Issues: Whether the second application for regular bail was liable to be allowed despite the prior rejection of bail, dismissal of the SLP, and the alleged active role attributed to the applicant in the offence.

Analysis: The application was considered as a second bail request after earlier rejection on merits and dismissal of the SLP. The material on record, including the prosecution version, the charge-sheet, the sanction for prosecution, the search and seizure proceedings, and the allegation of the applicant's involvement in the conspiracy and raid, was taken into account. The distinction drawn between the applicant's role and the bail granted to a co-accused did not persuade the Court to hold that the applicant's case stood on the same footing. No sufficient or compelling ground was found to justify release on bail.

Conclusion: The second bail application was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A second bail application will not be allowed where the record reflects active involvement in the offence and no sufficient change in circumstances is shown to warrant departure from the earlier refusal of bail.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 79 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on showing sufficient cause. (ii) Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential proceedings were valid when approval under the reassessment provisions was granted by an authority not competent under the applicable time-limit structure.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 79 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on showing sufficient cause.

Analysis: The delay was explained on the basis of the assessee's limited legal awareness, reliance on the accountant, and the need to deal urgently with attachment and release of the bank account. The explanation was found to be bona fide and not motivated by dilatory conduct. A liberal approach to "sufficient cause" was applied to advance substantial justice.

Conclusion: The delay of 79 days was condoned and the appeal was admitted.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential proceedings were valid when approval under the reassessment provisions was granted by an authority not competent under the applicable time-limit structure.

Analysis: Under the post-2021 reassessment regime, prior approval under the specified statutory hierarchy is a jurisdictional precondition for issuing a notice and for passing the order deciding whether reassessment should proceed. Where the alleged escapement was below the threshold and more than three years had elapsed from the end of the assessment year, approval could not lawfully be granted by the authority that sanctioned it in this case. Non-compliance with the prescribed approval requirement affected jurisdiction and rendered the reassessment notice invalid.

Conclusion: The notice under reassessment was held to be bad in law and was quashed, with the consequential proceedings also falling.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded, the reassessment was annulled on jurisdictional grounds, and the merits of the addition were rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, compliance with the statutorily prescribed approval hierarchy is a jurisdictional condition precedent, and breach of that requirement invalidates the notice and all consequent proceedings.

Issues: Whether addition for alleged on-money receipts on sale of flats could be sustained solely on digital data and documents seized from an independent third-party broker, without corroborative material from the assessee.

Analysis: The additions for the two flats rested on digital data and documents recovered from an independent broker, while no incriminating material was found from the assessee. The broker was neither an employee nor a partner/director of the assessee, and the material was not corroborated through independent evidence. The presumption concerning seized material under Section 132(4) was confined to the person from whom the material was found and could not, without corroboration, establish undisclosed receipts of the assessee in an assessment under Section 143(3).

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,17,00,000 for alleged on-money receipts was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether revision under section 263 was valid where the assessment accepted exemption of interest on enhanced compensation without examining the governing statutory provisions and binding jurisdictional precedent; (ii) Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources or exempt as compensation under section 10(37); (iii) Whether a faceless assessment shifted the applicable jurisdictional High Court from Punjab and Haryana to Delhi; (iv) Whether approval for reopening, alleged invalidity of the assessment order, or initiation following an audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal invalidated the revisionary proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether revision under section 263 was valid where the assessment accepted exemption of interest on enhanced compensation without examining the governing statutory provisions and binding jurisdictional precedent.

Analysis: Revision under section 263 requires that the assessment order be both erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. The assessment order contained no examination of the taxability of interest on enhanced compensation, the statutory treatment under sections 145B(1), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv), or the binding decisions of the jurisdictional High Court. Mere collection of material without a conscious enquiry, application of law, or reasoned view did not constitute a valid enquiry. The possible-view principle did not apply because the assessment order disclosed no reasoned adoption of a permissible view and disregarded mandatory provisions and binding precedent.

Conclusion: The assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue, and revision under section 263 was valid. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources or exempt as compensation under section 10(37).

Analysis: The post-amendment statutory scheme specifically charges interest on compensation or enhanced compensation under section 56(2)(viii), taxes it on receipt basis under section 145B(1), and permits only the prescribed deduction under section 57(iv). Binding jurisdictional precedent treated such interest as income from other sources. Section 10(37) applies to capital gains arising from compulsory acquisition of agricultural land; it cannot override the specific charging and computation scheme governing interest on enhanced compensation.

Conclusion: Interest on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources and is not exempt under section 10(37). This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a faceless assessment shifted the applicable jurisdictional High Court from Punjab and Haryana to Delhi.

Analysis: The faceless assessment mechanism is procedural and does not alter territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction remained determined by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, whom the assessee had identified as situated at Chandigarh. Consequently, Punjab and Haryana High Court decisions bound the Assessing Officer, whereas decisions of the Delhi High Court and coordinate benches had no overriding force.

Conclusion: Faceless assessment did not shift the applicable jurisdictional High Court to Delhi. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether approval for reopening, alleged invalidity of the assessment order, or initiation following an audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal invalidated the revisionary proceedings.

Analysis: Approval under section 151 for reopening is a distinct prima facie exercise and neither determines the merits nor restricts the independent revisionary power under section 263. An assessment order remains operative unless set aside or declared void in appropriate proceedings; its alleged defects could not render it non est in the revision appeal. An audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal may provide information or trigger scrutiny, provided the Principal Commissioner independently examines the record and forms the required satisfaction. The record and revision order demonstrated such independent application of mind.

Conclusion: None of the technical objections invalidated the exercise of revisionary jurisdiction. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary orders requiring fresh assessment in accordance with the statutory scheme governing interest on enhanced compensation were legally sustainable across all connected matters.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the consequential assessment could be sustained where approval for issuance of notice was granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax rather than the competent Chief Commissioner of Income Tax.

Analysis: For the relevant reassessment action, approval under Section 151 for issuance of notice under Section 148 was required from the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. The approval was instead accorded by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The applicable CBDT instructions and the adopted coordinate-bench ruling treated approval by the Principal Commissioner as incompetent, rendering the notice and all consequential proceedings invalid.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential assessment were invalid for want of approval by the competent authority; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment was invalid for want of notice under Section 143(2) where no return was filed in response to notice under Section 148; (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 10(26) on the bank deposits; (iii) Whether the cash deposits in the bank accounts were assessable as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was invalid for want of notice under Section 143(2) where no return was filed in response to notice under Section 148.

Analysis: The additional legal ground was admitted because it arose from the existing record and required no factual verification. Notice under Section 143(2) is required only where the assessee files a valid return. As no return was filed either under Section 139 or in response to the notice under Section 148, issuance of such notice was not required.

Conclusion: The reassessment was not invalid for absence of notice under Section 143(2), against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 10(26) on the bank deposits.

Analysis: Tribal status, residence certificates and GST registration did not establish that the deposits represented income derived from a legitimate business carried on within the specified area. The assessee neither maintained nor produced books of account, bills, vouchers, financial statements or a computation of business income. Section 10(26) exempts qualifying income computed under the Act and does not exempt the entire receipts or bank deposits.

Conclusion: Exemption under Section 10(26) was rightly denied, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cash deposits in the bank accounts were assessable as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Analysis: The assessee failed, including in remand proceedings, to substantiate the nature and source of the substantial cash deposits through reliable evidence. Bank statements, GST returns and supplier agreements without supporting business records did not establish a legitimate source for the deposits.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69A for unexplained bank deposits were sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment and the tax treatment of the unexplained deposits remain legally sustainable, and no exemption is available on the unsubstantiated deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no return is filed in response to a notice under Section 148, notice under Section 143(2) is not a prerequisite to the reassessment.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders passed under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, stood deemed to be withdrawn under Section 62(2) after the returns were filed and the taxes, interest, penalty and late fee were paid.

Analysis: The assessment orders had been issued on the footing that the returns had not been filed. The record showed that the returns in Form GSTR-3B were subsequently filed for the relevant periods and that the amounts due under those returns were also paid. In those circumstances, the deeming provision under Section 62(2) became operative and the earlier assessment orders could not survive.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were deemed to have been withdrawn, and the petition was allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether depreciation on the in-house software, claimed in the books, could be excluded while computing the assessee's PLI under TNMM for benchmarking the international transaction; (ii) Whether certain comparables were liable to be excluded on the ground of excessive turnover and whether the question of functional dissimilarity required fresh examination.

Issue (i): Whether depreciation on the in-house software, claimed in the books, could be excluded while computing the assessee's PLI under TNMM for benchmarking the international transaction.

Analysis: Under Rule 10B(1)(e) and Rule 10B(3), net profit margins under TNMM are to be compared after making reasonably accurate adjustments for differences that materially affect profitability. The assessee demonstrated that the major portion of its depreciation related to capitalised in-house CRM software, that this depreciation materially distorted its margin in the impugned year, and that the software's revenue impact became meaningful only in later years. The material difference between the assessee's margin and the comparables' depreciation profile justified a year-specific adjustment for benchmarking purposes.

Conclusion: The exclusion of depreciation on the in-house software for PLI computation was upheld, and the TPO was directed to recompute the PLI accordingly.

Issue (ii): Whether certain comparables were liable to be excluded on the ground of excessive turnover and whether the question of functional dissimilarity required fresh examination.

Analysis: Comparability under TNMM must be evaluated with reference to functions, assets and risks, and turnover materially affects comparability. Companies with turnover many times higher than the assessee's were found unsuitable, and the upper turnover filter was held applicable on the facts. As to the functional dissimilarity objections, the record showed that the assessee's functional profile in the transfer pricing study was broader than pure software development, while the objections had not been fully examined at the lower stages; therefore the matter required reconsideration on a proper factual basis.

Conclusion: The comparables with excessive turnover were directed to be excluded, and the functional dissimilarity objections were remitted to the TPO for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was not sustained in its existing form; the assessee succeeded on the depreciation adjustment and turnover-based exclusion of comparables, while the remaining comparability issue was sent back for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Under TNMM, a materially distortive item affecting the tested party's margin may be adjusted if the adjustment is reasonably accurate, and comparability must account for functional similarity and turnover-related differences that materially affect profit margins.

Issues: Challenge to cancellation of GST registration and consequential directions for revocation and restoration of registration.

Analysis: The writ petition questioned cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration for alleged non-filing of returns and non-payment of tax. Relief was granted by directing the petitioner to apply for revocation, file draft returns, deposit all tax dues within the stipulated time, and, if the revocation plea is accepted, complete the pending returns after restoration of registration. Provision was also made for manual filing if online filing posed difficulty.

Conclusion: The petitioner was given an opportunity to seek revocation of cancellation, subject to compliance with the stated directions, and the writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability and expiry of the statutory appellate remedy under the CGST Act; (ii) whether the petitioner was entitled to correction of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and consequential reconsideration of the denial of transitional credit.

Issue (i): whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability and expiry of the statutory appellate remedy under the CGST Act

Analysis: The challenge was not a routine grievance against an assessment, but one seeking correction of a bona fide mistake in the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms. The relief sought was treated as one beyond the effective powers of the statutory authorities under the CGST framework and therefore within the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, non-availment of the appellate remedy within limitation was held not to bar the writ petition.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the petitioner was entitled to correction of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and consequential reconsideration of the denial of transitional credit

Analysis: The record showed that the original transitional credit claim had been verified and a substantial part was found eligible. The revised filings were found to have omitted the figures in the earlier forms, and the omission was accepted as a bona fide mistake. The denial of any opportunity to correct the revised forms was considered likely to result in double taxation, and a liberal approach was adopted where no tax evasion was alleged. Accordingly, the impugned order and demand were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered after permitting rectification and after giving an opportunity of hearing and document production.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to rectification of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and to fresh consideration of the transitional credit claim.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment and demand were quashed, the petitioner was allowed to rectify the revised transitional forms, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a revised transitional return omits earlier claimed credit due to a bona fide mistake and the statutory remedy is ineffective for correction, writ jurisdiction may be exercised to permit rectification and require fresh consideration of the claim.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose intervention application had been disposed of and who did not challenge that order, could still maintain an appeal against the liquidation order under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The right of appeal under Section 61 is available to a person aggrieved, but that status depends on the legal effect of prior orders. The appellant had sought intervention in the liquidation proceedings, and the Tribunal's order disposing of that application was treated as a rejection of intervention. Since that order was not challenged, it attained finality. In these circumstances, the appellant could not bypass the concluded order on intervention and directly assail the liquidation order as an aggrieved person. The earlier orders closing the stay application and the intervention application therefore controlled the appellant's standing in the appeal.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to maintain the appeal against the liquidation order, and the challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A party whose request to intervene has been finally rejected and who does not challenge that rejection cannot later invoke the appellate remedy as a person aggrieved against the subsequent substantive order in the same proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the earlier assessment order dated 28.11.2025 and the subsequent order dated 08.12.2025, insofar as they pertain to the same discrepancy between Form GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B, result in duplication of proceedings and double taxation and are liable to be quashed; (ii) Whether the impugned order dated 08.12.2025 was passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing because notices were uploaded on the GST portal and the order is liable to be set aside with directions for fresh consideration.

Issue (i): Whether two assessment orders covering the same discrepancy amount to duplication and double taxation and whether the earlier order must be quashed.

Analysis: The Court examined the fact that the 28.11.2025 order addressed only the discrepancy between Form GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B and that the 08.12.2025 order again quantified the same issue leading to two orders for the same taxable event. The Court treated the two orders as covering the identical issue and noted that such repetition produces overlapping liability and double taxation.

Conclusion: The earlier order dated 28.11.2025 is quashed on account of duplication of proceedings and resulting double taxation. The conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the order dated 08.12.2025 was passed without personal hearing due to notices being uploaded on the GST portal and whether that order should be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration subject to conditions.

Analysis: The Court analysed the process of service via the GST portal and the petitioner's assertion that they were unaware of the show cause notice and were not furnished an original notice or afforded personal hearing. Having regard to the absence of an opportunity of personal hearing and the Court's view that the assessment confirmed proposals from the show cause notice without personal hearing, the Court considered remedial directions including conditional payment and remand for fresh hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 08.12.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration after compliance with the Court's directions; this conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The Court quashed the earlier order dated 28.11.2025 and set aside the subsequent order dated 08.12.2025, remanding the matter to the appropriate officer for fresh consideration after the petitioner pays 25% of the disputed tax within four weeks, files a reply within three weeks of payment, and is granted a personal hearing; the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative orders resulting in duplication of liability for the same taxable discrepancy are unsustainable and must be quashed, and an assessment confirmed without affording an opportunity of personal hearing (where service was effected electronically and the party was unaware) vitiates the order and warrants setting aside and remand for fresh consideration subject to conditions laid down by the Court.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration dated 08.04.2025 should be revoked.

Analysis: The petitioner attributed non-filing of returns for six months to severe mental stress and physical illness and expressed willingness to file outstanding returns and pay tax dues with interest and fee. The impugned order cancelled the GST registration. The petitioner seeks restoration of registration to enable compliance. The order sets conditions for restoration including technical steps to enable filing on the GST portal, timelines for filing outstanding returns and payment of dues with interest and fee, and restrictions on utilization of any unapproved input tax credit pending departmental scrutiny and approval. The conditions also provide that failure to comply will terminate the benefit granted.

Conclusion: The cancellation of GST registration dated 08.04.2025 is revoked and the petitioner's registration is restored subject to the specified conditions; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to substitute the valuation method chosen by the assessee under Rule 11UA(2) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 when determining fair market value for the purposes of section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the assessee qualifies as a "venture capital undertaking" and hence falls within the proviso to section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 such that consideration received from a venture capital fund is not exigible to tax under that clause.

Issue (i): Whether the Assessing Officer can change the valuation method adopted by the assessee under Rule 11UA(2) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: Rule 11UA(2) prescribes two alternative methods for determining fair market value of unquoted equity shares at the assessee's option, namely the NAV formula and valuation by merchant banker/accountant using the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. The statutory scheme couples section 56(2)(viib) with Rule 11UA(2) to vest the choice of method in the assessee while permitting the Assessing Officer to scrutinize or reject a submitted valuation if it is unreasonable or erroneous. Case law cited in the order establishes that while the Assessing Officer may examine the correctness of the valuation workings, record reasons for rejection, and obtain a fresh valuation, any fresh valuation or recalculation must proceed on the valuation basis chosen by the assessee (DCF where DCF was chosen) and not by substituting an altogether different method (NAV) without first confronting specific, material defects in the adopted method or its workings.

Conclusion: The Tribunal holds that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to substitute the NAV method in place of the DCF method chosen by the assessee; the Assessing Officer may scrutinize and, if necessary, obtain fresh valuation only using the method opted by the assessee. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee is a venture capital undertaking within the meaning adopted for the proviso to section 56(2)(viib), thereby exempting consideration received from a venture capital fund from being taxed under that clause.

Analysis: The proviso to section 56(2)(viib) adopts the definition of venture capital undertaking from the Explanation to section 10(23FB), which in turn incorporates definitions in the Venture Capital Fund/AIF regulations. A venture capital undertaking is essentially an unlisted domestic company engaged in providing services or in production/manufacture (subject to specified exclusions). The Assessing Officer's remand report accepted that the assessee had commenced setting up the business (licenses, capital work in progress) and that investments were received from a SEBI-registered venture capital fund. Those factual findings, together with the regulatory definition, satisfy the criteria for the proviso's exception in respect of investments from the venture capital fund. The Tribunal applied those findings to delete additions attributable to amounts received from the venture capital fund; where the investment was from the venture capital fund, section 56(2)(viib) does not apply.

Conclusion: The Tribunal holds that the assessee qualifies as a venture capital undertaking for the relevant investments from the SEBI-registered venture capital fund, and the proviso to section 56(2)(viib) exempts such receipts from taxation under that clause. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed: additions made by applying a valuation method different from that chosen by the assessee are set aside, and additions relating to subscriptions by the recognised venture capital fund are deleted; remaining issues are remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification or fresh determination consistent with the points above.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Rule 11UA(2) affords the assessee an express option between valuation methods, the Assessing Officer may scrutinize or reject a submitted valuation but lacks jurisdiction to substitute a different valuation method; valuation reassessment, if any, must be carried out using the method chosen by the assessee, and amounts received from a venture capital fund for a company qualifying as a venture capital undertaking are exempt under the proviso to section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order dated 27 February 2025 is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice and failure to consider or record reasons for rejecting documentary evidence regarding movement of goods, thereby warranting interference and remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the Proper Officer considered the documentary replies furnished by the petitioner relating to movement and delivery of goods (invoices, transporter records, delivery acknowledgements, e-way bills, supplier returns and payment details) and whether the order contains any reasoning explaining why those documents were insufficient. The Court also examined whether the Proper Officer relied on statements of vehicle owners without supplying those statements to the petitioner or affording an opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarants, and whether such reliance without providing an opportunity to rebut amounts to a breach of natural justice. The Court compared the facts with applicable precedent and found the adjudication order devoid of any reasoning on the petitioner's documentary evidence and reliant on uncommunicated statements, resulting in denial of a fair hearing.

Conclusion: The adjudication order dated 27 February 2025 is quashed for violation of principles of natural justice and for failure to consider and record reasons regarding the petitioner's documentary evidence; the matter is remanded to the Proper Officer for fresh adjudication after supplying any statements relied upon and affording the petitioner an opportunity of cross-examination and hearing, to be completed expeditiously.

Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of stay petitions and the transfer of admitted liquidation funds to the Income Tax Department without referring the matter to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/Commissioner as contemplated by Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 was proper; (ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to operate their attached bank accounts and for remittance of the matter to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/CIT to decide the quantum/proportion of lump sum payment for stay.

Issue (i): Whether the assessing officer/authority was bound to refer the question of quantum of lump sum payment for stay to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/Commissioner under Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 when additions were based on credible evidence collected during search, and whether transfer of funds by the liquidator to the Income Tax Department without such referral was valid.

Analysis: The Court examined Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 (as subsequently reflected in the Office Memorandum dated 31.07.2017) which contemplates that where additions arise from credible evidence collected in search operations, the assessing officer should refer to the administrative Pr.CIT/CIT who shall decide the quantum/proportion of the disputed demand to be paid as lump sum for granting stay. The impugned stay rejection orders did not record any such reference to the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner despite the assessments being based on search-related material. The Court applied the principle that when a specific procedure is prescribed it must be followed and noted the precedential guidance in Pr.CIT vs. LG Electronics India (P.) Ltd. regarding the role of the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner in such matters. Given the absence of the mandatory referral, the transfer of admitted liquidation funds directly to the Income Tax Department without the prescribed administrative decision-making was procedurally irregular.

Conclusion: The assessing authority's rejection of the stay petitions without referring the matter to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/Commissioner as required by Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 was not in accordance with the prescribed procedure; the transfers carried out by the liquidator are to be examined and addressed by the Principal Commissioner/CIT.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners are entitled to operate the bank accounts attached pursuant to the garnishee/attachment and whether the matters should be remitted to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/CIT for appropriate orders under the Office Memorandum.

Analysis: The Court considered the factual matrix showing admitted claims in liquidation, the allocation by the liquidator, payments effected and amounts retained/transferred pursuant to garnishee orders. In light of the procedural deficiency identified under Issue (i), the Court concluded that a fresh administrative exercise by the Principal Commissioner/CIT was necessary to determine the appropriate quantum/proportion for stay in accordance with the CBDT memorandum and applicable law. To secure the petitioners' interim rights pending that exercise, the Court observed that the petitioners should be permitted to operate their attached bank accounts and directed the Principal Commissioner/CIT to pass appropriate orders within a time-bound period taking into account existing payments, garnishee claims and relevant precedents.

Conclusion: The petitioners are permitted to operate the attached bank accounts. The matters are remitted to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/CIT to decide the quantum/proportion of payment for stay and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 (and related guidance) within three weeks from receipt of the order.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions are disposed of by remitting the matter to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/CIT for a fresh decision on the quantum/proportion of lump sum payment for stay under the CBDT Office Memorandum, and by permitting the petitioners to operate their attached bank accounts pending such administrative determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Where additions are founded on credible evidence collected in a search, the assessing officer must refer the question of the quantum/proportion of lump sum payment for grant of stay to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax/Commissioner under Paragraph 4(B)(a) of the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016, and failure to follow that prescribed referral procedure renders subsequent transfers and enforcement steps subject to reconsideration by the Principal Commissioner/CIT.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 14,52,23,691 made under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged unexplained cash deposits during the demonetisation period was rightly deleted by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).

Analysis: The issue involves application of the statutory framework governing unexplained credits and the onus on the assessee to prove identity, capacity and genuineness of transactions. Relevant provisions include Section 68 and Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and principles concerning rejection of books under Section 145(3). Material facts examined include bank deposit patterns, month-wise sales and cash-deposit tables, stock registers, VAT filings (including revisions), and survey records. The appellate authority found that books of account were audited, stock records and purchases were not disputed, sales recorded in books matched survey findings, and no invocation of Section 145(3) was made to reject the books. The Assessing Officer relied on clustering of cash bills, alleged PAN avoidance and post-facto VAT revisions to infer fabrication, but did not produce cogent independent evidence disproving the assessee's documentary records or obtain third-party confirmations. Established legal principles require that where books are accepted and primary records are available and unexplained credits are satisfactorily explained by the assessee, additions under Section 68 cannot be sustained merely on suspicion arising from statistical comparisons or post-facto inferences. The interplay between unexplained credits and the special taxation under Section 115BBE was considered but the factual foundation for treating the deposits as unexplained was found insufficient in the record before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 14,52,23,691 made under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE is upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed; result is in favour of the respondent (assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in disallowing 50% of the indexed cost of improvement (cost of construction) claimed by the assessee and adding Rs. 38,58,354 to income.

Analysis: The claim for cost of construction was supported by a confirmation and breakup furnished by the contractor and a response to notice under Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in which the contractor confirmed undertaking the work and provided identity documents and income-tax return details. The Assessing Officer relied on disbelief of the contractor's capacity and made a 50% ad-hoc disallowance despite the contractor's confirmation and the verification responses. The authorities below treated a handwritten breakup and the contractor's confirmations as unsatisfactory without identifying specific defects in those documents. The evidence on record included the contractor's confirmation, the Section 133(6) reply, and corroborative documentary material showing structural changes between purchase and sale of the property.

Conclusion: The disallowance of 50% of the claimed cost of construction is not sustainable and is deleted; the assessee's ground challenging that disallowance is allowed (in favour of the assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly issued i.e., whether the Assessing Officer had reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment; (ii) Whether the payments made to a suspected entry provider could be taxed in the year of payment and whether the omission to specify the specific charging section in the assessment order vitiates the addition.

Issue (i): Validity of reopening under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer received investigative information indicating that the counterparty was a paper entity, its bank transactions were not commensurate with declared income, withdrawals followed credits, the entity failed to comply with summons and was not found at the registered address; the return had only been processed under Section 143(1) and not scrutinized earlier; the AO verified AIR data and conducted enquiries including issuing summons and a field inspection which remained unresponded. These materials were used to form a prima facie belief of escapement of income and provided a rational connection between the information and reopening.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was validly issued and the reopening was procedurally and substantively justified in favour of the revenue.

Issue (ii): Taxability in the impugned year of payments to an alleged accommodation/entry provider and effect of not specifying the charging section in the assessment order.

Analysis: The AO's enquiries established that the alleged supplier was an entry provider and no actual purchase had occurred; payments made in the impugned year to such provider were treated as unexplained expenditure liable to tax in the year of payment; the assessee did not produce confirmations or evidence of delivery; the AO had given notice from the stage of reopening and conducted assessment proceedings directed to the taxability of the payments. The absence of an express mention of the specific statutory provision in the assessment order did not prejudice the assessee given that the nature and tax consequence of the payment were communicated and litigated during assessment.

Conclusion: The payments to the entry provider are taxable in the year of payment as unexplained expenditure and the omission to specify the exact section in the assessment order does not vitiate the addition; the conclusion is in favour of the revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed and the additions by reassessment are upheld, with the AO's reopening and taxation of the impugned payments sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Reopening under Section 148 requires a prima facie belief supported by relevant external information and a rational connection, and payments made to a paper/entry provider may be treated as unexplained expenditure taxable in the year of payment under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the exemption of Rs.7,500 per member per month under Entry No.77 of Notification No.12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) is to be ascertained monthly or on an annual/invoicing-period basis; (ii) Whether charges for water procured through tankers or BWSSB collected by the association fall under Entry No.99 of Notification No.02/2017-Central Tax (Rate) as exempt goods; (iii) Whether corpus/sinking fund collections are liable to GST at the time of collection or only when applied towards supply; (iv) Whether application of deposit towards consideration can be proportioned to depreciation charged in books for a capital asset; (v) Whether sinking/repair fund contributions are eligible for the Rs.7,500 per month exemption and whether they must be clubbed with common area maintenance for that purpose; (vi) Whether voluntary contributions for festivals are liable to GST.

Issue (i): Whether the Rs.7,500 per member per month exemption under Entry No.77 is to be ascertained monthly or annually.

Analysis: Entry No.77 expressly states the exemption amount as Rs.7,500 per month per member for sourcing goods or services for common use. The text of the notification and its phrasing indicate a monthly quantum; therefore aggregation annually or by invoice period is not supported. The Authority also considered relevant clarifications and the scope of the entry as addressing recurring monthly maintenance collections.

Conclusion: The exemption under Entry No.77 is applicable on a monthly basis and cannot be aggregated annually or by other invoicing periods (decision in favour of the applicant on this issue).

Issue (ii): Whether water charges collected by the association qualify as exempt goods under Entry No.99.

Analysis: Although water as a commodity may fall under Entry No.99 when supplied independently, the Authority examined the nature of the applicant's activity and found that procurement, storage and distribution of water are integral to the upkeep and maintenance services provided to members. Under the definition of composite supply, the principal supply is maintenance services (SAC 9995/999598) and water supply is incidental. Pre-GST precedents cited by the applicant concern a different regime and are not determinative under GST's broader supply and composite supply concepts.

Conclusion: The water charges collected are incidental to a composite supply of maintenance services and Entry No.99 exemption for water as goods is not available to the applicant (decision against the applicant on this issue).

Issue (iii): Whether corpus/sinking fund collections are taxable at the time of receipt or only when applied towards supply.

Analysis: Section 2(31) and time of supply provisions (Section 13) distinguish advances and deposits; where an amount is an advance towards future supply, time of supply is the earlier of invoice date or receipt of payment. The Authority examined the character of corpus/sinking fund collections and found them to be advances for future supply (ring-fenced but intended for future services), triggering time of supply on receipt under Section 13.

Conclusion: Corpus/sinking fund collections constitute advance receipts towards future supplies and attract GST at the time of receipt (decision against the applicant on timing of taxability).

Issue (iv): Whether application of deposit towards consideration can be proportioned to depreciation charged in accounting records.

Analysis: The CGST Act governs levy, valuation and timing; accounting treatments such as depreciation or internal transfers do not determine taxability. The acquisition of a capital asset from collected funds and subsequent depreciation are accounting matters and do not, by themselves, create taxable supplies or alter statutory time-of-supply rules.

Conclusion: Depreciation-based apportionment of deposits does not govern GST liability; accounting treatment is not relevant for determining levy or timing (decision against the applicant on this contention).

Issue (v): Whether sinking/repair fund contributions qualify for Entry No.77 exemption and whether they must be clubbed with monthly maintenance charges for determining eligibility.

Analysis: The Authority examined the distinct nature and purpose of recurring monthly maintenance charges versus corpus/sinking funds (the latter being one-time or infrequent, ring-fenced for capital/major non-recurring expenditure). Circular No.109/28/2019-GST clarifies that Entry No.77 applies to recurring monthly maintenance. Given the separate character and intended use of sinking funds, they are not to be clubbed with monthly maintenance for the Rs.7,500 per month exemption.

Conclusion: Sinking/repair fund contributions do not qualify for aggregation with monthly maintenance for Entry No.77 and are not covered by the Rs.7,500 per month exemption at the time of collection (decision against the applicant on aggregation; in favour of revenue for taxability at receipt).

Issue (vi): Whether voluntary contributions for cultural festivals are liable to GST.

Analysis: Supply and consideration under Sections 7 and 2(31) require a payment made in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of supply. The festival contributions are voluntary, without obligation or quid pro quo, and no specific supply is promised in return; they lack the element of consideration required for GST levy under Section 9.

Conclusion: Voluntary donations collected for cultural festivals do not constitute consideration for a supply and are not liable to GST (decision in favour of the applicant on this issue).

Final Conclusion: The Authority rules that (i) the Rs.7,500 exemption under Entry No.77 is monthly; (ii) water supplied through the association forms part of a composite maintenance service and Entry No.99 exemption does not apply; (iii) corpus/sinking fund receipts are advances taxable at receipt; (iv) accounting depreciation cannot determine GST timing or liability; (v) sinking funds are not to be clubbed with monthly maintenance for the Rs.7,500 exemption; and (vi) voluntary festival contributions are not taxable. The ruling results in mixed outcomes with the association succeeding on the monthly exemption point and on voluntary donations, but not on water treatment or corpus/sinking fund treatment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a membership organisation provides upkeep and maintenance services, incidental supplies (such as water) form part of a composite supply classifiable as services; time of supply and taxability of advances are governed by Sections 13 and 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017; accounting treatments like depreciation do not determine GST liability; Entry No.77 exemption is expressly monthly and sinking/corpus funds are not to be clubbed with recurring maintenance for that exemption.