, without undertaking a permissible course of referral. Given finality of the earlier declaration and absence of change in the governing legal framework, the co-ordinate Bench was duty-bound to apply the earlier ratio.
Conclusion: The refusal to apply the earlier binding declaration and the artificial narrowing of its effect was contrary to judicial discipline; the later decision was vitiated.
Issue 5: Consequential directions on refund and restraint once levy held unauthorised
Legal framework: The Court applied the principle that amounts collected under a levy held without authority of law cannot be retained, and restitution follows from the finding of illegality.
Interpretation and reasoning: Having declared the levy without authority of law for the relevant period, the Court directed refund after verification, set a strict timeline for completion by the competent customs authority, required cooperation in furnishing particulars, and prohibited "hyper-technical objections" defeating the substance of relief. The Court expressly denied interest on the refund and restrained enforcement of any further demand for the covered period, while clarifying it expressed no opinion on any future legislative regime.
Conclusion: Refund of amounts deposited under protest for the specified period was ordered without interest, to be completed within eight weeks after verification; no further demand for that period could be enforced.
Customs duty on electricity sent from SEZ to domestic buyers struck down for lack of "import" u/s12
Customs duty demanded on electrical energy transmitted from an SEZ to the DTA was held ultra vires as the statutory charging event under s.12 Customs Act-"import into India"-did not exist in substance, and delegated "exemption" power could not be inverted to create a levy; the levy therefore lacked authority under Arts. 14 and 265, and later rate/format changes did not cure the foundational defect, so the demand was unsustainable. The HC's refusal of relief for want of a specific challenge to subsequent notifications was erroneous because, absent any new statutory basis, such instruments did not generate a fresh cause of action, and effective relief could follow enforcement of the prior declaration; the appeal was allowed and the impugned HC judgment set aside.
Limits of delegated legislation in matters of taxation - discipline of judicial precedent and the obligation of co-ordinate Benches to adhere to settled law - obligation of the State to give effect to judicial declarations instead of reasserting. What, in law, did the Gujarat High Court decide in its judgment dated 15 July 2015, and what is the true scope of that decision? - HELD THAT:- On the constitutional and statutory basis, the High Court held that the levy was ultra vires because there was, in substance, no “import into India” that could trigger the charge under Section 12 of the Customs Act. This went to the very root of the matter. The Court was not deciding a mere technical irregularity. It held that the alleged taxable event did not exist in law. The absence of a taxable event is a jurisdictional defect - On retrospectivity, the High Court found that fastening a 16% ad valorem duty with effect from 26 June 2009 through delegated action offended Article 265 of the Constitution, which requires authority of law for every tax levy and collection. The judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 15 July 2015 was not a limited adjudication confined to the validity of one notification or to a closed span of time. It was a declaration of law founded on constitutional and statutory interpretation, determining that on the then-existing legal framework no customs duty could be levied on electrical energy transmitted from an SEZ to the DTA - The reasoning of said decision went to the very root of the taxing power i.e., it identified the absence of a charging event, the misuse of the exemption power, and the inherent arbitrariness of the scheme. Once such a declaration of law was rendered and affirmed by this Court, it acquired binding normative force and governed all transactions resting on the same legal footing. The essence of that pronouncement was not temporal but structural; it struck at the authority to levy, not merely at the rate or the period. Whether, in the period subsequent to 15 September 2010 and prior to 16 February 2016, there was any material changes in the statutory position or factual footing that would justify a different result from that arrived at in 2015 judgment? - HELD THAT:- The High Court in 2015 correctly detected that inversion: a provision designed to grant relief (exemption) had been inverted to impose a burden (levy). Such inversion is not a mere irregularity; it is an illegality at source. The said finding of the High Court is in consonance with settled principles of law declared by this Court. That conclusion has a direct bearing on the respondent’s present defence. If the very manner in which the levy was introduced was beyond the scope of delegated authority, then subsequent notifications which continue to demand duty on the same taxable fiction namely, that SEZ- to-DTA electricity is to be treated as exigible to customs duty cannot be insulated merely because they altered the rate from 16% to ten paise to three paise, or because they framed the imposition of customs duty prospectively. In other words, where the root is ultra vires, the branch cannot claim legitimacy by altering its foliage. The levy on electricity generated in the Special Economic Zone and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area, as sought to be enforced against the appellant, has no sanction in law. The charge does not find support in the statutory scheme. We also find that, even after the decision rendered in 2015, there has been no change either in the law or in the relevant facts which could justify taking a view different from the one already taken. The legal position having remained the same, the conclusion reached earlier must continue to hold the field. Section 30 of the SEZ Act continued unchanged; the Customs Tariff continued to prescribe a nil rate on imported electrical energy; and the constitutional parameters of Articles 14 and 265 remained constant. The subsequent notifications merely varied the form and rate of duty; they did not cure the fundamental absence of authority to tax. The attempt of the executive to reintroduce the very same levy through the route of an “exemption” notification cannot be sustained. Whether the High Court, in its impugned judgment of 28 June 2019, was justified in holding that no relief could be granted to the appellant in the absence of a specific and fresh challenge to Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus? - HELD THAT:- The High Court, in its judgment of 2019, fell into error in accepting the submission of the Union that the later notifications continued to operate merely because they were not specifically set aside in the decision of 2015. Once the levy itself had been held to be without authority of law, its continuance through subsequent notifications could not be sustained. The invalidity goes to the root and does not depend upon the form or sequence of the notifications - the respondents’ contention that the appellant could not be granted relief because the later notifications were not independently impugned is rejected. Thus, where a levy has been declared to be without authority of law, a subsequent petition seeking enforcement of that declaration and consequential relief cannot be treated as a fresh challenge merely because the levy is sought to be continued under later or similar notifications. In the absence of any new statutory basis, such notifications do not create a new cause of action. A constitutional court is entitled to grant effective relief without insisting upon separate challenges to each such notification. The High Court, in the impugned judgment of 2019, erred in taking a contrary view. Whether, in view of the 2015 declaration of law and its affirmation, the High Court in 2019 was at liberty, being a co- ordinate Bench, to deny relief by narrowing the effect of the earlier pronouncement? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, if the Division Bench in 2019 was of the opinion that the 2015 decision could not, or ought not, apply to the later notifications or to the later period, the proper course was to request that the question be placed before a larger Bench of the High Court. The Bench in 2019 did not do so. Instead, it narrowed the effect of the 2015 judgment and declined relief for the subsequent years. That course was impermissible. The 2019 Bench was bound by the declaration of law in 2015, unless duly referred to a larger Bench. Once the 2015 judgment had declared the levy to be ultra vires and this Court had declined interference, it was incumbent upon the administrative authorities to conform their conduct to that declaration. Judicial pronouncements are not advisory opinions; they are binding commands of law. When the executive continues to enforce, under new guise, a levy that has been judicially struck down, it acts in defiance of constitutional discipline and erodes public confidence in the rule of law. Finality of adjudication is an essential component of good governance. The repetition of an invalidated levy through successive notifications compels needless litigation, burdens the courts, and subjects citizens to prolonged uncertainty - The doctrine interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which essentially means, that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation would squarely apply; the State must exemplify obedience to judgments, not resistance to them. The levy of customs duty on electrical energy cleared by the appellant from its SEZ unit to the DTA during the relevant period, as sought to be enforced through Notification No. 25/2010-Cus., Notification No. 91/2010-Cus., Notification No. 26/2012-Cus., and similar instruments, was without authority of law - the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28 June 2019 cannot be sustained. Appeal allowed.