Issues: (i) whether the services rendered by the appellant were taxable as cosmetic and plastic surgery services or were exempt as healthcare services under the mega exemption; (ii) whether assessment based on the kacha register and best judgment method was sustainable; (iii) whether demand confirmed beyond the scope of the show cause notice could be sustained; (iv) whether cum-tax benefit was admissible; and (v) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Issue (i): whether the services rendered by the appellant were taxable as cosmetic and plastic surgery services or were exempt as healthcare services under the mega exemption

Analysis: The relevant statutory framework distinguished taxable cosmetic or plastic surgery from healthcare services provided by a clinical establishment, an authorised medical practitioner or paramedics. The services in question included a mixed range of dermatological and trichological procedures, and the record showed that each service had not been separately examined to determine whether it was undertaken for beautification or for diagnosis, treatment or care of illness, injury, deformity or abnormality. The earlier decisions cited showed that the character of each procedure must be tested on its own facts, including the underlying condition treated and the post-treatment care.

Conclusion: The matter required fresh examination item-wise by the adjudicating authority, and the existing classification finding could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): whether assessment based on the kacha register and best judgment method was sustainable

Analysis: The kacha register was only a tentative appointment and estimate record and not the final account of receipts, whereas the audited balance sheet and other records reflected the actual figures. At the same time, the software data was not furnished despite the Department's effort to obtain it from the software owner, which justified resort to best judgment under the statutory scheme. Thus, the kacha register by itself was not a reliable basis for quantification.

Conclusion: Reliance on the kacha register for quantification was rejected, while the use of best judgment assessment was upheld only because the relevant data was not made available.

Issue (iii): whether demand confirmed beyond the scope of the show cause notice could be sustained

Analysis: The show cause notice proposed a specific amount of service tax demand, and the adjudication order confirmed a higher amount without notice for the excess. A demand which exceeds the quantified proposal in the notice is not legally sustainable because the assessee must be put to notice of the precise liability proposed for adjudication.

Conclusion: The excess confirmation beyond the notice amount was held unsustainable.

Issue (iv): whether cum-tax benefit was admissible

Analysis: Service tax is an indirect levy and, where tax is not separately collected, the gross amount received is ordinarily to be treated as inclusive of service tax for working out the taxable value. The record did not show separate collection of service tax from the clients, and the statutory valuation principle therefore required recomputation on a cum-tax basis.

Conclusion: Cum-tax benefit was held admissible.

Issue (v): whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked

Analysis: The assessee had filed returns and maintained audited accounts, and the controversy turned on the character of the services and their proper legal classification. In a dispute centred on interpretation, suppression or wilful misstatement could not be attributed merely because the Department later took a different view, particularly when the relevant information was already on record.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The classification and quantification required fresh adjudication on an item-wise basis, the excess demand could not survive, the assessee was entitled to cum-tax adjustment, and the extended limitation was not available to the Department.

Ratio Decidendi: Where mixed medical and aesthetic procedures are involved, each service must be individually examined to determine whether it is healthcare service or taxable cosmetic or plastic surgery, and in an interpretational dispute with filed returns and available records, extended limitation and unsupported excess quantification cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the demand for service tax of Rs.10,35,930/- (with interest and penalties) raised by invoking the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is sustainable or is time-barred; and whether the appellant, being a provider of manpower/security services where tax liability arises under reverse charge, could be held liable under the extended period.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the requisites for invoking the extended five-year limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) viz., fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade tax were specifically alleged and supported by material. The decision applies settled principles that mere non-payment does not attract the extended period absent positive acts showing intent to evade; the burden to prove mala fide lies on the Revenue and must be reflected in the show cause notice. The Tribunal also analysed the statutory scheme of reverse charge mechanism and observed that liability of service recipient is independent of liability of service provider; where tax is 100% on reverse charge basis, demand could not be sustained against the provider for recipients' liability. Relevant notifications and case law were considered to determine applicability of RCM and the standard for invocation of extended limitation.

Conclusion: The demand raised by invoking the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) is not sustainable. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the supply of site analyser machines on hire against payment of VAT amounted to taxable service under the category of supply of tangible goods for use.

Analysis: The dispute turned on whether the transaction transferred only custody or also the right of possession and effective control. The governing test is that a taxable service exists only where tangible goods are supplied for use without transfer of possession and effective control; where the transaction answers the constitutional concept of a transfer of the right to use goods and is treated as a deemed sale, service tax does not apply. The Tribunal relied on the contractual features of the arrangement, the customer's practical control over the machines, and the fact that VAT had been discharged, which supported the conclusion that the transaction was a transfer of right to use goods and not a mere service. The earlier decisions relied upon were applied on the same principle.

Conclusion: The activity did not constitute taxable service under supply of tangible goods for use, and the service tax demand, interest, and penalties could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tangible goods are handed over for exclusive use with possession and effective control passing to the customer and the transaction is treated as a deemed sale on which VAT is paid, the arrangement falls outside the taxable service of supply of tangible goods for use.

Issues: Whether the assessable value of goods cleared to an interconnected undertaking could be determined under Rule 9 or Rule 10 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000, and whether transaction value had to be accepted where the assessee also made sales to unrelated buyers.

Analysis: The valuation scheme under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 distinguishes between sales to related persons and sales to interconnected undertakings. For Rule 9 to apply, the buyer must not only be an interconnected undertaking but must also fall within the additional relationship contemplated by Section 4(3)(b)(ii), (iii) or (iv). For Rule 10(a) to apply after 01.12.2013, the same additional relationship is again required; failing that, Rule 10(b) directs valuation as if the parties are not related. The record showed that the assessee made clearances not only to the group company but also to unrelated buyers, and the show cause notice did not allege that the clearances were exclusively to the interconnected undertaking or that the parties were otherwise related in the required statutory sense. In the absence of proof of mutuality of interest, mere interconnection or common shareholding was insufficient to displace transaction value. Rule 11 could not be invoked where the demand itself was founded on Rule 9.

Conclusion: Rule 9 and Rule 10(a) were not applicable, and the transaction value had to be accepted. The demand and penalty were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The valuation adopted by the Department could not be sustained on the facts and the statutory scheme, so the assessee succeeded on merits and the consequential levy also failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee sells goods both to an interconnected undertaking and to unrelated buyers, valuation cannot be shifted from transaction value to Rule 9 or Rule 10(a) unless the Department proves the additional statutory relationship and mutuality of interest required by Section 4(3)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could admit additional evidence produced by the Revenue and remand the assessments under Rule 29.

Analysis: Rule 29 was strictly interpreted as denying either party a right to produce additional evidence. The Tribunal may itself require evidence necessary for adjudication or another substantial cause; an assessee denied sufficient opportunity before the income-tax authorities may seek permission to produce evidence. The material here arose from a subsequent search and was admitted on the Revenue's application without proper application of the rule.

Conclusion: Admission of the Revenue's additional evidence and the resulting remand violated Rule 29 and exceeded the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Neither party may produce additional evidence before the Tribunal as of right; the Tribunal may require it on its own initiative, while an assessee denied sufficient opportunity may seek permission to produce it.

Issues: Whether the earlier writ order warranted review on the ground that the CESTAT order had reserved liberty to re-approach it after the Supreme Court's final verdict.

Analysis: The liberty reserved by the CESTAT was expressly conditional upon approaching it within the prescribed time. After unconditionally withdrawing the Supreme Court appeals, the petitioners did not avail that remedy and instead challenged consequential demand notices while the underlying adjudication remained unchallenged. The subsequent attempt to recall the CESTAT order was inconsistent with reliance on that very order. No error apparent on the face of the record was established, and the repeated proceedings amounted to abuse of process.

Conclusion: No ground for review was made out; the underlying adjudication had attained finality.

Issues: (i) Whether, for assessment year 2020-21, depreciation was allowable on goodwill arising from an amalgamation; (ii) Whether a disallowance under section 14A read with rule 8D could be made where no exempt income was earned.

Issue (i): Whether, for assessment year 2020-21, depreciation was allowable on goodwill arising from an amalgamation.

Analysis: Under section 32 as applicable before the Finance Act, 2021 amendment, goodwill arising on amalgamation was an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. The excess consideration issued on amalgamation over the net assets acquired represented goodwill acquired for consideration and was supported by the sanctioned amalgamation scheme and valuation material. Explanation 7 to section 43(1) did not preclude depreciation where the amalgamated company incurred cost for the goodwill. The Revenue had not objected to the amalgamation or valuation before the NCLT, and rule 11UA was inapplicable because section 56 was not in issue. The statutory exclusion of goodwill from depreciable assets applied only from assessment year 2021-22.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the goodwill for assessment year 2020-21 was allowable, and deletion of the disallowance was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether a disallowance under section 14A read with rule 8D could be made where no exempt income was earned.

Analysis: The assessee had earned no exempt dividend income during the relevant year, having opted for growth options in its mutual-fund investments. Section 14A applies only where an exemption in respect of income is claimed; therefore, no related expenditure could be disallowed in the absence of exempt income.

Conclusion: No disallowance under section 14A read with rule 8D was permissible, and deletion of the disallowance was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The deletions of both the goodwill-depreciation and section 14A disallowances remain effective.

Issues: Whether donations forming part of corporate social responsibility expenditure, after disallowance of such expenditure in computing business income, are eligible for deduction under section 80G.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to section 37(1) excludes corporate social responsibility expenditure only from deduction while computing business income. Section 80G operates independently under Chapter VI-A in computing total income and does not impose voluntariness as a condition for donations to approved institutions. The statutory exclusion for specified CSR donations does not extend to donations made to other institutions approved under section 80G. Although the quantum of CSR spending is mandatory, the assessee retains the choice of recipient; therefore, a CSR donation does not cease to qualify merely because it is made towards that obligation, provided the prescribed conditions and documentation are satisfied.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80G is allowable for the eligible CSR donations, and the disallowance is deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the electricity tariff charged by the distribution licensee to the consuming unit is a valid comparable uncontrolled price for determining the arm's length price of power supplied by a captive power plant under section 80IA; (ii) Whether capital creditors written back in respect of capital assets are taxable under section 41(1); (iii) Whether disallowance under section 14A is to be computed only with reference to investments yielding exempt income; (iv) Whether disallowance computed under section 14A can be added to book profit under section 115JB.

Issue (i): Whether the electricity tariff charged by the distribution licensee to the consuming unit is a valid comparable uncontrolled price for determining the arm's length price of power supplied by a captive power plant under section 80IA.

Analysis: For a specified domestic transaction, the substituted explanation to section 80IA(8) requires determination of arm's length price under section 92F(ii). A captive power plant, established principally for captive consumption, is functionally distinct from a bulk generating company supplying a distribution licensee. The price paid by the consuming manufacturing unit to the distribution licensee represents the cost it would otherwise incur for electricity and has sufficient comparability for application of the comparable uncontrolled price method. The provisions of section 80A(6) do not require adoption of the rate at which a generating company sells power to a distribution licensee.

Conclusion: The distribution-licensee tariff paid by the consuming unit is a valid comparable uncontrolled price for determining the arm's length price of captive power supplied to that unit. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether capital creditors written back in respect of capital assets are taxable under section 41(1).

Analysis: Section 41(1) applies only where a trading liability, loss or expenditure allowed as a deduction has been remitted or ceased. Depreciation on a capital asset does not constitute an allowance of the principal capital liability incurred for acquiring that asset. The borrowing transaction and acquisition of the capital asset are independent, and waiver or write-back of a capital liability does not convert it into a trading liability.

Conclusion: Write-back of capital creditors relating to acquisition of capital assets is not taxable under section 41(1). The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance under section 14A is to be computed only with reference to investments yielding exempt income.

Analysis: The disallowance under section 14A was required to be recomputed at 0.5% of the average value of investments that actually yielded exempt income during the relevant year.

Conclusion: Only investments yielding exempt income may be considered for the prescribed computation of disallowance. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether disallowance computed under section 14A can be added to book profit under section 115JB.

Analysis: The disallowance computed under section 14A under the normal provisions does not automatically constitute an adjustment to book profit under section 115JB.

Conclusion: The section 14A disallowance cannot be added while computing book profit under section 115JB. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The relief granted in respect of captive-power pricing, capital-liability write-back, exempt-income disallowance and book-profit computation is sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For captive power supplied to an assessee's own consuming unit in a specified domestic transaction, the tariff at which that unit purchases comparable electricity from a distribution licensee may constitute a valid comparable uncontrolled price for determining arm's length price.

Issues: Whether sale of lubricating oil purchased in bulk, repacked into smaller containers and marketed under the dealer's own brand name amounts to sale by a trademark holder taxable as a deemed first sale under Section 5AA.

Analysis: Section 5AA deems a dealer holding a trademark who sells goods otherwise than at the first point of sale to be the first seller in the State. The assessee purchased lubricating oil from registered dealers, repacked it in smaller quantities, and marketed it under the distinct brand name and trademark "Vicrocil". The statutory expression "trademark" covers both registered and unregistered trademarks; registration is not a prerequisite where the dealer adopts and uses a distinctive trade name while marketing the goods. Tax paid at the preceding purchase point remains deductible in determining the liability.

Conclusion: The sales were taxable under Section 5AA as deemed first sales; the substantial question was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the assessee had shown sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay in filing the appeals before the first appellate authority and before the Tribunal.

Analysis: The appeals were delayed by 1797 days. The explanation offered, namely non-receipt of notices, reliance on the tax consultant, COVID-19 disruption and lapse of memory after resumption of office, was found unsupported by cogent material and insufficient to explain the entire delay. The order relied on the principle that while limitation provisions may be construed liberally, the existence of sufficient cause remains a condition precedent, and negligence, inactivity, want of diligence, or inordinate delay cannot be ignored. The merits of the assessment were not examined because the delay itself barred admission.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the appeals were not admitted on merits. The assessee's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the impugned order passed under Section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, fixing payment of the disputed demand in instalments, could be sustained when it was challenged for want of proper consideration and whether the matter required reconsideration in the light of the CBDT circular governing stay of demand.

Analysis: The order under challenge required the petitioner to deposit the demand in instalments. The Court noted that the impugned order did not disclose proper application of mind to the relevant factors bearing on the stay application. It also relied on the CBDT guidelines under Circular No.1914/1993 dated 02.02.1993, which contemplate consideration of all relevant factors and communication of the decision by a speaking order. Following the earlier decision referred to in the order, the Court held that the matter should be reconsidered by the authority on merits.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside to the extent of requiring fresh consideration and the matter was remitted to the first respondent for a fresh order on merits. Recovery proceedings were directed to remain in abeyance until such reconsideration.

Issues: (i) Whether an assessee can claim deduction under Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of employees' liabilities (leave encashment, bonus, gratuity provision) by treating transfer of such liabilities to a transferee on slump sale as deemed payment on or before the due date under Section 139(1); (ii) Whether adjustments made in the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of such deduction are barred as being debatable or unlawful, and whether the application under Rule 27 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 raising such grounds is maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether transfer of employees' liabilities to a transferee on slump sale amounts to payment for claiming deduction under Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 43B permits specified deductions only when the sum is actually paid by the assessee, and the proviso allows payment on or before the due date under Section 139(1) to qualify. The statutory text contains a non obstante clause prioritising actual payment as the condition for allowance. Contractual transfer of liabilities to a third party does not, by itself, extinguish the statutory requirement of actual payment by the assessee. Authorities addressing conversion of interest into paid-up capital or extinguishment by issuance of securities were distinguished on facts where the obligation was actually discharged; those decisions dealing with interest conversion are not analogous to transfer of employees' dues. Allowing deduction merely on the basis that the transferee later paid or did not claim deduction would permit circumvention of the actual payment requirement and is inconsistent with the statutory scheme and earlier decisions holding that statutory obligations cannot be shifted by contract to claim deduction under Section 43B.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 43B cannot be claimed by treating transfer of employees' liabilities to a transferee as deemed payment; actual payment by the assessee on or before the due date under Section 139(1) is required. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjustment in the intimation under Section 143(1) was impermissible as a debatable issue and whether the grounds raised in the Rule 27 application are maintainable.

Analysis: Section 143(1) permits adjustment of incorrect claims apparent from the return; a prima facie incorrect claim visible on the face of the return can be adjusted in the processing intimation after offering an opportunity to the assessee. The question of whether the Section 43B deduction met the statutory actual payment requirement was not a debatable legal issue preventing adjustment at the processing stage where the claim is objectively incorrect on the return. Rule 27 permits the respondent to support the first appellate authority's order, and the Tribunal admitted the Rule 27 application to decide the raised grounds. The specific grounds arguing that the adjustment was debatable or that the intimation was non-speaking were examined and found unsustainable on the statutory scheme and record showing opportunity was provided before adjustment.

Conclusion: The adjustment made under Section 143(1) was permissible as a prima facie adjustment apparent from the return; the Rule 27 application was admitted but the specific grounds challenging the adjustment were rejected. These conclusions are against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether property linked to proceeds of crime may be attached although its holder is not accused of the predicate offence? (ii) Whether deposits attributed to the appellants could be treated as their own funds rather than proceeds of crime? (iii) Whether sufficient reason to believe existed for issuance of the show-cause notice? (iv) Whether the appellants satisfactorily explained the sources for acquiring the attached properties, including housing loans? (v) Whether property of equivalent value may be attached as proceeds of crime?

Issue (i): Whether property linked to proceeds of crime may be attached although its holder is not accused of the predicate offence?

Analysis: Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 permits attachment of property having a nexus with proceeds of crime and is not confined to property held by a person arraigned for the scheduled offence. Attachment turns on the property's connection with proceeds of crime rather than the holder's status as an accused in the predicate offence.

Conclusion: Yes. Property linked to proceeds of crime may be attached notwithstanding that its holder is not accused of the predicate offence; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether deposits attributed to the appellants could be treated as their own funds rather than proceeds of crime?

Analysis: Statements recorded under Section 50(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 identified cash deposits, gold coins and investments as derived from the embezzled funds. The bank deposits, handling of bearer cheques, acquisition of assets and unexplained burnt currency supported the attribution of the deposits to proceeds of crime rather than to the appellants' claimed savings.

Conclusion: No. The deposits and assets were treated as proceeds of crime and not as the appellants' own funds; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether sufficient reason to believe existed for issuance of the show-cause notice?

Analysis: The statements, banking material, cash deposits, seized assets and unexplained currency constituted adequate material connecting the attached properties with proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: Yes. Sufficient reason to believe existed for issuing the show-cause notice; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether the appellants satisfactorily explained the sources for acquiring the attached properties, including housing loans?

Analysis: The asserted cash sale consideration was denied by the purchaser, and the claimed inheritance was not substantiated. Although housing loans and certain disclosed income were accounted for, the sources for the balance consideration and investments remained unexplained. The loans were found to have been used to give an apparent legitimate form to tainted funds.

Conclusion: No. The sources for acquiring the attached properties were not satisfactorily established; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (v): Whether property of equivalent value may be attached as proceeds of crime?

Analysis: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 includes the value of property derived or obtained from scheduled criminal activity, while Section 2(1)(v) gives an expansive meaning to property. The statutory interpretation applied permits attachment of property representing equivalent value where the tainted property is unavailable or cannot be identified.

Conclusion: Yes. The attached properties were liable to attachment as property of equivalent value of the proceeds of crime; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The attachment framework extends to proceeds of crime held by a person not charged with the predicate offence and to assets representing their equivalent value, where the claimed lawful sources do not displace the established nexus with tainted funds.

Ratio Decidendi: Attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not contingent upon the holder being accused of the scheduled offence and may reach property constituting proceeds of crime or its equivalent value.

Issues: Whether the addition of the gross purchase amount as unexplained cash credit on the basis of alleged client code modification in commodity transactions was sustainable.

Analysis: The purchase and sale transactions were pair trades, with a corresponding sale or purchase for each transaction; consequently, only the resultant profit or loss could be relevant. The broker confirmed that any client code modification was made without the assessee's instruction or knowledge, for operational reasons. Revenue did not identify the modified transactions, establish the assessee's involvement, or prove that she obtained a positive gain. Further, the disputed amount was not a credit found in the assessee's books, and its treatment as unexplained cash credit merely on the basis of an investigation report was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was upheld; the alleged client code modification did not justify an addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained cash credit cannot rest on alleged client code modification where the amount is not credited in the assessee's books and Revenue fails to establish the assessee's participation in, or benefit from, the modification.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned; (ii) Whether exemption for a charitable trust under section 11 could be denied solely because Form No. 10B was not filed within the prescribed time, despite the audit report having been uploaded before the return of income.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The delay arose because hearing notices were not effectively communicated by the tax practitioner due to a personal emergency, and the trust became aware of the appellate order only upon receipt of recovery proceedings. The explanation established that the delay was attributable to the representative's inadvertent lapse rather than deliberate inaction by the trust.

Conclusion: The delay of 221 days was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether exemption for a charitable trust under section 11 could be denied solely because Form No. 10B was not filed within the prescribed time, despite the audit report having been uploaded before the return of income.

Analysis: The trust's accounts were audited and Form No. 10B was uploaded before the return was filed. Neither the charitable character of its objects nor the application of income for charitable purposes was disputed. Filing the audit report within the stipulated time was treated as a procedural requirement, and not as a substantive condition precedent to exemption, where the report was available on record and the substantive conditions were otherwise met.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11, including deduction for actual application of income and statutory accumulation; denial of exemption and taxation of gross receipts solely for the alleged delay in filing Form No. 10B were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The trust's charitable income is to be recomputed after granting the claimed exemption, application of income and permissible accumulation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a charitable trust has been audited and its audit report is available on record, delayed filing of Form No. 10B is a procedural and curable defect that does not by itself defeat exemption under section 11.

Issues: Whether a trust that had commenced charitable activities before obtaining provisional approval was required to apply for regular approval within six months of commencement of activities under clause (iii) of the first proviso to section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The provisional-approval regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2020 was intended to facilitate registration of newly formed charitable institutions whose activities had not begun. The requirement to apply within six months of commencement of activities consequently applies to institutions commencing activities after provisional approval. Applying that requirement to an institution already carrying on charitable activities when provisional approval was obtained would create an irrational and absurd bar against its obtaining regular approval. A harmonious and purposive construction requires such an existing institution to apply at least six months before expiry of its provisional approval. The subsequent amendment by the Finance Act, 2024, permitting an application at any time after commencement of activities, reinforces this interpretation. The application had been rejected solely as time-barred, without examining the substantive statutory conditions or identifying any violation warranting cancellation of provisional approval.

Conclusion: The application in Form No. 10AB was filed within the permissible statutory time and was valid and maintainable. The matter was restored for fresh verification of eligibility after affording opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of registration under Section 12AB without granting the requested adjournment warranted fresh consideration; (ii) Whether an application for approval under Section 80G(5), rejected as time-barred under clause (iii) of the first proviso, was required to be considered under subsequently inserted clause (iv)(B).

Issue (i): Whether rejection of registration under Section 12AB without granting the requested adjournment warranted fresh consideration.

Analysis: Registration was declined solely because supporting details concerning the trust's activities were not furnished, although an adjournment had been sought and refused because the application was becoming time-barred. The denial of an effective opportunity to furnish relevant material warranted restoration for examination on merits consistent with principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The registration application under Section 12AB must be considered afresh after affording the assessee an opportunity to furnish the required details, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an application for approval under Section 80G(5), rejected as time-barred under clause (iii) of the first proviso, was required to be considered under subsequently inserted clause (iv)(B).

Analysis: Clause (iv), inserted in the first proviso to Section 80G(5) with effect from 01.10.2024, independently permits a trust that has commenced activities to seek approval at any time thereafter. Since the rejection order was made after that amendment took effect, the application was required to be evaluated under clause (iv)(B), rather than rejected by applying the earlier timeline in clause (iii).

Conclusion: The Section 80G application must be treated as one filed under clause (iv)(B) of the first proviso to Section 80G(5) and decided in accordance with law, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The applications for charitable registration and donor-approval require merits-based adjudication after the assessee is afforded a proper opportunity and the amended approval framework is applied.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an amended statutory provision governing eligibility for approval is operative when the authority decides an application, the application must be considered under that provision; rejection without a reasonable opportunity to produce material warrants fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether confirmation of the attachment of the appellant's bank funds as alleged benami property could stand without investigation into the source of demonetised currency, the actual control of the alleged benamidar companies, and the genuineness of the appellant's bullion-sale transactions.

Analysis: The record did not establish that the appellant had supplied demonetised currency to the alleged benamidar companies. Material questions concerning the role and whereabouts of the alleged actual operator, the incorporation, shareholding, bank-account operation and management of those companies, and their transactions with third parties remained unverified. At the same time, the appellant had not produced stock registers, VAT returns, and supporting material necessary to verify availability and sale of gold, including the receipt not supported by a sale invoice. These unresolved matters required a comprehensive further investigation.

Conclusion: The attachment confirmation could not be sustained on the existing investigation; the matter was remanded for re-investigation, which is in favour of the appellant.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by directing the respondents to consider the petitioner's pending representations and take an appropriate decision within two months, while maintaining status quo regarding the validity of the relevant Served From India Scheme scrips for three months.