Issues: (i) Whether the assessments initiated under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid in the absence of incriminating material relating to the assessee and in the context of the ten-year block period. (ii) Whether the additions made on the basis of the seized excel sheet and related statements were sustainable on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the assessments initiated under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid in the absence of incriminating material relating to the assessee and in the context of the ten-year block period.

Analysis: The search material did not contain the assessee's name and did not establish that the material belonged to, pertained to, or related to the assessee in a manner having a direct bearing on total income. The excel sheet was stated to have been created by staff of the searched person for investigative purposes and was not shown to be a seized contemporaneous business record. The satisfaction note was held to be mechanical and common for multiple years, and the assessments for AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 were also found to fall outside the applicable ten-year block period.

Conclusion: The assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C was invalid, and the quashing of the assessments was upheld, against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions made on the basis of the seized excel sheet and related statements were sustainable on merits.

Analysis: The material relied upon did not directly implicate the assessee, the name of the assessee did not appear in the excel sheet, and the surrounding statements and cross-examination did not provide reliable corroboration. The document was treated as lacking evidentiary value and incapable of supporting the alleged commission income or unexplained credits.

Conclusion: The additions were unsustainable and were rightly deleted, in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeals failed both on jurisdiction and on merits, and the relief granted by the first appellate authority was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For invoking section 153C, the material must be incriminating and must have a direct nexus with the non-searched person and his income; a mechanical satisfaction note and a document lacking evidentiary character cannot validly sustain jurisdiction or additions.

Issues: Whether the appeals challenging the liquidation order survived after the corporate debtor had been sold as a going concern and the liquidation proceedings had been closed.

Analysis: The liquidation proceedings had already been closed by a later order on the ground that the corporate debtor had been sold as a going concern, and the liquidator had been relieved of duties. In that situation, the order under challenge, which had directed commencement of liquidation, no longer had practical significance. The appeals therefore did not call for adjudication on the merits and had become infructuous.

Conclusion: The challenge to the liquidation order could not be pursued and the appeals were dismissed as infructuous.

Ratio Decidendi: Once liquidation proceedings are closed because the corporate debtor has been sold as a going concern, an appeal against the earlier liquidation order becomes infructuous.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 40,90,000 to the assessee's income as unexplained money under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), is justified where the assessee produced land ownership documents, confirmation letters from cultivators, PAN/Aadhaar details and a cash flow statement but did not produce written lease agreements.

Analysis: Relevant provisions include the Assessing Officer's power to treat cash deposits as unexplained money under section 69A read with section 115BBE, and the assessment procedure under section 143(3) read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee produced ownership records of agricultural land, a certificate of agricultural income, confirmation letters from third parties with identity details and PAN/Aadhaar copies, and a cash flow statement showing receipts and deposits. The absence of registered or written lease agreements was contested, and the assessing authority relied on that absence to reject the claimed source. The evidence produced was not directly contradicted by independent enquiries or material from the Assessing Officer. Recognition of tenancy or lease for agricultural land under local tenancy practice may not require a written lease to establish agricultural receipts where credible third-party confirmations and supporting financial statements are furnished. A mere suspicion or demand for a lease deed, without conducting further enquiry to test the genuineness of the supplied evidence, is insufficient to treat the amounts as unexplained money.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 40,90,000 treated as unexplained money under section 69A read with section 115BBE is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned. (ii) Whether the bank's wrongly credited and immediately reversed entry of Rs. 15,00,000/- can be treated as unexplained money liable to addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the first appeal is liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The assessee furnished an application explaining the reasons for delay, including acknowledgement by the bank of a mistaken credit, complaints to authorities, difficulties and exclusion of limitation period during COVID-19, and technical issues in filing the appeal. The Tribunal applied the principle of substantial justice and considered whether the delay was intentional or deliberate.

Conclusion: In favour of assessee. The delay in filing the first appeal is condoned.

Issue (ii): Whether the wrongly credited and immediately reversed bank entry of Rs. 15,00,000/- constitutes unexplained money and is liable to addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The record contains bank confirmation and contemporaneous evidence showing that the Rs. 15,00,000/- was a mistaken credit by the bank on 10.11.2016 and was reversed on the same day. The Tribunal examined whether such a factual scenario satisfies the elements of unexplained money under the statutory provisions relied upon by the assessing officer.

Conclusion: In favour of assessee. The addition of Rs. 15,00,000/- is deleted. The remaining amount of Rs. 1,95,447/- is to be assessed as the assessee's regular income and taxed as normal income (not under Section 115BBE).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: delay condoned; addition of Rs. 15,00,000/- deleted and balance amount directed to be assessed as normal income.

Ratio Decidendi: A bank's erroneous credit entry that is immediately reversed and supported by contemporaneous bank confirmation cannot be treated as unexplained money for the purposes of Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and therefore is not liable to addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the Department was justified in rejecting the transaction value and determining assessable value by applying Section 4(1)(b) read with Rule 7 of the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 2000 (including adding commission/trade margin) for CNG supplied to retail outlets, instead of accepting factory gate transaction value under Section 4(1)(a).

Analysis: The dispute turns on valuation principles under Section 4(1)(a) and Section 4(3)(c) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Rule 7 of the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 2000, including whether the place of removal is the factory gate or the retail outlet and whether grounds alleged in the show cause notice included related party treatment. The Tribunal compared the factual matrix and contractual terms with its earlier decision in the appellant's own case for an earlier period and considered whether the Revenue had specifically alleged related party transactions in the SCN. The Tribunal found the SCN relied on the place of removal being the retail outlet and invoked Rule 7 on that basis; it did not allege rejection of transaction value on the ground of related party status. The Tribunal therefore held that the Revenue could not raise the new ground of related party valuation which was not pleaded in the SCN, and that the earlier Tribunal decision covering identical factual and legal questions remained binding on the period in question.

Conclusion: Appeals allowed; the Department's demand and inclusion of the commission in assessable value under the alternative related party valuation ground is not sustained insofar as that ground was not pleaded in the show cause notice, and the Tribunal's earlier decision in the appellant's favour for identical facts is followed.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.10,00,000/- as unaccounted cash under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based on pen drive/excel sheets and third party statements recovered in a search (Section 132) and assessed under Section 153C, is sustainable where no incriminating documentary evidence directly connected to the assessee was found and no opportunity for cross examination of deponents was afforded.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals), including the pen drive entries, statements of third party employees and promoter, and the assessment record. It noted that no cash vouchers, receipts, ledgers or any document signed by the assessee linking her to the alleged cash payment were found during search or post search proceedings. The Tribunal considered decisions of coordinate benches and higher authorities addressing additions founded solely on third party materials and digital records recovered from third parties, and the legal requirement that where an assessee denies the payment, the revenue must corroborate such third party evidence and afford the assessee an opportunity to confront or cross examine the deponents. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer did not bring on record independent corroborative material nor adequately furnished or confronted the accused material in the assessment order, and that no opportunity for cross examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon was provided.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.10,00,000/- is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the excess stock of Rs. 75,00,770/- discovered during survey and surrendered by the assessee is taxable as unexplained investment under Section 69B read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or is assessable as business income.

Analysis: The excess stock was physically part of the mixed business stock and was not kept separately identifiable; documentary annexures located at the premises related to the assessee's business; the assessee admitted in surveyed statements that the excess stock derived from business receipts and offered the amount as additional business income in the return, with a separate credit entry in profit and loss account. Established legal framework requires that deeming provisions (Sections 69/69B) apply only where the alleged investment or asset is separately identifiable or where the assessee fails to satisfactorily explain the nature and source of the investment; where the excess stock lacks independent physical identity and a nexus with business receipts is shown or credibly explained, such amount is to be treated as business income. Coordinate Tribunal and High Court decisions applying the mixed-stock doctrine and upholding taxation as business income were relied upon and are factually analogous.

Conclusion: The excess stock of Rs. 75,00,770/- is assessable as business income and not as unexplained investment under Section 69B read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order, passed after notices were uploaded on the GST portal without any personal hearing and without effective service, can be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration subject to conditions.

Analysis: The show cause notice and reminders were uploaded on the GST portal but no effective personal hearing was afforded and the taxpayer claims unawareness of the notices. Where a taxpayer does not respond to notices sent by a particular mode, the issuing officer is required to explore other modes of service prescribed under Section 169(1) of the Act to achieve effective service rather than merely completing formalities. In such circumstances, passing an ex parte assessment confirming proposals in the notice without ensuring effective service or offering an opportunity of personal hearing undermines the objectives of the statute and may warrant fresh consideration. The taxpayer has offered to pay 25% of the disputed tax, and remand for fresh adjudication with a conditioned payment and an opportunity for filing replies and personal hearing addresses both procedural deficiency and the respondent's opportunity to decide on merits.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 13.03.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration on the condition that the taxpayer pays 25% of the disputed tax within four weeks; on payment the taxpayer may file objections within three weeks, after which the respondent shall issue a 14-day notice fixing personal hearing and decide the matter on merits.

Issues: Whether the appellant's retention of 15% from port dues fund, earmarked for maintenance and overheads under the concessionaire arrangement, constituted consideration for taxable services as Business Auxiliary Service or Port Services, so as to attract service tax.

Analysis: The port dues were statutory levies collected from port users and had already suffered service tax. The retained 15% was not an independent payment made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the appellant, but only a book adjustment from the same statutory fund used for agreed maintenance works within the port. The arrangement showed that the appellant operated as the concessionaire required to maintain the port from the port dues fund, and not as a commission agent rendering services on behalf of the Government. On these facts, the same receipt could not be treated as a separate taxable consideration, and taxing it again would amount to taxing the same service twice under the same head.

Conclusion: The retention of 15% out of port dues was not liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Service or Port Services, and the demand was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the transaction embodied in the 2019 agreements assigning the remaining Jigaon project work to the applicant could be validated under Section 536(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 as being bona fide, fair, just and reasonable and in the interest of the company, and whether objections based on insufficiency of stamp duty, absence of VIDC permission, and want of consideration defeated such validation.

Analysis: Section 536(2) operates as an enabling provision because the Court is empowered to order otherwise, and dispositions made after commencement of winding up are not automatically void ab initio. The governing test is whether the transaction was necessary or expedient in the interest of the company and its stakeholders, bona fide entered into, and deserving of protection in equity. On the facts, the company had become financially incapable of completing its share of the work, the project was under delay and penalty risk, the applicant took over the remaining work and liabilities, and the arrangement had already been acted upon. The prior Division Bench findings that the subcontracting arrangement was for the overall benefit of the joint venture and the company, as upheld by the Supreme Court, reinforced the conclusion. The stamp-duty objection did not succeed because insufficiency of stamping affects admissibility, not the underlying validity of the arrangement, and the court was not called upon to decide admissibility in evidence. The objection based on lack of VIDC approval was also rejected because the correspondence relied on did not displace the internal arrangement already acted upon and accepted in substance. The plea of absence of consideration likewise failed on the facts of transfer of work, liabilities and project execution by the applicant.

Conclusion: The 2019 agreements were valid and liable to be protected and validated under Section 536(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, and the objections raised against them were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The application succeeded, the impugned transaction was preserved as a bona fide and beneficial arrangement for completion of the project, and the official liquidator's contrary report did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A disposition of company property made after commencement of winding up may be validated where the Court finds it bona fide and in the interest of the company, and an insufficiency of stamp duty does not by itself render such transaction void.

Issues: Whether the appellant bank is entitled to avail cenvat credit on e-statements issued by National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) for ATM/NFS transaction charges for the period April 2009 to March 2012.

Analysis: The claim involves interpretation of documentary requirements for availing cenvat credit under Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, including the proviso to Rule 4A applicable to banking companies. The e-statements issued by NPCI were examined for whether they contained the requisite particulars contemplated by the proviso to Rule 4A and whether NPCI's role and the agreements between member banks rendered the e-statements functionally equivalent to invoices/bills/challans for the purposes of credit. The Tribunal applied the reasoning in the decision of Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. v. CCE&ST (CESTAT Chennai) holding that NPCI's statements, being self-contained and issued in the context of an agreement providing for NPCI to raise statements/invoices and account for settlements, satisfy the proviso to Rule 4A and Rule 9 requirements. The Tribunal also noted absence of any contrary compliance failure by NPCI (such as non-filing of returns) that would cast doubt on the transactions.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to avail cenvat credit on the e-statements issued by NPCI for the period April 2009 to March 2012; the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

Issues: (i) Whether the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to review the concluded vesting order dated 07.10.1971 under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953; (ii) Whether the respondent-company satisfied the requirements of Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 to retain the land on the footing that it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming on 01.01.1952.

Issue (i): Whether the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to review the concluded vesting order dated 07.10.1971 under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

Analysis: The power of review is not inherent and can be exercised only when the statute expressly or by necessary implication confers it. The authorities under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 are statutory, quasi-judicial authorities and the omnibus investment of Civil Court powers under Section 57A of that Act does not, by itself, include a substantive power of review. Section 57B further shows a legislative intent against reopening matters already enquired into, determined or decided under the Act. A concluded vesting order, which had attained finality, could not be reopened by an executive authority in the absence of an express review provision. Such an exercise would also be inconsistent with the finality of adjudication and the separation of powers.

Conclusion: The Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to review the vesting order, and the fresh order dated 07.05.2008 was void ab initio.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent-company satisfied the requirements of Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 to retain the land on the footing that it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming on 01.01.1952.

Analysis: To claim retention under Section 6(1)(j), the company had to establish that it was engaged exclusively in farming, and that such engagement existed on 01.01.1952. The materials relied upon by the respondent-company did not satisfactorily prove that statutory condition. The earlier vesting proceedings had given it opportunities to produce supporting evidence, but it failed to do so. The memoranda and later documents did not establish exclusive farming as the sole business of the company, and belated reliance on old documents could not justify reopening a concluded determination.

Conclusion: The respondent-company failed to satisfy Section 6(1)(j) and was not entitled to retain the lands in question.

Final Conclusion: The statutory framework did not permit the revival of a final vesting determination by review, and the respondent-company's claim to retention failed on merits as well. The Tribunal's restoration of the 1971 vesting order was upheld and the High Court's contrary view was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A quasi-judicial authority cannot review a concluded order unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication confers that power, and a claim for retention under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 must be proved by strict compliance with the statutory precondition of exclusive engagement in farming on the relevant date.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, having paid the redemption fine and penalty after the statutory period of 120 days and without a pending appeal, is entitled to re-export the confiscated goods and related directions; and whether the petitioner is entitled to refund of the redemption fine.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority's order dated 28.06.2023 confiscated the imported goods but expressly granted an option to redeem the confiscated goods for re-export on payment of a specified redemption fine and penalty under Section 125 and Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 125(3) provides that the option to pay the fine becomes void if the fine is not paid within 120 days from the date of the option unless an appeal against the order is pending. The petitioner did not file any appeal under Section 128 and paid the redemption fine and penalty only after about one year, well beyond the 120-day period. There is no factual or legal basis to treat the late payment as preserving the statutory option where no appeal was pending, and ignorance of the limitation provision is not a ground to extend or revive the statutory option. The respondents have accepted liability to refund the redemption fine but not the penalty.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; the petitioner is not entitled to a direction to re-export the goods as the statutory option under Section 125(3) is void for non-payment within 120 days in absence of a pending appeal. The respondent authorities are directed to refund the redemption fine of Rs. 12,00,000 to the petitioner within one week.

Issues: Whether the admission of the Section 7 insolvency petition could be interfered with on the grounds of alleged procedural defects, including authorization, information utility compliance, stamping, Section 65B compliance, service under Rule 4(3), and limitation, when the record otherwise established financial debt and default.

Analysis: The application was found to be duly authorised after the board resolutions were brought on record. The debt originally advanced by the bank and subsequently assigned to the respondent was supported by loan documents, security documents, the assignment deed, audited balance sheets, and the debtor's own email and account records acknowledging liability. The default and financial distress were therefore treated as established. The objection on limitation was rejected in view of the acknowledgments and the filing date. The absence of an information utility record was held to be directory and not fatal in the facts. The objections based on inadequate stamping and the absence of a Section 65B certificate were also treated as curable or non-fatal at the admission stage. The service defect under Rule 4(3) was held to be a rectifiable procedural lapse that stood cured. The appellate forum reiterated that, at the Section 7 stage, the enquiry is confined to the existence of financial debt, default, and completeness and limitation of the application.

Conclusion: The insolvency admission order was upheld and the technical objections raised by the appellant were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: At the Section 7 admission stage, curable procedural defects do not defeat an otherwise complete application where financial debt and default are established and the claim is within limitation.

Issues: Whether the imposition of a "General Penalty" under Section 125 of the respective GST enactments can be sustained where a concessional "Late Fee" under Section 47 of the respective GST enactments has been levied/accepted in terms of the notifications allowing reduced late fee.

Analysis: The Court examined the challenge to the general penalty imposed for non-filing of annual returns in light of the decision in Ms. Kandan Hardware Mart (batch decision dated 02.01.2026), which held that where taxpayers filed annual returns within the period permitted by the notifications granting concessional late fee, the late fee under Section 47(2) is penal in nature. The ratio adopted in that decision is that a penal late fee levied at a concessional rate under the notifications operates as the penalty for the default, and therefore there is no scope to impose an additional general penalty under Section 125 of the GST enactments over and above the late fee so levied. The petitioner in the present writ petition challenged only the imposition of the general penalty; the proposal for late fee was dropped or adjusted in accordance with the notifications permitting concessional payment.

Conclusion: Impugned order quashed insofar as it relates to levy of the general penalty under Section 125 of the respective GST enactments; petition allowed and consequential relief granted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the provisions of Section 13(2)(e) read with Section 13(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 apply to deny exemption under Sections 11 and 12 by treating the investment in shares as disqualifying application of income, where the impugned shareholding was attributed by aggregating holdings of the assessee and separate persons/entities.

Analysis: Section 13(2)(e) operates where any share, security or other property is purchased by or on behalf of the trust from a person referred to in Section 13(3) for a consideration which is more than adequate; Explanation 3 defines 'substantial interest' in a concern as ownership of not less than twenty percent of the voting power beneficially by such person or by such person together with other persons referred to in Section 13(3). The legal principle of separate juristic identity means that shareholding of an independent person, a HUF, or a corporate entity cannot be automatically attributed to another person unless statutory criteria are satisfied. The factual matrix showed the assessee held 14.18% directly, another individual held 11.66% as karta of his HUF, and a corporate entity connected to an office-bearer held further shares; none of the office-bearers individually held or directly controlled twenty percent or more of voting power, nor did the material establish that the purchases were made from a person falling squarely within Section 13(3) so as to trigger Section 13(2)(e). Reliance on aggregated shareholdings of distinct legal persons and on conjectural control was not justified on the recorded material. Precedential authority supports that mere titular positions or directorships and separate shareholdings cannot be conflated to infer substantial interest for purposes of Section 13 unless statutory tests are met.

Conclusion: Section 13(2)(e) read with Section 13(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not apply on the facts; invocation of Section 13(2)(e) by aggregating distinct persons' or entities' shareholdings was unsustainable and the denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For application of Section 13(2)(e) read with Explanation 3 to Section 13, the statutory threshold of substantial interest must be satisfied by the person referred to in Section 13(3) in accordance with their separate legal identity; aggregation of shareholdings of distinct legal persons or entities without satisfying the statutory criteria cannot be used to invoke Section 13(2)(e).

Issues: Whether the assessment order and notices were validly served pursuant to the procedure under Section 282 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules, and whether failure to follow the prescribed service procedure vitiates the assessment proceedings such that the assessment and consequent demand must be quashed.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the record and the factual report filed by the Revenue which admitted that the assessment order could not be served through the e-filing/ITBA portal due to technical/system error and that the Department claimed service by speed post but failed to produce tracking proof of delivery. The Tribunal applied the principle laid down by the Jurisdictional High Court in Suman Jeet Agarwal regarding notices uploaded on the e-filing portal and notices sent to unrelated e-mail addresses, which requires verification of the date on which the assessee viewed the notice on the e-filing portal and recognition of that date as the date of issuance; further, compliance with the statutory procedure for service under Section 282 and Rule 127 is mandatory. In the absence of proof of service by alternative permitted modes and given the admitted failure to properly serve the assessment order as per the prescribed procedure, the Tribunal found that the assessment proceedings suffered a procedural defect causing miscarriage of justice. The Tribunal considered that restoration to the Assessing Officer would not cure the fundamental defect of invalid service and that the assessment and consequential proceedings were thereby unlawful.

Conclusion: The assessment order and consequential proceedings were not validly served in accordance with Section 282 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules; the assessment and related demand proceedings are quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to comply with the mandatory service procedure under Section 282 of the Income-tax Act and applicable rules (including where e-filing upload without verifiable notice or proof of alternative service occurs) renders the assessment proceedings invalid and liable to be quashed for causing a miscarriage of justice.

Issues: (i) Whether there is debt and default within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 such as to warrant admission of the Section 7 petition; (ii) Whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether there is debt and default within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 such as to warrant admission of the Section 7 petition.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority found outstanding debt exceeding the statutory threshold and relied on NeSL record showing default. Multiple OTS proposals by the corporate debtor, including one after admission, were noted as evidencing default. No reconciliation or statement of account was produced by the corporate debtor to controvert the claim. The Adjudicating Authority applied the principle that once outstanding debt and default are established, admission under Section 7 follows.

Conclusion: The Section 7 petition was rightly admitted on the ground that debt and default as contemplated by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were established.

Issue (ii): Whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The date of default recorded in the application and NeSL was 08.06.2023. The Section 7 application filed on 15.01.2025 was held to be within the prescribed limitation period based on the date of default as recorded in the loan and NeSL records. The Adjudicating Authority's conclusion on limitation was accepted.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that an outstanding debt exists and a default has occurred, admission of a petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is required.

Issues: (i) whether the foreign arbitral award, once held enforceable, could be executed by the executing court despite objections based on FEMA, RBI approval, valuation, and alleged distinction between enforceability and executability; (ii) whether the executing court could grant consequential reliefs including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution against remaining respondents, and set-off of costs.

Issue (i): Whether the foreign arbitral award, once held enforceable, could be executed by the executing court despite objections based on FEMA, RBI approval, valuation, and alleged distinction between enforceability and executability?

Analysis: A foreign award that has been found enforceable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to be treated as a decree and may be executed in the same proceeding. The distinction sought to be drawn between enforceability and executability was rejected. The executing court cannot reopen objections that were already rejected in enforcement proceedings, especially where the Supreme Court has held that FEMA violations, if any, do not render the award void and that post-facto RBI permission may be available. The objections on valuation and pricing guidelines were also held to be matters already concluded and incapable of being re-agitated in execution.

Conclusion: The objections to executability were rejected, and the award was held executable.

Issue (ii): Whether the executing court could grant consequential reliefs including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution against remaining respondents, and set-off of costs?

Analysis: The residual power under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits the court to adopt execution machinery necessary to give effect to the relief granted by the award. The reliefs directing transfer of shares and steps necessary for implementation were treated as severable and capable of partial execution against the remaining respondents after deletion of some parties. The court also held that the directions for appointment of nominee directors and interim injunctions were consequential to the award and within execution powers. The request to rely on RBI correspondence to postpone execution was rejected, and the set-off of arbitral costs against the transfer price was allowed.

Conclusion: The consequential reliefs were granted, including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution, and set-off.

Final Conclusion: The execution application succeeded in substance, with the award enforced and the connected interim and ancillary reliefs granted to facilitate implementation of the award.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a foreign arbitral award is held enforceable and deemed a decree, the executing court must give effect to it in execution and cannot reopen merits-based objections already rejected in enforcement proceedings, unless the decree is a nullity on the face of the record; consequential and severable reliefs necessary to implement the award may also be granted in execution.

Issues: Whether the communication rejecting condonation of delay in receipt of remittance for export of services under Rule 96A(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, constitutes a valid order and whether the matter requires reconsideration after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned instrument is a communication/notification of a purported decision rather than a reasoned order passed by the competent authority. The record shows a note by a subordinate officer with the Commissioner s endorsement but no contemporaneous order recorded after consideration of the petitioner s grounds or after affording an opportunity of hearing. The legal framework under Rule 96A(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits consideration of applications for condonation of delay in relation to receipt of remittance; such consideration requires a decision rendered in accordance with principles of fair procedure, including giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard and recording reasons for acceptance or rejection of the application. Procedural irregularity is exacerbated where the authority has not addressed the substantive grounds raised by the applicant.

Conclusion: The impugned communication does not amount to a valid order; the matter is remitted to the competent authority to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh in accordance with law after affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing and after recording reasons for the decision.