Issues: Whether the petitioner should be granted liberty to prefer an appeal against the impugned GST assessment order and whether interim relief in the form of vacating the bank attachment should be granted subject to specified deposit and compliance conditions.

Analysis: The petition challenges the Assessment Order dated 27.04.2024 and the rejection of rectification. The relief granted is procedural and conditional: liberty is permitted to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority together with requisite documents to substantiate the defence, subject to the petitioner depositing 25% of the disputed tax over and above amounts already paid within 30 days from receipt of the order. The petitioner must procure from the tax officer a certificate evidencing the earlier payment of Rs. 5,75,646/- and place it before the Appellate Authority. On compliance with these stipulations, the Appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeal finally on merits without reference to limitation. The bank account attachment will be automatically vacated upon compliance; the order further clarifies that lifting of the bank attachment is subject to the petitioner depositing 50% of the disputed tax as ordered and not having arrears of other amounts. Failure to comply permits respondents to resume recovery proceedings as if the petition were dismissed.

Conclusion: Liberty granted to prefer appeal subject to depositing 25% of the disputed tax (over and above amounts already paid) within 30 days and producing a payment certificate; on such compliance the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal on merits without reference to limitation and the bank attachment shall be vacated subject to the specified deposit and non-arrears condition; failure to comply permits respondents to proceed with recovery.

Issues: Whether the amendment to Rule 4(7) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (imposing time limit for availing CENVAT credit) operates prospectively so that credit availed within one year of invoice issuance (after Notification No.21/2004-C.E.(N.T.) dated 11.07.2014 and Notification No.06/2015-C.E.(N.T.) dated 01.03.2015) cannot be denied for invoices issued prior to the amendment.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the effect of Notification No.21/2004-C.E. (N.T.) dated 11.07.2014 (effective 01.09.2014) which inserted a six-month time limit in Rule 4(7), and the subsequent Notification No.06/2015-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.2015 extending the period to one year. The Tribunal noted that invoices in dispute were issued prior to the amendment coming into force and applied the principle that restrictions introduced by later statutory amendment cannot retrospectively divest an assessee of an existing statutory right to take CENVAT credit where the conditions for credit (receipt of service/goods and payment of tax) were met. The Tribunal relied on its earlier decision in EM Services (I) Pvt. Ltd. and concluded that the amended time limitation is prospective and the benefit of the extended one-year period applies to the appellant's disputed invoices which were availed within one year.

Conclusion: The amendment to Rule 4(7) operates prospectively; the CENVAT credit availed by the appellant within one year of invoice issuance cannot be denied. The appeal of the assessee is allowed and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether liberty should be granted to file a statutory appeal against an assessment order and whether interim relief in the form of lifting bank attachment can be granted subject to conditions.

Analysis: The petition challenges an assessment order passed under Section 73 and notices under Section 50(1) and seeks rectification under Section 161 which was rejected. The petition is disposed at the admission stage by consent. Following established practice in similar matters, relief pending appeal is conditioned on the petitioner depositing a portion of the disputed tax to balance the competing interests of revenue protection and the availability of appellate remedy. The appellate authority is permitted to decide the appeal on merits without reference to limitation if the appeal is filed within the stipulated time. Compliance with the deposit requirement is linked to automatic vacation of the bank attachment, and failure to comply permits recovery action as if the petition were dismissed.

Conclusion: Liberty is granted to file a statutory appeal subject to depositing 25% of the disputed tax within thirty days; upon compliance the appellate authority may decide the appeal on merits without limitation reference and the bank attachment shall stand vacated; failure to comply permits the respondent to proceed with recovery as if the petition were dismissed.

Issues: Whether the penalty of Rs. 1,29,410/- levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where (a) the original addition that formed the basis for penalty was deleted in appeal and an entirely different amount was sustained by concession, and (b) the income was disclosed in the return and no fresh satisfaction of concealment was recorded by the Assessing Officer after appellate proceedings.

Analysis: The penalty was initiated with reference to additions made in the reassessment order, but the original addition was deleted by the appellate authority and a different amount was sustained pursuant to appellate proceedings and by concession. There is no material to show that the Assessing Officer recorded any fresh or independent satisfaction of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars with respect to the amount sustained on appeal. Penalty proceedings are quasicriminal in nature and require clear and specific recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer. Where primary facts were disclosed in the return and the dispute pertains to the legal characterisation of disclosed income or where an admission was made in appeal merely to buy peace of mind, such circumstances do not ipso facto establish mens rea or deliberate concealment. The penalty order also suffers from inconsistent computation and failure to identify the exact amount alleged to have been concealed.

Conclusion: The levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) is unsustainable and is deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether a transferee of a post-export DFIA can be denied customs exemption on the ground of actual use of the imported input in the exported goods; (ii) Whether a value cap or similar restriction introduced through public notice could be used to deny the exemption; (iii) Whether the impugned denial of exemption was sustainable and whether restoration of DFIA validity was warranted.

Issue (i): Whether a transferee of a post-export DFIA can be denied customs exemption on the ground of actual use of the imported input in the exported goods.

Analysis: The DFIA scheme was treated as a post-export, transferable scheme distinct from pre-export authorisations. On that basis, the Court held that importing an actual-use condition into the entitlement of a transferee was not supported by the scheme or the exemption notification. The Court further held that customs authorities could not deny benefit by speculating about the use of the input in the export product without first examining the shipping bills or other verifiable material relating to the original export.

Conclusion: The actual use objection was rejected and the exemption could not be denied on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether a value cap or similar restriction introduced through public notice could be used to deny the exemption.

Analysis: The Court held that the value restriction relied upon by the revenue, having been introduced through public notice, could not operate to curtail the entitlement under the DFIA scheme in the absence of valid enforceable authority. It treated the public notice-based cap as inapplicable for restricting import entitlement under the notification.

Conclusion: The value-cap objection was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned denial of exemption was sustainable and whether restoration of DFIA validity was warranted.

Analysis: The Court found that the denial rested on grounds beyond the original basis of rejection and without a proper factual foundation. It held that customs authorities could not substitute assumptions for verification of the export records and that the appellant, having been prevented by the dispute from utilising the authorisations, was entitled to restitutionary relief.

Conclusion: The denial order was set aside and restoration of licence validity for the unexpired period was directed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the customs demand was invalidated, and consequential relief was granted by directing restoration of DFIA validity.

Ratio Decidendi: A transferee under a post-export, transferable DFIA cannot be denied exemption by importing an actual-use requirement or other extra-notification restrictions unless such conditions are legally enforceable and factually verified from the export records.

Issues: Whether a General Penalty under Section 125 of the respective GST enactments can be imposed when a Late Fee under Section 47(2) has been imposed for the same tax period; and whether the General Penalty imposed on the petitioner should be dropped while confirming the Late Fee.

Analysis: The petition challenges an assessment order imposing both Late Fee under Section 47(2) and a General Penalty under Section 125 for the same tax period, and another assessment for the same period is the subject of an appeal. The Court noted authoritative precedent holding that where a taxpayer is liable to pay a Late Fee, imposition of a General Penalty under Section 125 cannot be sustained because Section 125 applies only in the absence of any other penalty; treating the two as co-existent would amount to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14. The respondent conceded that the cited decision has not been appealed and governs the field. Taking into account that two assessment orders exist for the same period, the Court applied the principle that General Penalty cannot be levied in presence of the Late Fee and considered appropriate equitable disposal by conditioning relief on payment of the Late Fee.

Conclusion: The General Penalty of Rs.50,000 imposed under Section 125 is dropped and the Late Fee of Rs.1,67,200 under Section 47(2) is confirmed; the impugned order dated 15.04.2025 shall stand quashed subject to deposit of the Late Fee within 30 days and other procedural directions in the order. (Decision in favour of the assessee on the issue of penalty.)

Issues: Whether notices, show-cause notices, assessment order and consequential demand and penalty notices for Assessment Year 2020-21 issued and passed in the name of an amalgamating/erstwhile company which ceased to exist on amalgamation are void for want of jurisdiction and not curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The petitioner's amalgamation of the transferor company into the petitioner with effect from 01.04.2017 was placed on record and communicated to the revenue in earlier assessment proceedings. For AY 2020-21, notwithstanding the petitioner filing return and participating in assessment proceedings, notices, show-cause notice, the order under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B, demand under Section 156 and penalty notices were issued in the name of the erstwhile company which had ceased to exist post-amalgamation. The legal framework includes the doctrine that an amalgamating/transferor company ceases to exist on sanction of scheme of amalgamation, Section 170 on succession to business, and Section 292B which preserves proceedings affected only by mere mistakes where they are in substance and effect in conformity with the Act. Precedents establish that issuance of jurisdictional notice in the name of a non-existent entity is a substantive illegality and not a curable procedural defect under Section 292B where the basis of jurisdiction is fundamentally at odds with the legal effect of amalgamation. The facts show no contemporaneous record or corrigendum by the assessing authority acknowledging a clerical/technical error; the revenue's reliance on a post-facto explanation of a technical glitch and the correctness of PAN does not cure the fundamental jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The notices, show-cause notice, assessment order dated 29.09.2022 under Section 143(3) r/w Section 144B, the consequential demand under Section 156 and the penalty notices issued in the name of the non-existent entity are void and are quashed. The writ petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether boronated calcium nitrate (Yaraliva Nitrabor) imported and classified under CTH 3102 6000 qualifies as a "water soluble calcium nitrate" within Sl. No.202(I)(b) of Notification No.12/2012-Cus dated 17.03.2012 and is therefore eligible for the exemption under that notification.

Analysis: The question turns on whether the imported product falls within the description and specifications of water-soluble calcium nitrate in Part-A of Schedule-1 of the Fertilizer Control Order, 1985 and the entries in Notification No.12/2012-Cus. The product contains boron and shows specified values for water insoluble matter and other parameters that correspond to the category of fortified fertilizers under the FCO. The notification grants exemption specifically to listed water-soluble fertilizers meeting the FCO specifications. Exemption notifications are to be interpreted strictly, and eligibility depends on the product matching the description and specifications set out in the FCO and the notification entry. The presence of boron and the matching of specifications to the fortified fertilizer entry indicate a different category from plain calcium nitrate listed for exemption.

Conclusion: The boronated calcium nitrate (Yaraliva Nitrabor) does not qualify as the water-soluble calcium nitrate covered by Sl. No.202(I)(b) of Notification No.12/2012-Cus dated 17.03.2012; the exemption is not available.

Issues: (i) Whether a show cause notice under Section 11A can be issued to recover duty where an order granting refund under Section 11B has attained finality; (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of excise duty paid on cash discounts and credit notes (i.e., whether the bar of unjust enrichment is attracted), including the evidentiary value of Chartered Accountant certificates and dealers' affidavits.

Issue (i): Whether a show cause notice under Section 11A can be issued to recover duty after a refund order under Section 11B has attained finality.

Analysis: The Tribunal's prior decisions held that once refund orders under Section 11B attain finality (no departmental appeal under Section 35), such amounts cannot be treated as 'duty erroneously refunded' for purposes of initiating recovery under Section 11A. The impugned appeals involve refund orders that were finally adjudicated in the appellant's favour by earlier Tribunal decisions; those decisions had attained finality.

Conclusion: A show cause notice under Section 11A for recovery of amounts already finally refunded under Section 11B could not lawfully be issued; the appellant is entitled to relief on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the bar of unjust enrichment prevents refund of duty on cash discounts and credit notes and whether the Chartered Accountant certificates and dealers' affidavits suffice to rebut the presumption of passage of duty.

Analysis: The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the CA certificates and affidavits for lack of supporting material, relying on precedent applying the unjust enrichment principle. Subsequent authority, including Tribunal decisions relied on by the appellant and appellate precedent, establish that where no contrary evidence is produced by the department, certified financial records and CA certificates (and supporting ledger documents/affidavits) may discharge the appellant's burden to show that the incidence of duty was not passed on. The impugned order failed to examine the Tribunal decisions and erred in rejecting the certificates without evidence to the contrary from the department.

Conclusion: The bar of unjust enrichment is not established on the record before the Tribunal; the appellant is entitled to refund of duty on cash discounts and credit notes, and the CA certificates and affidavits should have been accepted in the absence of contrary evidence.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed and the appellant is entitled to refunds and reliefs as determined by the Tribunal, reversing the impugned order and granting consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an order granting refund under Section 11B has attained finality, the department cannot invoke Section 11A to recover the refunded amount as 'erroneously refunded'; further, certified financial evidence (such as a Chartered Accountant's certificate with supporting documents) must be accepted to rebut the presumption of passage of duty unless the department produces contrary evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the Settlement Commission could invoke Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to reopen concluded settlement proceedings and levy interest under Section 234B; (ii) Whether the Petitioner is liable to pay interest under Section 234B from the date of intimation under Section 143(1) up to the date of the admission order under Section 245D(1).

Issue (i): Whether the Settlement Commission could invoke Section 154 to reopen concluded settlement proceedings and levy interest under Section 234B.

Analysis: The Court analysed the statutory scheme distinguishing Chapter XIV (procedure for assessment, where section 154 applies) from Chapter XIX-A (settlement proceedings under sections 245C and 245D). It relied on the precedent of the Constitution Bench in Brij Lal holding that settlement proceedings are final and conclusive and that section 154 is not available to reopen concluded settlement orders; the Court applied that ratio to the rectification order dated 23-3-2004 which sought to invoke section 154 to levy interest.

Conclusion: The rectification order dated 23-3-2004 passed by the Settlement Commission under Section 154 is without jurisdiction and is quashed and set aside; consequential demand notices are quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the Petitioner must be directed to pay interest under Section 234B from the date of intimation under Section 143(1) up to the date of the admission order under Section 245D(1).

Analysis: Having held that section 154 cannot be used to reopen concluded settlement proceedings, the Court considered the Revenue's submission that interest should nonetheless be payable up to the admission order date. The Court found that giving such a direction would amount to indirectly permitting what the Supreme Court has proscribed, and that the Supreme Court has fixed the terminal point for levy of interest in the context of settlement proceedings.

Conclusion: The Petitioner is not liable to be directed to pay interest from the date of intimation under Section 143(1) up to 22-8-1996 (date of admission under Section 245D(1)).

Final Conclusion: The Writ Petition is allowed: the rectification order and consequential demand notices are quashed, the Petition succeeds and is disposed of; no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi: The Settlement Commission cannot invoke Section 154 to reopen or rectify concluded settlement orders under Chapter XIX-A; interest under Section 234B in settlement matters cannot be levied by reopening concluded settlement orders and the terminal point for such interest is governed by the rules applicable to settlement proceedings as held by the Constitution Bench.

Issues: Whether the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer under Section 92CA(1) was made within the period of limitation such that the order passed under Section 92CA(3) is valid, and whether the impugned TPO order dated 27.01.2022 is liable to be quashed for being founded on a time-barred reference.

Analysis: The Court examined the timelines under Sections 148 and 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the effect of a reference under Section 92CA(1) on the limitation for completion of assessment. For a notice under Section 148 dated 24.02.2020 the ordinary limitation to complete reassessment fell within the period specified by Section 153(2) and the applicable proviso; a valid extension under Section 153(4) to add twelve months is available only if a reference under Section 92CA(1) is actually made during the course of the assessment proceedings before expiry of the original limitation. The material on record (ITBA entries and order sheets) showed that although approval for reference was accorded on 10.02.2021, the reference was transmitted to the TPO only on 11.01.2022 and received on 13.01.2022, after the relevant limitation had expired; pandemic-related statutory/notification extensions were considered but did not cure the fact that the reference itself was not made within the permissible period. An order passed by the TPO pursuant to a reference made beyond the statutory period is without jurisdiction and vitiates consequential proceedings.

Conclusion: The reference under Section 92CA(1) was not made within the period of limitation required by Section 153(2); the TPO order dated 27.01.2022 under Section 92CA(3) is without jurisdiction and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned TPO order dated 27.01.2022 (and any consequential proceedings) is set aside for want of a valid reference; the petitioner succeeds on the limitation and jurisdictional ground.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under Section 92CA(1) must be made during the course of assessment before expiry of the limitation under Section 153(2); only a reference actually made within that period can invoke the extension under Section 153(4), and a TPO order based on a reference made after that period is without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilised Cenvat/Input Tax Credit paid on input services in respect of exported services is admissible without establishing a direct nexus/correlation between the specific input services and the exported output services.

Analysis: The Court examined Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and Rule 2(l) defining "input service", the retrospective substitution of the phrase "used in" by "used for" effected by Section 74 of the Finance Act, 2010 and Notification dated 27.02.2010, and the clarificatory circulars of the Tax Research Unit and the Board. The statutory scheme, as amended and clarified, was analysed to determine whether it requires a one-to-one or direct nexus between particular input services and exported output services for refund eligibility. The Court considered the CESTAT's reliance on the retrospective amendment and the TRU circular introducing a simplified refund scheme (including refund in proportion to export turnover to total turnover) and the Board's earlier circulars advocating harmonious construction of the notification and the Cenvat rules. The Court also noted that recovery proceedings under Rule 14/Section 73 were not invoked by Revenue in the assessed cases.

Conclusion: The requirement of establishing a direct nexus/correlation between specific input services and exported output services is not necessary for grant of refund under Rule 5 as amended and clarified; refund entitlement is to be determined by the statutory formula and the amended/clarified scheme. The appeals filed by Revenue are dismissed and the orders allowing refund in favour of the assessee-respondent are upheld.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) correctly set aside demands made for the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and penalties under Section 11AC of the Act.

Analysis: The statutory test for invoking the extended period requires proof of fraud or collusion or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of the Act or Rules with intent to evade duty. The factual record showed that prior proceedings produced differing conclusions on liability and there was evidence that the respondents could have reasonably entertained the belief that no duty was payable on job work. The Tribunal's earlier remand concerned calculation and quantum, not fresh findings of intentional suppression; the adjudicating authorities' factual findings were weighed against the requirement that positive acts of suppression with intent must be established to extend limitation. The burden of proof to establish ingredients for extended limitation rests with the department; mere omission to register, file returns, or pay duty, without clear evidence of intent to evade, does not satisfy the statutory threshold for invoking extended limitation and consequent penalty.

Conclusion: The demands for extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) and the penalties under Section 11AC were correctly set aside; the impugned orders upholding that relief are to be upheld and the Revenue appeals dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) can be invoked only upon proof of fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of law with intent to evade duty; absent such positive proof, demands for extended limitation and associated penalties cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be granted time to pay admitted tax liabilities for assessment years 2017-2018, 2018-2019 and 2020-2021 and whether recovery proceedings in respect of those years should be deferred.

Analysis: The petition concerns recovery proceedings for multiple assessment years, of which separate orders already operate in respect of AY 2019-2020 (stay) and AY 2023-2024 (set aside and remitted). The remaining years involve admitted liabilities which the petitioner proposes to pay within a specified short period. The relief sought in relation to these remaining years is limited to a time extension for payment and suspension of recovery pending such payment. The Court considered the limited nature of the relief sought, the existence of stayed/remitted proceedings for other years, and the interest of justice in permitting an orderly discharge of admitted liabilities while preventing immediate coercive recovery.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted four weeks' time to pay the admitted tax liabilities for AY 2017-2018, 2018-2019 and 2020-2021 and recovery proceedings in respect of those years are directed to be deferred until the said date; this disposition is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a writ petition challenging the Order-in-Original dated 30.07.2025 on the ground of non-receipt of the Show Cause Notice can be finally adjudicated in a summary proceeding and whether interim security in the form of a deposit should be directed to protect the revenue pending challenge.

Analysis: The issue of service of notice and receipt of communications cannot be conclusively determined in a summary admission-stage proceeding. Relevant documentary proof of email communications or inbox status was not produced by the petitioner. Material facts include that the petitioner's director has left the business and the country, which affects the ability to secure recovery. In these circumstances, protecting the fiscal interest requires an interim measure. Hence a quantifiable deposit was directed to secure the disputed tax while the challenge proceeds.

Conclusion: Direction issued for deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 within 30 days by the petitioner (represented by its director and her son) as interim security; failure to deposit permits respondents to treat the writ petition as dismissed in limine and to proceed with recovery steps including extradition measures against the son.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 270A could be levied where the assessee, at the time of filing the return, claimed a deduction in accordance with binding precedent and offered a bona fide explanation under Section 270A(6); (ii) Whether under-reporting of income arises for the purposes of Section 270A(2) where the income assessed under Section 143(3) is not greater than the income processed under Section 143(1)(a).

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 270A could be levied where the assessee relied on existing High Court precedent and offered a bona fide explanation under Section 270A(6).

Analysis: Section 270A(6) excludes from 'under-reported income' amounts in respect of which the assessee offers a bona fide explanation and discloses all material facts to substantiate that explanation. The assessee filed the return claiming deduction in conformity with the then-binding High Court decision. On a prima facie view, that explanation qualifies as bona fide and was supported by disclosure of material facts, thereby removing the basis for treating the amount as under-reported under Section 270A.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 270A could not be levied on the basis of the facts prima facie where the assessee had a bona fide explanation based on binding precedent; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether under-reporting under Section 270A(2) exists when assessed income under Section 143(3) is not greater than income processed under Section 143(1)(a).

Analysis: Section 270A(2) contemplates under-reporting only where the income assessed under Section 143(3) exceeds the income determined in the return processed under Section 143(1)(a). On the material before the Court, and on a prima facie basis, the assessed income under Section 143(3) is not greater than the income processed under Section 143(1)(a), negating the statutory condition for under-reporting to arise.

Conclusion: On the prima facie material, under-reporting under Section 270A(2) is not established; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The petition discloses a strong prima facie case that the penalty could not lawfully have been imposed; accordingly, interim relief in the form of a stay of coercive action pursuant to the penalty order is warranted while the matter is pending.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee, at the time of filing the return, claims a deduction in conformity with binding precedent and offers a bona fide explanation with full disclosure of material facts, the amount so explained is excluded from 'under-reported income' under Section 270A(6), and a penalty under Section 270A cannot be sustained absent assessed income exceeding returned income as required by Section 270A(2).

Issues: Whether Rava/Suji subjected to single or double roasting (drying/heating reducing moisture) amounts to "manufacture" within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and thereby becomes classifiable as a food preparation under Chapter Heading 1901 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: The product Rava/Suji is admitted to be a finished granular product classifiable under Chapter Heading 1103. The processes of drying and roasting described reduce moisture content (from about 14.5% to 11-12% for single roasting and to 6-8% for double roasting) without producing a new commodity or altering the essential character, physical properties or end-use of Rava/Suji. Application of the categorical tests used for determining "manufacture" distinguishes processes that merely remove foreign matter or effect minor changes from processes that transform goods into a new, marketable article. The roasting/drying here falls within the category where the article remains essentially the same and continues to be marketable as Rava/Suji; no value-adding transformation creating a distinct product sold in the market arises. Reliance on classification and explanatory notes for Chapter 11 supports that semolina/sooji falls under Heading 1103 and that roasting per se does not convert it into a Chapter 1901 "food preparation".

Conclusion: The process of single or double roasting/drying of Rava/Suji does not amount to "manufacture" under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; therefore, the resultant product is not leviable to excise duty as a Chapter 1901 food preparation. Decision in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The special leave petition was dismissed. The time granted for refund of the amount was extended by two months.

Issues: Whether the order passed under section 148A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequent notice under section 148 of the Act for AY 2021-22 (challenging an alleged escapement of income of Rs. 3,67,43,973/- claimed as GST) are valid, having regard to the scope of the original show-cause notice under section 148A(1) and the ledger/assessment records showing write-off of amounts as bad debt and payment of GST/penalty.

Analysis: The issue turns on whether the Assessing Officer (AO) correctly formed a belief that income had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 by treating Rs. 3,67,43,973/- as a claimed expenditure that escaped assessment, notwithstanding ledger entries, a certificate evidencing write-off of bad debts, earlier assessment under section 143(3) including scrutiny of purchases from non-filers, and payment of GST/penalty following the DGGI survey. The AO's show-cause notice under section 148A(1) alleged bogus purchases aggregating to a specified amount; the subsequent order under section 148A(3) bifurcated a larger advanced payment figure and treated a component as having been appropriated to GST and claimed as expenditure. Examination of the ledger, the computation of income showing addition of the bad-debt amount, and documentary evidence of GST payment/adjustment demonstrate that the AO travelled beyond the scope of the original show-cause material and altered the case without affording notice or opportunity to explain the specific new contention. Reopening on the same factual matrix after detailed scrutiny in the original assessment amounted to a change of opinion and lacked the requisite basis of escapement of income disclosed by the materials before the AO.

Conclusion: The order under section 148A(3) and the notice under section 148 are invalid and are quashed; the writ petition is allowed in favour of the assessee and the impugned order and notice are set aside.

Issues: Whether the deduction claimed under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of interest income from investments with cooperative banks/societies was rightly disallowed by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A).

Analysis: The assessee is a registered cooperative society deriving interest income from investments with cooperative banks and other banks. Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction for interest or dividend derived by a cooperative society from its investment with any other cooperative society; the term "cooperative society" is defined in section 2(19) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claimed deduction on the basis of an assumed bifurcation of interest income without considering the detailed documentary bifurcation submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal noted consistent judicial authority recognizing that interest income from investments in cooperative societies/banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). Given the assessee's claim of providing particulars showing the correct bifurcation and the absence of proper verification by the Assessing Officer, the matter required factual verification rather than summary disallowance. Accordingly the Tribunal remitted the issue to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for verification of the interest income from cooperative banks, directing that on due verification the deduction be allowed in accordance with law and that the assessee be afforded a reasonable opportunity in the set-aside proceedings.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 80P(2)(d) is not sustained; the matter is set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification and consequent grant of deduction if established. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.