Issues: (i) Whether successive registration of FIRs (FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025) constituted a mala fide abuse of the criminal process to keep petitioner No.1 in custody and whether petitioner No.1 is entitled to be released on bail in those FIRs; (ii) Whether coercive action should be restrained against petitioner No.2 during the pendency of the petition.

Issue (i): Whether successive FIRs were mala fide and whether petitioner No.1 is entitled to bail in FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025.

Analysis: The petition record shows that petitioner No.1 had been called for inquiry in an earlier FIR and that two subsequent FIRs were registered after this Court had granted interim bail; the timing and sequence of registrations and remands indicate a pattern aimed at prolonging custody. Applicable constitutional provisions invoked include Article 32 read with Article 142 and the petition raised alleged violations of Articles 14, 19 and 21. Criminal law framework includes offences alleged under specified sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The registrational chronology, remand orders following grant of bail by this Court, and the absence of prior prosecution activity over many years were treated as material in assessing whether the process was being abused to frustrate the effect of bail.

Conclusion: Petitioner No.1 is entitled to be released on bail in FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether coercive action should be restrained against petitioner No.2 during the pendency of the petition.

Analysis: Petitioner No.2 had not been arrested at the time of decision. Given the findings on the pattern of successive FIRs and the need to protect personal liberty while investigation proceeds, a protective restraint on coercive steps was considered appropriate, subject to cooperation with the investigation.

Conclusion: No coercive steps shall be taken against petitioner No.2 subject to her cooperation with the investigation. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed; petitioner No.1 is directed to be released on bail in the specified FIRs and coercive action against petitioner No.2 is restrained on the stated condition, thereby providing protective relief to the petitioners while preserving investigative rights of the State.

Ratio Decidendi: Where successive criminal proceedings are instituted in sequence after judicial bail to defeat the effect of that bail and to perpetuate custody without independent supporting circumstances, such registrations constitute abuse of process and justify grant of bail and protective restraint on coercive action.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court order directing listing of the contempt petition for framing of charges can be sustained without a clear and categorical direction as to existence of a right and mode of compliance, and whether the respondents should be permitted to challenge the Government order dated 09.05.2025 by filing a writ petition to be taken up along with the contempt proceedings.

Analysis: The Court examined the sequence of writ orders, executive orders and repeated remands/reconsideration directed by the High Court, noting the absence of a clear, categorical finding by the High Court establishing a right and specifying the manner of compliance such that the executive would have no discretion. The Court also considered the propriety of invoking contempt jurisdiction when an appealable or challengeable executive order (09.05.2025) existed and remained unchallenged. Applying principles that courts must issue clear directions when seeking compliance and that contempt should not be used as a substitute for available challenges to executive action, the Court directed that the respondents be permitted to file a writ petition against the 09.05.2025 order and required the High Court to first decide that writ petition (hearing petitioners and State) and to refrain from remanding the matter back to the authorities; if the High Court finds merit it must issue clear and categorical directions for compliance, otherwise it may dismiss the writ petition with reasons.

Conclusion: Permission is granted to respondents to file a writ petition against the order dated 09.05.2025; the High Court shall take up that writ petition along with the contempt proceedings, decide the writ petition on merits without remanding the matter to the authorities, and either issue clear directions for compliance or dismiss the writ petition with reasoned findings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a court's order lacks a clear, categorical identification of a legally enforceable right and a specified mode of compliance, contempt proceedings are inappropriate; instead, parties must be permitted to challenge the executive order by ordinary writ remedy and courts should issue explicit directions or dismiss the challenge after reasoned consideration.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.43,79,941 under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating long-standing foreign trade creditors as ceased/remitted liabilities and thereby taxable in AY 2013-14 was correctly sustained by the authorities.

Analysis: The assessment under challenge arose from treatment of longstanding trade creditors as having ceased/remitted, attracting chargeability under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The material on record showed that the amounts remained recorded as liabilities in the assessee's books for the year under consideration, were not written off or admitted as waived during that year, and confirmations and transactional documents were placed before the assessing authority. Subsequent waiver and write-back were offered to tax by the assessee in AY 2024-25, indicating that no cessation or remission had occurred in the year under consideration. The invoking of Section 41(1) requires existence of cessation/remission or acquisition of benefit in respect of the trading liability in the year; that condition was not established by the revenue for the year under consideration on the available record.

Conclusion: Addition under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is deleted; decision in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Look-Out Circulars (LOCs) issued and continued at the instance of respondent banks against the petitioners are legally sustainable, and whether such LOCs should be quashed and permission to travel abroad granted.

Analysis: The Court examined the governing framework for issuance and continuation of LOCs, including Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the consolidated Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021, and relevant precedents holding that LOCs are coercive executive measures affecting the fundamental right to travel and must be exercised sparingly and in accordance with law. The jurisprudence requires that LOCs ordinarily be limited to cases involving cognizable offences where tangible material shows deliberate evasion or a proximate likelihood of absconding, and that the exceptional power under Clause 6(L) of the Office Memorandum be narrowly construed for grave national or systemic threats. The Court reviewed authorities holding that requests for LOCs by principal officers of public sector banks lack lawful foundation and that mere commercial defaults or association with an accused, without concrete material of complicity, do not justify LOCs. Applying these principles to the record, the Court noted absence of material demonstrating that the petitioners were deliberately evading process, that their continued departure would threaten sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, or national economic interests in the exceptional sense required, and that the petitioners had cooperated and previously complied with conditions imposed by courts.

Conclusion: The Look-Out Circulars issued against the petitioners are quashed. The petitioners are directed to furnish undertakings to the trial Special Judges confirming continued cooperation and to obtain prior permission from the competent trial courts for future foreign travel.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice dated 28.10.2025 issued under Section 74(1) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, alleging wrongful availing and utilisation of input tax credit under Section 17(5)(d) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is valid and whether the blocked input tax credit of Rs. 98,11,678/- should be unblocked.

Analysis: The Court examined the scope of Section 17(5)(d) which bars input tax credit in respect of goods or services received for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery). The facts establish that the petitioner acquired leasehold rights and transferred sub-plots and was not shown to have undertaken any construction activity; the respondent has not demonstrated that the petitioner engaged in construction within the meaning of Section 17(5)(d). The Court further considered Section 74(1), which requires fraud, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts to invoke the penal recovery provisions; there is no finding or contention that the petitioner committed fraud or wilful suppression. The record also shows that the petitioner had reversed an inadvertently utilised ITC and that the respondent had already blocked credit in the electronic ledger, supporting that the credit was not utilised for output tax liability at the time of blocking.

Conclusion: The impugned notice dated 28.10.2025 issued under Section 74(1) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is quashed and set aside; the respondent is directed to unblock the input tax credit amounting to Rs. 98,11,678/- in the petitioner's electronic credit ledger and to take necessary action within three weeks. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, under Rule 86-A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, the authority blocking an assessee's electronic credit ledger must communicate the reasons recorded for invoking Rule 86-A, permit the assessee to file a reply and additional documentary evidence, afford a personal hearing and thereafter pass a speaking order on the assessee's representation seeking revocation of the blocking.

Analysis: Rule 86-A confers a drastic power to block electronic credit ledgers where there are reasons to believe that input tax credit has been fraudulently availed or the assessee is ineligible. Prior judicial authority requires that, although notice prior to blocking may not be mandated by the text of the Rule, principles of natural justice oblige communication of the reasons recorded in writing so as to enable the assessee to make an effective representation. Following receipt of reasons and any objections or additional evidence, the authority must consider the submissions and pass a reasoned order either revoking the blocking or explaining why the request cannot be acceded to, within reasonable timelines.

Conclusion: The respondent is directed to allow the petitioner to file a reply and additional documentary evidence within one week from receipt of this order, to issue notice and fix a date for personal hearing, and on hearing the petitioner to decide the representation dated 06.01.2026 by either revoking the blocking of the electronic credit ledger or passing a speaking order explaining the refusal, within the specified timeframes set out in the order. This grants the petitioner procedural relief to seek deblocking and a reasoned decision (in favour of petitioner for entitlement to procedural remedy).

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in deciding I.A. No.2300 of 2023 concerning entitlement to profits accrued during CIRP without impleading and hearing the Successful Resolution Applicant, and whether the impugned order should be set aside and the I.A. revived for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Resolution Plan in which the appellant was the Successful Resolution Applicant had been approved by the Committee of Creditors and by the Adjudicating Authority prior to the hearing and decision of I.A. No.2300 of 2023. The appeal record shows the application before the Adjudicating Authority was decided without the appellant being impleaded or given an opportunity to file a response, despite the decision having direct potential to affect the appellant's rights under the approved Resolution Plan. The appeal court noted that the issue raised in the application (entitlement to profits accrued during the CIRP) required consideration with the appellant heard, and that procedural fairness and necessity of being a party justified setting aside the impugned order and directing fresh consideration by the Adjudicating Authority.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 11.03.2024 is set aside; I.A. No.2300 of 2023 is revived before the Adjudicating Authority; the Appellant is permitted to be impleaded as Respondent No.2 and to file a reply within two weeks; parties have liberty to apply for fixing a date for fresh consideration and the Adjudicating Authority is requested to decide the application expeditiously. No opinion is expressed on the merits of the contentions of the parties.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee is an "eligible assessee" within the meaning of Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (post amendment) for purposes of reference to the Dispute Resolution Panel; (ii) Whether the assessment framed by the Income Tax Officer was without jurisdiction or barred by limitation, including by reason of absence of a transfer order under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee qualifies as an "eligible assessee" under Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 after the amendment effective 01.04.2020.

Analysis: The Court examined the amended text of Section 144C(15)(b) as effected by the Finance Act with effect from 01.04.2020 and the temporal sequence of notices and proceedings. The Court noted that the amendment expanded clause (ii) to include any non-resident not being a company, and that the Section 148 notice was issued after the amendment came into effect. The Court also considered the assessee's participation in proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Panel and statutory provisions regarding participation and consequences of such proceedings.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the assessee. The assessee is an eligible assessee within the meaning of Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (post amendment).

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order dated 10.01.2023 was without jurisdiction or barred by limitation, including in the absence of a transfer order under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Court considered the sequence of notices (including notice under Section 142(1) and notice under Section 148), the reference to the Dispute Resolution Panel, and the relevant limitation provisions. The Court held that reference to the Dispute Resolution Panel under Section 144C extends the limitation for passing assessment orders as contemplated by Section 144C read with the limitation provisions. The Court observed that the assessee had engaged with the Draft Assessment Order by filing an objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel, and that statutory provisions and the assessee's conduct precluded permitting a belated challenge to jurisdiction based on absence of a transfer order or limitation where Section 144C procedures applied.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the assessee. The assessment order is not barred by limitation and is not invalid for want of a transfer order; the challenge to the assessment on these grounds is rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the assessment order is dismissed; the Court grants liberty to the assessee to challenge the merits of the assessment before the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from receipt of this order.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the amended definition of "eligible assessee" in Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 applies and the matter is taken up under Section 144C before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the limitation for passing the assessment is extended under Section 144C read with the limitation provisions, and the assessees covered by the amended definition cannot successfully impugn the assessment as time-barred or for lack of a transfer order when they are subject to Section 144C proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the protective addition of alleged cash payment (on-money) can be sustained where the substantive addition in respect of the same transaction against a co-purchaser has been deleted on merits and there is no independent corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The decision examines seized electronic records and statements recorded from persons associated with the developer, which purportedly show agreement values and higher actual sale prices with cash components. The seized material did not, however, directly identify individual buyers' cash payments, and no contemporaneous diaries or documents from buyers were produced to corroborate third-party statements. The substantive addition against the co-purchaser was deleted on merits by the First Appellate Authority after consideration of relevant facts. Given that the addition in the present case was made on a protective basis and the only material is third-party seized material and statements lacking independent corroboration, the protective addition cannot be allowed to survive as a substantive finding against the assessee.

Conclusion: The protective addition of Rs. 52,40,950 made on account of alleged on-money is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A protective addition based solely on third-party seized material and statements, without independent corroborative evidence and where a substantively identical addition against a co-purchaser is deleted on merits, cannot be converted into a substantive addition and must be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner (Exemptions) was justified in cancelling the assessee-trust's registration under section 12AB(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of suspicion regarding source of a donation.

Analysis: The issue required examination of the scope of section 12AB(4) (and related provisions) which permits cancellation of registration only upon satisfaction that one or more specified violations have occurred-examples include application of income other than for the objects of the trust, carrying on non-incidental business without separate books, activities not genuine or not in accordance with registration conditions, non-compliance with other material laws, or obtaining registration by false information. The statutory framework distinguishes between assessment inquiries into source of income and the limited inquiry for registration under sections 12A/12AB which focuses on genuineness of activities and application of income to objects. The regulatory provisions under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (and its rules) define "foreign contribution" and prescribe separate compliance obligations but do not by themselves convert receipt of a donation into a statutory ground for cancellation under section 12AB(4) unless a specified violation is established. The facts show the assessee had longstanding charitable activities (running hospitals and dispensaries), maintained statutory registrations including FCRA registration, filed requisite donor returns under rule 17AA, and no finding was recorded by the Commissioner that any specified violation (as defined in section 12AB(4) Explanation) had in fact occurred or that income was applied otherwise than for the trust's objects. The cancellation rested on suspicion about the source of one donation and on the Commissioner's view that the donation may be foreign-sourced, whereas procedure and powers under section 12AB(4) require satisfaction of specified violations supported by evidence and afforded opportunity of hearing; mere suspicion without incriminating material does not meet that standard. The enquiry steps available to revenue (including summons under section 131) were not fully employed to secure corroborative evidence; reliance on assessment-type provisions (such as section 68) or on unproven donor-source concerns cannot substitute for a recorded finding of a specified violation under section 12AB(4).

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the Commissioner (Exemptions) erred in cancelling the registration. There was no recorded finding of any specified violation under section 12AB(4), and cancellation based on suspicion about donor source was not sustainable. The impugned order cancelling registration under section 12AB(4) is set aside and the registration under section 12A is restored in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Cancellation of a trust's registration under section 12AB(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a recorded satisfaction that one or more statutory "specified violations" have occurred; mere suspicion regarding the source of donations, absent evidence that income has been applied otherwise than for the trust's objects or other specified violations, does not justify cancellation.

Issues: Whether a co-developer approved under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 is eligible to claim deduction under section 80-IAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and whether the second proviso to section 80-IAB(2) precludes such a claim where the whole SEZ is not fully developed or where the original developer has not absolutely extinguished rights.

Analysis: Section 80-IAB, as introduced by section 27 and the Second Schedule of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, adopts the meanings of "Developer" and "Special Economic Zone" from the SEZ Act. Section 2(g) of the SEZ Act expressly includes a co-developer within the definition of "Developer," while sections 3(11) and 3(12) provide the statutory mechanism for approval of co-developers. The second proviso to section 80-IAB(2) permits deduction to a transferee developer on transfer of operation and maintenance; its language focuses on the transfer of operation and maintenance and continuity of the incentive period, not on completion of the entire SEZ or absolute divestment of all rights by the original developer. The SEZ legislative and regulatory framework contemplates phased development and statutory recognition of co-developers assuming operation and maintenance responsibilities. On the facts, the assessee was approved as a co-developer, assumed long-term operational control of six fully operational warehouses by lease and derived profits from authorised SEZ operations. Procedural objections regarding electronic form fields and production of the original developer's returns do not negate substantive eligibility where the original developer did not claim the deduction and departmental verification is available to prevent duplication.

Conclusion: The assessee, as an approved co-developer, is entitled to claim deduction under section 80-IAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the profits derived from operation and maintenance of the specified warehouses; the deduction claimed for Assessment Years 2018-19, 2020-21 and 2021-22 is allowed subject to arithmetical verification of quantum and eligible period under section 80-IAB(2).

Issues: Whether credit on items such as welding electrodes, jointing sheets and other items used for maintenance, repair, upkeep or fabrication of plant and machinery is admissible as being "used in or in relation to manufacture".

Analysis: The Court examined the scope of the expression "used in or in relation to manufacture" and applied settled legal principles holding that the phrase has wide import and includes items used in the process of manufacture whether directly or indirectly and whether contained in the final product or not. The Court considered prior authority which held that items used for maintenance, repair, upkeep or fabrication of plant and machinery are encompassed within items "used in" manufacture and therefore qualify for credit.

Conclusion: Credit on welding electrodes and similar items used for maintenance, repair, upkeep or fabrication of plant and machinery is admissible; the appeals are allowed in terms of the cited judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: The expression "used in or in relation to manufacture" is to be interpreted broadly to include all items used in the process of manufacture (directly or indirectly), including items used for maintenance, repair, upkeep or fabrication of plant and machinery, and such items qualify for input credit.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order dated 28.10.2025 can be sustained or whether the matter should be remitted to the assessing officer for fresh adjudication and whether recovery proceedings and bank attachment should be kept in abeyance subject to conditions imposed by the Court.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order which was passed ex parte following non-response to Show Cause Notice in Form DRC-01 dated 10.06.2025 and noted overlapping proceedings arising from a subsequent Show Cause Notice dated 23.09.2025 where certain demands were dropped. The Court observed that parts of the demand confirmed in the impugned order related to matters that had been considered in the later proceedings and found that duplication and procedural defects warranted fresh consideration. The Court considered the petitioner's lack of notice, initiation of recovery and attachment of bank accounts, and balanced these with the need to protect revenue by imposing interim financial conditions to secure the disputed tax while allowing an opportunity for fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the State Tax Officer for fresh adjudication on merits. The petitioner is directed to deposit 10% of the disputed tax (in cash or from electronic cash ledger) within thirty days and to file a reply to the Show Cause Notice dated 10.06.2025 with supporting documents; on compliance, recovery proceedings are to be kept in abeyance and bank attachment lifted. If the petitioner fails to comply, the 1st Respondent may resume recovery as if the writ petition were dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted conditional relief by remitting the assessment for fresh consideration while protecting the revenue through specified interim deposits and procedural safeguards; the writ petition is disposed of subject to these conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition challenging the adjudication order imposing service tax, penalty and interest when the assessee has an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 and has not placed on record documentary proof to substantiate entitlement to exemptions under Notification No. 25/2012-ST and Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: The adjudication order under challenge assessed service tax, cess and penalties after recording that the assessee had not submitted work orders, invoices, reconciliation statements or other documentary evidence to support claims of exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 and Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012. The statutory framework provides an appellate remedy under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 which requires a prescribed pre-deposit; constitutional and precedential authorities recognise such a remedy as alternative and efficacious. Where an exemption is claimed under a notification, the onus lies on the claimant to place requisite materials before the adjudicating authority to demonstrate compliance with the notification's conditions. Invocation of extended period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was premised on alleged suppression and the material available to the adjudicating authority. The petitioner sought to place additional documents for the first time before this Court; however those documents were not before the adjudicating authority at the time of decision. The Limitation Act, 1963 (Section 14) principles were applied to exclude the period of pendency of the writ if an appeal is filed.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the adjudication order is not entertained on the ground that an alternative and efficacious remedy under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994 exists and the petitioner had not placed the necessary documentary material before the adjudicating authority to substantiate exemption claims. The petitioner is permitted to file an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta, with the period of pendency of the writ petition excluded for limitation purposes, and to produce such documents as may be necessary to support the claimed exemptions.

Issues: Whether interest under section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied on the ground that the delay in refund processing was attributable to the assessee, and whether the Assessing Officer could exclude the period of delay without a determination by the authority named in sub-section (2).

Analysis: Interest on refund under section 244A is the normal consequence, and denial is permissible only where the delay is attributable to the assessee or the deductor. Under section 244A(2), any question as to the period to be excluded must be decided by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, whose decision is final. The Assessing Officer could not unilaterally refuse interest merely by stating that the assessee had failed to claim the TDS in the revised return. The factual record also showed that the revised return followed recasting of accounts after the approved scheme of arrangement and that the assessee had notified the CPC and the Assessing Officer about the technical glitch in the TDS reflection.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to interest under section 244A, and the denial of such interest by the Assessing Officer was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings in favour of the assessee on entitlement to refund interest were left undisturbed, and no substantial question of law was found to arise.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in refund processing is alleged to be attributable to the assessee, exclusion of the corresponding period for section 244A interest must be determined by the statutory authority specified in section 244A(2), and the Assessing Officer cannot deny interest on his own.

Issues: Whether an assessment order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which is issued without affording an assessee a personal hearing despite a specific written request violates the principles of natural justice and requires setting aside of the assessment.

Analysis: The Court noted that the assessee specifically requested an opportunity for personal hearing in its written reply to the show-cause notice and that the Assessing Officer proceeded to pass the final assessment order without affording such hearing. The Court considered whether strict compliance with a specified mode (clicking a "seek video conferencing" button) in the show-cause notice could be treated as a condition that completely precludes granting a hearing by any other compliant means. The Court referred to and followed prior High Court decisions which held that an assessee's request for personal hearing must be honoured and that denying a hearing on the ground of non-use of a prescribed electronic button amounted to an impermissible technical curtailment of the assessee's right to be heard. The Court observed that oral or video-conferencing hearing is not an absolute right in every case, but once a right to be heard is invoked in the manner used by the assessee, the Assessing Officer must afford an opportunity and should not refuse it on hyper-technical grounds. The Court left all factual and substantive issues open for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer after affording the hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment order dated March 20, 2025 passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is set aside for violation of the principles of natural justice for having been passed without affording the personal hearing requested by the assessee; the matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh assessment after affording an opportunity of hearing by video conferencing.

Issues: Whether the competent authority erred in refusing to grant a 'NIL' rate tax withholding certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 2026-27 where (i) facts are substantially identical to those decided by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and (ii) the payments are not exigible to tax as 'royalty' or through a permanent establishment.

Analysis: The application under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 sought issuance of a 'NIL' rate certificate on the ground that payments received do not constitute income chargeable to tax in India as royalty and that the applicant is a tax resident of a treaty country. The matter involves earlier Tribunal findings on substantially similar facts holding that the payments were not royalty. The impugned order relied instead on an assessment order already set aside by the Tribunal and did not record distinguishing facts. Orders under Section 197 operate to prevent inappropriate tax deduction at source where tax is not exigible; while such deductions may be adjusted at assessment, granting a certificate at the correct rate is necessary to give effect to the statutory scheme and to avoid frustration of Section 197's purpose. The competent authority is required to follow the Tribunal's concurrent factual findings on identical or closely similar facts unless material distinctions are recorded after giving notice and opportunity to the applicant.

Conclusion: The impugned order and the consequential certificate are set aside and a 'NIL' rate certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to be issued for the assessment year 2026-27 within fifteen days. The competent authority is directed to continue issuing 'NIL' rate certificates for subsequent years within thirty days of application unless a recorded finding of permanent establishment or taxable transactions in India is made after issuing notice to the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an application under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 raises issues already conclusively determined by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on substantially similar facts, the competent authority must follow the Tribunal's findings and grant the appropriate rate certificate unless material distinctions are recorded after giving notice to the applicant.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal erred in refusing to direct refund of the portion of a refund for Assessment Year 2005-06 which was wrongfully adjusted in excess of 20% of the demand for Assessment Year 2020-21 contrary to the Tribunal's earlier stay order, and whether the Respondents must be directed to refund the excess amount with interest.

Analysis: The Tribunal had on January 17, 2025 granted a conditional stay of recovery for AY 2020-21 directing that only 20% of the outstanding demand be adjusted from the refund due for AY 2005-06 and that the balance be stayed. Despite that order, the Respondents adjusted the entire refund on February 17, 2025. The Tribunal later extended the stay but declined to direct immediate refund of the excess adjustment. The High Court examined the record, including the challans evidencing the full adjustment, the Tribunal's stay order limiting adjustment to 20%, and the absence of any vacating or amendment of that order prior to the February 17, 2025 adjustments. The Court found the Respondents' action of adjusting the entire refund during the subsistence of the Tribunal's order to be contrary to and in violation of the Tribunal's conditional stay, and noted that the Tribunal gave no valid reason to refuse directing a refund of the excess adjustment.

Conclusion: The impugned portion of the Tribunal's order is set aside. The Respondents are directed to refund Rs. 28,55,26,240 (the amount adjusted in excess of 20% of the demand) for Assessment Year 2005-06, together with interest as per law, to the Petitioner within three weeks from the date of uploading of the High Court order. The Tribunal's stay of recovery for AY 2020-21 continues to operate with this modification.

Issues: Whether the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) could issue directions or record findings after a final assessment order under Section 144C(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had been passed, and whether the DRP's findings regarding non-intimation to the Assessing Officer should be considered.

Analysis: Section 144C permits the DRP to issue directions "to enable" the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment (see Section 144C(5)) and contemplates consideration and issuance of directions while assessment proceedings are pending (see Section 144C(6), (7), (8), (11), (12) and (13)). Those provisions presuppose that the assessment is not finalised because the directions are for guidance to complete the assessment and are time bound. Where a final assessment order under Section 144C(4) has been passed, the statutory scheme shows that assessment proceedings have ended and the DRP's power to issue directions or make findings in relation to completing the assessment no longer subsists. Applying that statutory framework to the present facts, the DRP should have dismissed the objections as functus officio once the final assessment order was already passed and ought not to have recorded findings on whether intimation was given to the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The DRP had no power to issue directions or record findings after the final assessment order was passed; the DRP's findings regarding non-intimation to the Assessing Officer are unwarranted and shall not be considered by the appellate authority when deciding the pending appeal.

Issues: Whether the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite filing the audit report in Form No.10CCB after the due date for electronic filing but before processing/assessment, and whether such filing satisfies the statutory requirement for claiming the deduction.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the statutory requirement to furnish the audit report in Form No.10CCB in relation to a claim under Section 80IB(10) is satisfied by filing the Form after the due date for return but before processing/assessment under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal considered precedent where coordinate benches and higher courts have distinguished exemption provisions from deduction provisions and have held that, for deductions under Chapter VIA, filing the requisite audit certificate before the final order of assessment/processing can cure non-filing with the return. The Tribunal noted that the Form was uploaded prior to processing of the return and relied on prior Tribunal decisions (including Sahyadri Farmers Producer Company Ltd. and Desai Infra Projects (I) Pvt. Ltd.) which allowed similar deductions where the audit report was available before completion of assessment processing.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that since the audit report in Form No.10CCB was furnished before processing/assessment under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee cannot be denied the deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is set aside and the claim is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: For deductions under Chapter VIA (including Section 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961), filing the required audit report before the processing/final order of assessment suffices to satisfy the statutory filing requirement and entitles the assessee to the deduction even if the Form was not filed with the return by the due date.