Issues: Whether interim judicial interference should be granted to quash or suspend the show cause notice issued under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (and corresponding provisions of the U.P. GST Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017) pending adjudication.

Analysis: The petition was filed at the initiation of adjudication proceedings and no final conclusion has been reached by the adjudicating authority. Investigation including search and recording of recipient statements has taken place and the revenue seeks to rely on those materials and witnesses. Disputed questions of fact and law arise which require full adjudication; the petitioner has avenues within the adjudication to challenge documentary material and to cross-examine witnesses. Given the factual disputes and the need for an adjudicatory process to examine evidence and afford opportunity to test witness statements and documents, the matter is better resolved in the course of statutory adjudication rather than by pre-emptive judicial intervention.

Conclusion: Interim interference is declined and the writ petition is dismissed; the order upholds the continuance of the adjudication proceedings and is therefore against the petitioner and in favour of the revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the reopening of assessment by issuance of notice under section 148 is sustainable where the Assessing Officer's reasons are based on information uploaded by the Investigation Wing without corroborative tangible material connecting the information to the assessee; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs.65,24,960/- as undisclosed Long Term Capital Gain (disallowance under section 68) is sustainable where the reopening is challenged and the assessee furnished evidence of purchase and sale transactions.

Issue (i): Whether the reopening of assessment by issuance of notice under section 148 is sustainable where the Assessing Officer's reasons are based on information uploaded by the Investigation Wing without corroborative tangible material connecting the information to the assessee.

Analysis: Section 147 permits reassessment if the Assessing Officer has reasons to believe income has escaped assessment; such belief must be founded on tangible information having a live nexus with the formation of belief. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer relied on information from the Investigation Wing and an uploaded note, without specific factual links to the assessee's transactions (such as details of scrips, purchase consideration, payment mode, broker details or verification against assessee's records). The record shows absence of background material or cross-verification establishing a nexus between the information and the assessee.

Conclusion: The reopening of assessment under section 148 is quashed as unlawful for lack of tangible material and live nexus with the formation of belief; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs.65,24,960/- as undisclosed Long Term Capital Gain under section 68 is sustainable where the reopening is challenged and the assessee furnished evidence of purchase and sale transactions.

Analysis: The addition under section 68 was premised on the reassessment initiated after the impugned reopening. The assessee produced evidence of purchase (account-payee cheques, STT payment, RTGS receipts) and sale through broker with corresponding receipts on record. Given the quashing of the reopening for want of requisite tangible material and nexus, the foundational basis for treating the claimed LTCG as undisclosed is removed.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.65,24,960/- is deleted; in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal, concluding that the reassessment was invalid for lack of tangible material establishing a live nexus to form a belief that income had escaped assessment, and consequently deleted the impugned additions arising from that reassessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Reopening under section 147/148 requires tangible information having a direct/live nexus with the formation of belief that income has escaped assessment; mere information uploaded by investigative authorities without corroborative, case-specific background material is insufficient to sustain reassessment.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Tribunal should set aside the CIT(A)'s dismissal for non-prosecution and restore the additions made by the Assessing Officer (including addition of Rs. 10,81,240/- as unexplained funds and Rs. 2,90,000/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b)) for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined (i) the circumstances of issuance of notice under section 148 when the assessee was a non-filer and the initial escapement recorded by the Assessing Officer; (ii) the factual record regarding payments (balance consideration, stamp duty and registration charges) and absence of documentary evidence on the date and source of the Rs. 7,00,000/- payment and related entries; (iii) the fact that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating the merits or applying the facts on record despite multiple opportunities; and (iv) whether the difference between stamp duty value and transaction value merited enquiry under section 56(2)(vii)(b). The Tribunal found that material issues of source and valuation were not examined by the CIT(A) and that the Assessing Officer had not fully investigated available records (such as bank drafts and dates of payment). In the interest of justice and given the assessee's non-resident status and claimed difficulty in procuring older records, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to afford the assessee an opportunity to substantiate sources and explanations before the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The CIT(A)'s dismissal for non-prosecution is set aside to the extent that the merits were not adjudicated; the matter is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration limited to verification of sources for Rs. 10,81,240/- and enquiry regarding the difference between stamp duty value and transaction value (addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b)). The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned; (ii) Whether interest income earned by a co-operative housing society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Condonation of delay in filing appeals before the Tribunal.

Analysis: The application for condonation set out reasons including absence of regular professional assistance, advanced age of office-bearers, and lack of awareness of appeal procedures; the Tribunal applied established principles that procedural rules yield to substantial justice and referred to the test in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. MST Katiji for sufficiency of cause.

Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeals is condoned.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest earned on deposits with co-operative banks.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction for income by way of interest or dividends derived by a co-operative society from investments with any other co-operative society; section 2(19) defines "co-operative society"; the Tribunal followed coordinate-bench precedent holding that deposits with co-operative banks (being co-operative societies) qualify under section 80P(2)(d), examined the effect of section 80P(4) which excludes certain co-operative banks only in specific contexts, and applied the principle that where two reasonable constructions exist, the one favourable to the assessee should be adopted.

Conclusion: Interest income earned by the co-operative housing society from deposits with co-operative banks is deductible under section 80P(2)(d); the impugned orders denying that deduction are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for consequential compliance.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal condoned the delay and, following binding coordinate-bench precedent and applicable principles of statutory interpretation, directed grant of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest from co-operative banks, with consequential adjustments to be carried out by the Assessing Officer.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a co-operative society earns interest from investments placed with a co-operative bank that is a co-operative society within the meaning of section 2(19), such interest falls within the scope of deduction under section 80P(2)(d); ambiguities in taxing provisions are to be resolved in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice and consequent demand issued beyond the normal period of limitation (time-bar) is liable to be struck down.

Analysis: The proceedings concern an allegation of incorrect classification and invocation of the extended limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962. Relevant legal principles include that a show cause notice must set out specific allegations so the recipient can meet them, and that if a demand is found to be time-barred the tribunal need not examine merits. Factual material shows the goods underwent physical examination and were finally assessed and cleared following a first-check appraisal and duty payment more than one year before issuance of the show cause notice. The content and framing of the notice do not raise the substantive point relied upon later by the department; procedural defects in the notice and issuance beyond the normal period render the notice vulnerable to challenge. Coordinate decisions addressing similar imports and the settled proposition that limitation, when validly raised, precludes adjudication on merits are applicable.

Conclusion: The show cause notice and consequential demand are time-barred and are set aside; appeal allowed in favour of the importer-assessee.

Issues: Whether denial of the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were relied upon, contrary to the procedure under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962, vitiates the adjudication and requires remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The matter involves allegations of smuggling of gold and application of the reverse burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. Statements recorded under the Act were relied upon by the adjudicating authority, and the appellant had sought cross-examination of certain witnesses which was not permitted. Judicial precedents recognise that admissible statements may nonetheless require testing by cross-examination to assess probative value, and the procedure in Section 138B is the mechanism to permit cross-examination where relied upon material and requests are made. Denial of cross-examination in a case attracting reverse burden of proof can prejudice the noticee's ability to defend and is a curable procedural defect that may necessitate fresh consideration depending on facts and prejudice.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the original adjudicating authority for de novo adjudication after following the procedure laid down in Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 and affording the appellant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements were relied upon. All contentions are left open.

Issues: (i) whether a company petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed by allottees of a real estate project could be maintained jointly against two corporate debtors; (ii) whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees under the second proviso to Section 7(1) stood satisfied and whether changes made in the array of petitioners while refiling after defects were cured vitiated the petition; and (iii) whether the project stood completed with possession lawfully deliverable so as to negate financial debt and default.

Issue (i): whether a company petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed by allottees of a real estate project could be maintained jointly against two corporate debtors.

Analysis: The project was found to be a single integrated real estate project in which both corporate entities were closely connected. The original allotment of the land stood in favour of one company, and the later arrangement conferred marketing rights on the other company. The materials showed interchangeability in communications, demand notices, possession letters and receipts, and the allotment documentation contemplated execution of tripartite sublease deeds only after completion. In these circumstances, the joint petition was not treated as impermissible merely because two corporate entities were proceeded against together.

Conclusion: The joint petition against both corporate debtors was maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees under the second proviso to Section 7(1) stood satisfied and whether changes made in the array of petitioners while refiling after defects were cured vitiated the petition.

Analysis: The relevant date for testing the statutory threshold was the date of filing of the petition, not the date of admission. No reliable documentary material established that the alleged settlements or withdrawals had occurred before filing. The petition, as originally instituted and then refiled after removal of defects, disclosed allottees of 103 units. Changes made while the petition remained unregistered and was being refiled after defect correction were permissible under the NCLT Rules and did not amount to an abuse of process.

Conclusion: The threshold requirement was satisfied and the refiling amendments did not invalidate the petition.

Issue (iii): whether the project stood completed with possession lawfully deliverable so as to negate financial debt and default.

Analysis: The allotment letter, lease terms and the building regulations required completion and an occupancy-related formal completion before possession could be handed over, and the tripartite sublease deeds were a precondition. The record, including the status and observer reports, showed that substantial construction remained incomplete, that basic amenities were missing on several floors, and that no valid completion or occupancy certificate for the full project had been issued. The letters relied upon by the appellants were treated as insufficient to establish lawful, fit-for-occupation possession. The allottee payments therefore remained linked to an undelivered built-up space, supporting the existence of financial debt and default.

Conclusion: The project was not complete and default was established.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency admission was held to be legally sustainable on all material grounds, and the challenge to the rejection of the settlement deposit offer also failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real estate insolvency, a joint Section 7 petition against closely connected corporate entities is maintainable where the project is integrated and the documents show common participation, the allottee threshold is tested on the filing date, and possession cannot defeat default unless completion and the legally required occupancy formalities are established.

Issues: (i) Whether the proviso to Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 barred a direct transfer request to the High Court for transfer between two Special Courts in the same sessions division. (ii) Whether, in view of Section 44(1)(c) read with Section 65 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the accused could seek transfer of the scheduled-offence case to the Special Court where the PMLA case was pending, and whether such transfer was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the proviso to Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 barred a direct transfer request to the High Court for transfer between two Special Courts in the same sessions division.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 447 restricts direct applications to the High Court for transfer between criminal courts in the same sessions division unless the Sessions Judge has first been moved. However, Special Courts constituted under special statutes are distinct statutory fora exercising exclusive jurisdiction under those enactments. Their transfer between one Special Court and another Special Court was held not to be safely brought within the proviso's ordinary rule governing subordinate criminal courts in the sessions hierarchy. Accordingly, a direct application to the High Court for transfer between Special Courts was held to be legally permissible.

Conclusion: The proviso did not bar the transfer petition, and direct invocation of the High Court's transfer jurisdiction was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether, in view of Section 44(1)(c) read with Section 65 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the accused could seek transfer of the scheduled-offence case to the Special Court where the PMLA case was pending, and whether such transfer was justified.

Analysis: Section 44(1)(c) was treated as an enabling provision authorising the competent PMLA authority to seek committal of the scheduled-offence case, but not as an absolute bar on a transfer request by another aggrieved person. Section 65 made the procedural law applicable so far as it was not inconsistent with the PMLA. The Court accepted that the scheduled offence and the money-laundering offence are not tried as a joint trial, but found that both matters could appropriately be placed before the same Special Court in the interest of justice where both courts were notified Special Courts under the PC Act and the PMLA.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to seek transfer, and the transfer was warranted in the interest of justice.

Final Conclusion: The scheduled-offence case was ordered to be tried by the same Special Court already seized of the PMLA matter, and the transfer request succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is an enabling provision for committal at the instance of the authorised authority and does not exclude the High Court's transfer power under Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, particularly where transfer is sought between Special Courts in the interest of justice.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 can be granted to the accused/applicants in view of the ongoing investigation, the twin test under Section 45 PMLA, and the prosecuting agency's need for custodial interrogation.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory twin test in Section 45 PMLA which requires that when the Public Prosecutor opposes bail the court must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the accused is not guilty of money laundering and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court considered the scope of inquiry at bail stage (assessment on probabilities and prima facie material), the distinct treatment of economic/socio-economic offences, and the relevance of custodial interrogation in complex, transnational money-laundering schemes. The prosecution material showed an intricate horizontal and vertical layering of transactions, continued receipt of fresh complaints, alleged destruction of electronic evidence, assaults on investigating officers, bribing of local police, and active involvement of the accused in creating and operating numerous mule accounts and entities used to upload funds to an overseas payment platform. Given these circumstances and the ongoing need to unearth further layers and involvement (including bank officials), the Court found that investigators' requirement for custodial interrogation was reasonable and that the twin conditions of Section 45 PMLA were not satisfied.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail is refused; the applications are dismissed and the decision is in favour of the Respondent.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to CENVAT credit of input services distributed by its Head Office (Input Service Distributor) although the expenditure was not booked in the books of the branch/unit, and whether the proviso to Rule 3(4) or Rule 7 (prior to amendment w.e.f. 01.04.2012) prevents such distribution.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as it stood prior to 01.04.2012 and the related CBEC clarifications and circulars concerning the functioning of an Input Service Distributor (ISD). The Court reviewed authorities establishing that (i) Rule 7 did not mandate that expenses be booked in the books of a particular manufacturing unit for credit to be availed, (ii) prior to 01.04.2012 there was no statutory requirement for pro rata distribution by ISD, and (iii) recipients of credit who merely avail credit distributed by ISD are not liable to have eligibility re-opened by the department where the distributor bears the incidence of tax. The Tribunal also considered precedents holding that the proviso to Rule 3(4) does not apply to credits availed on ISD invoices and that absence of mens rea or allegations of suppression negates the basis for demand where distribution followed the ISD mechanism.

Conclusion: The impugned show cause notices and the Order-in-Original confirming demand are unsustainable. The appellant is entitled to the CENVAT credit distributed by its Head Office (ISD) for the periods in question; the proviso to Rule 3(4) and the pre-01.04.2012 text of Rule 7 do not bar such credit. The departmental demand is set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deposit (or date of reversal) instead of interest at the rate prescribed under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 on the refund of Rs.35,60,087/- ordered by the Appellate Authority.

Analysis: The appeal concerns refund of amounts found to be central excise duty following the Tribunal's and appellate orders and the applicability of statutory provisions governing refunds and interest. The Court examined the nature of the amount claimed (refund of duty arising from reversal of CENVAT credit and remission under Rule 21), the scheme of Section 11B and Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and relevant precedents including Mafatlal Industries, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Sandvik Asia, Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals, and subsequent authorities interpreting commencement and rate of interest. The Court distinguished decisions relied upon by the appellant which related to refunds of deposits made during investigations or pre-deposits under Section 35F, noting that Section 35FF governs interest on pre-deposits and prescribes a different starting point. The statutory text, Board circulars and Supreme Court authorities establish that refund of duty under Section 11B attracts interest under Section 11BB, and that the relevant date for commencement of statutory interest is determined by Section 11BB (expiry of three months from receipt of application), with rates fixed by notification. The appellant's reliance on decisions awarding 12% on equitable grounds was found inapplicable where the statutory provision prescribes a specific regime and interest rate; consequently, decisions concerning pre-deposits or inordinate delays beyond the statutory scheme were distinguished.

Conclusion: The appellant is not entitled to interest at 12%; the refund and interest are governed by Section 11B and Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the impugned allowance of interest at the rate prescribed under Section 11BB is correct. The appeal is rejected.

Issues: Whether an order passed under section 86 of the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003 by a Joint Commissioner, acting as a delegatee of the Commissioner, can be subjected to further suo motu revision under section 85 of the same Act by a Senior Joint Commissioner.

Analysis: Section 85 confers suo motu revisional power on the Commissioner in respect of specified assessments and orders passed by officers appointed under section 6(1) to assist him. Section 86 separately provides for revision on application in respect of orders passed by such officers, and the revisional power exercised under that provision by an authorised delegatee is an exercise of the Commissioner's authority itself. Once a Joint Commissioner acts under section 86 as a delegatee of the Commissioner, the resultant order assumes the character of an order of the Commissioner and is not an order of a subordinate officer amenable to further revision under section 85 by another delegatee. Permitting such a second revision would create an impermissible cycle of successive revisions, which the statutory scheme does not contemplate.

Conclusion: The order passed under section 86 could not be revised under section 85 by the Senior Joint Commissioner, and the review application failed.

Ratio Decidendi: An order passed in revision by a delegatee of the Commissioner cannot be subjected to a further revision under the same statutory scheme by another delegatee, unless the statute expressly authorises such successive revision.

Issues: (i) whether a dispute founded on an allegedly forged and fabricated admission deed, which itself contains the arbitration clause, is amenable to arbitration at the stage of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) whether the High Court was justified in exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to refer the suit to arbitration despite concurrent findings doubting the existence of the arbitration agreement.

Issue (i): whether a dispute founded on an allegedly forged and fabricated admission deed, which itself contains the arbitration clause, is amenable to arbitration at the stage of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Analysis: Serious allegations of fraud touching the arbitration agreement itself stand on a different footing from ordinary contractual disputes. Where the very existence or genuineness of the document containing the arbitration clause is in grave doubt, the dispute goes to the root of arbitral jurisdiction. Consent remains the foundation of arbitration, and an arbitrator cannot be appointed until it is shown, at least prima facie, that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement. The material on record, together with the earlier final prima facie assessment in the Section 9 proceedings, supported the view that the admission deed was under serious cloud and required a full-fledged inquiry rather than reference to arbitration.

Conclusion: The dispute was not amenable to arbitration at this stage, and the refusal to appoint an arbitrator was correct.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court was justified in exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to refer the suit to arbitration despite concurrent findings doubting the existence of the arbitration agreement

Analysis: Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction and does not permit reappreciation of evidence. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had concurrently held that the allegations of fraud were serious and that the original admission deed or a certified copy was not produced as required. Those concurrent findings were grounded in the record and could not be displaced merely on a different view of the facts. In these circumstances, directing reference of the suit to arbitration was beyond the proper scope of Article 227.

Conclusion: The order referring the suit to arbitration was unsustainable, while the order declining appointment of an arbitrator was correctly affirmed.

Final Conclusion: The controversy arising from the disputed admission deed was held to be non-arbitrable at the present stage, the order directing arbitration was set aside, and the refusal to appoint an arbitrator was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: When the very existence or genuineness of the document containing the arbitration clause is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery, the matter is non-arbitrable until the arbitration agreement itself is shown to exist, and supervisory jurisdiction cannot be used to overturn concurrent factual findings on that issue.

Issues: (i) Whether duty and confiscation could be sustained on the basis of the undertaking given at the time of importation for breach of the post-import conditions of the exemption notification; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 112 of the Customs Act could be validly imposed upon the company officials named in the order.

Issue (i): Whether duty could be confirmed and the aircraft confiscated on account of breach of Condition No.104 of the exemption notification relying upon the undertaking furnished at import.

Analysis: The exemption notification grants conditional nil rate subject to specified post-import conditions and an undertaking to pay duty on breach. The undertaking given at importation enables recovery of duty when the specified use is not complied with. Factual material (aircraft logbook) showed predominant non-revenue/private use inconsistent with Condition No.104. Prior authority establishes that non-revenue flights without remuneration do not constitute 'air transport service' for the condition. Where the post-import condition is breached, duty is recoverable on the basis of the undertaking and the aircraft may be liable to confiscation under the relevant provisions.

Conclusion: Duty confirmation and confiscation of the aircraft are upheld in favour of the revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 112 could be imposed on the company officials for acts leading to confiscation.

Analysis: Section 112 penalises acts or abetment that render goods liable to confiscation; statutory and precedent authorities require knowledge or mens rea for treating persons as abettors beyond mere facilitation. The impugned order does not record requisite knowledge or mens rea attributing awareness that non-remunerated use would violate the notification to the officials. Mere violation of the notification, without evidence of culpable knowledge/abetment, is insufficient to sustain penalties under Section 112.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 112 imposed on the named officials are not sustainable and are set aside (in favour of the appellants as to penalties).

Final Conclusion: The breach of conditional exemption justified confirmation of duty and confiscation of the aircraft, while imposition of penalties on the named officials was not supported by findings of culpable knowledge or abetment; the result is mixed, upholding recovery and confiscation but setting aside individual penalties.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an importer breaches post-import conditions of a conditional customs exemption, duty is recoverable and goods may be confiscated on the basis of the undertaking given at importation; however, imposition of penalty under Section 112 requires evidence of knowledge or abetment and cannot be based on mere violation or facilitation without mens rea.

Issues: Whether the provision for eviction, shifting and rehabilitation of encroachers was allowable as a deduction, and the extent of deduction admissible where supporting payment vouchers were not produced for the entire provision.

Analysis: The expenditure on rehabilitation, eviction and shifting of encroachers was held allowable in principle, being incurred to facilitate the assessee's business operations and not for acquiring a new capital asset. However, actual payment evidence remained material for quantifying the deduction. Although vouchers were not produced for the entire recurring provision, the assessee's public-sector status and compulsory audit requirements justified limited additional relief on the peculiar facts, without creating a precedent.

Conclusion: The rehabilitation provision was allowable in principle, but the assessee was granted only further relief of Rs. 1 crore; the disallowance was sustained to the extent of Rs. 34,92,16,124, partly in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: Arguments heard. Judgment reserved. Written submissions may be filed within one week.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court should intervene under Article 226 when an officer authorised under Section 20 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 has passed an order for continuance of freezing of accounts; (ii) Whether the petitioner should be permitted to operate the frozen account to defray employees' salaries for the specified months despite the freezing order.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court must intervene when the Authority under Section 20 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 has passed an order for continuance of freezing of the account.

Analysis: The scheme of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 contemplates initial freezing under Section 17(1A) and a power of continuance where the authorised officer records reasons under Section 20, subject to review by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8. The factual question whether material justifying the exercise of Section 17(1A) existed at the time of freezing, and whether further material was gathered during search, is within the remit of the Adjudicating Authority to examine in proceedings concerning continuation beyond the statutory period.

Conclusion: The petitioner's grievance as to continuance of freezing is to be decided by the Adjudicating Authority and the High Court will not, at this stage, intervene to set aside the continuance order. This conclusion is against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to operate the frozen account to defray employees' salaries for January 2026 and for February-March 2026 on conditions specified.

Analysis: The statutory prohibition on operating a frozen account is subject to prior permission of the officer who froze the account; judicial orders in analogous contexts have permitted operation of frozen/attached accounts for payment of salaries after verification. The petitioner and its holding company engage in activities not entirely impermissible and require continuing day-to-day operations and salary disbursements. Given the limited and quantifiable monthly salary requirement and the temporary nature of the continuance (until expiry of the 180-day period unless extended by the Adjudicating Authority), administrative verification and directed limited operation are an appropriate interim measure to protect employees' statutory and contractual dues while preserving the state's interest in adjudication of freezing continuation.

Conclusion: The petitioner is permitted, subject to verification by the respondent and bank communication, to operate the frozen account to pay salaries for January 2026 and, on provision of details by specified dates, for February and March 2026. This conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petition is disposed of by directing limited interim relief allowing operation of the frozen account for payment of employees' salaries for the specified months while leaving the question of continuation of freezing to be adjudicated by the Adjudicating Authority under the statutory scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory freezing is continued under Section 20 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, factual sufficiency for continuance is for the Adjudicating Authority to consider; meanwhile, limited interim permission to operate frozen accounts for payment of employees' salaries may be granted after administrative verification to protect livelihood interests without prejudicing the statutory adjudicatory process.

Issues: Whether the order in Form GST MOV-09 dated 06.05.2025 passed under Section 129 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is sustainable where the taxpayer deposited the penalty amount under protest and filed objections with a date afforded for hearing.

Analysis: Section 129(3) requires issuance of notice specifying tax and penalty and thereafter passing of an order; Section 129(5) provides that on payment of the amount referred to in subsection (1) proceedings shall be deemed to be concluded. The payment being made "under protest" and objections having been filed engages the requirement of adjudication and a speaking order to justify the demand and to preserve the statutory right of appeal. The deeming provision in subsection (5) does not operate to extinguish the taxpayer's right to challenge the demand where payment is under protest or objections are pending; the proper officer must pass a reasoned order addressing the objections and reflecting compliance with principles of natural justice so as to enable exercise of appeal remedies.

Conclusion: Order in Form GST MOV-09 dated 06.05.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Proper Officer to decide afresh after considering the reply/objections filed by the taxpayer and after giving an opportunity of hearing; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory interest on the refunded amount for the period of delay in payment of excess tax recovered.

Analysis: The reassessment order reduced the tax liability, and the excess amount was ultimately refunded only after the writ petition had been filed. The Court held that the authorities ought to have processed the refund promptly after receipt of the petitioner's representations, and that the refund having been made belatedly, the statutory consequence under Section 39(5) of the Chhattisgarh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was attracted. Interest was therefore payable on the refunded sum for the period during which the amount remained unpaid beyond the permissible time.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to interest at 0.5% per month on Rs. 60,62,081/- from 20.03.2025 till 31.10.2025.

Final Conclusion: Relief was confined to payment of statutory interest on the delayed refund, and the petition stood disposed of with a direction to release the interest within the stipulated period.

Ratio Decidendi: Where excess tax is refunded belatedly, statutory interest becomes payable for the period of delay under the governing refund provision.

Issues: Whether the imported individual products proposed to be used in manufacturing electric vehicles were covered by the concessional rate under Entry 318 of Notification No. 45/2025-Cus. dated 24.10.2025.

Analysis: The notification applied only where electrically operated vehicles were imported in an incomplete or unfinished form as a knocked down kit containing the necessary components, parts or sub-assemblies for assembling a complete vehicle. The concessional rate depended on the goods, as presented at import, answering the description of a kit classifiable under heading 8703 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The imported goods were described as standalone, unconnected and separately imported products, received at different points in time and in mismatched quantities. They were not presented as a complete or substantially complete kit and did not, at the time of import, possess the essential character of a complete vehicle.

Conclusion: The conditions of Entry 318 were not satisfied and the imported goods were not eligible for the concessional notification benefit.