Issues: (i) Whether duty-free raw cashew nuts imported under advance authorisation were diverted in breach of the actual user condition, the customs notification, and the Foreign Trade Policy, so as to sustain confiscation and duty demand; (ii) Whether penalty on the customs brokers was sustainable for merely facilitating clearance and transport of the goods.

Issue (i): Whether duty-free raw cashew nuts imported under advance authorisation were diverted in breach of the actual user condition, the customs notification, and the Foreign Trade Policy, so as to sustain confiscation and duty demand.

Analysis: The imported goods were covered by advance authorisations and were subject to the actual user condition under the notification and the Foreign Trade Policy. The evidence showed that the goods were not processed in the authorised premises, were routed to other units without permission, no proper accounts were maintained, and substantial quantities were sold in the local market or otherwise diverted. The Court treated the transfer to other units and the subsequent sales as contrary to the conditions of the exemption and the policy governing advance authorisation.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of Revenue. The confiscation and consequential duty liability were upheld against the importer and connected persons.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty on the customs brokers was sustainable for merely facilitating clearance and transport of the goods.

Analysis: The material showed that the customs brokers acted on the instructions received for clearance and dispatch, but there was no sufficient proof that they themselves participated in the diversion with an intention to evade revenue. Their role was confined to logistics and customs clearance, and the requisite mens rea for penalty was not established on the record as against them.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the brokers. The penalty imposed on them was not sustained.

Final Conclusion: The common judgment resulted in reversal of the Tribunal insofar as the importer-related appeals were concerned, while the appeals relating to the customs brokers failed, leaving the revenue's demand and confiscation intact against the importer side and the broker penalties set aside only where not justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods imported under advance authorisation must be used strictly in accordance with the actual user condition and the governing exemption conditions; unauthorised diversion, lack of accounting, and local sale justify denial of exemption and consequent customs action, while penalty on intermediaries requires proof of deliberate participation in the contravention.

Issues: Whether the National Company Law Tribunal correctly exercised its power under Section 59 of the Companies Act, 2013 to order rectification of the register of members, restore the shares to the registered shareholder and award damages/costs where duplicate share certificates were issued and shares were transferred without following prescribed procedure and due diligence.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined statutory provisions governing certificates and transfers (Sections 46, 56 and 59 of the Companies Act, 2013) and applicable regulatory guidelines (including SEBI Circular No. 1 (2000-2001) dated 09.05.2001 and transfer norms). The Tribunal analysed factual findings that the registered shareholder remained in possession of the original share certificate until dematerialisation request in 2018; that duplicate certificates were issued on the basis of belated/defective documents; that prescribed indemnity formats, notice and communication requirements and other prescribed checks were not complied with; that communications from the company/RTA were sent to an outdated address; and that material discrepancies existed in the documents submitted by the claimant (multiple inconsistent reasons for loss, non-standard indemnity, lack of evidence of payment). The Tribunal considered precedent (including Adesh Kaur v. Eicher Motors and Chalasani Udaya Shankar v. Lexus Technologies) establishing that where an open-and-shut case of fraud is shown and the aggrieved person is the victim, the Tribunal may exercise powers under Section 59 and order rectification and consequential reliefs. It rejected arguments that the petition was time-barred, that civil courts alone have jurisdiction over disputed title/forgery, or that non-joinder of the transferee barred relief, on the facts that the fraud was discovered only on dematerialisation and the statutory scheme and authorities permit Tribunal adjudication where powers are vested in it.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's order directing rectification of the register, restoration of the shares to the registered shareholder, or alternatively awarding damages equivalent to market value, together with costs, is upheld. The appeal is dismissed and the Tribunal's remedy under Section 59 in favour of the registered shareholder is affirmed.

Issues: (i) Whether the controversy raised by challenge to a provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is academic or infructuous and hence not amenable to adjudication by writ jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the impugned order quashing the provisional attachment dated March 29, 2022 should be set aside in view of subsequent confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority and availability of statutory appellate remedies.

Issue (i): Whether the controversy is academic or infructuous and not fit for writ adjudication.

Analysis: The provisional attachment was subsequently confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) of the PMLA and statutory appeals under Section 26 have been filed and remain pending. A comprehensive statutory scheme exists for adjudication, confirmation and appellate review of attachments under the PMLA. Where alternative efficacious statutory remedies are available and a later statutory determination (confirmation) has occurred, the dispute regarding the provisional attachment assumes an academic character.

Conclusion: The controversy is academic and not fit for fresh adjudication by writ jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned Single Judge order quashing the provisional attachment should be set aside in the circumstances.

Analysis: The provisional attachment dated March 29, 2022 had been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority on September 23, 2022. Given the confirmation and the existence of statutory appellate remedies, intervention by writ was restrained. Exceptional circumstances justifying departure from statutory remedy exhaustion were not found. Consequently, the earlier quashing order was rendered unsustainable in view of the subsequent statutory confirmation and the need to avoid multiplicity of litigation and protect public interest in preserving attached assets pending adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned order quashing the provisional attachment is set aside; the appeal is allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on the ground that the matter had become academic following confirmation of the provisional attachment by the Adjudicating Authority and because adequate statutory remedies under the PMLA are available; parties are directed to pursue the pending appellate proceedings expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory adjudicatory mechanism exists and a provisional attachment has been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority, writ intervention is ordinarily restrained and disputes rendered academic should not be adjudicated by writ courts, absent exceptional circumstances.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 1,25,98,834 made by the Assessing Officer on account of revaluation of closing stock is justified.

Analysis: The assessee is a society dealing in hardware items operating in remote locations. Stock verification statements and auditor-certified valuation reports were produced showing earlier downward valuation of old/damaged stock aggregating Rs. 99,10,235 up to 31.03.2014 and a further reduction of Rs. 26,88,599 during the relevant year, which together correspond to the claimed diminution in realizable value. The valuation exercise involved physical verification supervised by the Director of Societies, identification of old/damaged stock by branch heads, and estimation of realizable value with auditor approval; the methodology applied a percentage of MRP to estimate realizable value and was evidenced across years. The Assessing Officer did not invoke Section 145(3) to reject the audited books of account. On the record, the further reduction debited in the relevant year is limited to Rs. 26,88,599 and the overall valuation method is demonstrated as reasonable and non-arbitrary.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,25,98,834 on account of valuation of closing stock is deleted and the ground is allowed in part in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the adhoc 10% disallowance of miscellaneous/petty branch expenses debited under 'miscellaneous expenses' can be sustained where expenses are supported by internal vouchers and not specifically found non-genuine; (ii) Whether provisions for non-performing assets (NPA) created by the co-operative bank in accordance with RBI/NABARD guidelines are allowable deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the adhoc disallowance of 10% of miscellaneous expenses is sustainable.

Analysis: The authorities below disallowed 10% of miscellaneous branch expenses on the basis that records comprised internally generated petty vouchers and the genuineness of expenses could not be established. The Tribunal found no specific findings demonstrating non-genuineness and held that disallowance was made by presumption and estimation without plausible basis. The Tribunal referred to authorities prohibiting disallowance purely on conjecture.

Conclusion: The disallowance is not sustainable and is set aside; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the provisions for NPA created by the co-operative bank are deductible under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia) separately permits deduction in respect of provisions for bad and doubtful debts created inter alia by co-operative banks subject to specified limits, distinct from Section 36(1)(vii) which deals with write-offs. The assessee followed RBI/NABARD norms and supporting records were placed on record. The Tribunal held that the provision falls within the statutory scheme permitting deduction and that decisions cited by revenue on Section 36(1)(vii) are not apposite to provisioning under Section 36(1)(viia).

Conclusion: The provisions for NPA are allowable under Section 36(1)(viia); decision is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed and the additions/disallowances challenged in the appeals are deleted, resulting in a favourable outcome for the assessee across the assessed years.

Ratio Decidendi: Ad hoc disallowance based on estimation or presumption is impermissible; provisions for bad and doubtful debts created by a co-operative bank in accordance with RBI/NABARD norms are deductible under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court should interfere in writ jurisdiction with the seizure and the alleged extension of the period under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 on the basis of disputed questions of fact relating to authenticity, authority, and compliance. (ii) Whether immediate release of the seized goods or directions for forensic and mobile tower verification were warranted before completion of statutory adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court should interfere in writ jurisdiction with the seizure and the alleged extension of the period under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 on the basis of disputed questions of fact relating to authenticity, authority, and compliance.

Analysis: The dispute turned on factual questions concerning the genuineness of the extension document, the authority of the issuing officer, the timing of the show-cause notice, and the manner in which the seizure proceedings were conducted. Such questions could not be conclusively resolved without a full fact-finding enquiry. The matter was therefore treated as one that should be examined in the pending adjudication proceedings rather than in writ jurisdiction at an interlocutory stage.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted in writ jurisdiction on these disputed facts, and the challenge to the seizure and extension was not finally accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether immediate release of the seized goods or directions for forensic and mobile tower verification were warranted before completion of statutory adjudication.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority was regarded as the proper forum for deciding the merits of the show-cause notice and for considering evidence relating to alleged forgery and procedural compliance. In the absence of a sufficient basis to displace the ongoing statutory process, the Court declined to order immediate release of the seized assets or direct independent forensic inquiry at this stage. Instead, it protected the status quo and required expeditious completion of adjudication.

Conclusion: Immediate release and pre-adjudication forensic directions were declined, but the adjudication was directed to be completed expeditiously.

Final Conclusion: The challenge was not finally allowed on merits, but the appellant obtained limited procedural protection through an expedited adjudication direction and continuation of status quo over the seized assets.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seizure-related disputes depend on contested factual questions and the statutory adjudicatory process is still pending, writ interference at the interlocutory stage is not justified; such matters should ordinarily be left to the designated adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 7 application was maintainable where the principal default arose during the period protected by Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and whether, after excluding the portion of debt and default falling within Section 10A, the remaining default meets the minimum threshold under Section 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 provides for suspension of initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process in respect of defaults arising on or after 25 March 2020 for the specified protected period and expressly provides that no application shall ever be filed for defaults occurring during that period. The particulars of financial debt filed in Part IV of the original and the subsequent Section 7 petitions show that the principal instalments fell due in March, April and May 2020, dates that indisputably fall within the Section 10A protected period. The subsequent Section 7 petition, though reworking interest to exclude the Section 10A period, continued to claim the same principal amount, which on the pleadings crystallizes the date(s) of default within the prohibited period. Where a default is pleaded with specific dates that fall within Section 10A, that amount must be excluded for purposes of maintaining a Section 7 application. Once the principal amounts arising during Section 10A are excluded, only the post-Section 10A interest remained, and that amount fell below the statutory threshold prescribed under Section 4 for initiation of CIRP. Reliance on the concept of continuing default does not permit circumventing the statutory embargo created by Section 10A where the date(s) of default have been specifically pleaded within the protected period; the protection afforded by Section 10A would otherwise be nullified.

Conclusion: Issue (i) is answered against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent: the portion of debt which fell due during the Section 10A protected period must be excluded, and after such exclusion the remaining default does not meet the threshold under Section 4, rendering the Section 7 application non-maintainable; the appeal is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under section 76 of the Regulation; (ii) whether the notice of assessment of tax and interest under section 32 was barred by limitation; (iii) whether the impugned notices were vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under section 76 of the Regulation.

Analysis: The Regulation provides a complete appellate mechanism before the Appellate Tribunal. The Court reiterated that availability of an efficacious alternative remedy is a rule of self-imposed restraint, particularly in fiscal matters. The petitioner had also chosen to invoke the statutory objection procedure under section 74 and suffered an adverse reasoned order. Since the Tribunal was subsequently constituted and was functional, the disputes ought to be tested in the statutory forum rather than in writ jurisdiction. The challenge did not disclose any exceptional ground warranting bypass of the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy and the petitioners were to be relegated to the Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice of assessment of tax and interest under section 32 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The limitation plea depended upon disputed facts, including whether returns were duly filed and from which point the statutory period had to be computed. The respondents disputed the petitioner's factual foundation, and the returns were not placed before the Court. In these circumstances, limitation did not present a pure jurisdictional question fit for writ adjudication. The issue was better left to the statutory appellate forum, where evidence and factual controversy could be examined.

Conclusion: The notice was not held to be time-barred in writ jurisdiction, and the limitation objection was left to the statutory forum.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned notices were vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme did not require a pre-notice hearing before issuance of notices under sections 32 and 33. A post-decisional objection and hearing were available under section 74, and the petitioner in fact availed that remedy. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice caused by the absence of an earlier hearing. On that basis, the Court held that the notices were not invalid for violation of natural justice.

Conclusion: The notices were not vitiated by breach of natural justice.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were not entertained on merits and the matters were relegated to the statutory appellate remedy, with pre-August 19, 2025 cases directed to be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal and later cases dismissed so that all disputes could be decided under the statutory framework.

Ratio Decidendi: In fiscal matters, writ jurisdiction will ordinarily not be exercised where an effective statutory appellate remedy exists, especially when the dispute involves contested facts and the statute itself provides a post-decisional remedial mechanism; limitation and natural justice objections do not justify writ intervention unless they disclose a clear jurisdictional or exceptional infirmity.

Issues: Whether an assessee that has paid the assessed tax and interest and has not appealed against the assessment order is denied immunity from penalty merely for failure to file Form 68 under Section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 270AA grants immunity from penalty under Section 270A where the assessed tax and interest are paid within the prescribed period and no appeal is filed against the assessment order. The assessee fulfilled these substantive conditions after accepting the disallowance in the assessment framed pursuant to revision. Failure to file Form 68 was treated as a technical or venial procedural breach that could not defeat the vested substantive entitlement to immunity.

Conclusion: Non-filing of Form 68 does not disentitle the assessee from immunity under Section 270AA; the penalty under Section 270A is liable to be deleted. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a notice and assessment under Section 153C could validly be initiated where the deemed date of search in the case of the other person fell after 1 April 2021.

Analysis: Under the first proviso to Section 153C(1), the relevant search date for the other person is the date on which seized material is received by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over that person. As the actual receipt date was not available on record, the satisfaction-note date, 10 May 2022, was treated as the deemed receipt and search date. Section 153C(3), inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, excludes the application of Section 153C to searches initiated, or seized material requisitioned, on or after 1 April 2021.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 153C and the consequential assessment were without legal authority and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest awarded under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation for compulsorily acquired agricultural land is taxable as income from other sources after application of Section 57(iv), Section 56 and Section 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The adopted reasoning distinguished interest under Section 28, which is an accretion to the value of the land and forms part of enhanced compensation, from interest for delayed payment under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The amendments concerning taxation of interest on compensation were directed to the timing of taxation of interest and did not alter the character of Section 28 interest as part of enhanced compensation. The contrary High Court decision was not applicable in preference to the Supreme Court position; dismissal of a special leave petition without reasons did not create a binding declaration of law.

Conclusion: Interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 formed part of enhanced compensation and was not assessable as income from other sources; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest earned by a co-operative credit society from bank deposits of surplus funds maintained in connection with its credit-facility business is deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was a co-operative credit society providing credit facilities exclusively to its members and was required under its governing regulatory framework to maintain deposits and reserve funds. The interest arose from funds connected with that business. The governing decisions establish that a credit society not holding an RBI banking licence is not a co-operative bank excluded by section 80P(4), and that income attributable to its credit-facility business qualifies for deduction. Interest on deposits of its own business funds retains its business character; the contrary treatment in Totgar's was confined to interest on members' sale proceeds temporarily retained by a society engaged principally in marketing agricultural produce.

Conclusion: The interest income of Rs.35,43,169 was business income eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and not income from other sources; the addition was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether the benefit of the enhanced 10% tolerance band in relation to stamp duty valuation applies retrospectively so as to restrict the addition made under section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the difference between the declared consideration and the stamp duty value is below 10%.

Analysis: The addition arose from the difference between the purchase consideration and the stamp duty valuation of immovable property. The Tribunal followed its earlier co-ordinate bench decisions holding that the amendment introducing the tolerance band is curative in nature and relates back to the date when the anti-avoidance provision was inserted. Since the difference in the present case was 9.91%, it fell within the permissible tolerance limit. The same principle was held applicable to section 56(2)(vii)(b), with the result that the deeming addition based on stamp duty value could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The retrospective benefit of the 10% tolerance band was applied, and the addition sustained by the first appellate authority was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative amendment introducing or enlarging a tolerance band for minor variations between declared consideration and stamp duty valuation applies retrospectively where it removes unintended hardship in an anti-avoidance provision.

Issues: (i) whether tax liability of a deceased assessee can be recovered from the legal representative under Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) whether the assessment order passed after the assessee's death without notice, hearing, and reasons could stand in view of Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): whether tax liability of a deceased assessee can be recovered from the legal representative under Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 93 specifically creates liability in the hands of the legal representative where the assessee dies, including where the business has been discontinued, and permits recovery out of the estate of the deceased to the extent the estate can meet the charge.

Conclusion: The liability, if assessed in accordance with law, is recoverable from the estate of the deceased through the legal representative; the petitioner is not immune from such liability.

Issue (ii): whether the assessment order passed after the assessee's death without notice, hearing, and reasons could stand in view of Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Where adverse tax liability is proposed, an opportunity of hearing must be afforded, and the order must set out relevant facts and the basis of decision. The legal heir was not independently noticed or heard before the order was passed after the assessee's death, and the order did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a reasoned determination.

Conclusion: The assessment order was unsustainable and liable to be quashed for violation of the mandatory hearing and speaking-order requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the impugned assessment was set aside, and the respondents were left free to proceed afresh in accordance with law against the estate of the deceased after giving due opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax liability of a deceased assessee may be fastened on the legal representative under Section 93, but any assessment against the legal representative must comply with the mandatory requirements of prior hearing and a reasoned order under Section 75.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of alleged bogus purchases under section 69C could be sustained where the assessee produced purchase invoices, sales invoices, bank statements and ledger entries, and the Assessing Officer relied only on investigation material without independent enquiry or cross-examination.

Analysis: The assessee had furnished detailed documentary material supporting the purchases and corresponding sales, and the payments were shown through banking channels. The books of account and book results were not shown to be defective. The Assessing Officer relied on the investigation report and statements of third parties, but no corroborative independent enquiry was made and no effective opportunity of cross-examination was granted. In such circumstances, the material relied upon was insufficient to displace the documentary evidence produced by the assessee or to sustain the entire addition as unexplained expenditure.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was , and the Revenue's challenge failed. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether tax was deductible under section 194LBC on Excess Interest Spread paid by a securitisation trust to the originator.

Analysis: Section 194LBC applies only where income is payable to an investor in respect of that investor's investment in the securitisation trust. The originator had not subscribed to pass-through certificates or otherwise invested in the trust, and had maintained its minimum retention requirement through cash collateral. Excess Interest Spread was the residual surplus under the transaction waterfall and did not arise from an investment in the trust. Both statutory conditions for deduction at source were therefore absent.

Conclusion: The payment of Excess Interest Spread to the originator was not subject to tax deduction at source under section 194LBC; the assessee was not an assessee in default, and the demand under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) was liable to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax deduction under section 194LBC arises only where payment is made to an investor in respect of its investment in a securitisation trust; a residual payment to an originator without such investment does not attract the provision.

Issues: (i) Whether gas compressors manufactured for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems were classifiable under Heading 8414 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles; (ii) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments could be sustained on the ground of suppression of facts and wilful misstatement, and consequentially whether the quantification had to proceed under Section 73.

Issue (i): Whether gas compressors manufactured for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems were classifiable under Heading 8414 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles.

Analysis: The classification exercise was held to depend on the tariff scheme under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 read with the GST rate notification, including the relevant Section Notes and the General Rules for Interpretation. On a conjoint reading of Section Note 2, Section Note 2(e) and Section Note 3 to Section XVII, the goods were treated as parts intended solely for use in motor vehicle air-conditioning systems and not as standalone gas compressors under Heading 8414 for GST rate purposes. The specific heading under Chapter 87 was preferred over the more general Chapter 84 entry, and the Department's view that Heading 8708 applied was accepted.

Conclusion: The classification under Heading 8708 was upheld and the challenge to the rival classification under Heading 8414 failed.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments could be sustained on the ground of suppression of facts and wilful misstatement, and consequentially whether the quantification had to proceed under Section 73.

Analysis: The Court found that the assessees' classification had been consistently adopted over time and had been accepted by the Department, indicating a bona fide classification dispute rather than concealment or deliberate suppression. In such circumstances, invocation of the extended period under Section 74 and the associated penal consequence was not justified. The Court therefore set aside the proceedings to that extent and directed the matter to be reworked on the basis of the proper classification with quantification under the normal provision.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74 was held unsustainable and the matter was remitted for quantification under Section 73.

Final Conclusion: The Department's classification stand was sustained, but the extended-period and suppression-based proceedings were not. The matter was sent back only for fresh computation of tax and penalty under the normal limitation regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a product is specifically designed and used only as a component of motor vehicles, tariff classification must follow the more specific heading applicable to that vehicle part, and an extended limitation/penalty provision cannot be invoked absent wilful suppression or intent to evade tax in a bona fide classification dispute.

Issues: (i) Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. (ii) Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (iii) Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Issue (i): Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.

Analysis: Section 24(1)(a) applies where acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act had commenced but no award had been made before commencement of the 2013 Act. In such cases, the acquisition continues, but the award-making stage is governed by the 2013 Act, save that rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are not retrospectively imported into proceedings initiated under the earlier Act. The provision is a savings clause designed to extend the beneficial regime of the 2013 Act to pending matters at the stage of compensation determination.

Conclusion: The proceedings were correctly treated as governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, and the awards had to be made under the 2013 Act, apart from rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 74 prescribes a limitation period for appeals to the High Court, and its proviso only permits a further period within which the delayed appeal may still be entertained. The 2013 Act does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, and Section 103 states that the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force. Read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the absence of express exclusion means that Section 5 remains available. The statutory scheme does not justify reading an implied exclusion into Section 74.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.

Issue (iii): Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Analysis: Since Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied, and the matters involved appeals against awards under the 2013 Act, the delay applications were liable to be considered on the liberal standard of sufficient cause. The Court found no reason to remit the matters for further delay adjudication and preferred to avoid prolonging the litigation.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the first appeals was condoned and the applications were allowed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned High Court orders were set aside to the extent they had rejected condonation, and the first appeals were permitted to proceed on merits under the 2013 Act regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribing a limitation period does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 remains applicable by virtue of Section 29(2); and for pending land acquisition proceedings culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) requires application of the 2013 Act at the award stage.

Issues: Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 36(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 are unconstitutional or ultra vires, or whether they must be read down so as not to deny input tax credit to a bona fide recipient who has complied with the other conditions for availing credit.

Analysis: Input tax credit is part of the GST scheme designed to avoid cascading of tax. The provision under challenge made entitlement to credit depend on the supplier having actually paid the tax to the Government, even though the recipient has no practical mechanism to verify or control the supplier's compliance. The Court held that this places an onerous and impossible burden on a bona fide purchaser, and that the statute failed to distinguish between honest purchasing dealers and defaulting or collusive transactions. Following the line of authority that a bona fide recipient cannot be penalised for the supplier's default, the Court held that the provision need not be struck down if it is confined by interpretation to non-bona fide, collusive, or fraudulent transactions. Rule 36(4) was treated consistently with that approach.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) and Rule 36(4) were upheld in validity but read down so that denial of input tax credit is confined to transactions that are not bona fide or are collusive or fraudulent, and not to a bona fide recipient who otherwise satisfies the statutory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax credit condition that makes a bona fide recipient's entitlement depend on the supplier's act of remittance, despite the recipient having no effective control over that act, must be read down to avoid unconstitutional arbitrariness and to preserve the credit mechanism in genuine transactions.

Issues: Whether medicines and consumables supplied by a hospital pharmacy to in-patients during the course of diagnosis and treatment form part of a composite supply of healthcare services and are exempt under the relevant GST exemption entry.

Analysis: Health care services rendered by a clinical establishment are exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). Inpatient services include the complete gamut of hospital services provided under the direction of medical doctors till discharge, and the classification notes specifically encompass medical, pharmaceutical, nursing, laboratory and other allied services. Medicines and consumables supplied to in-patients are naturally bundled with the principal healthcare service and are supplied in conjunction with it in the ordinary course of business. Under section 2(30), such a bundle is a composite supply, and under section 8(a) it takes the tax character of the principal supply.

Conclusion: The supply of medicines and consumables to in-patients by the hospital pharmacy is part of a composite supply of healthcare services and is exempt under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read with section 8(a) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Where medicines and consumables are supplied to in-patients as an integral and naturally bundled part of hospital treatment, the supply is a composite supply whose tax treatment follows the exempt principal supply of healthcare services.