Issues: Whether the show-cause notice demanding customs duty was barred by limitation and whether invocation of the extended period was sustainable.

Analysis: The dispute related to temporary removal and re-import of goods from an SEZ unit. The Tribunal noted that the export, re-import and temporary removal activities were within the knowledge of the Department throughout the relevant period. The show-cause notice was issued after the normal period of two years from the relevant date, and the demand had been raised only by invoking the extended period. In the absence of any sustainable basis to treat the case as one involving suppression or other ingredients necessary for extended limitation, the notice could not be upheld.

Conclusion: The demand was held to be time-barred and the show-cause notice was found unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the material facts were already within the Department's knowledge, the extended period of limitation under customs law could not be invoked in the absence of suppression or similar culpable conduct.

Issues: Whether dolochar generated during the course of manufacture of sponge iron is liable to central excise duty as a manufactured excisable good.

Analysis: The issue requires determining if dolochar constitutes a distinct manufactured excisable commodity within the meaning of Sections 2(d) and 2(f) and attracts levy under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Coordinate Tribunal decisions hold that dolochar arising as waste in sponge iron manufacture is not a manufactured product but a waste item predominantly comprising coal/char and used as fuel; such decisions have been followed and earlier contrary rulings found per incuriam. The question involves application of the taxable event of manufacture and classification principles; where goods are unavoidable waste of the manufacturing process and do not emerge as a distinct excisable product, duty is not attracted. Precedents relied upon by the Tribunal establish that dolochar is akin to fuel/char and not a new manufactured excisable commodity, and therefore duty demand cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: Dolochar generated in the course of manufacture of sponge iron is not liable to central excise duty; the demand, interest and penalty imposed are set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs, if any.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of customs duty with interest for non-fulfillment of export obligation under the EPCG scheme is sustainable; (ii) Whether confiscation of imported capital goods, imposition of redemption fine and penalty for non-fulfillment of export obligation are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of customs duty with interest for non-fulfillment of export obligation under the EPCG scheme is sustainable.

Analysis: The Appellant imported capital goods under Notification No. 102/2009-Cus dated 11.09.2009 claiming EPCG benefits and did not comply with condition at Sl.no.2(8) of the said Notification. The Appellant admitted non-fulfillment and paid the differential duty; interest under Section 28AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was claimed by Revenue and remains unpaid. The Tribunal recognises that non-fulfillment arose from factors beyond the Appellant's control and there is no allegation of fraudulent activity.

Conclusion: The demand of customs duty with interest is upheld and remains payable; Revenue is entitled to recover interest in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether confiscation of imported capital goods, imposition of redemption fine and penalty for non-fulfillment of export obligation are sustainable.

Analysis: Prior Tribunal precedents establish that once the differential duty is paid and the importer exits the EPCG scheme, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty are not sustainable in the absence of evasion or fraud. The Appellant established non-fulfillment due to circumstances beyond their control and there is no finding of fraudulent conduct affecting Customs revenue.

Conclusion: Confiscation of goods, imposition of redemption fine and penalty are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partially allowed by confirming the demand of duty with interest while setting aside confiscation, redemption fine and penalty, leaving recovery of interest to proceed as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where non-fulfilment of export obligation under the EPCG scheme occurs without fraud or duty evasion and the differential duty is paid, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty are not sustainable, although duty and interest remain recoverable.

Issues: (i) Whether the dealer claiming input tax credit discharged the burden under Section 70 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 by producing invoices, portal details, e-UPass and banking records. (ii) Whether the Tribunal's order remitting the matter to the assessing authority could be sustained in the light of the law governing proof of genuineness of input tax credit claims.

Issue (i): Whether the dealer claiming input tax credit discharged the burden under Section 70 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 by producing invoices, portal details, e-UPass and banking records.

Analysis: Section 70 places the burden on the purchasing dealer to prove that the claim for input tax credit is correct. The governing principle is that the dealer must establish genuineness of the transactions and actual movement of goods by cogent material. Mere invoices, payment through banking channels, and portal entries reflecting the selling dealer's status are not, by themselves, sufficient to discharge that burden. The Court also applied the rule stated by the Supreme Court that the purchasing dealer must produce supporting material beyond the invoice and payment record.

Conclusion: The burden was not treated as discharged merely on the basis of invoices, e-UPass and banking particulars.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal's order remitting the matter to the assessing authority could be sustained in the light of the law governing proof of genuineness of input tax credit claims.

Analysis: The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the initial burden had been discharged and that the authorities had to disprove entitlement, but that approach was required to be aligned with the later binding interpretation of Section 70. In that view, the remand could not stand in the form in which it was made. The matter was therefore directed to be completed by the assessing authority in accordance with the governing law, while leaving the parties free to place additional material on record.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was modified and the remand proceedings were directed to be concluded according to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

Final Conclusion: The revision petitions succeeded only to a limited extent, with the Tribunal's directions being adjusted so that the assessing authority would complete the remand proceedings under the correct legal standard for proving input tax credit claims.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer claiming input tax credit under Section 70 must independently prove the genuineness of the purchase transaction and the movement of goods by cogent evidence; invoices, banking payments and portal-generated particulars alone do not shift the burden to the revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the period of limitation for passing the final assessment order under section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be determined with reference to section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (i.e., whether sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive) and whether the final assessment orders in the five appeals are barred by limitation.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the competing views: the assessees relied on the Madras High Court decision in Roca Bathroom Products holding that sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and that the limitation under section 153 applies to final orders under section 144C(13); the Revenue relied on the proposition that section 144C is a self-contained code with non-obstante language excluding other provisions, and also urged judicial restraint because the Supreme Court has referred the issue to a larger Bench and passed interim directions affecting citation of certain High Court reasoning. The Tribunal examined the reasoning in Roca Bathroom Products and subsequent appellate and coordinate-bench orders which interpret the timelines under sections 144C and 153 as inter-dependent, noting that section 144C contains inbuilt timelines but does not oust the outer limit prescribed by section 153. The Tribunal then applied the legal framework to the undisputed date-sheets for the five assessment years and found that in each case the final assessment order was passed after the outer limitation date computed with reference to section 153; accordingly those final orders were time-barred.

Conclusion: The final assessment orders for all five appeals are barred by limitation and are quashed; the appeals are therefore allowed in favour of the assessees.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 59,18,00,000/- made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the assessment year 2017-18 (and carried protectively into A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17) can be sustained as income of the assessee; (ii) Whether the protective additions made in A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17 survive once the substantive addition for A.Y. 2017-18 is deleted.

Issue (i): Whether the deposit/receipts collected by M/s IFAMA Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. can be treated as unexplained money assessable in the hands of the assessee under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The legal framework includes Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which applies where an assessee is found to be the owner of money not recorded in books and the assessee offers no satisfactory explanation. The Tribunal examined whether the impugned receipts were owned by the assessee or were receipts of the company and whether there was material to attribute ownership to the assessee. The authorities below treated deposits received by the company as unexplained income of the assessee on the basis of his alleged directorship/managerial appointment, without evidence establishing that the assessee was the owner of the sums or had retained them for his personal use.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 59,18,00,000/- under Section 69A is deleted for A.Y. 2017-18. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the same addition sustained protectively in A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17 can stand after deletion of the substantive addition for A.Y. 2017-18.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that the addition was made substantively for A.Y. 2017-18 and carried protectively into the earlier years. Having deleted the substantive assessment for the year in which the material was found insufficient to attribute ownership to the assessee, the protective assessments lack independent footing. The Tribunal applied the same reasoning to the protective assessments, noting that deposits collected by the company cannot be assessed as the assessee's income merely because he was a director, absent proof of ownership.

Conclusion: The ground attacking the protective additions for A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17 is allowed; the protective additions are deleted. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed by deleting the addition of Rs. 59,18,00,000/- assessed as unexplained money in the assessee's hands for A.Y. 2017-18 and, consequentially, deleting the protective additions for A.Y. 2015-16 and 2016-17; the overall effect is favourable to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Deposits or receipts of a company cannot be treated as the unexplained income of a director under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 unless the assessee is shown to be the owner of those sums; protective assessments based solely on a substantive assessment that is deleted cannot survive independently.

Issues: Whether the amounts deducted by government from payments to the assessee for late supply of goods (claimed as penalty/damages of Rs. 32,91,211) are expenses falling within Explanation 1 to Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (i.e., expenditure incurred for an offence or prohibited by law) and therefore non-deductible, or whether they are deductible business expenditure as damages for breach of contract.

Analysis: Explanation 1 to Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 excludes from deduction only those expenditures that are incurred for an offence or are prohibited by law. The impugned additions treated the sums as arising from an offence on the basis that late payments were habitual. The facts show the amounts were deducted pursuant to tender terms as consequences of delayed supply and represent contractual damages/short payments by government departments rather than penalties imposed by statute or criminal sanction. The authorities below did not point to any statutory prohibition or crime rendering the payments penal in the sense contemplated by Explanation 1, and relied on conjecture about habit without legal support. Precedents distinguish between compensatory damages for breach of contract (deductible if laid out wholly and exclusively for business) and penalties arising from criminal or prohibited activities (non-deductible under Explanation 1).

Conclusion: The sums of Rs. 32,91,211 represent contractual damages/compensatory adjustments for delayed supply and are deductible under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Explanation 1 to Section 37 does not apply because the expenditure was not incurred for an offence nor was it prohibited by law. The addition confirmed by the lower authorities is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The decision restores the deductibility of the claimed amount as a business expense arising from breach of contract and negates the application of Explanation 1 to Section 37; the appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Expenditure that constitutes compensatory damages for breach of contract, not incurred for an offence or prohibited by law, is deductible as a business expense under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and Explanation 1 to Section 37 applies only to expenditures that are penal or criminal in nature.

Issues: (i) Whether the year of acquisition of the immovable property, for indexation purposes, was financial year 1996-97 or financial year 1998-99. (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction of cost incurred for completion of construction and related improvement while computing capital gains.

Issue (i): Whether the year of acquisition of the immovable property, for indexation purposes, was financial year 1996-97 or financial year 1998-99.

Analysis: The registered purchase deed recorded that the full consideration had been paid in April 1996 and possession had been handed over in April 1996. The Revenue did not bring any contrary material to dislodge those recitals. The later date of registration, by itself, did not defer the transfer where possession had already been handed over and consideration paid. In such circumstances, the transfer was complete for the purposes of capital gains law by reason of the statutory concept of transfer read with possession in part performance.

Conclusion: The year of acquisition was financial year 1996-97, and the Cost Inflation Index applicable to that year had to be adopted. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction of cost incurred for completion of construction and related improvement while computing capital gains.

Analysis: The purchase deed described the property as a semi-finished building, whereas the sale deed described it as a fully constructed residential building. That change in description established that construction was completed after acquisition. The claim could not be rejected in a blanket manner merely because bills and vouchers were not produced, especially when the construction activity was otherwise evident from the registered documents. The same property and similar facts were accepted in the cases of the other co-owners, and no distinguishing material was shown to justify inconsistent treatment. The principle of consistency and judicial discipline therefore required parity in computation.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction of the cost incurred for completion of construction, and the corresponding adjustment in capital gains computation was to be allowed. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment of capital gains was required to be recomputed by adopting the earlier year of acquisition and by allowing the construction-related deduction, while the remaining grounds were not independently pursued and were treated as infructuous.

Ratio Decidendi: For capital gains computation, the year of acquisition follows the effective transfer evidenced by payment and delivery of possession, not merely the later date of registration; and where construction is shown by registered documents and similar co-owners are accepted on the same footing, the claim cannot be denied solely for want of old supporting vouchers.

Issues: Whether the confirmation of provisional attachment was liable to be interfered with on the grounds of alleged miscalculation of income and expenditure, inconsistency in valuation of properties, and failure to explain the source of funds used for acquisition of assets and cash deposits.

Analysis: The burden to disprove the findings supporting attachment rested on the appellants under Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The appellants relied on alternative income figures, rental income, agricultural income, loan receipts, insurance proceeds, and salary data, but did not produce satisfactory documentary proof for the material years and transactions. The Tribunal found that the claimed income was not substantiated by rent deeds, complete bank records, proof of agricultural receipts, or evidence of the alleged sources of cash and family contributions. The alleged discrepancies in valuation between the FIR and the provisional attachment order were not shown to undermine the attachment, and even if some variation existed, the attachment assessment would still sustain scrutiny. The unexplained cash deposits and absence of a credible source for several acquisitions supported the conclusion that the assets were disproportionate to known lawful income.

Conclusion: The challenge to the confirmed provisional attachment failed, and the attachment was upheld.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in confirming the Provisional Attachment Order in respect of two immovable properties registered in the appellant's name on the ground that the properties were acquired out of proceeds of crime and the appellant failed to disclose the source for acquisition or repayment of loans.

Analysis: The appeal challenges confirmation of provisional attachment of two plots said to have been purchased using proceeds traced to offences investigated by the Enforcement Directorate. The statutory scheme under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 places on the person claiming legitimacy of assets the duty to disclose and establish lawful source; Section 24 requires satisfactory explanation and supporting evidence of source. The Tribunal considered recorded statements, bank transaction analysis, valuation and construction costs, loan documents, and the absence of bank statements or other documentation from the appellant to show lawful source or repayment origin. The Tribunal accepted the respondent's findings of cash deposits routed through relatives' accounts and other transactions forming a money trail and layering indicative of proceeds of crime. The Tribunal addressed the appellant's submissions that one property predated the check period and that loans and repayments established lawful source, but found that absence of documentary proof of source of funds or of repayments meant the appellant did not discharge the statutory burden; consequently the Adjudicating Authority's confirmation of the provisional attachment was upheld.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed and the confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Order is upheld in favour of the respondent.

Issues: Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on coal that was fed into the manufacturing process, later found to have low Gross Calorific Value, and then used within the factory for coal bedding.

Analysis: The coal was admittedly introduced into the feeder pipe and subjected to the manufacturing process. The mere fact that, after such use, some coal was segregated on the basis of low GCV and transferred for ancillary use within the factory did not mean that it had not been used in or in relation to manufacture. The principle applied was that once inputs are put to use in the manufacturing stream, subsequent rejection or removal of part of the input does not, by itself, disentitle credit where the input had the required nexus with manufacture.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on the coal rejects was admissible, and denial of credit was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether duty could be demanded under Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 on transfer of capital goods between two units of the same legal entity when the transfer was only an inter-unit stock transfer and no sale or transaction value existed.

Analysis: The demand rested on the premise that the proviso to Rule 3(5A) applied on transaction value. The transfer here was between units of the same company, was supported by Form F, and was not a sale in substance. The Tribunal followed its earlier view that a transfer between sister units does not amount to a trading transaction and, in the absence of sale, the basis for invoking the proviso to Rule 3(5A) was not available.

Conclusion: The demand raised by invoking Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where capital goods are transferred only as stock transfer between units of the same legal entity and no sale or transaction value exists, the proviso to Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 cannot be invoked to demand duty on the transaction value.

Issues: Whether the appeal raises any substantial question of law and whether the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal are perverse so as to warrant interference.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the evidence including seized goods, notebooks, computer printouts, shifting of machinery and packing material, statutory returns, and statements. It found that the notebooks related to an earlier unit, packing machinery and materials were shifted to a new unit, the computer printouts were inadmissible for non-compliance with statutory requirements, production was during trial runs, and that excise liability arises on removal. The Tribunal recorded that statutory returns for earlier units showed compliance and that the Revenue failed to produce independent, cogent evidence to establish unaccounted procurement, manufacture and removal. These are factual findings founded on the material on record and no material demonstrating perversity in the Tribunal's conclusions has been placed before the Court.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arises; the Tribunal's factual findings are not shown to be perverse and do not warrant interference by this Court.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by a tribunal where those findings are supported by the record; interference is permissible only if perversity is specifically pleaded and established.

Issues: Whether the revisional order passed under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 setting aside the assessment order framed under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144B is sustainable where the Assessing Officer had issued repeated notices under Section 142(1) and considered detailed submissions regarding payments to specified persons and the Commissioner remanded the matter for fresh inquiry without recording independent findings that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

Analysis: The statutory test for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 requires a conclusion that the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Evidence of inquiry by the Assessing Officer includes issuance of repeated notices under Section 142(1), show cause notices, receipt of detailed replies, confirmations and supporting documents addressing payments to specified persons, and framing of assessment under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144B. Where the record shows that the Assessing Officer applied his mind to the issue and accepted the returned income after considering the material placed before him, mere disagreement by the revisional authority does not convert the assessment order into an erroneous one. Invocation of Section 263 cannot be used to direct a roving or fishing inquiry or to remand for fresh verification without the Commissioner recording clear prima facie reasons demonstrating how the impugned order is erroneous and how such error is prejudicial to revenue. Further, where payments to related parties are in issue, the Commissioner must identify and quantify any excessive or unreasonable portion in comparison to fair market value before treating the assessment as prejudicial to revenue; absence of such specific findings weakens the case for revision.

Conclusion: The revisional order under Section 263 is unsustainable and is set aside; the Assessing Officer's order under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144B is restored. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the fuel farm facility as an infrastructure facility forming part of the airport and whether the agreement with BIAL satisfied the statutory condition; (ii) Whether the interest expenditure on hedge swap transactions was allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the fuel farm facility as an infrastructure facility forming part of the airport and whether the agreement with BIAL satisfied the statutory condition.

Analysis: The fuel farm facility was established at the Bangalore International Airport under an arrangement with BIAL, which had been granted the right to develop, operate and manage airport facilities and to confer service provider rights. The Court treated BIAL as a statutory body for the purposes of the provision and held that the agreement with BIAL met the requirement of an agreement with a statutory body. The Court further held that airport operations include facilities incidental and integral to the landing, departure and functioning of aircraft, and that supply of fuel is indispensable to airport activity. The reasoning applied the earlier view that airport-linked facilities forming part of the airport infrastructure qualify as infrastructure facilities.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Revenue's objection on the absence of a direct agreement with the Government or the alleged non-integral nature of the fuel farm was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the interest expenditure on hedge swap transactions was allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The hedge swap interest issue was held to be covered by the Supreme Court's decision relied upon by the Tribunal, and there was no serious dispute on the applicability of that ruling to the facts. The Tribunal's allowance of the deduction was therefore upheld.

Conclusion: The interest expenditure on hedge swap transactions was allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose on either issue, and the Tribunal's order was affirmed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Airport-linked facilities that are integral and indispensable to airport operations, and are developed under an authorised agreement with a statutory airport entity, qualify as infrastructure facilities for deduction under Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961; a covered interest expenditure claim under Section 36(1)(iii) cannot be disturbed where it is governed by binding precedent.

Issues: (i) Whether the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal as time-barred should be set aside and the appeal re-heard in view of non-service/publishing of notice and delay; (ii) Whether the cancellation of GST registration should be considered for revocation upon payment of outstanding statutory dues and subject to statutory conditions under the CGST Act and Rules.

Issue (i): Whether the dismissal of the appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as barred by limitation ought to be set aside and the appeal re-heard where the petitioner was not given effective personal notice and became aware of suspension/cancellation only after limitation had run.

Analysis: The Court considered the statutory limitation framework under Section 107 and related provisos, the effect of non-service or only website publication of notices on the running of limitation, and the writ Court's power to condone delay. The Court observed that limitation serves dual purposes of compliance and protection of third party rights, and that in the present facts cancellation prejudices primarily the assessee. Relying on the writ jurisdiction to condone delay where appropriate and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the Court found merit in permitting reconsideration on merits rather than allowing a dismissal on procedural limitation grounds to foreclose substantive adjudication.

Conclusion: The order dated 16.12.2025 of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal as time-barred is set aside and the appeal is to be re-heard on merits by the Appellate Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether revocation of cancellation of GST registration should be considered by the authorities upon compliance with statutory conditions, including deposit of outstanding dues and fulfillment of return-filing/payment requirements under the CGST Act and Rules.

Analysis: The Court examined Rule 23(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the statutory scheme which conditions revocation on furnishing returns and payment of amounts due. The Court directed respondent authorities to inform the petitioner of outstanding statutory dues up to the date of cancellation and permitted revocation to be considered upon payment of such dues, with continued compliance thereafter. The Court emphasised that revocation and compliance facilitate revenue collection and do not prejudice third parties in the present factual matrix.

Conclusion: The respondent authorities are directed to intimate outstanding statutory dues to the petitioner and, upon payment of such dues and compliance with statutory conditions, to consider revocation of the cancellation of GST registration; the Appellate Authority shall decide the reheard appeal on merits.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted substantive relief to the petitioner by setting aside the appellate dismissal for limitation and directing a merits rehearing, together with administrative directions for intimation and payment of outstanding dues as a pre-condition for consideration of revocation; the writ petition is disposed accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ Court may condone statutory or quasi-judicial delay and remit a matter for merits consideration where non-service or defective service of statutory notice has impeded an assessee's ability to meet limitation, and where revocation of registration, subject to statutory payment and return conditions, does not prejudice third party rights and is in the interest of effective revenue administration.

Issues: Whether the petition for cancellation of bail granted to the respondent should be allowed and bail revoked.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the trial court's reliance on analogy between Sections 132 and 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to treat the offence as compoundable/bailable was legally sustainable, having regard to the statutory scheme that distinguishes cognizability, bailability and compoundability based on the amount of tax evaded. The Court noted that deposit of a portion of the alleged evaded tax does not change the statutory classification of the offence under Section 132, nor does it render compoundable an offence which statute excludes from compounding under Section 138. The Court also considered other relevant factors for bail: the maximum statutory sentence, period of custody already undergone, absence of prior criminal record or misuse of bail, likelihood of witness tampering (low because witnesses are officials), consent of the Special Public Prosecutor before the trial court, and precedents where bail was granted in comparable circumstances.

Conclusion: The application to cancel bail is dismissed; the bail granted to the respondent stands.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the trial court's grant of bail is rejected and the respondent's release on bail is upheld, notwithstanding the trial court's imperfect statutory analogy; the matter proceeds to trial subject to the existing bail conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Deposit of a portion of the alleged evaded tax does not alter the statutory classification of offences under Section 132 or the limits of compounding under Section 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, but bail may nevertheless be retained after holistic consideration of statutory classification, custody, severity of punishment and other relevant factors.

Issues: Whether the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay for filing a revised return (under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and in light of CBDT Circular No. 11/2024 dated 01.10.2024) should be set aside and the matter remitted for consideration of the revised return for the assessment year 2018-19.

Analysis: The petitioner filed the original return for assessment year 2018-19 and later sought rectification and/or to file a revised return to correct an apparent mis-declaration in Schedule-EI concerning exempt/dividend income. The authority rejected the condonation application relying on CBDT Circular No. 11/2024 which prescribes a five-year limitation from the end of the relevant assessment year for entertaining revised returns under Section 119(2)(b). The Court examined the factual record showing a bona fide, apparent mistake in the exempt income declaration and noted that rectification efforts and grievance communications were made within the five-year period indicated by the circular. The Court did not decide the merits of the revised return content but focused on whether the petitioner should be permitted to have the revised return considered in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The order dated 22.12.2025 rejecting the condonation application is set aside and the matter is remitted to the authority to consider the petitioner's revised return for assessment year 2018-19 in accordance with law. The petition is disposed of and all contentions are kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether a pre-existing dispute within the meaning of Sections 8 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 existed between the parties such that the Section 9 application should have been rejected; and (ii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority committed error in admitting the Section 9 application and initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor.

Analysis: The material on record before admission included contemporaneous communications and a debit note dated 25.10.2017 issued by the end-user Yashwant Glucose Karkhana to the Corporate Debtor, a subsequent debit note dated 31.03.2018 from the Corporate Debtor to the Operational Creditor reflected in ledgers and in the Corporate Debtor's income tax returns filed before issuance of the Section 8 demand notice, and other pre-demand communications describing cattle deaths and contamination. The statutory test under Section 9(5)(ii)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 requires the adjudicating authority at the admission stage to determine only whether a plausible dispute exists that is not a patently feeble or spurious defence and which requires further investigation; the authority is not to decide on the merits. The reply to the Section 8 demand notice dated 01.07.2019 set out denial of liability, assertion of losses, and reference to the debit notes and related communications, thereby constituting a notice of dispute within Section 9(5)(ii)(d). The payments made in respect of a separate purchase order did not negate the existence of a dispute relating to the disputed purchase order which was independently disputed and stopped mid-supply.

Conclusion: (i) A pre-existing dispute existed within the meaning of Sections 8 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as the dispute was supported by plausible documentary evidence and communications preceding the Section 8 demand notice.

Conclusion: (ii) The Adjudicating Authority erred in admitting the Section 9 application; the Section 9 application ought to have been rejected under Section 9(5)(ii)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the orders initiating CIRP and appointing the Interim Resolution Professional were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the operational creditor's application under Section 9 is met by a notice of dispute supported by contemporaneous documents or other prima facie evidence showing a plausible dispute that is not patently feeble or illusory, the adjudicating authority must reject the Section 9 application under Section 9(5)(ii)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether the Regional Director erred in rejecting the petitioners application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 seeking direction to rectify/change Respondent No.2's name (Refex Hotels Private Limited) on the ground that the name is identical with or too nearly resembles the petitioners prior company name and registered trademark 'REFEX'.

Analysis: The Court compared the corporate names and found 'REFEX' to be the prominent and distinctive part of both names, noting the petitioners prior incorporation (2002) and prior registration of the coined word 'REFEX' as a trademark (Class 1, effective 17.05.2007). Authorities of this Court establish that under the statutory scheme (including Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013 and predecessor provisions), the competent authority must determine whether a proposed or registered name is identical with or too nearly resembles an existing registered name; dissimilarity in the nature of business is not a determinative criterion for declining to issue directions. The Regional Directors sole basis for rejectiondifference in business activities between the partieswas therefore not a relevant ground for refusing relief. The Court also considered the respondents assertions (coinage and good faith adoption; existence of other companies using 'REFEX') and found them unsubstantiated on the record. The Court declined to dismiss the petition on delay grounds in view of the suspension of limitation for part of the intervening period.

Conclusion: The petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 23.08.2018 is set aside and Respondent No.2 is directed to change its name within four weeks to a name that is not identical with or does not resemble the petitioners name or any other existing company.