Issues: (i) Whether the Miscellaneous Application filed by the Revenue was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the Tribunal could recall/rectify its earlier order and restore the entire matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication instead of limited remand.

Issue (i): Maintainability of the Miscellaneous Application filed by the Revenue on limitation grounds.

Analysis: The Tribunal's earlier order dated 25.05.2023 was received by the Revenue's office on 21.08.2023 as certified in the application. Calculation of the statutory limitation period from that date showed the Miscellaneous Application filed on 13.02.2024 fell within the prescribed time limit ending 29.02.2024.

Conclusion: The Miscellaneous Application is maintainable and the preliminary objection on limitation is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Scope of the Tribunal's power to recall or rectify its order and remit the entire matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The Tribunal's power in a Miscellaneous Application is confined to rectification of mistakes apparent on the record. A prayer seeking complete recall and substantive rehearing of merits would amount to review of the Tribunal's concluded findings, requiring re-appreciation of facts and alteration of reasons, which exceeds the statutory scope of rectification. The appropriate remedy for re-adjudication of merits is not by way of rectification under the Miscellaneous Application forum.

Conclusion: The request to recall the order and restore the matter for de novo adjudication is beyond the scope of rectification and is rejected; the Miscellaneous Application is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's Miscellaneous Application - the application was held maintainable on limitation grounds but was refused on merits because rectification cannot be used to effectuate a substantive review or to restore the entire matter for de novo adjudication; the remand directions in the earlier order stand.

Ratio Decidendi: A Miscellaneous Application may be used only to rectify mistakes apparent on the record and cannot be employed to review or re-open concluded merits-based findings or to restore a matter for de novo adjudication.

Issues: Whether the Circular dated 3 December 2018 issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, which canalizes e-auctions of unclaimed/uncleared imported goods through a single agency (MSTC) for a limited period, is ultra vires the powers of the Board under Section 143-AA of the Customs Act, 1962 and/or violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The Circular is an executive administrative measure addressing disposal of unclaimed/uncleared cargo and was issued under the power to prescribe separate procedures for categories of goods or persons in Section 143-AA of the Customs Act, 1962. Judicial scrutiny of economic or fiscal policy measures is limited to legality, arbitrariness, procedural fairness and compliance with constitutional limits; courts exercise restraint and do not substitute policy judgment. Reasonable classification and an intelligible differentia connecting the classification to the objective are constitutionally permissible. Administrative circulars need not contain detailed reasons; where challenged the issuing authority may place reasons on record (e.g., in counter-affidavit) and courts may examine whether those reasons demonstrate absence of arbitrariness. The impugned Circular aims at expeditious, transparent disposal of cargo through a centralized e-auction portal run by a PSU with demonstrated capacity, for a limited period (one year after unloading), and contains safeguards such as segregation of disputed consignments and preservation of prior disposal procedure for goods remaining unsold after one year. The measure engages Article 19(1)(g) but is subject to reasonable restriction under Article 19(2); the limited temporal scope and stated public interest objectives constitute a rational nexus to the aim of expeditious clearance and revenue protection. Reliance on earlier task force reports, operational limitations of field formations, and the PSU's auction infrastructure were adequate factual bases for the policy choice; no misuse of the statutory power is established.

Conclusion: The Circular dated 3 December 2018 is within the scope of Section 143-AA of the Customs Act, 1962, does not offend Article 14, and constitutes a reasonable restriction on the freedom under Article 19(1)(g); consequently the challenge to the Circular fails and the impugned judgment dismissing the writ petition is upheld.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where the income addition is determined on the basis of estimation of gross profit under Section 145(3) and the accounts are not maintained.

Analysis: Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for penalty for under-reporting and misreporting of income, with sub-section (6) excluding from "under-reported income" amounts determined on the basis of an estimate in specified circumstances. The assessment in the present case is based on estimation of gross profit at 10% after finding that books of account were not maintained. Tribunal precedents applied the exclusion in sub-section (6) to hold that an addition made purely on estimation does not furnish the foundation for penalty under Section 270A. The authorities relied upon show that where the addition arises from estimation and not from established concealment or misreporting, penalty under Section 270A is not leviable.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained where the impugned income addition is determined on the basis of estimation of gross profit under Section 145(3) and the under-reported income is therefore excluded under Section 270A(6). The penalty imposed is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 10,98,896/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 arising from difference between stamp duty valuation and purchase consideration is sustainable; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer/DRP was required to refer the valuation to the Departmental Valuation Officer under section 50C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and whether the matter should be remanded for such reference.

Issue (i): Whether the addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is warranted on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The provision of section 56(2)(vii)(b) treats the difference between stamp duty valuation and actual consideration as taxable unless specific exceptions apply. The Court examined the statutory scope of section 56(2)(vii)(b) and noted that purchase from a reputed or listed seller does not fall within the exceptions that negate the statutory operation of the provision.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 10,98,896/- under section 56(2)(vii)(b) is upheld and the assessee's challenge to delete the addition is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Whether the AO/DRP should have referred the valuation to the Departmental Valuation Officer under section 50C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and whether the matter should be remanded for such reference.

Analysis: The assessee had expressly requested in objections filed under section 144C(2) that valuation be referred to the DVO; the Court considered statutory procedure under section 50C(2) together with the requirement under sub-clause (b) of section 144C(2) that objections be filed to both the DRP and the AO. The Court concluded that the request made to the DRP could not be divorced from AO proceedings and that substantial justice required proper determination of fair market value by reference to the DVO where disputed. The Court therefore found it appropriate to set aside the issue to the AO with a direction to refer the matter to the DVO and decide afresh after affording opportunity to the assessee; the AO was permitted to follow DRP procedure again if necessary.

Conclusion: The ground claiming failure to refer valuation to the DVO under section 50C(2) is allowed and the matter is set aside to the Assessing Officer with direction to make reference to the DVO and decide the issue afresh.

Final Conclusion: One substantive challenge to the addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) is dismissed while the procedural claim for reference to the DVO under section 50C(2) is allowed by remand; overall the appeal is partly allowed and the valuation issue is to be reexamined by the AO following the directed reference to the DVO.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee disputes stamp duty value and has sought reference to the Valuation Officer in objections filed under section 144C(2), the Assessing Officer must consider and, where appropriate, make a reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer under section 50C(2) to determine fair market value before finalizing additions under section 56(2)(vii)(b).

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of duty based on undervaluation could be sustained on the footing that the appellant and the buyers were related persons or inter-connected undertakings so as to exclude transaction value and attract Rules 9 and 10 of the Central Excise (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000; (ii) whether the goods manufactured by the appellant were correctly classifiable under Chapter heading 8471 or under Chapter heading 90318220 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985; (iii) whether the alleged short payment for March 2017 was established; and (iv) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of duty based on undervaluation could be sustained on the footing that the appellant and the buyers were related persons or inter-connected undertakings so as to exclude transaction value and attract Rules 9 and 10 of the Central Excise (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.

Analysis: The finding of related person status was not supported by a proper legal foundation. The appellant was a proprietary concern, while the buyers were a partnership firm and a body corporate, and the material did not establish the kind of mutuality of interest or flow back of additional consideration necessary to reject the declared transaction value. The buyers further showed that the goods were not merely resold as such, but were combined with other materials and services such as installation, integration, testing, commissioning, warranty support, and after-sales service, making the resale price non-comparable with the appellant's sale price. The profit figures also did not support the allegation of suppression through related-party pricing.

Conclusion: The undervaluation demand based on related-person treatment and application of Rules 9 and 10 was not sustainable and is answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the goods manufactured by the appellant were correctly classifiable under Chapter heading 8471 or under Chapter heading 90318220 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: The products were found to function as microprocessor-based data processing systems rather than mere testing or measuring equipment. Their features, including data acquisition, processing, display, and output through connected devices, satisfied the conditions associated with automatic data processing units. The Tribunal also followed the earlier classification approach applied to comparable microprocessor-based systems.

Conclusion: The goods were classifiable under Chapter heading 8471 and the contrary reclassification was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged short payment for March 2017 was established.

Analysis: The reconciliation of the March 2017 ER-1 return with the invoices showed that the value attributed to March included an invoice already subjected to duty in February 2017. On that basis, the differential demand for March 2017 did not survive.

Conclusion: The alleged short payment for March 2017 was not proved and the finding was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Analysis: The record showed repeated audits, prior departmental scrutiny, and recorded statements over several years, demonstrating that the relevant transactions were within the knowledge of the department. In the absence of suppression of facts or comparable culpable conduct, the extended limitation period could not be applied.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unjustified and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand, reclassification, and penalty could not be sustained on the facts and law applied to the record, and the assessee obtained complete relief.

Ratio Decidendi: For rejecting transaction value under the related-person/ inter-connected undertaking framework, the revenue must establish legally relevant relationship and mutuality of interest or flow back of consideration; where the product functions as an automatic data processing unit, classification must follow its essential data-processing character; and extended limitation cannot rest on a case where the department already had material knowledge of the facts.

Issues: Whether the re-blocking of the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger on 30.05.2025 was liable to be quashed on the ground that it remained blocked beyond the permissible period under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and was void for want of jurisdiction or statutory violation.

Analysis: The respondents produced an order-in-original dated 01.05.2025 arising from proceedings under Section 74 of the Telangana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in which tax, interest, fee and penalties aggregating Rs. 4,95,64,354/- were imposed and, following that order, the Electronic Credit Ledger was re-blocked on 30.05.2025. The period of one year specified by Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 had not expired since the date of the re-blocking. The writ petition filed in July, 2025 did not disclose these material facts, including initiation of proceedings under Section 74 of the TGST Act, which were germane to the challenge to the blocking. In the context of a writ petition, material facts relevant to the cause of action must be disclosed. Given the ongoing statutory proceeding and the unexpired one-year period under Rule 86A, there was no ground to interfere with the administrative action of blocking the Electronic Credit Ledger.

Conclusion: The challenge to the re-blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger is rejected; the writ petition is dismissed and the respondents' action in re-blocking the Electronic Credit Ledger on 30.05.2025 is upheld (in favour of Revenue).

Issues: Whether bhandara expenses of Rs. 7,47,203 constituted application of income for charitable purposes (relief of the poor) within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee is a trust registered under Section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The amounts in dispute represent distribution of food (bhandara). Distribution of food to the needy falls within the scope of "relief of the poor" which is a recognised charitable purpose under Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The lower authorities treated the bhandara as religious/cultural gatherings and not within the trust objects because the activity was not expressly detailed in the trust deed; however, the fact that food was distributed to the needy is not disputed. The activity of targeted relief by distribution of food is functionally within charitable relief even if conducted in the course of religious gatherings, and absence of express wording in the trust deed does not preclude treating such distributions as application of income for charitable purposes where the activity is shown to benefit the needy.

Conclusion: The bhandara expenses of Rs. 7,47,203 are to be treated as application of income for charitable purposes (relief of the poor) under Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the assessee's grounds on this issue are allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Distribution of food to the needy constitutes "relief of the poor" and therefore qualifies as application of income for charitable purposes under Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, even if the activity occurs in a religious or cultural setting and is not explicitly itemized in the trust deed.

Issues: Whether the disallowance under section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of salary paid to directors (alleged cash payments in excess of Rs.20,000) was correctly confirmed by the authorities.

Analysis: The issue concerns whether cash salary payments to the directors exceeded the statutory single-day limit under section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The books and ledger entries show monthly salary liabilities with cash components of Rs.20,000 each month to the directors and the balance paid by cheque, with no cash payment exceeding Rs.20,000 on any single day. The assessment was reopened under provisions relating to section 147/148 after issuance of notices under section 148A, but the substantive adjudication on disallowance turns on the applicability of the single-day cash payment restriction under section 40A(3).

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The disallowance under section 40A(3) amounting to Rs.4,80,000 is deleted and the assesee's ground challenging the disallowance is allowed.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in refusing to direct the Resolution Professional to produce the full valuation reports and minutes of the monitoring committee to a dissenting financial creditor seeking to challenge the post-approval distribution under an approved resolution plan.

Analysis: Regulation 35, as it existed at the relevant time, provided for disclosure of fair value and liquidation value in summary form to members of the Committee of Creditors on receiving confidentiality undertakings, and did not mandate sharing of full valuation reports. The Resolution Professional supplied the liquidation value in summary form and acted within the regulatory framework; the applicant had not previously contested the liquidation value during the CIRP and did not demonstrate unfairness or denial of natural justice that would warrant overriding the regulatory confidentiality regime. The challenge to the distribution amount remains a separate pending proceeding before the Adjudicating Authority.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority's refusal to direct production of the full valuation reports and minutes is upheld; the application seeking production of full valuation reports is dismissed.

Issues: Whether Company Application seeking transfer of winding-up proceedings to the National Company Law Tribunal under Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 should be allowed.

Analysis: The statutory framework gives primacy to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 as a later special enactment for time bound corporate insolvency resolution (Section 238, IBC). The settled test for refusing transfer under Section 434(1)(c) is whether the winding up has reached an irreversible stage of "corporate death" making revival impossible; mere appointment of receivers or sale of some assets by secured creditors does not, by itself, constitute such an irreversible stage. The material showed that some assets were in possession of DRT receivers or secured creditors and that limited sales had occurred, while the Official Liquidator retained possession of other assets and substantial funds and the claims verification process remained ongoing. The objections based on potential prejudice to workmen arising from prioritisation under the IBC engage legislative policy (waterfall) and do not, by themselves, justify refusal of transfer. The determinative question of whether revival is possible falls within the exclusive remit of the NCLT under the IBC framework.

Conclusion: Company Application allowed; transfer to the NCLT to enable initiation of corporate insolvency resolution in terms of Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. The Applicant to file application in the NCLT within seven days; workmen permitted to file claims before the NCLT; actions by secured creditors and prior orders preserved for appropriate application to the NCLT.

Issues: Whether appellant is entitled to avail Cenvat credit on input service invoices which did not mention the service provider's service tax registration number at the time of issuance, when the registration numbers were subsequently produced and there is no dispute on receipt and use of the input services.

Analysis: The issue arises under Rule 2(l) and Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and Sections 72A, 73(1) and 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 as invoked in the adjudication. The dispute is limited to procedural non-compliance (non-mentioning of service tax registration number on invoices) while the service usage for providing taxable output service and payment of service tax on such input services are not disputed. Prior decisions of the Tribunal (including A.P. Fashion Pvt. Ltd. and Kemwell Biopharma Pvt. Ltd.) are treated as precedent for the proposition that omission of registration number on invoices is a procedural irregularity and does not defeat the substantive entitlement to Cenvat credit where registration details are available and the input services are received and used for taxable output service. The adjudicating authority's denial of credit based solely on omission of registration numbers in invoices is therefore examined in light of the admitted receipt and utilisation of input services and production of registration numbers to the department.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to avail and retain the Cenvat credit in respect of the input service invoices in question; the impugned order denying credit on the sole ground of non-mentioning of service provider registration numbers is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act could be imposed where the assessee deposited the allegedly inadmissible CENVAT credit along with interest prior to issuance of the show cause notice and whether issuance of the SCN invoking extended limitation was sustainable in law in view of Section 11A(2) of the Act.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the facts established a bona fide case and the legal effect of payment of duty and interest prior to issuance of SCN under Section 11A(2) of the Act. The material shows that upon detection of alleged irregular CENVAT credit, the assessee paid the entire disputed amount with interest before any SCN was issued. The Tribunal considered the statutory protection afforded by Section 11A(2) where duty and interest are paid prior to issuance of notice and surveyed the effect of that provision on proceedings for demand and penalty. The Tribunal also assessed the consequence of invoking extended period of limitation where the statutory bar in Section 11A(2) applies.

Conclusion: The SCN invoking the extended period was not sustainable because the assessee had paid the disputed duty along with interest prior to issuance of the SCN, thereby attracting the protection of Section 11A(2) of the Act; accordingly, imposition of penalty under Section 11AC was rightly dropped and the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is empowered to entertain and decide an application raising a claim of exemption which was not made in the original return of income due to an error by the assessee.

Analysis: The issue is examined on the basis of the scope and purpose of Section 264, earlier decisions of the High Court establishing that revisional powers are wide and meant to prevent miscarriage of justice, and the applicability (or inapplicability) of precedents which declined relief where a claim was sought by correspondence without revision of the return. The analysis considers authorities holding that Section 264 empowers the revisional authority to correct errors committed by subordinate authorities and to grant relief where an assessee, by mistake, failed to make a legitimate claim in the return. The analysis distinguishes decisions where the claim was sought by post-return correspondence without filing a revised return and concludes those decisions do not restrict the revisional power under Section 264 to address mistakes made by the assessee in the return.

Conclusion: Issue (i): The Commissioner is empowered under Section 264 to consider and decide a revision application that seeks relief for a claim not made in the original return due to an assessee's mistake; the impugned order rejecting such an application solely because the claim was not made in the original return is set aside and the matter is remanded for de novo consideration with opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 confers wide revisional jurisdiction enabling the Commissioner to correct errors and grant relief even where the assessee failed to make a claim in the original return, subject to de novo consideration and observance of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the declared FOB value of the exported goods could be rejected and re-determined under the export valuation rules on the basis of a market survey and notional profit margin, and whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The valuation of export goods must begin with the declared transaction value under section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007. If the Revenue seeks to discard that value, it must do so on the basis of a lawful sequential application of the valuation rules and by producing cogent evidence that the declared price is unacceptable. The record did not show any reliable investigation or contemporaneous comparable export evidence discrediting the declared value. The Department's reliance on a retail market survey was found to be an improper comparison because the survey did not compare like goods on a like-for-like export basis. The adjudicating authority also travelled beyond the statutory scheme by re-determining unit value and adding a notional profit margin, for which no authority existed under the Customs Act, 1962 or the 2007 Rules. The contemporaneous export data produced by the exporter supported the declared value, and no misdeclaration or legal prohibition was established.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declared export value was unsustainable, and the consequential confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could not be upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Declared export value cannot be rejected unless the Revenue discharges its burden by cogent evidence and applies the export valuation rules sequentially; a market survey or notional enhancement without statutory basis is insufficient to displace the transaction value.

Issues: (i) Whether forfeited security deposit (SD) and earnest money deposit (EMD) amounts on breach of contract are taxable as consideration for declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether tender/empanelment fee and supply of tender documents collected from bidders constitute consideration for a taxable service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked against the appellant for the demands in issue.

Issue (i): Whether forfeited SD/EMD amounts are taxable as consideration for declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether forfeited amounts involve a quid pro quo or any activity in return that would qualify them as consideration for a service as defined in Section 65B(44). Reliance was placed on consistent tribunal decisions and departmental circulars treating liquidated damages/forfeited deposits as non-taxable. The authority below had upheld demand under Section 66E(e) but subsequent decisions and circulars were considered to establish that forfeited SD/EMD are not consideration for a service.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee. The demand of service tax on forfeited SD/EMD is set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether tender/empanelment fee for providing tender documents to bidders amounts to consideration for a taxable service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The Tribunal analysed whether the fee involved a contractual arrangement and a quid pro quo constituting a service under Section 65B(44). It noted that a tender is an invitation and that providing tender documents is akin to sale of documents rather than rendering a service. The Department failed to demonstrate any contractual nexus or activity in return amounting to a declared service; departmental circulars concerning government/local authority charges were also considered.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee. The demand of service tax on tender/empanelment fee is set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation was rightly invoked by the Department for the assessed demands.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled legal test that extended limitation requires proof of positive, conscious, and deliberate suppression or intent to evade tax. Finding no evidence of mala fide suppression or deliberate evasion and noting bona fide belief of no liability and that one issue was already settled in favour of assessee, the Tribunal held that the conditions for invoking extended limitation were not satisfied.

Conclusion: In favour of the Assessee. The invocation of extended period is held to be improper and the demands for the extended period are barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming service tax demand is set aside in entirety and the appeal is allowed; the demands confirmed below are annulled and are not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts forfeited as security deposit or earnest money and fees charged merely for providing tender documents do not constitute consideration (quid pro quo) for a taxable service under Section 65B(44) and Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; extended limitation can be invoked only upon proof of positive, deliberate suppression or intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether an appellate authority may confirm a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice to show cause without affording the affected party an opportunity to meet those new grounds.

Issue (i): Whether an appellate authority may confirm a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice to show cause without affording the affected party an opportunity to meet those new grounds.

Analysis: The proceedings originated from a notice to show cause alleging excess availment of input tax credit because the supplier had not filed specified monthly returns. During adjudication and appeal the supplier filed the outstanding returns. Statutory provisions recognise limitations on adjudication to the grounds set out in the notice and require procedural fairness; Section 75(4) and the second proviso to Section 107(11) embody these constraints. Where an appellate authority proposes to decide on a ground extraneous to the notice to show cause, procedural fairness requires that the affected party be given notice of and an opportunity to rebut such ground before a demand is confirmed. The appellate authority in the present matter confirmed the demand on new grounds that were not the subject of the original notice and did not afford an opportunity to the affected party to meet those grounds.

Conclusion: The appellate authority acted improperly in confirming the demand on grounds not contained in the notice to show cause without affording an opportunity to rebut those grounds; the appellate order is set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh decision after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing on all points the appellate authority proposes to rely upon.

Final Conclusion: The order under challenge is set aside and the matter is remitted to the appellate authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording the petitioner a chance to file submissions and to reply to any queries or new grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicating or appellate authority may not sustain or confirm a demand on grounds extraneous to the notice to show cause without first informing the affected party of those grounds and affording an opportunity to be heard; where new grounds are relied upon, the matter must be remitted for fresh decision after allowing the party to meet those grounds.

Issues: Whether the order dated 18.12.2024 passed under Section 74 of the Act of 2017 can be sustained when the assessee was not provided copies of seized documents and the seized CPU and was thus deprived of a meaningful opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the adjudication complied with principles of natural justice by affording the assessee access to seized records and a meaningful personal hearing before confirming demand under Section 74. The factual matrix shows seizure of documents and the CPU, repeated requests by the assessee for copies and return of the CPU, and that those materials were not returned prior to conclusion of the adjudication. The respondents' affidavit and annexed correspondence indicate instructions for the assessee to approach the proper officer to obtain seized material, and the respondents contend opportunities were afforded; however, the record establishes that the seized items were not actually made available to the assessee for effective participation in the proceedings. The Court considered the effect of proceeding to confirm demand without allowing the assessee to inspect or use the seized records, and whether such procedure precluded a fair opportunity to frame defence and to prefer an effective appeal.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 18.12.2024 is set aside for lack of a meaningful opportunity of hearing owing to non-provision of seized documents and the CPU. The impugned order shall be treated as an additional show cause notice and the assessee shall be permitted to obtain the seized documents and CPU and file a consolidated reply within two weeks of receipt; the proper officer shall furnish the seized material on application and afford an opportunity of hearing before concluding proceedings. All points on merits are left open to the adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the period during which an application for rectification under Section 161 of the UPGST Act, 2017 remained pending is to be excluded for computing limitation for filing an appeal by applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (ii) Whether appeals rejected by the appellate authority as barred by limitation and delay are maintainable where the petitioner had pursued remedies (including a writ dismissed as withdrawn with liberty) bona fide and made requisite pre-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether pendency of a rectification application under Section 161 suspends or excludes the running of limitation for filing an appeal by operation of Section 14 Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Where an application for rectification under Section 161 is filed within the prescribed time, the running of limitation for filing an appeal is held to be in abeyance from the date of filing of that application until its decision. The underlying principle of Section 14 applies where the rectification application is filed bona fide and within time; the only exception is where the rectification application itself is time-barred. The Division Bench precedent establishes that the period while the rectification application remained pending must be excluded from the limitation for filing an appeal.

Conclusion: The period during which a timely rectification application under Section 161 remained pending is excluded for computing limitation for filing an appeal; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether appeals dismissed or rejected as barred by limitation should be held maintainable where the petitioner had pursued alternate remedies bona fide (including withdrawal of a writ with liberty to file appeal) and had made the prescribed pre-deposit.

Analysis: Where a petitioner has pursued remedies bona fide before a forum and has acted within available avenues (including filing a writ that is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty and subsequently preferring an appeal), the period spent pursuing those remedies is to be excluded in computing limitation. Deposit of the prescribed percentage as interim measure removes an impediment to adjudication on merits. In such circumstances the appellate authority must treat the appeal as maintainable and decide it on merits rather than refuse admission solely on limitation grounds.

Conclusion: The appeals were maintainable and the impugned orders rejecting the appeals as barred by limitation are set aside; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders rejecting the appeals as barred by limitation are set aside and the appellate authority is directed to proceed to decide the appeals on merits within two months while treating them as maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a rectification application under Section 161 is filed within time and pursued bona fide, the period of its pendency is excluded from limitation for filing an appeal under the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and an appellate authority must treat subsequent appeals as maintainable if the exclusion brings the appeal within time and pre-deposit requirements are met.

Issues: Whether the Special Leave Petitions should be disposed of by permitting the petitioner(s) to file applications before the High Court to place on record a subsequent clarification and for the High Court to consider such applications on merits.

Analysis: The petitions were disposed by granting permission to the petitioner(s) to place the latest clarification (effective from 01.04.2021) before the High Court by filing an appropriate application in the disposed matters; such applications are to be considered on merits after giving an opportunity of hearing to both sides. The order preserves the right of aggrieved parties to approach this Court against the impugned or subsequent orders and disposes of all pending applications, including those seeking condonation of delay.

Conclusion: Petitioners are permitted to file applications before the High Court to bring the specified clarification to its notice; the High Court shall consider such applications on merits after hearing both sides. All pending applications are disposed of.

Outcome: Delay in refiling was condoned, but the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition was dismissed and the special leave petition was dismissed.