Issues: Whether the Competent Authority lawfully rejected the petitioner's application under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite a binding judgment of the High Court holding that the petitioner's domain name registration charges were not taxable, and whether the impugned order and consequential certificate should be quashed with a direction to issue a nil rate certificate.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order dated 06.03.2025 and the consequential certificate dated 21.08.2025 in light of the earlier judgment of this Court dated 11.12.2023 which had held that the domain name registration charges constituted the right to use services and were not taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The Court found that the Competent Authority's sole stated reason for rejection-that the Department proposed to file a Special Leave Petition-did not constitute a legally sustainable reason. The Court reiterated the statutory obligation of the authority deciding applications under Section 197 to determine applications in accordance with the Act and applicable treaties, and that revenue targets or speculative departmental actions do not justify disregarding binding judicial decisions. The Court also considered procedural safeguards for future applications, including provision for issuing notice and recording a finding if a permanent establishment in India is alleged.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 06.03.2025 and consequential certificate dated 21.08.2025 are quashed and set aside; the Competent Authority is directed to issue a certificate at nil rate within fifteen days and to issue nil-rate certificates for subsequent years on application within 30 days, subject to the authority recording a reasoned finding (after notice) if it concludes the petitioner has a permanent establishment in India. The relief is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the assessee's income was disclosed during reassessment and appellate proceedings, and the addition arose from a difference of opinion on the manner of taxation under the India-Germany DTAA.

Analysis: The assessee had filed its original return on the basis of its understanding of section 115A(5) and the Tribunal had already accepted that no obligation to file the return under section 139(1) arose on those facts. The income later brought to tax was either disclosed in response to reassessment notice or voluntarily offered during appellate proceedings. The quantum dispute turned on the proper characterization and rate of taxability of interest, commitment fees, and fees for technical services under the treaty, and not on any finding that the particulars furnished in the return were false or erroneous. Mere rejection of a legal claim, without proof of inaccurate particulars or concealment, does not attract penalty under section 271(1)(c).

Conclusion: Penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not leviable, and the deletion of penalty was /maintained in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars cannot be sustained when the addition results from a bona fide legal dispute on taxability and the income has been disclosed without any finding of false or erroneous particulars.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal against the customs duty demand was correctly filed before the Commissioner (Appeals), Customs. (ii) Whether the demand of customs duty on the ground of non-fulfilment of NFE norms could be sustained when the NFE issue had already been adjudicated by the Development Commissioner and the penalty had been paid.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal against the customs duty demand was correctly filed before the Commissioner (Appeals), Customs.

Analysis: The duty demand was one of customs duty and the accompanying penalty arose in that context. The appellate forum could not be rejected on the ground that the matter belonged before the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise. The dismissal of the appeal on that jurisdictional ground was therefore erroneous.

Conclusion: The appeal was rightly maintainable before the Commissioner (Appeals), Customs, and the dismissal on that ground was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand of customs duty on the ground of non-fulfilment of NFE norms could be sustained when the NFE issue had already been adjudicated by the Development Commissioner and the penalty had been paid.

Analysis: The NFE default had already been dealt with by the Development Commissioner, who imposed a penalty that was subsequently paid. The Letter of Permission was thereafter renewed from time to time. In these circumstances, the Revenue had no basis to reopen the same NFE issue and sustain a customs duty demand on that footing.

Conclusion: The demand based on alleged non-fulfilment of NFE norms could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the substantive NFE issue has already been adjudicated by the competent authority and the prescribed penalty has been paid, a parallel customs demand on the same default cannot be sustained, and dismissal of the appeal on an incorrect appellate forum ground is impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether short-paid duty arising on finalization of provisional assessment could be adjusted against excess duty already paid; (ii) whether the matter required remand for fresh computation of the short-paid duty amount.

Issue (i): Whether short-paid duty arising on finalization of provisional assessment could be adjusted against excess duty already paid.

Analysis: The assessments were provisional and were finalized after the disputed period. The Court found no statutory prohibition against adjusting excess duty paid in some clearances against short-paid duty in others, particularly when the adjustment was made immediately after finalization. The Court also noted that the Tribunal had previously accepted the same principle in similar factual settings.

Conclusion: Yes. The short-paid duty could be adjusted against the excess duty paid, and the contrary finding was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the matter required remand for fresh computation of the short-paid duty amount.

Analysis: A worksheet placing a different computation of the short-paid duty was produced for the first time at the hearing. The Court held that the correctness of the arithmetical computation had not been examined by the original authority and needed reconsideration at that stage.

Conclusion: Yes. The matter was remanded to the original authority for fresh determination of the correct duty amount after due consideration of the computation.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the legal entitlement to set off excess duty against short-paid duty, but the quantum of short-paid duty was sent back for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In provisional assessment cases, where excess duty and short-paid duty arise from the same finalized assessment period, adjustment of one against the other is permissible absent any express statutory bar, and a remand may be ordered for recalculation of the correct duty quantum.

Issues: (i) Whether, in proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the High Court could declare prior arbitral proceedings as a nullity on the ground that they were conducted during a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether transactions undertaken pursuant to the arbitral orders during the relevant period should be protected.

Issue (i): Whether, in proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the High Court could declare prior arbitral proceedings as a nullity on the ground that they were conducted during a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 15(2) contemplates only substitution of the arbitrator according to the rules applicable to the original appointment. Section 15(3) and Section 15(4) preserve the continuity of the arbitration and protect prior hearings and orders, unless the parties agree otherwise. The Court held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(2), could not travel beyond the limited statutory remit and could not set aside or nullify arbitral orders which the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not permit to be challenged in that manner. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code and the course prescribed by statute cannot be displaced by an alternate procedure.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked jurisdiction to declare the proceedings held between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 a nullity, and that part of the impugned order was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether transactions undertaken pursuant to the arbitral orders during the relevant period should be protected.

Analysis: The Court took note of the long lapse of time and the creation of third-party rights, including home buyers' interests, and exercised its constitutional power to avoid undoing completed commercial arrangements that had proceeded on the strength of the arbitral orders.

Conclusion: The transactions entered into pursuant to the arbitral orders were declared legally valid.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by removing the declaration of nullity, while preserving the transactions carried out in the interregnum and substituting the arbitrator for continuation of the arbitration from the existing stage.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings for substitution of an arbitrator, the court must confine itself to the limited power of appointing a substitute under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and cannot nullify prior arbitral proceedings or orders, which remain protected by the statutory scheme of continuity.

Issues: Whether the Competent Authority under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified in refusing to grant a certificate at nil rate despite a prior decision of the High Court in favour of the petitioner, and whether the impugned order and consequent certificate issued @15% should be set aside and a nil-rate certificate directed to be issued.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order dated 19.08.2025 and found that the Competent Authority did not dispute the nature of the transaction nor record any finding on its taxability vis-a -vis the petitioner's Associate Enterprise. The Competent Authority rejected the petitioner's application primarily on the ground that the Department had decided to file an SLP against an earlier High Court order that had granted a nil-rate certificate; no SLP had in fact been filed and no new facts or distinguishing particulars for the relevant assessment period were shown. The Court analysed the purpose and timelines of Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, noting the statutory requirement for timely decision-making and the objective of avoiding undue blockage of an assessee's cash flow where treaty or statutory provisions justify nil or reduced withholding. The Court held that, in inter se disputes already adjudicated by the High Court, the Competent Authority must follow the settled position unless it can point to factual differences or new information affecting taxability; the principle that each assessment year is separate does not permit arbitrary refusal to follow a binding High Court decision. The Court also noted the procedural delay in deciding the petitioner's application (filed 12.03.2025 and required to be decided by 12.04.2025) and the practical prejudice caused by withholding at 15% for transactions since 01.04.2025.

Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the impugned order dated 19.08.2025 and the consequential certificate issued @15% are set aside and the Competent Authority is directed to issue a certificate at nil rate within 15 days from the date of this order.

Issues: Whether the Fe content of the exported iron ore fines for the shipping bill is below 58% for the purpose of export duty assessment, having regard to multiple laboratory test reports and re-tests.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted six laboratory analysis reports (load port, discharge port and CRCL reports) with varying Fe and moisture values. The adjudicating authority and the first appellate authority examined the factual matrix, including the grant of a second re test under Board's Circular No. 30/2017 Cus dated 18.07.2017, the CRCL Mumbai re test result showing Fe 55.6%, and the destination port and invoice basis reports. Both authorities recorded reasons for accepting the CRCL Mumbai re test and for finalizing the shipping bill on the basis that Fe content was below 58%, and the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with their factual findings and application of the circular's guiding principle that the competent authority may rely on either test while recording reasons.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the Fe content for the shipment is to be treated as below 58% for assessment purposes and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where multiple valid laboratory tests and re tests exist, the competent authority under Board's Circular No. 30/2017 Cus dated 18.07.2017 may rely on any one test result for finalization of the shipping bill provided reasons for that selection are recorded; such reasoned factual findings will not be interfered with in the absence of perversity.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the assessment order and rectification rejection order should be entertained when disputed questions of fact were involved and an appellate remedy was available; and whether liberty should be granted to pursue the appeal on deposit of part of the disputed tax.

Outcome: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and was disposed of by granting liberty to avail the appellate remedy subject to deposit of 25% of the disputed tax within the stipulated time.

Issues: (i) Whether the deed of guarantee dated 13.10.2015 contemplates invocation of the guarantee by the financial creditor before instituting any proceeding against the personal guarantor; (ii) If yes, whether the financial creditor invoked the personal guarantee before filing the Section 95(1) application.

Issue (i): Whether the deed of guarantee dated 13.10.2015 contemplates invocation of guarantee by the financial creditor before taking any proceeding against the personal guarantor.

Analysis: The guarantee deed contains express clauses (Clause 2, Clause 14 and Clause 32) that make guarantor liability contingent on demand by the Bank and prescribe the manner of making a demand. The Compromise and Settlement Agreement/MoU acknowledged the guarantees but did not expressly or by necessary implication alter the demand/invocation mechanism in the original deed. Clause 2.1 of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement acknowledges outstanding facilities and restates guarantor obligations but does not, on its terms, eliminate the requirement of invocation placed by the original guarantee deed. Clause 2.2 (suspension of existing events of default) preserves lenders' rights to invoke defaults in future, confirming that prior invocation requirements remain relevant.

Conclusion: The deed of guarantee contemplates invocation of the guarantee (issuance of demand) by the financial creditor before proceedings against the personal guarantor.

Issue (ii): If invocation is required, whether the financial creditor invoked the personal guarantee prior to filing the Section 95(1) application.

Analysis: The record shows issuance of a demand notice in Form B dated 27.02.2020, but no separate evidence of prior invocation of the guarantee as required by the deed of guarantee. The Tribunal's prior authority (State Bank of India v. Deepak Kumar Singhania) and Rule 3(1)(e) of the 2019 Rules were considered: a personal guarantor becomes a debtor for purposes of Section 95 only where guarantee has been invoked and remains unpaid. The Form-B requirement of dates when debt was due and default occurred presupposes default of the guarantor, which in turn arises only upon invocation consistent with the guarantee terms; Form-B cannot be treated as a substitute for invocation absent compliance with the deed.

Conclusion: The financial creditor did not invoke the personal guarantee prior to issuing the Form B demand and filing the Section 95(1) application; therefore invocation did not occur before filing.

Final Conclusion: Because the guarantee had to be invoked before initiating proceedings under Section 95 and the financial creditor did not invoke the guarantee prior to issuing the Form B demand and filing the Section 95 application, the admission order dated 03.05.2024 admitting the Section 95 application is unsustainable; the appeals are allowed. The decision does not preclude the financial creditor from taking such proceedings as may be permissible in law after valid invocation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a personal guarantor's liability under a deed is triggered by a demand/invocation, a financial creditor must invoke the guarantee in accordance with its terms before a default by the guarantor can be said to exist for purposes of initiating proceedings under Section 95; a notice under Rule 7(1)/Form B does not, without more, constitute invocation of the guarantee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Designated Authority was empowered to reject a VCES declaration outside the limited situations listed in Section 106(2) and whether the power to reject is confined to the Commissioner under Section 111; (ii) Whether the rejection of the VCES declaration was justified on the grounds that the declarant failed to pay not less than fifty percent of the declared tax dues by 31.12.2013 and that the declaration related to a subsequent period on the same issue for which an order of determination existed (second proviso to Section 106(1)).

Issue (i): Whether the Designated Authority had jurisdiction to reject a VCES declaration for non-compliance with mandatory scheme stipulations beyond the situations enumerated in Section 106(2), and whether rejection power is restricted to Commissioners under Section 111.

Analysis: Section 106(1) and Section 107 set out who may declare and the procedural requirements; Section 106(2) prescribes specific circumstances requiring rejection where certain inquiries or audits are pending. Nothing in the VCES expressly prohibits the Designated Authority from rejecting declarations that do not comply with other mandatory provisions of the scheme (for example, prescribed payment timelines). Statutory provisions dealing with consequences of false declarations (Section 111) and recovery (Section 110, Section 87 of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994) do not, by their existence, oust the Designated Authority's power to act when mandatory conditions of the scheme are violated. Authorities may exercise ancillary or inherent powers necessary to effectuate the scheme provided that principles of natural justice are observed.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the declaration was sustainable because the declarant failed to deposit at least fifty percent of declared tax dues by 31.12.2013 and because the declaration covered a subsequent period on the same issue as an earlier adjudication (second proviso to Section 106(1)).

Analysis: Section 107(3) mandates payment of not less than fifty percent of declared tax dues on or before 31.12.2013 and submission of proof thereof; Section 107(4) and its proviso allow staged payment and provide limited extension with interest for delayed payment of the balance. The statutory scheme evidences a strict, time-bound pre-deposit requirement as an essential condition for entitlement to scheme benefits. Circular clarification echoes that failure to pay 50% by 31.12.2013 renders a declarant ineligible. Separately, the second proviso to Section 106(1) bars declarations in respect of an issue for any subsequent period where a notice or order of determination on that issue has been issued earlier. The record shows the declarant paid only a portion after the deadline and that an earlier order addressed the same issue for an earlier period, bringing the subsequent-period bar into play. Precedents uphold strict adherence to Section 107(3) and the second proviso.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the Designated Authority's rejection of the VCES declaration because the declarant failed to comply with the mandatory pre-deposit requirement of Section 107(3) and the declaration was barred under the second proviso to Section 106(1); the appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative authorities under the VCES may reject declarations that do not strictly comply with mandatory, time-bound statutory conditions of the scheme (including the 50% pre-deposit under Section 107(3)), and declarations are barred for subsequent periods on the same issue where an earlier notice or order of determination exists under the second proviso to Section 106(1).

Issues: Whether freight realized from buyers at the consignment agent's depot was includible in the assessable value for excise duty where the goods were cleared on freight-to-pay basis through consignment agents.

Analysis: The dispute turned on valuation under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the relevant valuation rules governing sales through depots or consignment agents. The record showed that the freight was borne by the buyers and not by the manufacturer, and the same issue involving the very same assessee for earlier periods had already been decided in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal followed those earlier decisions and held that, on the facts presented, the freight element could not be added to the assessable value. It also applied the principle of judicial discipline and consistency, declining to take a different view in the absence of any stay or contrary higher-court ruling on the assessee's own cases.

Conclusion: The freight amount was not includible in the assessable value, and the demand, penalty, and consequential levy were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief as permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are cleared through consignment agents on freight-to-pay basis and the freight is not shown to have accrued to or benefitted the manufacturer, such freight is not includible in the assessable value for excise duty.

Issues: Whether the impugned order denying input tax credit was liable to be quashed for being a non-speaking order passed without considering the petitioner's reply, and whether the matter required remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The petitioner's reply to the show cause notice was on record, but the impugned order did not deal with the submissions raised therein and merely recorded a conclusion that the reply was not in order and the credit was not available under the Act. Such an order did not disclose reasons showing application of mind to the defence raised by the petitioner. The absence of consideration of the reply and the failure to pass a reasoned order amounted to a breach of natural justice and justified interference under writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh hearing and a reasoned order after considering all submissions of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded to the extent of getting the adverse order annulled and the dispute sent back for fresh decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: An order affecting civil or fiscal rights must show consideration of the reply and reasons reflecting application of mind; a non-speaking order passed without doing so is liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority lawfully imposed penalties under Sections 112(a), 112(b) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 on the Customs House Agent where the order in original allegedly reproduces the show cause notice, fails to record reasoned findings on the petitioner's explanations and lacks clear findings of knowledge and intention.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the adjudicating authority acted in accordance with the statutory scheme while imposing penalties under Sections 112(a), 112(b) and 114AA. The Court noted that these provisions require a clear finding as to the petitioner's knowledge and intention (mens rea) or active abetment before penalties can be imposed. The impugned order largely reproduces allegations from the show cause notice and records conclusions adverse to the petitioner without adequately addressing or rejecting the petitioner's explanations and documentary material. The Court observed that routine reproduction of the notice and unsupported recitals do not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned quasijudicial order, particularly where imposition of penalty is quasicriminal in character. The Court also considered relevant administrative guidance showing common CHA practices (payment of charges by CHA pending recovery from importer) and found that adverse inferences could not be drawn without specific reasoning. In view of the absence of express findings establishing knowledge or intent and lack of consideration of the petitioner's replies, the jurisdictional requirements for invoking Sections 112(a), 112(b) and 114AA were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The order imposing penalties under Sections 112(a), 112(b) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Issues: Legality of the conditions imposed for provisional release of seized imported goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, specifically (i) requirement of bond equal to value of goods, (ii) furnishing of bank guarantee equal to 50% of value, (iii) undertaking to cooperate in investigation and adjudication, and (iv) re-export under Customs supervision within stipulated time.

Analysis: The decision examines whether the conditions imposed were justified given the nature of goods (allegedly High Speed Diesel) and the available test reports; whether samples and tests were representative and determinative; and whether a uniform, non-discriminatory approach should be applied where an earlier provisional release order in materially similar circumstances imposed a lower bank guarantee (10%). Consideration is given to the importer's position that goods are to be re-exported and that analysis certificates from the foreign supplier exist, and to administrative practice and judicial authority favouring consistency of treatment. On balance, while provisional release subject to safeguards is permissible under Section 110A, imposing a higher bank guarantee (50%) in circumstances where an identical subject-matter provisional release by the same authority applied 10% would be inconsistent and discriminatory; other conditions (bond equal to value, undertaking to cooperate, supervised re-export within time) are appropriate safeguards.

Conclusion: The impugned provisional release order is modified: provisional release for re-export is allowed subject to (a) execution of bond equal to the value of the goods, (b) furnishing of bank guarantee equal to 10% of the value of the goods, (c) submission of an undertaking to cooperate in investigation and adjudication, and (d) re-export under Customs supervision within a stipulated time. The appeal is partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the imported ceramic resonator is classifiable under tariff item 85416000 as mounted piezo-electric crystals, and not under tariff item 8543, tariff item 8548, or as parts of a washing machine under tariff item 845090.

Analysis: The goods were found to be a PZT-based ceramic resonator fitted with electrodes and terminals, designed as a surface-mount electronic component for generating stable clock signals by piezoelectric resonance. On the statutory scheme, classification is governed by the terms of the headings, section notes, chapter notes, and the General Rules for Interpretation, with specific headings prevailing over residuary headings. Note 2(a) to Section XVI required classification in Chapter 85 because the goods answered the description of mounted piezo-electric crystals in heading 8541. The goods were not identifiable as a machine-specific part so as to fall under parts classification, and heading 8543 was inapplicable because the goods were already specifically covered elsewhere in Chapter 85. Heading 8548, being residuary, could not be invoked once a specific heading covered the goods.

Conclusion: The ceramic resonator was held classifiable under tariff item 85416000 as mounted piezo-electric crystals, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint filed by the Deputy Registrar of Companies was maintainable under Section 439(2) of the Companies Act, 2013; (ii) Whether the complaint was barred by limitation; (iii) Whether the alleged contraventions of Section 129 read with Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013 were prima facie made out; (iv) Whether prosecution of the director was sustainable in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint filed by the Deputy Registrar of Companies was maintainable under Section 439(2) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: Section 439(2) permits cognizance on a complaint by the Registrar, a shareholder or member, or a person authorised by the Central Government. The Court noted that the complaint was filed by a Deputy Registrar, and relied on the statutory definition of "Registrar" in Section 2(75), which includes a deputy registrar discharging functions under the Act.

Conclusion: The complaint was held to be maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The alleged non-disclosure related to the period from November 2016 to December 2016, while the complaint was filed in November 2019. The Court held that the alleged offences under Section 129 and Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013 were not hit by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly because the punishment structure and the nature of the allegations did not attract the bar urged by the petitioner.

Conclusion: The complaint was not barred by limitation.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged contraventions of Section 129 read with Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013 were prima facie made out.

Analysis: The Court found that the complaint was vague and did not contain specific allegations that the petitioner knowingly made any false statement or suppressed a material fact. The allegations were essentially of non-disclosure in the financial statements, which did not by itself establish the requisite element of deliberate falsity or mens rea for Section 448.

Conclusion: Prima facie, the allegations under Section 448 were not made out against the petitioner on the materials placed.

Issue (iv): Whether prosecution of the director was sustainable in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused.

Analysis: The Court held that the alleged offences arose out of the company's financial statements and were primarily attributable to the company. It applied the settled principle that vicarious criminal liability of directors can be fastened only where the statute so provides and where the principal offender, namely the company, is before the Court. Since the company was not made an accused, the complaint suffered from a fundamental defect of non-joinder.

Conclusion: The prosecution against the petitioner-director was unsustainable in the absence of the company as an accused.

Final Conclusion: The revisional court exercised inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding against the petitioner, holding that continuation of the case would amount to abuse of process and that the impugned proceedings could not be sustained against her alone.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions arising from corporate contraventions founded on the company's financial statements, directors cannot be fastened with criminal liability by way of vicarious liability unless the statute contemplates it and the company, as the principal offender, is before the Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of central excise duty on the allegation of clandestine manufacture and clearance of MS Ingots during the period 2009-10 to 2011-12 was sustainable in law and on facts; (ii) Whether the Department's appeal against dropping of the proposed CENVAT credit demand of Rs.1,40,10,321/- and consequential penalties was sustainable; (iii) Whether the penalties imposed on the assessee company under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and on the Managing Director and Manager under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of central excise duty on the allegation of clandestine manufacture and clearance of MS Ingots during the period 2009-10 to 2011-12 was sustainable in law and on facts

Analysis: Allegations of clandestine manufacture require a complete and unbroken chain of cogent, corroborative evidence, including proof of raw material procurement, actual manufacture, removal, transport, buyers, and flow of consideration. The demand here rested mainly on electronic printouts, private papers, statements, and electricity-based extrapolation. The electronic material was held inadmissible for want of compliance with Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the certificate contemplated under Section 36B(4). The private records were uncorroborated, the statements were weakened by retractions and cross-examination, and electricity consumption could not be the sole basis for quantification without independent support.

Conclusion: The duty demand on clandestine removal was not proved and was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeal against dropping of the proposed CENVAT credit demand of Rs.1,40,10,321/- and consequential penalties was sustainable

Analysis: The Department was required to establish that the inputs covered by the disputed invoices were not received and that the alleged invoice-based credit was fraudulent. The adjudicating authority found no reliable invoice-wise correlation, no credible proof of reverse cash flow, and no independent evidence disproving movement documents and statutory records. The Department's reliance on general probability and dealer statements did not displace the absence of foundational proof. A remand was also found unwarranted as it would merely fill gaps in the Department's case.

Conclusion: The dropping of the CENVAT credit demand and consequential penalties was upheld.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalties imposed on the assessee company under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and on the Managing Director and Manager under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 were sustainable

Analysis: Penalty under Section 11AC requires established elements of fraud, suppression, wilful misstatement, collusion, or intent to evade duty. Since the clandestine removal demand itself failed, the company penalty could not survive. Rule 26 penalty requires conscious knowledge and active involvement in dealing with goods liable to confiscation. In the absence of proved clandestine activity, reliable corroboration, or evidence of knowing participation by the individuals, the personal penalties could not stand.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 11AC and Rule 26 were unsustainable and were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside insofar as it confirmed duty, interest, and penalties on alleged clandestine removal, while the Department's challenge to the dropped CENVAT credit demand failed. The assessee's appeals succeeded and the Department's appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Clandestine removal and related penal liability cannot be sustained on uncertified electronic records, uncorroborated private documents, retracted statements, or speculative electricity-based extrapolation unless the Revenue proves the full evidentiary chain by admissible and independent material.

Issues: Whether the trial court was justified in permitting the complainant, who was also the investigating officer, to refer to the complaint contents and supporting papers while being examined as PW-1.

Analysis: The complainant, as investigating officer, was not entitled to rely on investigation papers as a substitute for his own evidence, but the complaint, after cognizance, could be looked into by him when examined as PW-1. The Court also noted that a witness cannot be expected to memorize factual particulars such as TIN numbers, and limited reference to the papers furnished to the accused was permissible for that purpose.

Conclusion: The trial magistrate correctly overruled the objection, and no interference was warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Authority's dismissal of the petitioner's appeal as barred by limitation can be faulted and whether the petitioner is entitled to condonation of delay; (ii) Whether an adjudication order uploaded only under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal amounts to effective service such that limitation begins to run.

Issue (i): Whether the Appellate Authority's order dismissing the appeal for delay should be set aside and the petitioner afforded an opportunity to seek condonation of delay.

Analysis: The Court examined the materials concerning the petitioner's lack of notice of the adjudication order, the petitioner's restoration of GST registration following court direction, and the fact that the grounds now urged before the High Court were not presented to the Appellate Authority earlier. The Court noted prevailing precedent of the Division Bench in M/s Ram Kumar Sinhal and related decisions concerning service by portal upload. Recognising that the Appellate Authority has not been given the opportunity to consider cogent reasons or supporting documents, the Court considered proportional relief to enable a fresh application for condonation to be placed before the Appellate Authority for adjudication in light of authoritative precedent.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted leave to file an application before the Appellate Authority within three weeks; if the Appellate Authority, applying the Division Bench precedent and subsequent decisions, is satisfied that cogent reasons exist to condone the delay or that the petitioner lacked knowledge of the order, it shall condone the delay and proceed to decide the appeal on merits. The Appellate Authority's order dated February 20, 2025 shall be of no effect and deemed set aside in such event.

Issue (ii): Whether uploading the adjudication order solely under the "additional notices and orders" tab on the GST portal constitutes effective service and starts limitation.

Analysis: The Court referred to the Division Bench decision in M/s Ram Kumar Sinhal and subsequent authorities addressing sufficiency of service by mere upload on the GST portal. The Court observed that the petitioner remained unaware of the adjudication order as it was uploaded under the specified tab, and emphasised that determination of whether such uploading amounted to valid service requires application of the cited precedent and factual assessment by the Appellate Authority, which has not yet been undertaken.

Conclusion: The question whether portal uploading under the "additional notices and orders" tab constitutes effective service is left for the Appellate Authority to decide in accordance with the Division Bench precedent; such determination may warrant condonation of delay if the petitioner lacked knowledge of the order.

Final Conclusion: The High Court did not decide the merits of the appeal but afforded the petitioner a further procedural opportunity to approach the Appellate Authority with full explanations and supporting documents; the Appellate Authority is directed to reconsider any application for condonation of delay in the light of controlling Division Bench precedent and, if satisfied, to hear the appeal on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a party demonstrates absence of knowledge of an adjudication order that was uploaded only in a non-prominent portal location, the competent authority must consider whether such uploading constituted effective service and whether limitation should be condoned in light of binding Division Bench precedent before dismissing an appeal as time-barred.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 33/1999-C.E. (and related notifications/amendments) for refund of excise duty on the products manufactured (LPG and Solvex-GL) and whether the Show Cause Notice/demand for recovery of refunded duty is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined prior proceedings and findings concerning eligibility for the Notification(s). The Tribunal recorded that earlier proceedings and a Final Order of this Tribunal had held that the impugned products fell within the scope of the Notification(s) relied upon by the appellant. The Tribunal considered the amendment introduced by Notification No. 21/2007-C.E. and subsequent modified Notification No. 18/2008-C.E., and the initiation of show cause proceedings, in the context of the earlier Tribunal adjudication recognising coverage of the products by the exemption Notification. The Tribunal treated the merits of the appellant's entitlement in light of the prior Tribunal decision and the evidence on classification and production processes presented in the record.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to the benefit of the Notification(s) for the impugned products and had correctly availed the exemption and consequent refunds; the Show Cause Notice and recovery proceedings are not sustainable and are set aside; the appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any.