Issues: Whether the writ petition could be entertained in Delhi when the award, the pending challenge under Section 34, and the recovery proceedings all had their substantial connection with Agra, and whether the doctrine of forum conveniens required relegation to the court having the dominant territorial nexus.

Analysis: The territorial reach under Article 226 depends not on any isolated or slender fact, but on whether the pleaded facts form a material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action. Even where some consequence of the impugned action is felt within the forum, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriately connected with the lis. The decision-making authority, the underlying arbitral proceedings, the pending Section 34 proceedings, and the recovery steps were all centred at Agra, while the Delhi connection was only incidental. The writ remedy, being discretionary, could not be treated as available merely because a recovery notice was received within Delhi.

Conclusion: The petition was not fit to be entertained in Delhi and the petitioner was required to pursue remedies before the court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

Issues: Whether failure to consider the conditional nature of the assessee's non-pressing of reopening grounds, despite liberty to raise legal and factual issues in the departmental appeal, constituted a mistake apparent from the record warranting recall of the appellate order.

Analysis: The withdrawal letter placed before the first appellate authority expressly made non-pressing of the reopening grounds subject to relief being granted on the other grounds. Further, while dismissing the assessee's cross-objection and cross-appeal as withdrawn, liberty had been reserved to raise all factual and legal issues in the departmental appeal. The appellate order nevertheless rejected the reopening challenge on the premise of an unconditional non-pressing and did not adjudicate those issues. This omission, coupled with non-consideration of the assessee's submissions before issuing directions, disclosed a mistake apparent from the record amenable to rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The order in the departmental appeal was recalled for de novo adjudication, with the assessee entitled to raise the reserved legal and factual grounds.

Issues: Whether deduction for investment in a new residential property could be denied because income from a tannery building was assessed under the head 'Income from house property'.

Analysis: The assessee owned one self-occupied residential house and a tannery that was let out. Classification of rental income from the tannery under the head 'Income from house property' did not establish that the tannery was a residential house. The relevant requirement concerns ownership of more than one residential house, other than the new asset, and not the head under which income from a commercial building is assessed.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 54F; denial of the deduction was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether interest awarded under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation for compulsorily acquired land is taxable as income from other sources under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The interest awarded under Section 28 is an accretion to the value of the acquired land and forms part of enhanced compensation, unlike interest for delayed payment under Section 34. The amendments concerning taxation of interest on compensation were directed at the timing of taxation of interest income and did not alter the character of Section 28 interest. The adopted reasoning further treated the contrary view as inapplicable in light of the governing Supreme Court position.

Conclusion: Interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 forms part of enhanced compensation and is not assessable as income from other sources; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest awarded under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land is taxable as income from other sources after applying the statutory provisions concerning such interest.

Analysis: Interest under section 28 is an accretion to the value of the acquired land and forms an integral part of enhanced compensation, unlike interest for delayed payment under section 34. The statutory amendments governing taxation of interest on compensation address the year of taxability of interest receipts and do not alter the character of section 28 interest as part of enhanced compensation. The governing Supreme Court position supporting this characterisation remained applicable; a contrary High Court view rendered without considering the subsequent Supreme Court affirmation could not displace it.

Conclusion: Interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 forms part of enhanced compensation and is not taxable as income from other sources; it is eligible for the applicable exemption available to the enhanced compensation.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the show cause notice, order-in-original and GST demand should be entertained when the petitioner raised the plea of amalgamation and non-existence of the earlier GST registration for the first time before the writ court, and whether the petitioner should be relegated to the appellate remedy.

Analysis: The dispute concerned reversal of input tax credit for the period July 2017 to March 2018 under Section 16(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Section 41 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner's amalgamation-related contention involved disputed facts and had not been urged before the adjudicating authority, where the petitioner had not responded to the show cause notice or appeared for personal hearing. In these circumstances, the writ court found it appropriate to leave the factual controversy to the statutory appellate forum and to permit consideration of delay if an appeal was filed promptly with the requisite deposit.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy, with liberty to seek condonation of delay before the appellate authority.

Issues: Whether the impugned order imposing penalty for alleged non-fulfilment of export obligation could be sustained when the petitioner complained of non-service of the show cause notice and hearing notices and sought an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: The dispute turned on compliance with principles of natural justice in the adjudication of the alleged export-obligation default. The petitioner asserted that the notices were only uploaded on the website and that no effective opportunity of hearing was granted. The respondents stated that the communications had been sent to the email address available with them, but also indicated readiness to afford a hearing. In that backdrop, the Court found it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and restore the matter for fresh consideration with notice and hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority to hear the petitioner and receive documents on the specified date, failing which the impugned order would revive.

Ratio Decidendi: An order imposing adverse fiscal consequences cannot be sustained where effective opportunity of hearing is not shown to have been afforded, and the proper course is to set aside the order and remit the matter for fresh adjudication after granting hearing.

Issues: Whether the company appeals were barred by limitation and whether the delay in filing could be condoned by reckoning limitation from the date of uploading of the impugned order and by excluding the time taken to obtain the certified copy.

Analysis: The appeals arose from orders pronounced in open court on 01.08.2025. The statutory period under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 had to be counted from the day after pronouncement. The party seeking exclusion under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was required to apply for a certified copy within the limitation period so as to claim exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining it. The record showed that the certified copy was applied for only on 29.09.2025, long after expiry of the initial limitation period, and no reliable material established that the impugned order was first uploaded only on 26.09.2025. The gap between pronouncement and uploading, even if assumed, could not extend the limitation in the absence of a timely application for the certified copy. Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not advance the case on these facts.

Conclusion: The delay could not be condoned and the appeals were held to be time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, limitation runs from pronouncement in open court, and exclusion of time for obtaining a certified copy under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is unavailable unless the application for the copy is made within the prescribed limitation period.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer's ad-hoc disallowance of 20% of "other expenses" under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable in the absence of any specific defect, infirmity, or rejection of books of account where the assessee furnished detailed ledger accounts, party-wise break-up and TDS particulars and maintained audited books under Section 44AB.

Analysis: The legal framework requires the Revenue to point out specific defects in vouchers or demonstrate that particular expenditures are not incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes before making disallowances. Estimation or rule-of-thumb disallowances are permissible only where accounts are unreliable, incomplete, or books are rejected. On the facts, the assessee produced detailed ledger entries, party-wise details, invoices, proof of payment, and TDS particulars; the books of account were audited under Section 44AB and were not rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer made a blanket 20% disallowance without identifying any specific unverifiable transaction or defect and the Revenue failed to impeach the 477-page ledger or supporting records even after remand.

Conclusion: The ad-hoc disallowance of 20% of the other expenses is unsustainable and is deleted; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the Assessing Officer's disallowance is not confirmed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether registration charges incurred by the seller on transfer of immovable property were allowable as a deduction while computing capital gains.

Analysis: The sale deed recorded an agreement that the seller would bear the purchase and registration expenses. The purchasers were identifiable from the registered deed, and the Revenue did not produce contrary evidence or independent verification to disprove the payment or the contractual allocation of such expenses. In the absence of a dispute on the remaining components of capital gains computation, the claimed registration charges were held to be a genuine outgoing incurred by the assessee in connection with the transfer.

Conclusion: The disallowance of registration charges was not justified and the deduction was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the addition relating to registration charges was deleted, with the capital gains computation accepted on the assessee's claim for transfer-related expenses.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a transfer deed expressly places the burden of registration or incidental transfer expenses on the seller, and the Revenue fails to rebut the documentary evidence, such expenditure is allowable in computing capital gains.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction for indexed cost of improvement claimed on sale of immovable property.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 348 days in filing the appeal should be condoned and the appeal admitted for adjudication.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the affidavit and reasons for delay, considered whether the delay was bonafide, whether the assessee gained by the delay, and applied justice-oriented principles and precedent guidance to assess whether condonation is warranted.

Conclusion: Delay condoned and appeal admitted.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction for indexed cost of improvement of the property sold, where documentary proof of expenditure is not available but the registered sale agreement describes a constructed triple-storeyed building.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the absence of detailed documentary evidence of the claimed improvement expenditure, the registered sale agreement's description confirming the existence of constructed residential building, the claimed amounts and their per square foot implication, and the deceased status of the assessee with representation by legal heir. Balancing the lack of documentary proof against the factual indication of construction and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal exercised discretion to allow a portion of the claimed improvement cost.

Conclusion: 80% of the improvement cost claimed by the assessee is to be allowed for computation of indexed cost of improvement; the Assessing Officer is directed to compute revised indexed cost adopting 80% of the claimed improvement amounts and grant the corresponding deduction. The finding of the lower authority on this point is set aside and the grounds of appeal are partly allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by condoning the delay and granting partial relief on the claimed indexed cost of improvement, resulting in a revision of capital gains computation in favour of the assessee to the extent indicated.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary proof of claimed improvement expenditure is lacking but the registered sale deed establishes the existence of significant construction and equity demands relief, the Tribunal may grant a reasonable proportionate allowance of claimed improvement cost for computing indexed cost of improvement, subject to recalculation by the assessing authority.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order passed without personal hearing and relying solely on notices uploaded on the GST portal, without effective service, should be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration; and whether the bank attachment effected pursuant to that order should be released.

Analysis: The Court examined the record and found that the show cause notice and related communications were uploaded on the GST portal but the petitioner did not receive any personal notice and no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded prior to passing of the impugned assessment order. The respondent conceded that no personal hearing was provided. The Court applied the statutory methods of service under Section 169(1) of the GST Act and observed that while portal upload is a valid mode of service, the issuing officer must, where there is no response from the taxpayer, explore other modes of service prescribed by the statute (including registered post/RPAD) to make service effective and to ensure the taxpayer is given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Court noted that merely completing formalities by portal upload and proceeding ex parte leads to ineffective service and multiplicity of litigation. Considering that the disputed tax amount had been recovered, the Court held that remand for fresh consideration with an opportunity for the petitioner to file objections and to be heard was appropriate. The Court further reasoned that because the impugned order was set aside, any attachment of the petitioner's bank account made pursuant to that order could no longer subsist and ought to be released immediately on production of this order.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 15.09.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration; the petitioner is granted three weeks to file reply/objections and the respondent shall give 14 days clear notice fixing a date for personal hearing before passing fresh orders; the attachment on the petitioner's bank account is to be released and the bank instructed to de-freeze the account upon production of this order. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration dated 21.05.2025 should be revoked and registration restored, having regard to the petitioner's failure to file returns for six months due to health reasons and the petitioner's willingness to file outstanding returns and pay tax, interest and penalty.

Analysis: The petitioner did not file GST returns for a period of six months on account of health problems and now expresses willingness to file all outstanding returns and pay tax dues with applicable interest and penalty. The respondent confirmed cancellation of registration by the impugned order dated 21.05.2025. On the facts before the Court, revocation of the cancellation is considered appropriate provided safeguards are imposed to protect revenue interest. The order restores registration subject to conditions which include enabling the petitioner to file returns on the GST portal, filing all outstanding returns within four weeks of restoration and payment of tax dues with interest and belated filing fee, prohibition on utilising any unapproved input tax credit until scrutiny and approval by competent department officers, and automatic cessation of the benefit if conditions are not complied with.

Conclusion: Revocation of the cancellation of GST registration dated 21.05.2025 is granted in favour of the assessee subject to the specified conditions (portal adjustments, filing of outstanding returns within four weeks with payment of tax, interest and belated filing fee, and scrutiny/approval of any input tax credit before utilisation).

Issues: Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction of the indexed cost of acquisition (including land share and construction) under section 55(2)(ac) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and to have the sale of the property treated as long-term capital gain, notwithstanding that the assessing officer treated the entire sale consideration as unexplained income without allowing cost of acquisition.

Analysis: The facts, as recorded, show that the property was acquired in 1994-95 (land purchased 4 February 1995; construction in 1995-96) and sold by registered deed on 11 January 2016 for Rs. 14 lakhs. The assessing officer and the first appellate authority treated the entire sale consideration as unexplained income without granting any deduction for cost of acquisition despite having the sale deed on record indicating date and components of acquisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessee held an undivided 1/9th share in the land and also bore the cost of construction; these elements constitute the cost of acquisition. Given the availability of information to the assessing officer regarding the date and nature of acquisition, the officer was duty-bound to allow the deduction of the indexed cost of land and construction and then compute long-term capital gain chargeable to tax in the hands of the legal heir. The Tribunal observed that the primary claim pressed before it was limited to grant of indexed cost and computation as long-term capital gain, and other issues were not pressed.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on the limited ground that the assessing officer shall grant deduction of the cost of acquisition of the land (1/9th undivided share) and the cost of construction, indexed to the year of acquisition, and thereafter compute the long-term capital gain chargeable to tax in the hands of the legal heir. The grounds impugning the non-grant of indexed cost are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) despite the return of income being filed on 31-10-2019, and whether the applicable due date was 31-10-2019 in view of the audit requirement under the Punjab State Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was required to get its accounts audited under section 48(1-A) of the Punjab State Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. Pending the statutory audit, a special audit report had been obtained before the return was filed. Explanation-2(a)(ii) to section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies where accounts are required to be audited under the Act or any other law in force, and in such a case the due date is 31st October. Since the return was filed on 31-10-2019, it was within the prescribed due date. The earlier denial of deduction on the premise of delay was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the deduction under section 80P(2)(d), and the disallowance was aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 3,40,000 made under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as unexplained cash investment in the purchase of a residential flat is justified.

Analysis: The assessment arose from reassessment proceedings initiated under Sections 147, 144 and 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 following information obtained during action under Section 133A; records showed a ledger mentioning a cash payment of Rs. 3,40,000 towards purchase of the flat. The assessee argued (i) the flat was jointly purchased and payments should be examined in the husband's hands, and (ii) alternatively, the cash payment was made from gifted cash withdrawn by the assessee's mother-in-law, with bank statements and a gift declaration to be produced. The first contention was not accepted on the record of joint purchase and reassessment. The alternative contention involved documentary proof that could not be verified before the Tribunal; in the interest of justice a remand was directed to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for verification of the mother-in-law's bank statement and gift declaration and for fresh decision after granting a fair opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: Issue is partly decided in favour of the assessee; the addition of Rs. 3,40,000 under Section 69 is remitted to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for verification of the gift evidence and for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 1,23,383 made u/s. 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for unexplained money can be sustained where the assessee produced bank statements, identity proofs and declarations from alleged lenders explaining the receipts as small loans received through banking channels.

Analysis: The recorded receipts consist of multiple small transactions in the assessee's bank account during the relevant period. The assessee furnished the bank passbook/statement showing the transactions, identity documents of the alleged lenders and signed declarations from those lenders explaining the nature of the receipts as loans. The documentary material was examined in the light of the statutory provision for unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the requirement that the nature and source of cash credits or receipts be satisfactorily explained by the assessee. The evidence shows contemporaneous banking entries and corroborative declarations identifying lenders and amounts, which address the statutory concern regarding source of funds.

Conclusion: Addition of Rs. 1,23,383 made u/s. 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is deleted; the assessee's explanation of the receipts as small loans supported by bank entries, identity proofs and declarations is accepted and the ground of appeal is allowed.

Issues: Whether the deduction claimed under section 80GGA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for a donation of INR 1,00,000 to Navjeevan Charitable Trust is admissible or is to be disallowed as a bogus donation in view of statements and material seized during search proceedings on the trust.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee (bank payment, donation receipt, registration/notification and Form No.58A) against the departmental material arising from a lawful search and survey on the trust, which included trustee statements admitting refunding cheque donations in cash after deducting commission and ledgers seized showing donor lists. The decision applies the principle that exemption and deduction claims must be substantiated and that, where the Department produces credible and corroborative material from search/survey indicating an organised accommodation-entry racket and admissions by the donee, the onus rests on the assessee to rebut that material with cogent evidence. The Tribunal also considered that prior registrations or payment through banking channels do not alone establish genuineness when post-donation evidence demonstrates refunds in cash and accommodation entries; coordinating precedents relied upon by the assessee were held factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80GGA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the donation of INR 1,00,000 is disallowed as the donation is held to be bogus; the assessee's appeal on this issue is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the learned CIT(A) erred in directing the Assessing Officer to allow credit for TDS not reflected in Form 26AS and/or not deposited by the deductor on the basis of evidence produced and an indemnity bond, without independent confirmation of deposit under section 199(1) read with Rule 37BA.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the return, 143(1) intimation, rectification proceedings and the particulars of short granted TDS claimed by the assessee. The learned CIT(A) directed the AO to grant TDS credit as reflected in Form 26AS and to verify claims for TDS deducted but not reflected in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee and an indemnity bond. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s direction was conditional and required the AO to carry out necessary verification rather than ordering an outright grant of credit. The Tribunal therefore examined whether the CIT(A) had bypassed the statutory verification mechanism or improperly shifted the onus to the AO without safeguards, and found that the CIT(A) expressly required verification before granting credit.

Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the findings of the learned CIT(A), concluding that there was no infirmity in directing the AO to verify records and evidence (including Form 26AS and indemnity bond) before allowing TDS credit. The Revenue's grounds challenging that direction are dismissed and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed; the assessee's cross objection is rendered infructuous and dismissed.

Issues: Whether assessments already completed by an order under Section 147 read with Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be reopened by issuance of a fresh notice under Section 148A(b) and consequent notice under Section 148 (new regime) following the decisions in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal.

Analysis: The petitions challenge assessment orders dated 30.03.2023 (arising from notices and proceedings under the new regime) on the ground that earlier assessment orders pursuant to proceedings under the old regime had already been passed. The legal framework comprises the substituted provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 effective from 01.04.2021, the directions in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal treating certain pre- and post-1.4.2021 notices as deemed show-cause notices under section 148A(b), and the further clarifications in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal regarding the application of the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 and the surviving limitation period for issuance of reassessment notices. Where an assessment had already been completed earlier (resulting in an assessment order under section 147/144), the purpose and finality of reassessment proceedings precludes reopening the same assessment by issuing fresh notices under section 148A(b) and section 148. The Supreme Court directions operate to validate and prescribe procedure for notices that had not culminated in an assessment within the surviving time limits, but do not mandate reopening assessments which were earlier completed on the merits.

Conclusion: Writ petitions are allowed; impugned assessment orders set aside to the extent they attempt to reopen assessments already concluded. Relief is granted in favour of the petitioner (assessee).