Issues: Whether an assessee is entitled to interest under section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on refunds determined and payable by issuance of Form No.5 under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, for delay in payment beyond the prescribed period.

Analysis: The issue arises where refunds were determined under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 and Form No.5 was issued, but consequential Order Giving Effect under the Income-tax Act and payment/adjustment of refund were delayed beyond the statutory period. The Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for interest on refunds under section 244A(1)(b) for delays beyond prescribed timelines; procedural timelines for giving effect to appeal orders are reflected in section 153(5). The DTVSV Act is a self-contained scheme for settlement of disputes, but its Explanation to section 7 addresses refunds of amounts paid before filing a declaration and contains a proviso disallowing interest under section 244A in that specific context. Judicial authorities including the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. and several High Courts (Bombay, Rajasthan, Delhi, Allahabad, Kerala) have held that where the State has retained money without right and refund becomes due, interest is payable as compensation for undue retention; those decisions treated refunds arising on issuance of determinative orders as attracting interest under section 244A unless the special statute expressly and unambiguously excludes such interest. The Tribunal examined the statutory text of the DTVSV Act, the Explanation to section 7, the sequence of events (issuance of Form No.5, delay in consequential Order Giving Effect and payment), and relevant precedents, and concluded that the Explanation to section 7 pertains to payments made prior to filing declarations and does not operate to exclude interest on refunds that become due upon issuance of Form No.5. In light of binding and persuasive precedents, and the characterisation of refunds determined under Form No.5 as 'refund of tax' for purposes of the Income-tax Act, the Tribunal held that interest under section 244A is payable for delay beyond the statutorily prescribed period.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest under section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the delayed refunds determined by issuance of Form No.5 under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020; the appeals are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Refunds determined by issuance of Form No.5 under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 constitute refunds of tax for purposes of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and, unless a special enactment expressly excludes interest for refunds arising after issuance of Form No.5, interest under section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is payable for delay in payment beyond the prescribed period.

Issues: Whether the garnishee notice issued by the tax authority to the petitioner's banker and resulting hold on the petitioner's bank account should be withdrawn pending submission and consideration of documents by the petitioner in relation to a disputed GST recovery demand.

Analysis: The record shows that credit notes and related return filings were previously communicated by the petitioner and that the petitioner has offered to furnish all supporting documents and clarifications. The tax authority issued statutory recovery intimation and thereafter a garnishee notice placing a hold on the petitioner's bank account before completing consideration of the petitioner's explanations and documentary material. Given the petitioner's readiness to produce documents and the availability of a process for the authority to examine the materials, the garnishee notice operates as an immediate and disproportionate interference with the petitioner's banking operations. It is appropriate to require the petitioner to submit the outstanding documents within a short, specified period and to require the authority to consider the submissions within a defined timeframe while protecting the petitioner from immediate attachment where there is no reasonable apprehension of evasion and where the petitioner is a reputed entity.

Conclusion: The garnishee notice dated 3rd February 2026 issued to the petitioner's banker shall be withdrawn forthwith and shall not be acted upon; the petitioner shall submit the required documents within ten days of service of the order and the authority shall consider the submissions and take an appropriate decision within one month of receipt.

Final Conclusion: The matter is disposed of by permitting the petitioner an opportunity to furnish documents and by directing the tax authority to decide on recovery after consideration of the materials within a fixed period; the interim withdrawal of the garnishee notice preserves the petitioner's right to operate its bank account pending such decision.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer has shown readiness to furnish documentary proof and there is no reasonable apprehension of evasion, provisional enforcement by garnishee/attachment should be withdrawn pending fair opportunity for submission and expedited consideration by the tax authority.

Issues: Whether the Respondents are required to consider and decide the Petitioner's representation dated 11 January 2024 (seeking extension of incentive entitlement periods and related reliefs) and, if so, whether the Petitioner must be granted an opportunity of hearing and be permitted to file further documents before a decision is taken.

Analysis: The matter involves grant or extension of policy benefits under tourism incentive certificates and requires inter-departmental consideration involving the Department of Tourism/Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Finance. Given the nature of the relief sought, a policy decision is appropriate and administrative authorities are best placed to take a considered view after necessary consultations. Procedural fairness requires that the Petitioner be given an opportunity to be heard and to file any additional documents relevant to the representation before a final administrative decision is taken. The Court has not adjudicated the merits of the claimed entitlement to incentives or refunds; instead it has directed the concerned authorities to decide the pending representation in accordance with law and after hearing the Petitioner.

Conclusion: The Respondents are directed to consider and decide the Petitioner's representation dated 11 January 2024 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within two months from receipt of the order, and to grant the Petitioner an opportunity of being heard and to permit filing of further documents prior to taking the decision; the petition is disposed of in these terms.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount of management expenditure debited to the profit and loss account in excess of the limit prescribed under section 40C of the Insurance Act, 1938 read with the IRDA regulations was disallowable in computing the income of a non-life insurer. (ii) Whether the penalty levied under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive once the underlying disallowance was deleted.

Issue (i): Whether the amount of management expenditure debited to the profit and loss account in excess of the limit prescribed under section 40C of the Insurance Act, 1938 read with the IRDA regulations was disallowable in computing the income of a non-life insurer.

Analysis: The income of an insurer is governed by section 44 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which overrides the normal computation provisions and requires computation under the First Schedule. Under Rule 5 of the First Schedule, only expenditure or allowance not admissible under sections 30 to 43B can be added back. The excess management expenditure was shown as an allocation in accordance with the IRDA regulatory framework and was not found to be personal or capital expenditure. The regulatory ceiling was treated as an accounting and allocation mechanism, not as expenditure incurred for an offence or for a purpose prohibited by law. Explanation 1 to section 37(1) was therefore held to be inapplicable.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the excess management expenditure was not sustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty levied under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive once the underlying disallowance was deleted.

Analysis: The penalty was imposed only with reference to the disallowance made on account of the excess management expenditure. Once that addition was deleted, the basis for the penalty ceased to exist.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A was cancelled, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed and the assessee obtained relief on both the quantum addition and the connected penalty issue.

Ratio Decidendi: For a non-life insurer, income must be computed under section 44 read with the First Schedule, and a management expense allocated in accordance with the IRDA framework is not disallowable merely because it exceeds the regulatory ceiling unless it is otherwise hit by a specific disallowance or is expenditure incurred for a purpose prohibited by law.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the show-cause notice dated 28.01.2025 and the Order-in-Original dated 19.12.2025 is maintainable before the High Court notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and whether the impugned order is liable to be quashed on merits in view of the material on record including statements and investigation findings.

Analysis: The Court examined (a) the availability and efficacy of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as an alternative remedy to challenge an adjudication under Section 74 of the Act; (b) the factual and investigative record relied upon by the respondents, including the recorded statement dated 05.07.2024 and subsequent statements corroborating ownership and control of transport firms; and (c) the adjudicating authority's application of provisions concerning self-assessment under Section 59 and eligibility of input tax credit under Sections 16 and 17 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court noted that the petitioner was informed of the alternate remedy, elected to address merits before the Court citing inability to make pre-deposit, and that the departmental investigation unearthed admissions and corroborative statements indicating clandestine arrangements, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts, and findings by the adjudicating authority that gave rise to proposed demand and penalty under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Given these circumstances, the Court considered both the propriety of entertaining a writ in presence of an efficacious statutory appeal and the sufficiency of material justifying continuation of adjudicatory proceedings.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable in the face of the efficacious alternative statutory remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and, on the material on record including admissions and corroborative statements, the petitioner has not established grounds for quashing the impugned order; accordingly the writ petition is rejected and the challenge is dismissed (decision in favour of revenue).

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in directing the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) to grant registration under Section 12AB and Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, instead of remanding the matter to the Commissioner for inquiry into the genuineness of activities and compliance with other laws.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme distinguishing fresh registration and provisional registration, and the procedure under Section 12AB(1) which, where an application falls under sub-clause (iii) of Section 12A(1)(ac), mandates that the Commissioner call for documents and make such inquiries as necessary to satisfy himself about (A) the genuineness of the trust's activities and (B) compliance with other laws material to achieving its objects. The Commissioner had recorded that the trust had failed to supply documents despite multiple opportunities, and therefore rejected the application after inquiry. The Tribunal, however, recorded that documents had been produced and directed grant of registration without making the requisite findings on genuineness or legal compliance. Given that the respondent's application was filed under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) (covered by Section 12AB(1)(b)), the statutory text requires an inquiry and recorded findings before registration can be granted; this requirement is especially stringent where registration under Section 80G is involved because it confers donor tax benefits. The Tribunal's summary direction to grant registration thus bypassed the mandatory inquiry and findings the Commissioner was required to undertake.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was not justified in directing grant of registration under Section 12AB and Section 80G without the Commissioner first conducting the inquiries and recording findings as required by law; the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner to decide the application in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the purchaser's claim that the sale was without notice of the existing liability could displace the attachment in execution; (ii) Whether a post-award transferee could resist execution of the money award under Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether the purchaser's claim that the sale was without notice of the existing liability could displace the attachment in execution.

Analysis: The sale deed was executed after the arbitral proceedings had been instituted and after the award had been made. The Court noted that the non-production of the tripartite agreement, which explained the earlier debt-related arrangement, weakened the plea of absence of notice. The independent recovery steps under the SARFAESI proceedings did not shield the judgment-debtor's property from execution of the award. On the record, the purchaser failed to establish that the transfer was free from notice of the existing claim.

Conclusion: The plea of purchase without notice was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether a post-award transferee could resist execution of the money award under Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: An arbitral award enforceable under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands in the position of a decree. Order XXI Rule 102 bars a transferee pendente lite from resisting execution through the protections otherwise available to third-party claimants. The Court held that pendency for this purpose is linked to the institution of the proceeding that culminated in the award, and not merely to the later challenge under Section 34. A transferee after institution of the arbitral proceedings and after the award cannot defeat execution by setting up a later purchase, even in a money claim, because that would frustrate realization of the decree-holder's fruits of the decree.

Conclusion: The purchaser was treated as a transferee pendente lite and her claim petition was not maintainable against execution.

Final Conclusion: The attachment and the dismissal of the claim petition were upheld, and the execution of the arbitral award was allowed to proceed against the property.

Ratio Decidendi: A transferee of the judgment-debtor's property after institution of the proceeding that culminates in a decree or enforceable award is a transferee pendente lite and cannot resist execution under Order XXI Rule 102, including where the decree is for money and the award remains unsatisfied.

Issues: Whether the refund due for the earlier tax period could be adjusted against alleged demands for later tax periods after those later demands had been settled under the amnesty/settlement scheme.

Analysis: The refund arose for the tax period 2007-08. The later period demands for 2008-09 and 2009-10 stood settled under the settlement orders, and the department did not dispute that there was no surviving demand for those periods. In that situation, the adjustment of the earlier refund against settled and non-existent liabilities was held to be without authority. The Court also treated the settlement regime as governing the liability position for the later periods, making the attempted retention of the refund legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The adjustment of the refund was invalid and the petitioner was entitled to release of the refund amount with interest as per rules.

Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 50(3) read with Section 42(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is payable where transitional input tax credit was wrongfully availed and subsequently reversed, and whether mere availment without utilisation excludes interest liability; (ii) Whether amount in the electronic cash ledger can be adjusted under Section 79 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 towards interest arising from such wrongful availment.

Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 50(3) read with Section 42(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is payable where transitional input tax credit was wrongfully availed and later reversed, and whether non-utilisation precludes levy of interest.

Analysis: The finding recorded is that the disputed transitional credit was claimed in GSTR-3B and remained in the electronic credit ledger from 28.08.2017 until reversal on 20.05.2019. The statutory text of Section 50(3) makes interest payable on undue or excess claim of input tax credit. Where the tax liability arises from self-assessment and remains unpaid, Section 79 and related provisions permit recovery as an arrear. The court accepted the factual conclusion that the credit was wrongfully availed and that during the relevant period the electronic credit ledger balance did not establish that the credit was never effectively utilised to the exclusion of the revenue consequence asserted by respondents.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 50(3) read with Section 42(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is payable on the excess claim of input tax credit in the facts found, and mere initial reflection without the ability to show non-utilisation did not negate the interest liability; the claim that non-utilisation alone precludes interest is rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the claimed refund in the electronic cash ledger could be lawfully adjusted under Section 79 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 towards the interest liability adjudged on the wrongful availment.

Analysis: Section 49(3) and (4) distinguish permitted uses of balances in the electronic cash ledger and electronic credit ledger, and Section 79 permits recovery of unpaid amounts by deduction from monies owing to the taxable person. The appellate order applied these provisions to hold that interest and related liabilities are payable from the electronic cash ledger and that adjustment of the refund was permissible as recovery of an arrear.

Conclusion: The adjustment of the electronic cash ledger refund against the confirmed interest arrear under Section 79 was lawful and sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The judgment upholds the recovery of interest on the excess transitional input tax credit and the adjustment of the electronic cash ledger refund against that interest; the writ petition is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxable person has made an undue or excess claim of input tax credit and accepted or self-assessed reversal, interest under Section 50(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is payable on that excess claim, and amounts in the electronic cash ledger may be adjusted under Section 79 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for recovery of such interest as an arrear.

Issues: (i) Whether provisional release of imported goods claimed to be eligible for preferential duty may be granted to importers who furnish security for any differential duty, despite an administrative consultation directing scrutiny of origin documents under Section 28DA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The legal framework includes Section 18, Section 28DA and Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962, Notification No. 46/2011-Cus (preferential duty claim), the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 (CAROTAR), and Annexure-III of the Customs Tariff Rules, 2009 governing origin verification, retroactive checks and verification visits. Section 28DA(5) permits the proper officer, where preferential rate is suspended, to release goods upon importer request on furnishing security equal to the difference between provisional duty under Section 18 and the preferential duty claimed. The consultation letters and departmental communications raised concerns about origin documentation relating to a common foreign exporter and asked for written submissions; however no adjudicatory proceedings (show cause notices) had been issued to the importers and the suppliers had offered cooperation and origin-related documentation. The importers uniformly offered to furnish bonds and bank guarantees securing any differential duty. Considerations of prejudice from continued detention, incurring demurrage, and the availability of statutory security for provisional release weigh in favour of provisional relief while preserving the department's right to pursue substantive verification and recovery if the preferential claim is ultimately disallowed.

Conclusion: Provisional release of the imported goods is granted upon the importers furnishing bonds and bank guarantees securing the differential duty; provisional assessment under Section 18 shall be completed and goods released in accordance with the timelines directed. The order leaves open the department's rights to initiate and pursue proceedings under Section 28DA or other applicable provisions and does not express any opinion on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether dismissal of a company petition for non-joinder of a necessary party should be sustained where the appellant seeks leave to amend the cause title to implead the missing party.

Analysis: The decision applies principles permitting amendment of parties to ensure disputes are adjudicated on merits rather than on hyper-technical grounds. The legal framework includes Order I Rule 9, Order I Rule 10(2) and Order I Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (procedural powers to add or strike out parties), the duty of tribunals under Section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 to be guided by principles of natural justice and not be strictly bound by CPC procedures, and the protection of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In balancing equities the consequence of prior proceedings and any earlier procedural forfeitures was weighed against the need to allow effective adjudication between the rightful parties; therefore prejudice to respondents arising from prior procedural developments was addressed by permitting them to file their counter after the amendment.

Conclusion: The appellant is permitted to amend the cause title to implead the necessary party within two weeks; the impugned order of dismissal for non-joinder is modified to that extent and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Issues: Whether the impugned order passed confirming tax, interest and penalty under Section 73 of the TNGST Act, 2017 without adequate adjudication and opportunity of hearing is sustainable, and whether the matter should be remitted for de novo consideration.

Analysis: The impugned order confirmed tax, interest and penalty on account of alleged excess availing of input tax credit based on comparisons of GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A/2B and recorded that no reply or personal hearing response was received. The order, however, does not conclusively establish whether the alleged IGST credit was utilized and records the absence of clarity on utilization. The statutory scheme invoked includes determination of tax under Section 73, levy of interest under Section 50, and the provision in Section 75(9) regarding interest liability. Given the factual uncertainty as to utilization of the credit and the procedural posture in which the order was passed, an opportunity to file a reply with supporting documents and an opportunity of hearing are necessary before a final adjudication on tax, interest and penalty can be made. Remittal for fresh consideration enables a reasoned decision after hearing and proper ascertainment of utilization and related facts.

Conclusion: The impugned order is quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh decision on merits after affording the taxpayer an opportunity to file a reply with documents and to be heard; recovery proceedings are to be kept in abeyance pending de novo proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment/order determining tax, interest and penalty under Section 73 of the TNGST Act, 2017 that proceeds without resolving material factual questions regarding input tax credit utilization and without providing the affected person a fair opportunity to reply and be heard is liable to be quashed and remitted for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to refund of the excess GST paid on works contract services supplied to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, or whether any refund, if otherwise available, had to be claimed from the recipient entity and not from the tax department.

Analysis: The rate of tax on works contract services rendered to Government entities and authorities was increased to 18% by Notification No.22 of 2021-Central Tax (Rate) with effect from 01.01.2022. The later notification dated 13.07.2022 also governed the relevant category of services from 18.07.2022. The petitioner had paid tax at the enhanced rate for the relevant period and then sought refund of the alleged excess. The impugned refund claim was rejected on the footing that the housing board's internal resolution or communication did not create a statutory obligation on the respondent to sanction refund. The Court accepted that, if any amount was recoverable, the claim lay against the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, consistent with the principle reflected in Section 64A of the Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Conclusion: The refund claim against the respondent was not sustainable, and the petitioner was not entitled to refund from the tax department. Any further recovery, if permissible, was left to be pursued against the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of jewellery seized from the appellant under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transaction Act, 1988 is sustainable as benami property.

Analysis: The matter was examined by verifying the seized jewellery against invoices, hallmarks and the records of M/s Senco Gold Limited through an inspection in the presence of the appellant, witnesses and a Senco representative. The inspection identified only four items as traceable to Senco Gold Ltd. by hallmark and internal sale records; the balance of the jewellery was found to be personal and not identifiable from Senco records. The appellant furnished invoices and photographs which were acknowledged during the verification. The identified beneficial owner had made subsequent disclosures under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016. In light of the verification findings and documentary corroboration, the material produced by the Initiating Officer was insufficient to sustain that the seized jewellery was benami property.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment of the seized jewellery under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transaction Act, 1988 is not sustainable; the impugned order confirming the attachment is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellant exported consignments at understated FOB value by giving discounts to accommodate commissions to overseas protective agents and thereby contravened the disclosure and realization obligations under FEMA and the Export Regulations; (ii) Whether the individual directors are liable for the contraventions of the company; (iii) What is the appropriate quantum of penalty having regard to the findings, the Settlement Commission deposit and the nature of the consignments.

Issue (i): Whether the Appellant under invoiced export value by giving discounts to cover overseas agents' fees and thereby breached the disclosure and realization obligations under FEMA and related regulations.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the recorded statement of the company director admitting negotiated prices lower than initial offers for the 18 disputed consignments, the Settlement Commission's finding and the company's voluntary deposits of differential duty, interest and penalty. The Tribunal analysed the commercial nature of FOB valuation (expenses up to loading on board inclusive of commissions for services at load/discharge ports) and the RBI-prescribed method for declaring full export value and showing commission as permissible deduction. The Tribunal considered appellants' submissions on long term formulaic pricing and spot contract bidding records for some consignments and balanced these against admissions and the conduct of voluntarily depositing sums with the Settlement Commission.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that for 12 of the 18 consignments the export value was understated and that the arrangement effectively kept part of the consideration offshore, resulting in contravention of the disclosure and realization obligations; charges relating to 6 consignments executed under long term contracts were dropped.

Issue (ii): Whether the individual directors (the managing director and the director/CFO) are liable for the company's contraventions.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the statutory principle that where a company commits a contravention its officers in charge are deemed liable unless they prove lack of knowledge or exercise of due diligence. The Tribunal reviewed the appellants' pleadings, the absence of evidence showing due diligence or lack of knowledge, and the director's admitted role in finalizing negotiated prices.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held both individual appellants liable under the statutory provisioning and not entitled to exoneration on the facts; penalties were therefore maintainable against them.

Issue (iii): What penalty is appropriate having regard to the nature of contravention, prior Settlement Commission deposit and mitigating considerations.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the statutory ceiling for penalty in civil contraventions, the absence of mens rea as a prerequisite for penalty, the voluntary payment to the Settlement Commission (treated as admission by conduct), and the limited scope for price variation under long term contracts. The Tribunal exercised discretion to reduce the quantum from that imposed by the Adjudicating Authority, taking into account prior deposits and proportionality.

Conclusion: The Tribunal reduced the penalties to Rs. 30,00,000 on the company and Rs. 3,00,000 on each of the two individual appellants and directed adjustment of any pre deposits against the imposed penalty; the appeals were partly allowed to this extent.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirmed contraventions in respect of selected consignments, imposed reduced penalties on the company and its directors, and disposed of the appeals partly in favour of the appellants while dismissing other reliefs sought.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an exporter's declarations omit integral components of FOB value and the omissions are corroborated by admissions and conduct (including voluntary deposits), a civil penalty under FEMA is payable irrespective of mens rea, though the quantum of penalty is subject to proportionality and mitigating considerations such as prior settlement and limited scope of contractual price variation.

Issues: Whether the impugned order imposing penalties under Section 7(1)(a) and Section 7(1)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and related Regulations can be sustained when a resolution plan effecting change of management of the corporate debtor was approved and implemented prior to the impugned order, thereby invoking the immunity provisions arising from the approved resolution plan and Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the timing and effect of the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) initiated on 17.08.2017, the approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT (25/27 June 2019), the restoration of that approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 28.02.2020, and implementation of the approved resolution plan in March 2020. The Tribunal relied upon the legal framework that an approved resolution plan which effects change of management freezes and extinguishes claims not part of the resolution plan against the corporate debtor, and noted the relevance of Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (as introduced by amendment) and related Supreme Court authorities addressing the effect of approved resolution plans on pre plan claims and proceedings. The Tribunal observed that the impugned order was passed on 28.08.2020 after the resolution plan had been restored and implemented, that the new management had taken effective control, and that there was no material placed on record to show that the new management were promoters, were related to previous promoters, or had abetted the alleged offences. Applying the principles in JSW Ispat and Ghanashyam Mishra regarding the freeze and extinguishment of pre plan claims and the immunity afforded to the corporate debtor pursuant to an approved resolution plan, the Tribunal concluded that the penalties and proceedings imposed by the impugned order could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The impugned order imposing penalties is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant, M/s Orchid Pharma Ltd.

Issues: Whether rejection of the petitioner's application for refund of taxes paid twice can be sustained on the ground of limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The record establishes that identical tax amounts were discharged twice for the same transactions - once by utilising the credit ledger and later by utilising the cash ledger - and supporting payment evidence and bank details were placed before the authority. Where an amount has been paid and retained without authority of law, Article 265 of the Constitution of India precludes the State from retaining such funds. Precedents recognise that claims for refund of amounts paid under a mistake of law are not necessarily governed by the statutory limitation prescribed for refunds under the special law and that the Limitation Act and principles relating to discovery of mistake may govern such claims. An order of rejection must be judged by the grounds stated in that order and cannot be sustained by fresh or different reasons raised subsequently.

Conclusion: The rejection of the refund application solely on the ground that it was filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unsustainable. The impugned order rejecting the refund is quashed and set aside; the petitioner is permitted to file a fresh refund application within a fortnight and the authority shall decide it in accordance with law and the discussions above, failing which interest as directed shall accrue.

Issues: Whether, in proceedings pursuant to a summons under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the person whose statement is being recorded may have the statement video recorded at the petitioner's cost and may be accompanied by an advocate who may sit at a visible but not audible distance without interfering with the recording.

Analysis: The summons inquiry relates to input tax credit claimed and is conducted under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner has expressed willingness to cooperate with the inquiry and sought limited safeguards: (i) video recording of the statement at the petitioner's cost; and (ii) allowing an advocate to accompany the witness, to sit at a visible but not audible distance and not to interfere with or disturb the recording. The petitioners also relied on an order of a Co-ordinate Bench providing similar directions. Considering the nature of the inquiry, the stated willingness to cooperate, and the petitioner's medical condition requiring humanitarian consideration, granting these limited safeguards suitably balances investigative needs and the petitioner's rights.

Conclusion: The petition is allowed to the limited extent that (i) the statement of the person summoned shall be video recorded at the cost of the petitioners; and (ii) an advocate may accompany the person during recording but shall not interfere, interrupt or disturb the recording and shall sit at a visible but not audible distance.

Issues: (i) Whether service of notices exclusively by uploading on the GST common portal, where the taxpayer's GST registration had been cancelled, amounts to valid service under Section 169 of the CGST Act; (ii) Whether the impugned order was passed in violation of the statutory requirement of opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) of the CGST Act.

Issue (i): Whether portal-only service on a person whose registration was cancelled constitutes valid service under Section 169 of the CGST Act.

Analysis: Section 169 prescribes multiple modes of service including direct tender, registered post/courier, email, making notice available on the common portal, and affixation or publication where other modes are not practicable. Making a notice available on the portal is one permissible method but not exclusive. Where registration is cancelled, the person is not obliged to monitor the portal and reliance solely on portal uploading imposes a duty on a non-registered person inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: Portal-only service in the circumstances where registration stood cancelled is not valid service under Section 169 of the CGST Act; service was not effected in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned adjudication violated Section 75(4) by failing to grant an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates that an opportunity of hearing be granted where a request is received in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated, reflecting the audi alteram partem principle and requirements of natural justice applicable to fiscal adjudications.

Conclusion: The impugned order violated Section 75(4) as the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity of personal hearing; a fresh adjudication must include grant of hearing if so desired by the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication is quashed for defective service and failure to afford the statutory opportunity of hearing; the revenue is permitted to issue a fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law, ensuring valid service and compliance with Section 75(4).

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer's GST registration is cancelled, service of statutory notices cannot be effected exclusively by portal upload; effective service must be effected by a mode that actually communicates the notice to the addressee, and adjudication without granting the opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) breaches the audi alteram partem rule.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority is required to accept the appellant's appeal manually under the proviso to Rule 108(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, where the appeal cannot be filed electronically.

Analysis: The proviso to Rule 108(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits manual filing of an appeal in FORM GST APL-01 where the appeal cannot be filed electronically due to non-availability of the decision or order to be appealed against on the common portal. The petitioner has shown that the portal is not accepting electronic filing of the appeal challenging demands II to V because of non-deposit of amount under demand I, creating an impediment to electronic filing. Counsel for the respondents was directed to obtain instructions regarding filing of the appeal challenging demands II to V. Having regard to the proviso and the stated inability to file electronically, manual acceptance is warranted to enable filing and issuance of provisional acknowledgement as contemplated by the rule.

Conclusion: The Appellate Authority is directed to accept the appeal manually under the proviso to Rule 108(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and proceed in accordance with the statutory framework.