Issues: (i) Whether the Principal Commissioner erred in invoking revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside the assessment insofar as allowance of deduction under section 36(1)(viia) for provisions on standard assets; (ii) Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue for not verifying transactions with related parties under section 40A(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of provisions made for standard assets and whether non-enquiry by the Assessing Officer rendered the assessment order erroneous under section 263.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the AO made requisite inquiries and whether the matter was one of two permissible views. It considered coordinate bench decisions including the assessee's own preceding-year decision and other Tribunal rulings that held deduction under section 36(1)(viia) may include provisions for standard assets. The Tribunal found that in the present facts the AO had not raised queries on the issue for the impugned year but coordinate bench precedent and the immediately preceding-year decision in the assessee's case supported allowance and quashing of 263 proceedings under identical circumstances.

Conclusion: The invocation of revisional jurisdiction under section 263 in respect of allowance under section 36(1)(viia) is quashed and the appeal is allowed on this issue in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order was erroneous for not verifying payments to related parties under section 40A(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the PCIT set aside the assessment in part for alleged failure to verify related-party transactions. The assessee produced the AO's subsequent order for related-party payments showing no addition; the Tribunal therefore confined its decision to the first issue and observed that the AO ultimately did not make additions on the related-party issue.

Conclusion: No relief to Revenue is sustained on the related-party payments issue; the appeal is allowed as to the matters set aside and the 263 proceedings quashed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal, following coordinate bench precedent and the assessee's preceding-year decision, holds that revisionary proceedings under section 263 cannot be sustained on the facts and circumstances and accordingly allows the appeal, quashing the 263 order insofar as it set aside the assessment for examination of the specified issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where coordinate benches of the Tribunal and the Tribunal's immediately preceding-year decision in the same assessee have consistently held that deduction under section 36(1)(viia) may include provisions for standard assets, revisional jurisdiction under section 263 cannot be sustained to reopen an assessment under identical circumstances absent a demonstrated failure of inquiry or an impermissible legal view by the Assessing Officer.

Issues: (i) Whether the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 setting aside the assessment framed under section 143(3) is justified on the ground that the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue.

Analysis: Relevant provisions include Section 263 and Explanation 2(a) thereto and Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; proceedings arose after search under Section 132 and notice under Section 153C and inquiries under Section 142(1). The assessing officer had issued specific queries, received and examined the explanations and documents regarding bank accounts, source of investment in immovable property and related party loans, and completed assessment at returned income under Section 143(3). The Principal Commissioner relied on Explanation 2(a) to Section 263 to hold the assessment erroneous on the ground of alleged lack of verification; however, the material on record shows that requisite enquiries and verification were made by the assessing officer and no specific error in the assessment order prejudicial to revenue was identified by the Principal Commissioner.

Conclusion: The order under Section 263 setting aside the assessment is quashed and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether property can be attached even if the person in whose name it stands is not accused of the predicate offence; (ii) Whether deposits made by Shri Muzaffar Ali Bohra can be presumed to be proceeds of crime despite the appellant claiming them as own funds; (iii) Whether there was no reason to believe on the part of the Adjudicating Authority for issuance of the Show Cause Notice to the appellant; (iv) Whether the appellant has satisfactorily explained the sources of funds for acquiring the properties including housing loans.

Issue (i): Whether property can be attached even if the person in whose name it stands is not accused of the predicate offence.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the Supreme Court precedent in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, holding that attachment power extends to any person in possession of proceeds of crime irrespective of whether that person is accused in the predicate offence. The Tribunal also examined investigative material indicating cash deposits and transactions linking the appellant's family to proceeds of the embezzlement.

Conclusion: Issue decided against the appellant; property can be attached even if the person is not an accused.

Issue (ii): Whether deposits made by Shri Muzaffar Ali Bohra can be presumed to be proceeds of crime despite the appellant claiming them as own funds.

Analysis: The Tribunal relied on statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and investigative findings that identified significant cash deposits, seized cash and jewellery, and transfers from the embezzled corpus to the appellant and relatives. The Tribunal found these facts, together with unexplained transactions and expenditures, sufficient to treat the deposits as proceeds of crime for the purpose of attachment.

Conclusion: Issue decided against the appellant; deposits were correctly treated as proceeds of crime for attachment purposes.

Issue (iii): Whether there was no reason to believe on the part of the Adjudicating Authority for issuance of the Show Cause Notice to the appellant.

Analysis: The Tribunal evaluated the investigative material, including cash deposits, seizure of burnt notes, investments and charge sheeting entries, and concluded that there existed a reasonable basis and apprehension regarding the appellant's involvement or connection with the proceeds of crime, thereby justifying issuance of the Show Cause Notice.

Conclusion: Issue decided against the appellant; there was sufficient reason to believe to issue the Show Cause Notice.

Issue (iv): Whether the appellant has duly explained the sources of funds for acquiring the properties including housing loans.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the appellant's explanation regarding sale proceeds of a plot and instalment payments, but found the Enforcement Directorate's accounting of salary, deposits, PF, arrears, seized assets and unexplained expenditures more persuasive. The Tribunal concluded the declared sources and loans did not satisfactorily account for the deposits, investments and acquisitions when measured against the investigative findings.

Conclusion: Issue decided against the appellant; explanations were insufficient to discharge the burden of showing acquisitions were not from proceeds of crime.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the Adjudicating Authority's confirmation of the provisional attachment order, concluding that the investigative record furnished sufficient basis under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 to link the impugned properties to proceeds of crime and to proceed with attachment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where property is linked to proceeds of crime, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 permits provisional attachment of that property in the hands of any person irrespective of whether that person is an accused, and the definition of "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) includes the value of such property thereby permitting attachment equivalent to the value of proceeds when tainted property cannot be traced.

Issues: Whether interest and dividend received by a cooperative society from a cooperative bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act are eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The question was examined in the light of decisions of the jurisdictional High Court recognizing entitlement to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest received from cooperative banks registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. The authorities relied upon establish that income in the form of interest and dividend received from such cooperative banks falls within the scope of Section 80P(2)(d) as applicable to cooperative societies.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of interest and dividend received from a cooperative bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act; result is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest and dividend received by a cooperative society from a cooperative bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act fall within the scope of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as affirmed by the jurisdictional High Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the strike off of the company extinguished the liability arising from the FEMA adjudication and whether the legal representatives remained answerable for the penalty proceedings; (ii) Whether the penalties imposed on the individual appellants warranted reduction on the ground of proportionality.

Issue (i): Whether the strike off of the company extinguished the liability arising from the FEMA adjudication and whether the legal representatives remained answerable for the penalty proceedings.

Analysis: The applicable provisions on removal of a company's name from the register make it clear that dissolution under the Companies Act, 2013 does not wipe out subsisting liabilities. Liability continues after strike off, and enforcement may proceed against persons who remain legally answerable. In the FEMA framework, the adjudicating authority treated the deceased noticee as the person in charge of the company's affairs and proceeded against the legal representatives under the statutory scheme governing continuation of adjudication after death.

Conclusion: The liability was not extinguished by the company's strike off, and the proceedings against the legal representatives were maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalties imposed on the individual appellants warranted reduction on the ground of proportionality.

Analysis: Penalty under FEMA is attracted on proof of contravention and does not require proof of mens rea unless the statute so indicates. At the same time, the quantum of penalty must fit the nature and gravity of the contravention. On that basis, the adjudicated penalties on the individual appellants were found excessive and the ends of justice were considered satisfied by reducing them to the amount already deposited.

Conclusion: The penalties were reduced to Rs. 30,000 each.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded to the limited extent of reducing the individual penalties, while the underlying FEMA liability was not set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Liability under FEMA remains enforceable despite the company's strike off, and penalty for statutory contravention is a civil consequence that may be moderated on proportionality even though mens rea is not required.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation under subsection (1) of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be invoked to confirm service tax demand in respect of renting of immovable property where retrospective amendment and judicial divergence created confusion, in absence of suppression, willful misstatement or fraud.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the effect of the Finance Act amendments and prior conflicting judicial views on the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property. The Finance Act, 2007 introduced the taxable entry for renting of immovable property and subsequent retrospective amendment altered the definition of person liable to pay service tax, producing genuine uncertainty in trade about exigibility. The Tribunal applied the statutory limitation framework under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 and the settled principle that the extended period applies only where there is suppression, willful misstatement, fraud or similar conduct as specified in the proviso. In circumstances where the department issued the show cause notice based on books of account and where the non-payment arose amid contentious retrospective amendment and divergent judicial pronouncements, the necessary ingredients for invoking the extended period were not established. The Tribunal also relied on its earlier decision dealing with similar contentious retrospective amendments and concluded that mere non-payment in such context does not amount to suppression or fraud justifying invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period under subsection (1) of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 cannot be invoked; the challenge to the demand is allowed on the ground of limitation and the adjudged demands confirmed beyond the normal period are set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a three-day delay in giving the written intimation required under the area-based exemption notification before the first clearance in the financial year could justify denial of the re-credit benefit.

Analysis: The notification required the manufacturer to exercise the option in writing before effecting the first clearance in the financial year. The assessee admittedly gave the intimation three days late, but the underlying eligibility for the exemption was not in dispute. The Tribunal followed its earlier decisions on similar exemption conditions, and also relied on the distinction between substantive conditions and procedural requirements. It held that where the substantive entitlement is otherwise satisfied, delayed compliance with a procedural requirement does not extinguish the exemption benefit.

Conclusion: The delay was only a procedural lapse and did not warrant denial of the exemption benefit. The challenge to the assessee's re-credit was rejected and the assessee succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Late compliance with a procedural requirement in an exemption notification does not defeat the substantive benefit when the claimant is otherwise eligible and the condition is not a substantive eligibility requirement.

Issues: (i) Whether a penalty imposed on a company continues to be payable after the company has been struck off the register; (ii) Whether the directors are liable for penalties imposed under FEMA and whether the penalty on the individual directors should be reduced.

Issue (i): Whether a penalty imposed on a company continues to be payable after the company has been struck off the register.

Analysis: Section 248(6) and Section 250 of the Companies Act, 2013 preserve the continuity and enforceability of liabilities of a company even after its name is struck off and require sufficient provision for discharge of liabilities. Section 19(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 mandates deposit of penalty at the time of filing an appeal unless the Appellate Tribunal dispenses with the deposit to avoid undue hardship. The statutory framework thus contemplates continued liability and procedural pre-deposit obligations despite dissolution by striking off.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the company remains payable notwithstanding that the company has been struck off; failure to make the statutory pre-deposit warranted dismissal of the company's appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the directors are liable for penalties imposed under FEMA and whether the penalty on the individual directors should be reduced.

Analysis: Section 42(1) of FEMA preserves liability of directors where the corporate contravention is established. Section 13(1) of FEMA provides for civil penalties without language requiring mens rea. Judicial authorities cited support that mens rea is not essential for imposition of civil fines for statutory contraventions; however, the Tribunal retains the power to temper penalties for proportionality and equity. The adjudicatory finding that the directors were responsible for conduct of the company was sustained, but equitable reduction was considered appropriate on the facts.

Conclusion: The individual directors are liable for the contraventions; their penalties are reduced to Rs. 30,000 each, with pre-deposits adjusted accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The appeal by the company is dismissed for non-compliance with the statutory pre-deposit requirement and the directors' appeals are partly allowed limited to reduction of individual penalties; overall the decision upholds continuing enforceability of corporate liabilities after striking off while permitting equitable mitigation of director penalties.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under FEMA is a civil consequence enforceable against a company even after striking off pursuant to Sections 248(6) and 250 of the Companies Act, 2013, directors remain liable for corporate contraventions under Section 42(1) of FEMA, and mens rea is not a prerequisite for imposing civil penalties under Section 13(1) of FEMA while the Appellate Tribunal may moderate penalties on equitable grounds.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of the entire deposit of Rs. 28,60,546/- (including pre-deposit) with interest under the statutory provisions and Circular, or only to a refund limited to 7.5% of the amount involved in the appeal as held by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Analysis: The appellate tribunal order setting aside the adjudicating orders produced a consequential refund claim. The refund claim was partially rejected on the ground that original bank/TR-6 records were not legible or available and the department could not verify payments from bank records. The applicable circular provides that attested xerox copies of documents evidencing payment suffice for refund processing and places responsibility on the department to maintain records to facilitate verification of deposits. The adjudicating authority's reliance on non-availability of bank records, despite submission of self-attested xerox challans and the tribunal's earlier order in favour of the appellant, does not negate entitlement to refund where the department has failed to maintain verification records.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to refund of the entire deposited amount of Rs. 28,60,546/- along with applicable interest under Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the impugned partial allowance limiting refund to 7.5% is set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellate order entitles an assessee to refund and the assessee furnishes attested xerox copies of payment challans, denial of full refund on the sole ground of the department's inability to retrieve bank records is not sustainable; the department must maintain records and attested copies suffice for refund with interest under the statute and administrative circular.

Issues: (i) Whether commission paid for securing a new tenant during the relevant year is allowable as business expenditure; (ii) Whether interest of Rs. 6,24,72,099/- claimed on loans used for group investments is allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) / alternatively under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Whether housekeeping and security expenses of Rs. 15,65,959/- are allowable as business expenditure; (iv) Whether long-term capital loss of Rs. 2,92,89,516/- and its carry forward claimed on transfer of specified immovable properties is allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the commission expense of Rs. 8,54,250/- paid to arrange a new tenant in the relevant financial year is deductible as business expenditure.

Analysis: The expense relates to the assessee's renting business and was incurred to secure continuity of tenancy; possession was handed over in the relevant year and the commission is part of regular business practice. The assessing officer applied a matching approach to defer the deduction because rental income arose in the subsequent year. The appellate authority's factual findings that the commission was incurred wholly and exclusively for business and that the handover occurred in the relevant year were affirmed after examining the lease terms and prior business practice.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The commission deduction was allowed and the addition deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether interest of Rs. 6,24,72,099/- paid on loans used for investments in group concerns is deductible under Section 36(1)(iii) or alternatively under Section 37.

Analysis: Prior appellate findings for the immediate earlier year held that borrowed funds and their deployment in group investments were for business purposes and were governed by the doctrine of commercial expediency (as applied in S.A. Builders). No fresh borrowings or fresh investments occurred in the relevant year and the appellate findings for the earlier year became final. The assessing officer's allegation of a pre-planned tax-avoidance scheme invoking McDowell was not supported by contemporaneous evidence, and the assessee produced documents (including draft opinion and resolutions) consistent with commercial reorganisation objectives. The authorities applied the test of nexus and commercial expediency and found no contra-evidence proving diversion to non-business use.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The interest disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) and alternatively under Section 37 was deleted.

Issue (iii): Whether housekeeping and security expenses of Rs. 15,65,959/- are disallowable as disproportionate and not for business.

Analysis: The lease agreement provisions required the lessor to bear maintenance and security charges; the expenses were actually incurred and supported by rent and maintenance receipts. The assessing officer did not dispute genuineness of expenditure and applied an estimate without rebutting the contractual terms. The appellate authority accepted the contractual and documentary evidence and the nexus of the expenses to the letting business.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The disallowance was deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether the claimed long-term capital loss of Rs. 2,92,89,516/- (Units 46 and 47) and its carry forward are allowable.

Analysis: The record shows the original agreement to sell was unregistered, unsigned by witnesses, and subsequently rescinded by an MOU which expressly stated the earlier agreement was never executed and was terminated; contemporaneous entries indicated advances and receipts but no registered transfer or possession in the assessee's favour. Transactions involved related parties and documents did not establish enforceable ownership or transfer; factual findings by the assessing and appellate authorities that the claim lacked lawful transfer documentation and genuineness were supported by the MOU language and ledger evidence.

Conclusion: Against Assessee. The claimed long-term capital loss and its carry forward were disallowed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the deletions of the assessing officer's additions relating to commission, interest and housekeeping/security expenses (relief to the assessee on Revenue appeals) and dismissed the assessee's claim on the carry forward of the capital loss; both the Revenue's and the assessee's appeals were finally disposed of by dismissal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where contemporaneous documentary evidence and prior final appellate findings establish that borrowed funds and related expenditures have a nexus to business and serve commercial expediency, interest and related business expenses are allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) (and alternatively under Section 37) unless contrary evidence proves diversion to non business use; conversely, a claimed capital loss requires legally enforceable transfer/ownership documentation and absence of such documentation or a rescinding MOU negates allowance of the loss.

Issues: (i) Whether there was a violation of the principles of natural justice in the adjudicating authority passing the impugned order without affording proper opportunity of personal hearing; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised notwithstanding the availability of an alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice for lack of clear notice and denial of opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: The record shows issuance of an intimation specifying the date of personal hearing and a statement that the matter would be decided on merits if there was non-appearance. The reply filed by the petitioner was considered by the adjudicating authority. A communication seeking personal hearing that was dated after the impugned order was not shown to have been received prior to the order. The factual record does not support a finding of ambiguity in the intimation or denial of hearing.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition warrants interference despite the existence of a statutory appeal remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: An efficacious alternative remedy of appeal is available under the statute. Interference by writ is appropriate only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. No such exceptional circumstances were established on the facts presented.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction should not be exercised and the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the available statutory remedy.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed with liberty to avail the statutory appeal remedy in accordance with law; no expression of opinion is made on the merits of the underlying tax dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory appeal remedy exists and no exceptional circumstances or proven denial of natural justice are shown, interference by writ under Article 226 is unwarranted.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 should be levied at 30% (s.271AAB(1A)(a)) or 60% (s.271AAB(1A)(b)) where search was conducted under Section 132 and the search party did not put specific questions / record statements under Section 132(4) regarding the source of cash and valuables found.

Analysis: The facts show search and seizure proceedings under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with cash and valuables found and partly seized. Statements recorded under Section 132(4) were limited to certain persons and did not include specific questioning regarding the source of the cash and jewelleries. The relevant penal provision distinguishes cases covered by Section 271AAB(1A)(a) (rate 30%) from those falling under Section 271AAB(1A)(b) (rate 60%). The applicability of the higher rate depends on the assessed failure to admit undisclosed income in response to enquiries during search proceedings. Where the authorised officers did not elicit explanations about the assets found by putting appropriate questions under Section 132(4), the conditions for applying the higher rate are not satisfied and the lesser rate under subsection (a) is triggered.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to be computed at 30% (s.271AAB(1A)(a)) and not at 60% (s.271AAB(1A)(b)). The Assessing Officer is directed to compute penalty at 30%.

Issues: (i) Whether an assessment framed under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for an unabated assessment year is sustainable where the Assessing Officer relied on a document seized from a third party and statements recorded under section 132(4) and whether such seized material constitutes incriminating material; (ii) Whether an additional ground raised by the respondent under Rule 27 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 challenging approval under section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without application of mind can be admitted before the Tribunal.

Issue (i): Whether the document seized from a third party and the statements recorded under section 132(4) constituted incriminating material enabling additions under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the unabated assessment year.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined (a) the scope of 'incriminating material' for unabated assessment years, (b) the seized sheet (Annexure A-1, page 14) and the specific entry relied upon by the AO, and (c) the statements recorded under section 132(4) by the third-party persons which were subsequently retracted. The Tribunal applied precedent that incriminating material must directly indicate undisclosed income or assets and must be corroborated by other material. It found that the AO had inconsistently relied on portions of the statements, that the statements were retracted and not supported by cogent corroborative evidence, and that the assessee produced uncontested ledger and bank evidence showing the impugned entry corresponded to an investment in a mutual fund. The Tribunal therefore held that the seized document did not qualify as incriminating material sufficient to disturb an unabated assessment year under section 153A.

Conclusion: The document seized from the third party and the statements under section 132(4) did not constitute incriminating material to sustain the addition under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the assessment under section 153A is invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether Additional Ground No.2 challenging the approval under section 153D on the ground of mechanical approval without application of mind could be admitted under Rule 27 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered Rule 27 and relevant authorities, and reviewed the record to determine whether the issue of approval under section 153D was raised before and decided by the CIT(A). It found that the question of approval under section 153D was neither before the CIT(A) nor decided against the respondent, and that the respondent did not make submissions on this point before the Tribunal. Rule 27 permits a respondent to support the order on grounds decided against him by the CIT(A) but does not permit introduction of fresh grounds whose factual matrix is not on record.

Conclusion: Additional Ground No.2 is not admissible under Rule 27 and is rejected.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed Additional Ground No.1, held the assessment framed under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to be invalid for lack of incriminating material, dismissed the Revenue's appeal as academic on merits, and rejected the additional ground challenging approval under section 153D raised before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: For an unabated assessment year under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 an addition can stand only if there is incriminating material discovered in the course of search that directly links to undisclosed income or assets and is corroborated by other material; absence of such incriminating material renders the assessment under section 153A invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether supply of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items to in patients as part of hospital treatment is exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as a composite supply of healthcare services; (ii) Whether supply of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items to out patients as part of treatment is exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as a composite supply of healthcare services.

Issue (i): Whether supplies of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items to in patients as part of treatment are exempt as a composite supply under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: Inpatient services are classified under SAC 999311 and the explanatory notes include medical, pharmaceutical and paramedical services provided to inpatients from admission till discharge. The statutory definition of composite supply (Section 2(30) of the CGST Act, 2017) covers supplies naturally bundled with a principal supply. Circular No. 32/06/2018 GST clarifies that amounts charged by hospitals from patients, including retention and fees, are towards healthcare services and are exempt; supplies to inpatients such as food (when advised by doctor) are part of the composite supply. The hospital's facts show integrated pharmacy, dispensing under prescriptions issued during inpatient treatment, consolidated billing and that medicines and consumables are issued as an inseparable part of care until discharge.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. Supply of medicines, consumables, implants and other medical items supplied to in patients as part of treatment is exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as a composite supply of healthcare services.

Issue (ii): Whether supplies of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items to out patients as part of treatment are exempt as a composite supply under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption under Entry No. 74 covers healthcare services by a clinical establishment and inpatient services are expressly covered under SAC 999311. For outpatients, although consultation services qualify as healthcare services and are exempt, medicines and consumables prescribed to outpatients are not necessarily supplied exclusively by the hospital, and outpatients are free to procure medicines from other pharmacies. The facts show that outpatient pharmacy dispensing is not necessarily integral and exclusive to the outpatient consultation in the same manner as inpatient dispensing. Circular No. 32/06/2018 GST distinguishes supplies to admitted patients (composite) from supplies to non admitted patients (taxable) by analogy to food supplies.

Conclusion: Partly against the assessee. Consultation services provided to out patients are exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017. However, supply of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items to out patients is taxable and does not form part of the exempt composite healthcare supply.

Final Conclusion: The Advance Ruling holds that supplies to in patients of medicines, consumables, implants and medical items are exempt as part of composite inpatient healthcare services, whereas for out patients only the consultation healthcare service is exempt and supplies of medicines and related items to out patients are taxable under GST.

Ratio Decidendi: Supplies of goods that are naturally bundled with and supplied in conjunction with inpatient healthcare services, where the healthcare service is the principal supply and the goods are dispensed exclusively as part of treatment until discharge, constitute a composite supply covered by Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 and are exempt; similar goods supplied to out patients, which can be procured independently, do not form such a composite supply and are taxable.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit can be availed by the head office in respect of input services ordered and paid for by it but used at different locations/units; (ii) Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on cargo and courier services used to effect sale of scrap that is integral to the maintenance and repair service; (iii) Whether service tax is payable on providing equipment on hire as supply of tangible goods where VAT has been discharged treating the transaction as a deemed sale.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit can be availed by the head office in respect of input services ordered and paid for by it but used at different locations/units.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined prior decision in the appellant's own case and found that invoices were raised on and payments (including service tax) were made by the head office; the services were used for providing taxable repair and maintenance services across locations; receipt and use of the services was undisputed. The Tribunal applied the relevant rule under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 to determine eligibility where input services are received and paid for by the registered head office and used in relation to taxable output services.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit is admissible to the head office for input services ordered and paid for by it even if used at different locations; the demand denying such credit is not sustainable (decision in favour of the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on cargo and courier services used to effect sale of scrap that is integral to the maintenance and repair service.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that sale of scrap formed part of the maintenance and repair contracts and that cargo/courier services were used to affect those sales in the course of providing the taxable output service. Treating sale of scrap as integral to the taxable service, the Tribunal concluded that the input service (cargo/courier) was used for providing the taxable output service and therefore falls within the scope of admissible Cenvat credit.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on cargo and courier services used for sale of scrap integral to the maintenance and repair service is admissible; the denial of credit is not sustainable (decision in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether service tax is payable on providing equipment on hire as supply of tangible goods where VAT has been discharged treating the transaction as a deemed sale.

Analysis: The Tribunal relied on its earlier decisions holding that where VAT has been paid by treating the transaction as a deemed sale (transfer/right to use treated as sale under state VAT law), service tax is not additionally leviable on the same transaction. The appellant established that VAT was discharged on hire transactions by treating them as deemed sales.

Conclusion: No service tax is payable on the hiring of equipment where VAT has been discharged treating the transaction as a deemed sale; the demand for service tax is set aside (decision in favour of the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders denying Cenvat credit and confirming service tax demands are set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential reliefs; the appellant succeeds on all decided issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit is available where input services are received and paid for by the registered person and are used for providing taxable output services (Rule 2(I) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004); input services integral to a taxable service (including services used to effect sale of scrap that is part of the service) qualify as inputs; where a transaction is treated as a deemed sale and VAT is discharged, service tax is not leviable on the same transaction (deemed sale doctrine under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India as applied with state VAT law).

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's activities of transportation of coal and civil construction work are taxable as "mining service" under Section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994 or are classifiable as goods transport agency/construction services; (ii) Whether the demand in respect of the period 2008-09 to 2012-13 (SCN dated 18.02.2015) is barred by the normal period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 or whether extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Issue (i): Classification of services as "mining service" versus goods transport agency/construction services.

Analysis: The appellant carried out pure transportation and civil construction activities. Prior authority, including the Supreme Court in Commissioner of C.Ex. & S.T., Raipur v. Singh Transporters, and Tribunal decisions, treat transportation of coal as taxable under goods transport agency services and not as mining services. The activities in issue are post-mining/logistics in nature and constituted separate services (transportation/construction) rather than services "in relation to" mining as defined in Section 65(105)(zzzy).

Conclusion: The activities of transportation of coal and civil construction work are not taxable as "mining service" and are properly classifiable as goods transport agency/construction services; the demand under the category of "mining service" is unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Invocability of extended period of limitation for SCN dated 18.02.2015 covering 2008-09 to 2012-13.

Analysis: The proceedings were initiated based on findings from the assessee's audited books (EA-2000 audit) and not on new facts demonstrating suppression with intent to evade tax. No established suppression of facts was shown to justify invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73; the Show Cause Notice was issued beyond the one-year normal limitation period under Section 73(1).

Conclusion: The demand in respect of the period 2008-09 to 2012-13 is barred by the normal period of limitation; extended period of limitation cannot be invoked, favourable to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demands of service tax, interest and penalties confirmed in the impugned orders under the category of "mining service" are set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Transportation of coal and related logistics or civil construction activities are post-mining services appropriately classifiable as goods transport agency or construction services and do not fall within "mining service" under Section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994; demands raised beyond the normal limitation under Section 73(1) are barred where suppression with intent to evade tax is not established.

Issues: Whether the refund claim was hit by unjust enrichment and whether the incidence of duty had been passed on to the buyers.

Analysis: The refund dispute turned on whether mere disclosure of duty in invoices was conclusive proof of passing on the duty burden. The invoices had to disclose duty particulars under the excise law, and that circumstance by itself was not decisive. The comparative price data, the retention of substantially the same sale price, the explanation that margins were absorbed to maintain market competitiveness, and the Chartered Accountant certificate supported the finding that the duty was borne by the assessee. The burden to dislodge that material was on Revenue, and no contrary evidence was produced.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by unjust enrichment and the incidence of duty was not passed on to the buyers.

Final Conclusion: The order granting cash refund to the assessee was upheld and Revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere mention of duty in excise invoices does not by itself establish passing on of the duty burden; unjust enrichment must be determined from the totality of evidence, and a duly supported professional certificate and price pattern may establish that the incidence was absorbed by the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether development and operation of BESS on a standalone basis amounts to supply of electrical energy eligible for exemption from GST under Notification No. 02/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017. (ii) Whether development and operation of co-located BESS amounts to supply of electricity eligible for exemption under Notification No. 02/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017 or nil rate under Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017. (iii) Whether the applicant's activity is taxable at 18% under support services to electricity transmission and distribution and whether GST registration in Tamil Nadu is required.

Issue (i): Whether development and operation of BESS on a standalone basis amounts to supply of electrical energy eligible for exemption from GST under Notification No. 02/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017.

Analysis: The activity was found to be storage of electricity by conversion into chemical energy and its later re-delivery on demand, not generation of electricity. The statutory scheme under the Electricity Act and the Electricity (Amendment) Rules treated energy storage as part of the power system, but the ruling held that a standalone BESS does not itself become a generating, transmitting, or distributing utility. The exemption for electrical energy therefore did not apply to the applicant's standalone BESS activity.

Conclusion: Against the applicant. Standalone BESS does not amount to exempt supply of electrical energy.

Issue (ii): Whether development and operation of co-located BESS amounts to supply of electricity eligible for exemption under Notification No. 02/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017 or nil rate under Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28-06-2017.

Analysis: Co-location was treated as a matter of ownership and physical arrangement, not of the essential function of the facility. The same storage-and-dispatch function was performed in both standalone and co-located models. Since the activity remained one of providing storage support rather than generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, the exemption notifications available to those utilities were held inapplicable.

Conclusion: Against the applicant. Co-located BESS is not exempt under either notification.

Issue (iii): Whether the applicant's activity is taxable at 18% under support services to electricity transmission and distribution and whether GST registration in Tamil Nadu is required.

Analysis: The applicant was held to be providing a storage facility in aid of electricity transmission and distribution, with consideration charged by capacity-based tariff rather than by sale of electricity. The activity was classified under support services to electricity transmission and distribution and held liable to GST at 18%. As taxable supplies were being made in Tamil Nadu, registration was held necessary for discharge of tax liability.

Conclusion: Against the applicant. The activity is taxable at 18% and GST registration in Tamil Nadu is required.

Final Conclusion: The ruling holds that both standalone and co-located BESS activities are taxable support services, not exempt supplies of electricity, and the applicant must discharge GST accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: A battery energy storage system that stores electricity and re-delivers it on demand is not itself a generating, transmitting, or distributing utility; therefore, exemption notifications meant for supply of electricity or transmission and distribution services do not apply, and the activity is taxable as support services to electricity transmission and distribution.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment and resulting addition made under the re-opening provisions (Sections 148A/148/147 r.w. Section 144B) and disallowance under Section 37(1) are valid where the basis stated in the notice for reopening differs from the basis on which additions were ultimately made.

Analysis: The reopening notice and the order under the re-opening provisions referred to specific alleged transactions and entities as the basis for reassessment. The final assessment order, however, records additions on the basis of different parties and transactions not identified in the original notice or order under the re-opening provisions. Such divergence indicates that the assessment was concluded on a ground materially different from the ground of reopening. Settled principles require that reassessment be founded on the stated basis and that the material forming the basis of reopening be communicated so that objections can be meaningfully raised; a reassessment founded on a different basis results in jurisdictional infirmity and absence of requisite application of mind.

Conclusion: The reassessment and the consequential disallowance under Section 37(1) are invalid and the assessment order is quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notice under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequent assessment framed under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are valid where the initial notice was issued in the name of the deceased assessee and a subsequent notice to the legal representative was issued but not recorded or acted upon in the assessment order.

Analysis: The materials establish that the assessee died before the first notice under Section 153A was issued, a later notice under Section 153A was issued to the legal representative, and the assessment order records only the first notice to the deceased while also issuing a notice under Section 142(1) in the name of the deceased. The assessment was finalized on the basis of the notice recorded in the assessment order without considering the subsequent notice and return filed by the legal representative. The issue requires determination whether an assessment finalized on the basis of notices issued in the name of the deceased, without recording or considering the notice issued to the legal representative, is valid in view of the statutory scheme and relevant precedent regarding notice validity after death.

Conclusion: The notice and the resulting assessment under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are quashed for being invalidly predicated on the notice issued in the name of the deceased without due recognition of the notice issued to the legal representative. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.