Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment of the South Goa land parcel and connected bank balances of Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. was sustainable on the footing that the property represented proceeds of crime. (ii) Whether the attachment of the shares and other properties of Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd., KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. and the 5 LLP entities was justified on the basis of the alleged receipt and layering of proceeds of crime.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional attachment of the South Goa land parcel and connected bank balances of Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. was sustainable on the footing that the property represented proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The attachment could stand only if the property itself, or the traced value represented by it, had a nexus with the tainted funds. The record showed that the Goa land was acquired before the alleged diversion of homebuyers' funds commenced, and the lease premium had been paid from independent funds mobilised through a third party. The Tribunal also noted that the money from Unitech moved to other entities under the stated arrangements, but not to Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. for acquisition of the land. On that footing, the land parcel could not be treated as property derived from proceeds of crime. As to the bank balances, the Tribunal did not find sufficient basis to interfere completely and confined its interference only to the land parcel.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment of the Goa land parcel was unsustainable and was set aside, while the bank balance attachment was not wholly interfered with.

Issue (ii): Whether the attachment of the shares and other properties of Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd., KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. and the 5 LLP entities was justified on the basis of the alleged receipt and layering of proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted that the investigation established a money trail from Unitech to Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd. and KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. in relation to the share arrangements and related transactions, and held that the non-fulfilment of the agreed terms did not negate the receipt of tainted funds. The objection based on the date of inclusion of IPC offences in the PMLA Schedule was rejected because the relevant inquiry was the laundering process and projection of tainted money as untainted, not the date of the predicate acts. However, for the LLP entities, the Tribunal found that they came into existence much later than the relevant diversion period and that no reliable trail linked their assets to proceeds of crime. It further held that, if at all, only the corresponding share interests could have been attached, not the assets of the LLPs themselves.

Conclusion: The attachment of the shares and related properties of Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd. and KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. was upheld, while the attachment of the properties of the 5 LLP entities was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the limited extent of the Goa land parcel and the LLP properties, and failed in relation to the remaining attachments, leaving the impugned orders partly undisturbed and partly interfered with.

Ratio Decidendi: In a PMLA attachment challenge, the decisive test is whether the attached property has a traceable nexus with proceeds of crime or their equivalent value, and the relevant inquiry focuses on the laundering and projection of tainted funds rather than the date of the underlying predicate offence.

Issues: Whether the outstanding demand for interest for late payment of TDS (arising from OLTAS recording cheque-realisation date instead of cheque-tender date) is incorrect and whether the petitioner is entitled to deletion of that demand and refund of amounts paid under protest with applicable interest.

Analysis: The factual position is admitted that cheques for TDS were tendered to the authorised bank within the statutory due dates and were subsequently honoured. Board Circular No. 261 dated 08.08.1979 treats the date of tendering a cheque as the date of payment where the cheque is honoured. The demand arose solely because the Department's OLTAS/portal recorded cheque-realisation dates as payment dates, producing an artificial delay and consequent interest liability. The Department's inability, due to system limitations, to alter challan dates or to reflect the correct tender date does not override the settled legal position that the cheque-tender date is the date of payment. Where the system cannot give effect to the legally correct position, administrative or manual measures must be adopted to rectify records and grant relief.

Conclusion: The outstanding demand based on wrongly recorded delayed payment is incorrect; the respondent authority must treat the cheque tender dates as the dates of payment, delete the erroneous demand, and refund the amount paid under protest with interest under Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 from the date of payment until refund.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dated 16.07.2025 passed by the Learned Addl./JCIT(A) is vitiated by non-application of mind because it incorporates facts, figures and observations pertaining to a different legal entity (Novartis Healthcare Private Limited) instead of the present assessee (Novartis India Limited), and whether the impugned order should be set aside and the matters restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The impugned appellate order reproduced the statement of facts, extracts of the assessment order, and figures of additions that belong to a distinct legal entity rather than the assessee before the appellate authority. An appellate authority must adjudicate on the basis of correct and relevant facts and material pertaining to the party whose appeal is under consideration. Reliance on factual material of a different assessee demonstrates lack of application of mind and undermines the validity of the conclusions drawn. Post-facto explanations or the pendency of rectification applications cannot cure an order founded on an erroneous factual foundation. Given that the foundational facts were incorrect, the appellate conclusions based on those facts cannot stand and require fresh adjudication by the appellate authority after consideration of correct records.

Conclusion: The impugned order is vitiated by non-application of mind and is set aside. The appeal filed by the Revenue and the cross-objection filed by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes and the matters are restored to the file of the Learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication strictly in accordance with law after considering correct facts and material.

Issues: (i) whether summoning and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against Non-Executive and Independent Directors in the absence of material showing that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business; (ii) whether the summoning order could be interfered with in respect of the Chief Financial Officer of the company at the stage of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): whether summoning and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against Non-Executive and Independent Directors in the absence of material showing that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business.

Analysis: The protective scheme for Independent Directors under the Companies Act, 2013 recognizes that such directors are not, by status alone, responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs. Liability for an offence by the company does not automatically extend to every director. For vicarious criminal liability, there must be specific material showing active involvement or a direct nexus with the transaction and the company's business. The record showed that the petitioners in this category were Independent and Non-Executive Directors, and there was no sufficient basis to treat them as persons in charge of the company's affairs for the purpose of Section 141.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the petitioners. The summoning order and the proceedings were quashed against the Non-Executive and Independent Directors.

Issue (ii): whether the summoning order could be interfered with in respect of the Chief Financial Officer of the company at the stage of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: A Chief Financial Officer is part of the company's key managerial personnel and, by office, is connected with financial administration and monetary affairs. Whether such a person had knowledge of the transaction and exercised control over it is ordinarily a matter for trial, especially where the role is linked to financial management. On the materials before the Court, no ground was made out to conclude at the quashing stage that the summoning order was unsustainable against the Chief Financial Officer.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the petitioner. The summoning order was upheld in respect of the Chief Financial Officer.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded only in part: the proceedings were terminated against the Independent and Non-Executive Directors, while the prosecution was permitted to continue against the Chief Financial Officer.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions for dishonour of cheques, a director can be made vicariously liable only on specific material showing responsibility for the conduct of the company's business, whereas mere status as a director is insufficient; a key managerial officer whose role is intrinsically connected with company finances may require trial to determine involvement.

Issues: Whether tax deduction at source (TDS) is required to be deducted from payment of annual lease rent paid to a development authority and whether the precedent in Rajesh Projects (India) (P.) Ltd. applies.

Analysis: The Court applied the reasoning in Rajesh Projects (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that TDS is required to be deducted from annual lease rent paid to the development authority, and noted that this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Commissioner of Income-tax. The appellant was unable to distinguish the facts of the present matters from the facts in Rajesh Projects. The Rajesh Projects decision was applied prospectively.

Conclusion: The appeals challenging the Tribunal's allowance of the assessee's appeals are rejected; the decision in favour of the assessee (on the basis of prospective application of Rajesh Projects) is affirmed.

Issues: Whether the delay of 50 days in filing the Audit Report in Form No.10B for A.Y. 2018-19 should be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to enable the Petitioner-Trust to avail exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the impugned order dated 07/10/2025 rejecting the application for condonation should be quashed.

Analysis: The factual matrix shows filing of the return and Form 10B on 20/12/2018 whereas the due date was 31/10/2018, resulting in a 50-day delay. The statutory framework includes Section 119(2)(b) which empowers the Board to relax requirements to avoid genuine hardship, and the Finance Act, 2017 insertion of clause (ba) in Section 12A(1) which linked the due date of Form 10B to Section 139(4A). CBDT Circular No.16/2022 (19/07/2022) provided that delays not exceeding 365 days may be decided on merits, with delegated authorities required to act within prescribed timelines. Judicial precedents treat the requirement to furnish the audit report with return as procedural or directory where substantial compliance is shown, and emphasise liberal construction of benevolent provisions to prevent genuine hardship. The Court finds that Respondent No.1 failed to apply mind in accordance with the delegated power under Section 119(2)(b) and the relevant circulars, unduly relying on prior-year filing delays while ignoring timely compliance in subsequent years and the shortness of the present delay. Considering the nature and extent of delay (50 days), the purpose of Section 119(2)(b) to mitigate genuine hardship, and binding/ persuasive authorities recognizing substantial compliance and relief in comparable circumstances, the conditions for exercising discretion in favour of the Petitioner are met. The Court further directed that, having condoned the delay, the Form No.10B shall be treated as filed within time and the return processed in accordance with law within three months of uploading the order.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 07/10/2025 is quashed and set aside; the delay of 50 days in filing Form No.10B is condoned; the Form No.10B shall be treated as filed within time and the Respondents shall process the Petitioner's Return of Income in accordance with law within three months from the date of uploading this Order.

Issues: Whether the notices dated 24.06.2025 (under Section 143(2)) and 14.11.2025 (under Section 142(1)) seeking to scrutinise and seek clarifications in respect of the modified return filed under Section 170A are valid, when an assessment order in respect of the same assessment year has already been passed after taking into account the modified return in terms of Section 170A(2)(b).

Analysis: Section 170A applies where, prior to the date of an order of business reorganisation, a return has been furnished and requires the successor to furnish a modified return within the prescribed period. Section 170A(2)(b) mandates that where assessment proceedings were pending on the date of furnishing the modified return, the Assessing Officer shall pass an order assessing or reassessing total income in accordance with the order of business reorganisation and taking into account the modified return so furnished. In the present case, the modified return was filed while assessment proceedings were pending and the Assessing Officer subsequently passed an assessment order dated 26.03.2025 which took the amalgamation and the modified return into account. The issuance of a subsequent notice under Section 143(2), issued mechanically by the selection system, and a later notice under Section 142(1) seeking to again scrutinise or seek clarifications on the modified return would result in re-scrutiny of the same modified return already subject to assessment under Section 170A(2)(b). Accepting the respondents' contention that a modified return may be selected for fresh scrutiny would nullify the distinction between clauses (a) and (b) of Section 170A(2) and permit double scrutiny contrary to the statutory mandate. Further, the record indicates that the 24.06.2025 notice was issued in an identity-blind, mechanical manner without application of mind, which vitiates that notice.

Conclusion: The impugned notices dated 24.06.2025 (under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961) and 14.11.2025 (under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961) are quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether the subject properties, in view of subsequent developments during the pendency of the appeal, should be treated as restored under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The appeal had become academic because of later events affecting the mortgaged properties and related proceedings. In that situation, the Court declined to decide the larger question of law and, while keeping all rights and contentions open, granted the practical relief sought by directing that the subject properties be treated as restored under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and that possession be handed over to the respondent.

Conclusion: The relief on restoration of the subject properties was granted in favour of the respondent, while the question of law remained open.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of as having become academic, with operative directions protecting the respondent's claim to restoration and possession of the subject properties.

Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent developments render the dispute academic, the Court may decline to adjudicate the larger question of law and pass appropriate restorative directions on the basis of Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issues: Whether the applicant, a foreign national facing prosecution under the CGST Act for alleged tax evasion, was entitled to bail having regard to the nature of the evidence, the stage of the case, the maximum punishment, custody period, and the absence of material showing likelihood of tampering with evidence.

Analysis: The application arose out of allegations of GST evasion based on documentary material and investigation already completed, followed by filing of complaint. The applicant had remained in custody since 26.08.2025, the offences were triable by a Magistrate, and the maximum punishment was five years. The Court also noted the applicant's status as a woman, the absence of convincing material suggesting tampering with evidence, and the fact that the case was supported substantially by documentary evidence. On these facts, the Court considered the custody to be no longer necessary for the purposes of trial.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail and was directed to be released on furnishing the stipulated bond and sureties, subject to conditions.

Final Conclusion: Bail was granted in the GST prosecution, with protective conditions imposed to secure the applicant's appearance and to prevent interference with the trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In a GST prosecution resting principally on documentary evidence, where the accused has spent substantial time in custody, the case is triable by a Magistrate, and no convincing material shows a real risk of tampering with evidence, bail may be granted subject to suitable conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner is required to make any further pre-deposit to institute an appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal against the impugned order dated 30.06.2025, in view of an earlier pre-deposit made at the first appellate stage; (ii) Whether the Tribunal should be directed to accept and decide the appeal on merits without raising the issue of limitation or insisting on a fresh pre-deposit, and whether physical filing may be permitted if the e-filing system does not accept the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether any further pre-deposit is required.

Analysis: The petitioner had already made a substantial pre-deposit at the first appellate stage amounting to Rs. 23,85,182/-, whereas the confirmed demand in the impugned order is significantly lower after first appellate reduction (approximately Rs. 40,00,000/-). The facts show an existing substantial deposit made in relation to the dispute which the Tribunal is capable of taking into account when permitting an appeal.

Conclusion: No further pre-deposit is required; the Tribunal should not insist upon any fresh pre-deposit in order to admit the appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal should accept and decide the appeal on merits without taking objection on limitation and whether physical filing may be permitted if e-filing fails.

Analysis: The petitioner sought extraordinary relief because the Appellate Tribunal was not fully functional; there is evidence that some members are appointed and e-filing is permitted but operational difficulties may persist. The petitioner undertakes to file the appeal within four weeks. Given bona fide pursuit of remedies before the Court and practical difficulties in filing, the Tribunal should not raise limitation objections or refuse admission on technical grounds; alternative physical filing should be permitted if e-filing is not operating to accept the appeal within the prescribed time.

Conclusion: If the appeal is filed within four weeks, the Tribunal must decide the appeal on merits without advertence to limitation; if e-filing is not accepting the appeal, the Tribunal must accept physical filing and shall not insist upon any fresh pre-deposit.

Final Conclusion: The remedy before the Tribunal is preserved and the Tribunal is directed to admit the appeal without requiring any further pre-deposit, to permit physical filing if necessary, and to decide the appeal on its merits without raising limitation objections where the appeal is filed within the specified period.

Ratio Decidendi: A substantial pre-deposit made at the first appellate stage in relation to the same demand dispenses with an obligation to make an additional pre-deposit at the Tribunal stage; where operational or bona fide obstacles prevent e-filing, physical filing must be permitted and the Tribunal should decide the appeal on merits without imposing limitation or fresh pre-deposit barriers.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee, a society registered under the Karnataka Souhadra Sahakari Act, 1997 and carrying on credit facilities to members, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (including interest from co-operative banks) and whether such income should be treated under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) or Section 80P(2)(d); (ii) Whether provisions made by the assessee for interest on advances and non-performing advances (Rs. 3,96,141 and Rs. 63,795) are disallowable for tax purposes.

Issue (i): Entitlement to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for a society registered under the Karnataka Souhadra Sahakari Act, 1997 and characterization of interest income.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether registration under the Karnataka Souhadra Sahakari Act, 1997 brings the assessee within the definition of co-operative society under Section 2(19) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and thus eligible for Section 80P deductions. The Tribunal relied on authoritative precedent of the Karnataka High Court holding that societies registered under the Souhadra Act fall within Section 2(19). The Tribunal also considered the nature of interest earned from SEDCC Bank Limited and whether such receipts form part of the business income from members (eligible under Section 80P(2)(a)(i)) or are to be taxed as income from other sources and/or claimed under Section 80P(2)(d). Decisions allowing similar treatment were noted and applied to classify the interest as business income attributable to credit activities to members, consistent with the assessee's claim.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The interest income from the co-operative bank is to be treated as business income attributable to the activity of providing credit facilities to members and not under Section 80P(2)(d). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Allowability of provisions for interest on advances and for non-performing advances (Rs. 3,96,141 and Rs. 63,795).

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that the provisions were made consistently under the assessee's regular accounting policy (mercantile system) and were mandated by statutory or regulatory requirements applicable to co-operative societies. The Tribunal noted that accrual-based accounting provisions required by statute or banking regulation do not, by themselves, attract disallowance unless expressly prohibited by the Income-tax Act. The provisions were assessed in light of applicable accounting practice and regulatory mandates.

Conclusion: The additions disallowing the provisions of Rs. 3,96,141 and Rs. 63,795 are deleted. Ground no. 6 and ground no. 7 are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) is granted (including the interest income treated as business income attributable to member credit activity), and the additions for provisions for interest and non-performing advances are deleted; the appellate order under challenge is set aside accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: A society registered under the Karnataka Souhadra Sahakari Act, 1997 falls within the definition of "co-operative society" under Section 2(19) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; income from credit facilities to members (including attributable interest) qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and legitimate accrual-based provisions mandated by statute or regulatory framework are not disallowable unless expressly prohibited by the Income-tax Act.

Issues: Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (by notice issued under Section 148) after the lapse of four years was valid or was barred by the first proviso to Section 147 where a regular assessment had already been concluded under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer and the material on record. The AO relied on general information from investigation/portal records relating to third-party search activity and noted that the assessee had claimed exempt long-term capital gains; the AO did not put forward any specific undisclosed material fact which the assessee had failed to disclose during the original assessment under Section 143(3). The AO also did not independently verify or reconcile the portal information with the assessment records before forming the belief of escapement of income. In these circumstances, the information available was either already on record or was general third-party information that required independent verification; the AO's bald assertion of non-disclosure without identifying specific material facts or conducting requisite enquiries was insufficient to satisfy the first proviso to Section 147.

Conclusion: The reopening of assessment under Section 147/notice under Section 148 was barred by the first proviso to Section 147 as the original assessment had been completed under Section 143(3) and there was no failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The notice under Section 148 and the consequential reassessment order are quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 5,31,46,170/- computed by restricting interest on unsecured loans to 12% and treated as unexplained under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable; (ii) Whether the deletion by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) of the addition of Rs. 30,09,99,829/- under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged regrouping of balances was erroneous.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 5,31,46,170/- made by substituting a benchmark interest rate and treating the differential as unexplained credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is permissible.

Analysis: Section 68 requires a sum to be found credited in the books of account whose nature and source are not satisfactorily explained. The impugned amount is not an independent credit entry but a computed differential arising from substituting the rate of interest payable on disclosed unsecured loans. The interest payments were made through banking channels to identified parties and the amount in dispute represents alleged excessive interest, not a fresh credit. The computation does not identify any specific credited sum which remained unexplained.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 5,31,46,170/- under Section 68 is unsustainable and is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of the addition of Rs. 30,09,99,829/- by the CIT(A), on the basis that the difference arose from legitimate regrouping of running account balances, was incorrect for lack of independent verification and failure to discharge the burden under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The addition was founded on merging figures shown under two heads rather than identifying a particular unexplained credit entry. Ledger accounts show running balances that legitimately changed character during the year due to receipts, repayments and fresh advances, resulting in reclassification in the balance sheet. There is no material showing that the Assessing Officer identified any specific credit entry lacking identity, genuineness or creditworthiness, nor substantive verification rebutting the ledger entries presented.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 30,09,99,829/- by the CIT(A) was correct and is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in respect of the addition founded on substitution of interest rate and the matter is restored to the Assessing Officer for limited verification and consequential recomputation of Work-in-Progress if required; the Revenue's appeal against deletion of the regrouping-based addition is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies only where a specific sum is found credited in the books and its nature and source remain unexplained; it does not permit treating an accounting substitution of interest rate or a reclassification/regrouping of running account balances as unexplained cash credit.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled, under Article 226, to have the Order in Original set aside or read down so as to grant the statutory option of redemption under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of goods held to be prohibited by DGFT Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 and whether the writ court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction where the statutory appeal was dismissed as time barred and there is prolonged delay in approaching the High Court.

Analysis: The statutory framework provides a specific appellate remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 with strict limitation and condonation limits; beyond the outer limit the appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay. Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 confers discretion (use of "may") on the adjudicating authority to grant redemption and does not create an absolute right to redemption where goods are prohibited under the import policy. DGFT Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 coupled with MIP conditions renders the goods prohibited if declared CIF is below the statutory threshold, and prohibition by the executive policy cannot be overridden by exercising redemption where the statutory scheme and policy preclude release. Principles of delay and laches and the discretionary nature of writ relief in fiscal matters preclude exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction where the petitioner allowed the statutory order to attain finality by inaction and did not challenge the appellate authority's dismissal on limitation. The petitioner's ancillary pleas (retesting, waiver of charges, reduction/setting aside of penalty) are consequential on the primary challenge to confiscation and cannot be independently entertained once confiscation and penalty have become final by reason of statutory appeal being time barred and the petitioner's unexplained delay.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; no relief is granted to compel grant of redemption under Section 125 or to set aside absolute confiscation or penalty given the prohibition under the DGFT notification, the discretionary scope of redemption, the finality of the time barred appellate order, and the petitioner's inordinate delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order dated 12.06.2024 and antecedent notices are invalid for want of Document Identification Number (DIN) and signatures; (ii) Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of delay/laches in prosecuting statutory remedies and approaching the Court.

Issue (i): Validity of assessment order and antecedent show-cause notices for alleged absence of DIN and signatures.

Analysis: The assessment order contains an auto-generated Reference Number assigned on upload. Electronic issuance of Form GST DRC-01 and summary assessment in Form GST DRC-07 generate a reference/RFN when digitally signed by the issuing authority. Prior court findings and departmental demonstration establish that the presence of such reference/RFN is indicative of affixation of a digital signature and that the portal generates the identification number on upload.

Conclusion: The contention that the assessment order and notices are invalid for lack of DIN and signatures is negatived; the Reference/RFN generated on upload suffices.

Issue (ii): Maintainability of the writ petition in view of delay and laches.

Analysis: The petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority and the appeal was rejected; no adequate explanation was offered for delay in preferring the appeal or in approaching the Court after rejection. Prior objections and portal upload notice show awareness of assessment proceedings by the petitioner.

Conclusion: The writ petition is barred by delay and laches and is liable to be dismissed on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition raising the above grounds is dismissed; the assessment order and notices are not invalidated on the grounds urged and the petition is rejected for delay.

Ratio Decidendi: An electronically issued GST assessment order or notice bearing an auto-generated Reference/Record Filing Number (RFN) upon upload is sufficient evidentiary indicium of a digital signature/DIN for purposes of validating the electronic proceeding.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of cash deposits of Rs. 33,20,000 treated as unexplained and taxed under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 94,903 by computing a higher gross profit on the basis of an alleged standard margin is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposit of Rs. 33,20,000 in Specified Bank Notes during demonetisation can be treated as unexplained and brought to tax under Section 68 and taxed under Section 115BBE.

Analysis: The facts establish pre-demonetisation cash balances in the business books sufficient to account for the deposited Specified Bank Notes. The books of account recording cash on hand prior to demonetisation are undisputed by the lower authorities. The deposits were also offered as sales in the profit and loss account and there is no finding that expenditure entries in the books are bogus or that the books suffer from any patent or latent defect. In absence of proof that the pre-existing cash balances shown in the books were fictitious, the subsequent deposits in bank of Specified Bank Notes cannot be characterized as unexplained receipts for the purposes of Section 68.

Conclusion: Issue (i) answered in favour of the assessee; the addition of Rs. 33,20,000 is deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 94,903 by applying a presumed 10% margin is sustainable when the assessee's audited books show a gross profit rate of 9.48% and no defect in books is demonstrated.

Analysis: The assessee's books are audited and subject to stock control; no evidence was produced to show that the books suffer from any defect or that the comparator margin and its components (such as storage or handling charges) are applicable as a basis to reject the books. Rejection of book results requires a finding of a glaring or demonstrable defect. Absent such a finding, a mere comparison with an alleged standard margin is insufficient to make an addition.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) answered in favour of the assessee; the addition of Rs. 94,903 is deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by deleting the additions of Rs. 33,20,000 (treated under Section 68 and taxed under Section 115BBE) and Rs. 94,903 (gross profit adjustment), while other general grounds are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where undisputed, audited books of account show pre-existing cash balances sufficient to account for deposits of Specified Bank Notes and there is no proof that such books are fictitious or suffer from patent or latent defects, cash deposited during demonetisation cannot be treated as unexplained under Section 68; similarly, books of account cannot be rejected and additions made solely by comparing with an alleged standard margin without evidence of defect or inappropriate accounting.

Issues: (i) Whether a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank is entitled to deduction under section 80P despite section 80P(4); (ii) whether interest income is deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i); (iii) whether e-stamping income is deductible under section 80P(2)(c)(ii).

Issue (i): Whether a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank is entitled to deduction under section 80P despite section 80P(4).

Analysis: The controlling principle applied was that a state rural agricultural and rural development bank engaged in providing credit facilities to its members remains a co-operative society and is not a co-operative bank within the meaning of the banking law provisions. On that basis, section 80P(4) does not bar deduction where the entity is not treated as a co-operative bank, and the earlier view denying relief could not be sustained in light of the governing precedent.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P could not be denied on the ground of section 80P(4), and the claim was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest income is deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Analysis: Interest earned from various entities was treated as income attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members. Income that is directly attributable to the co-operative society's credit activity qualifies for deduction under the stated provision.

Conclusion: The interest income was held deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether e-stamping income is deductible under section 80P(2)(c)(ii).

Analysis: The e-stamping receipts were treated as incidental income arising from an authorized activity and falling within the category of eligible profits and gains of the co-operative society. The amount was considered within the scope of the statutory deduction claimed.

Conclusion: The e-stamping income was held deductible under section 80P(2)(c)(ii) in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The order restores the assessee's entitlement to deduction under section 80P for the relevant incomes, as the entity was not treated as a co-operative bank for the purposes of the exclusion and the receipts in question were found eligible for deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: A primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank engaged in providing credit facilities to its members is to be treated as a co-operative society and not as a co-operative bank for section 80P purposes, and income attributable to that activity remains deductible.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs.20,00,130/- made by the Assessing Officer under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The addition was founded solely on information from the Investigation Wing and a statement of a third party recorded during search proceedings, without independent corroborative material such as bank statements, transaction dates, places or modes of receipt linking the assessee to the alleged accommodation entries. The assessee consistently denied the transactions and filed an affidavit which the Assessing Officer did not rebut or investigate further. The name in the investigation annexure was a different entity and no nexus was established between that entity and the assessee. An addition under Section 69A cannot be sustained on unverified third-party information or mere suspicion; the Assessing Officer bears the burden to produce cogent evidence of possession of unexplained money. The absence of opportunity for cross-examination of the third party further undermined the reliability of the material. Given the lack of basic enquiries and corroboration, the appellate deletion was an appropriate exercise of fact-finding rather than a direction for a roving inquiry.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs.20,00,130/- is upheld in favour of the assessee.