Issues: (i) Whether the adjustment made by the Centralized Processing Centre (CPC) u/s. 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act could be sustained without prior intimation/show cause notice to the assessee; (ii) Whether, on merits, the amount of Rs. 2,88,06,410/- representing recovered bad debts was chargeable as additional income where the assessee had credited the recovery to profit and loss account.

Issue (i): Whether the CPC could make the adjustment under section 143(1)(a) without issuing prior intimation to the assessee.

Analysis: The statutory provisos to the processing provision require that no adjustment under clause (i) to (vi) of section 143(1)(a) be made unless an intimation proposing such adjustment is given to the assessee and any response so received is considered. The factual record does not demonstrate that the CPC issued the requisite prior intimation or afforded the assessee an opportunity to respond before making the adjustment.

Conclusion: The adjustment made by the CPC without prior intimation cannot be sustained; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the recovered amount of Rs. 2,88,06,410/- was properly chargeable as an additional income on merits despite the assessee having credited it to the profit and loss account.

Analysis: The assessee produced the financial statement schedules showing recognition of bad debt recovery in the profit and loss account and the audit report corroborating such recognition. The reconciliation of Schedule 14 and Schedule 17 demonstrates the recovery's accounting treatment. The Department has not established any contrary position on the record.

Conclusion: The recovered amount was already recognized and offered as income in the profit and loss account; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both the procedural defect (absence of prior intimation) and the merits (recognition of recovery in profit and loss account) support deletion of the adjustment and dismissal of the revenue's appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjustment made in the intimation under section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is invalid unless the statutory proviso requiring prior intimation and consideration of the assessee's response is complied with; where an amount of recovery is already recognized in the profit and loss account, a duplicate addition is not justified.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal should uphold the deletion of an addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating loans of Rs. 60,00,000 as bogus, having regard to documentary evidence produced by the assessee and a statement recorded under section 131 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 implicating the creditors as accommodation-entry providers.

Analysis: The issue turns on whether the assessee discharged the primary onus to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of the loans despite a statement recorded under section 131 alleging the creditors provided accommodation entries. Relevant considerations include documentary evidence of banking transactions, confirmations, income-tax returns and audited financial statements of the creditors, records of repayments and interest with tax deduction at source, and absence of independent corroborative material from the Revenue contradicting those documents. Where an addition under section 68 is founded solely on a statement recorded under section 131 without independent or cogent corroboration, the statement alone is insufficient to sustain an addition if the assessee produces credible contemporaneous documentary evidence establishing identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under section 68 is upheld; the Revenue's grounds attacking the learned CIT(A)'s findings are dismissed and the appeal is dismissed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A statement recorded under section 131 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot by itself justify an addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the assessee has produced adequate and unchallenged documentary evidence establishing the identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of the transactions, absent independent corroborative evidence to the contrary.

Issues: Whether the additions of Rs. 5,32,280 made under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (comprising Rs. 1,00,000 cash deposit and Rs. 4,32,280 towards stamp duty and registration charges) are sustainable for Assessment Year 2016-17.

Analysis: The assessment was reopened under Section 148 and draft additions were confirmed by the DRP under Section 144C(13) by treating certain payments as unexplained investments under Section 69. For the cash deposit of Rs. 1,00,000 the assessee produced bank statements and evidence of prior withdrawals from his NRE account which established the availability and source of cash; these records were accepted to connect the cash deposit to explained funds. For the stamp duty of Rs. 4,00,000 and registration charges of Rs. 32,280 the assessee produced a bank challan for stamp duty, a sub-registrar receipt for registration charges, and a notarized affidavit from the developer corroborated by registered documents of May 2015; these contemporaneous documents were accepted as adequately explaining that such amounts formed part of the payments made to the developer. The Tribunal directed deletion of the impugned additions on the basis of the documentary proof and corroboration placed on record.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,00,000 (cash deposit) is deleted. The addition of Rs. 4,32,280 (stamp duty and registration charges) is deleted. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice dated 28/07/2022 issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (new regime) after the expiry of three years was validly sanctioned in accordance with section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and related provisions, and if non-compliant, whether the reassessment proceedings must be quashed.

Analysis: The new regime introduced by Finance Act, 2021 requires prior sanction by the specified authority under section 151 before an assessing officer may pass an order under section 148A(d) or issue a notice under section 148; the level of the specified authority is linked to the time elapsed since the end of the relevant assessment year and to the amount of income alleged to have escaped assessment. For notices issued beyond three years from the end of the assessment year where the escaped income is less than the statutory threshold, the specified authority under section 151(ii)(b) must be of a higher rank (Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General). The statutory time limits are to be read with the temporal relief provided by TOLA where applicable. In the present facts, the income alleged to have escaped assessment was Rs. 37,76,422/-, the notice under the new regime was issued beyond three years, and approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner rather than by one of the higher authorities specified under section 151(ii)(b); therefore the statutory sanction requirement was not satisfied and the notice is time-barred and without valid sanction.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice dated 28/07/2022 issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is bad in law for non-compliance with section 151; the notice and the consequent reassessment proceedings are quashed and set aside. The legal grounds in the cross-objection are allowed and the Revenue appeal becomes infructuous; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the assessee's cross-objection is partly allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether allotment letters (with part payments) qualify as an "agreement" under section 43CA(3)/(4) for substituting stamp duty value as on agreement date and whether additions under section 43CA should be recomputed or remitted for verification; (ii) Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D and its impact on book profit under section 115JB is sustainable where no exempt income was earned; (iii) Whether claim of deferred tax requires adjudication or verification by the Assessing Officer.

Issue (i): Whether allotment letters together with part consideration received through banking channels constitute an agreement for the purposes of section 43CA(3)/(4) and whether the matter requires remand for verification of stamp duty values and part payments.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the record, the allotment letters, bank statements and ready reckoner rates, and considered precedent holdings that allotment letters may be treated as agreements where part consideration was received by prescribed banking modes on or before the allotment date. The Tribunal found that lower authorities had rejected allotment letters as not final and therefore applied a narrow interpretation. Given the additional evidence filed (bank statements and SDV ready reckoner rates) and relevant precedents, the Tribunal concluded that the factual questions of receipt of part payment and comparison of sale consideration with stamp duty values as on allotment date require verification by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The issue under section 43CA is remitted to the file of the Assessing Officer for limited adjudication: (1) verification of receipt of part consideration through banking channels on or before the allotment date; and (2) comparison of actual sale consideration with stamp duty valuation prevailing on the allotment date. This issue is allowed for statistical purposes as set aside to the AO.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D and the corresponding addition in computation of book profit under section 115JB can be sustained where the assessee did not earn any exempt income in the relevant year.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the assessee expressly stated that no exempt income was earned for the relevant year and that this factual position was not controverted by the Revenue. The Tribunal applied binding precedent of the jurisdictional High Court and the Special Bench authority on computation of book profit under section 115JB, which hold that in absence of exempt income no disallowance under section 14A is warranted and that certain 14A adjustments are not to be added back in book profit under section 115JB.

Conclusion: Disallowances under section 14A read with Rule 8D are deleted and the corresponding additions to book profit under section 115JB are disallowed. Grounds on section 14A and related 115JB issues are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the claim relating to deferred tax requires adjudication by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The parties agreed that the deferred tax point involves verification of claimed figures and supporting documents. The Tribunal considered this a matter suitable for verification and factual adjudication at the assessment level.

Conclusion: The deferred tax issue is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for verification and decision in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal partly allows the appeals: issues under section 43CA are remitted to the Assessing Officer for limited verification; disallowances under section 14A (and related additions under section 115JB) are deleted in favour of the assessee; the deferred tax claim is remitted for verification. The appeals are therefore partly allowed for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: An allotment letter accompanied by receipt of part consideration through prescribed banking channels on or before the allotment date can be treated as an "agreement" for the purposes of section 43CA(3)/(4), and factual verification of part payments and stamp duty values as on the allotment date is necessary before making additions; in absence of any exempt income, no disallowance under section 14A (or corresponding add-back under section 115JB) is permissible.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be levied in respect of additions/disallowances made under the normal provisions of the Act where the tax liability has been finally determined under section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (minimum alternate tax) for assessment years prior to 01.04.2016.

Analysis: The assessment records show tax liability for the relevant assessment years was computed and fixed under the deeming provisions of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal considered the legal position established by the decision in Nalwa Sons (as accepted by the CBDT) and the CBDT Circular dated 31-12-2015 which clarifies that prior to 01.04.2016, where tax payable under normal provisions is less than tax payable under section 115JB, penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted in respect of additions/disallowances made under normal provisions. The substituted Explanation 4 to section 271(1) operates prospectively w.e.f. 01.04.2016 and does not alter the pre-2016 position. The Revenue did not controvert the effect of the CBDT Circular on the facts of these cases.

Conclusion: Penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) in respect of additions/disallowances made under the normal provisions is deleted for the assessment years where tax was finally determined under section 115JB; appeals are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs.14,39,648 under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating cash deposited during demonetisation as unexplained income, was sustainable; (ii) Whether the set off of current year losses of Rs.2,05,053 against other income was correctly disallowed; (iii) Whether the assessment completed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for breach of principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposits of Rs.14,39,648 during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained income under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The AO recorded cash deposits in specified bank notes during the demonetisation period and issued statutory notices; the assessee failed to respond or furnish any source or explanation. The AO, after obtaining bank information under section 133(6), treated the deposits as belonging to the assessee and assessed them under section 69A and taxed under section 115BBE. The learned CIT(A) and the Tribunal examined the record of notices and opportunities afforded and found no material filed by the assessee to rebut the finding of unexplained deposits.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A read with section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is upheld against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the set off of current year losses of Rs.2,05,053 against other income was rightly disallowed by the AO.

Analysis: The assessee claimed set off of current year losses but did not produce supporting details or explanations despite statutory notices and opportunities before the AO and CIT(A). In absence of any supporting material, the claim of set off could not be verified and was rejected by the AO and sustained by the appellate authorities.

Conclusion: The disallowance of set off of current year losses of Rs.2,05,053 is affirmed against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the assessment completed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for non-compliance with principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The record shows issuance and service of statutory notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) and multiple hearing opportunities at the CIT(A) stage. The assessee did not respond at any stage and did not seek adjournment. The Tribunal noted that adequate opportunity was afforded and that the default lay with the assessee.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment/order under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not suffer from breach of natural justice and is valid.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's grounds and confirmed the assessment additions and disallowance, resulting in dismissal of the appeal; the decision upholds the tax treatment of unexplained cash deposits and the rejection of unsubstantiated loss set off where the assessee fails to furnish explanations or documents.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee deposits cash in bank during the demonetisation period and fails to furnish any acceptable explanation or documentary evidence despite statutory notices and opportunities, the assessing authority may treat such deposits as unexplained income under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and tax it under section 115BBE, and claims of set off lacking supporting material may be disallowed.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction, in reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to compute and assess deemed income under section 115JB when the AO accepted the returned income and made no additions on the grounds forming the basis for reopening.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated on the basis that certain payments to related parties lacked substantiation and had escaped assessment. During reassessment proceedings the Assessing Officer accepted the returned income and made no adverse additions on that issue. Despite acceptance, the Assessing Officer computed book profit under section 115JB and arrived at a MAT demand. The authorities relied upon establish that section 147 permits assessment or reassessment of the income which formed the basis of the formation of belief and permits assessment of other income only if such other income comes to the AO's notice in the course of proceedings assessing that originally believed-to-have-escaped income. If the AO, after issuing notice under section 148, concludes that the income forming the basis of the belief has not escaped assessment, the AO cannot independently assess some other income without issuing a fresh notice under section 148 directed to that income.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer exceeded jurisdiction by computing and assessing deemed income under section 115JB in the reassessment proceedings which had been initiated to examine other payments; the computation of book profit under section 115JB is quashed and the assessee is granted relief.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed and the MAT computation under section 115JB made in the reassessment is set aside as beyond the scope of the reassessment initiated under section 147.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reassessment notice under section 148 is issued for specific escaped income and the Assessing Officer, during reassessment, accepts that the originally alleged escaped income has not escaped assessment, the Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to assess other income (including computation under section 115JB) without issuing a fresh valid notice under section 148 directed to that other income.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order confirming denial of input tax credit and related demands is sustainable in view of the statutory insertion of Sections 16(5) and 16(6) and whether the writ petition merits interference by remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the assessment confirming reversal of input tax credit and consequent demands rested solely on belated availment under Section 16(4), and whether the subsequent statutory provisions (Sections 16(5) and 16(6)) require reevaluation of the taxpayer's entitlement. The Court considered the scope of the earlier order-in-original and the necessity of allowing the authority to re-examine entitlement on merits while preserving the consequence of belated availment. The Court also addressed procedural fairness by requiring filing of a proper reply and payment of amounts due for delayed return filing before fresh adjudication, and by conditioning lifting of bank attachment on compliance and absence of other arrears.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the tax authority for fresh adjudication of entitlement to input tax credit (excepting the issue of belated availment), subject to the petitioner filing a reply within 30 days and paying amounts due for late return filing within the same period; bank attachment is lifted conditionally. A fresh order on merits shall be passed after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax authority's confirmation of denial of input tax credit is based on belated availment and statutory amendments alter the entitlement framework, judicial interference by remand for fresh consideration is appropriate to enable the authority to apply the amended statutory provisions while preserving procedural safeguards.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order passed without affording an opportunity of personal hearing and relying solely on notices uploaded on the GST portal was vitiated and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Court examined the material showing that show cause notices were uploaded on the GST portal but the petitioner did not receive any personal notice and no personal hearing was afforded prior to passing the assessment order. The Court noted that although uploading on the portal is a valid mode of service, where there is no response from the addressee the officer must apply mind and explore other modes of service prescribed in Section 169(1) of the Act (for example RPAD) to effectuate effective service rather than merely completing a formal requirement. Having regard to the absence of opportunity of personal hearing and the requirement to ensure effective service, the Court considered it appropriate to set aside the impugned orders and remit the matter for fresh consideration, subject to conditions to balance the parties' interests.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 16.12.2024 and summary order dated 19.12.2024 are set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority for fresh consideration on condition that the assessee pays 25% of the disputed tax within four weeks, after which the assessee may file reply and the authority shall afford a 14 days clear notice fixing personal hearing and decide the matter on merits.

Issues: Whether the assessee is eligible for exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of long term capital gain where the new residential flat was booked by agreement on 23-05-2012 but possession was taken on 07-01-2015 (within two years of transfer of old property on 28-10-2013).

Analysis: The new property was an under-construction flat with consideration payable by instalments linked to construction. The agreement of booking dated 23-05-2012 recorded initial payment only and the remaining payments were made progressively; construction completed on 26-12-2014 and possession was handed over on 07-01-2015 after final payment. Section 54 requires purchase of a residential house within the statutory period and the entitlement to exemption depends on discharge of the purchase obligation and acquisition of the right to use and enjoy the completed house. Precedent treating possession and payment of full consideration on completion as the relevant date for claiming exemption for under-construction properties was applied.

Conclusion: Exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowed as the date of purchase for the purposes of section 54 is 07-01-2015 (possession after final payment), which falls within two years from the date of transfer of the original asset; appeal allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner is entitled to disbursement of interest on the refund already deposited in Court notwithstanding an inter se dispute between State and Central authorities regarding liability to pay such interest.

Analysis: The Court noted that the respondent has deposited the amount of interest on refund pursuant to earlier orders. The legal framework invoked includes Rule 94 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the definition of "proper officer" under Section 2(91) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which formed the basis of the respondents' inter se dispute over which authority is liable to pay the interest. The Court observed that the existence of an inter se dispute between authorities does not negate the petitioner's substantive entitlement to interest on the refund and that withholding payment from the petitioner on account of unresolved inter se allocation of liability would cause prejudice to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to the disbursement of the interest on the refund; the Registry is directed to verify and disburse the deposited interest amount to the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Where interest on a refund has been found due and deposited, the entitlement of the refund recipient to receive the interest cannot be withheld on account of an unresolved inter se dispute between tax authorities regarding which authority bears the liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the order-in-original passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, can be converted into an order under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, thereby enabling the petitioner to avail benefits under Section 128A of the CGST Act.

Analysis: The proceeding required examination of whether documentary evidence existed to show that the assessment under Section 74 involved no fraud, misrepresentation, or suppression of facts and therefore could be recharacterised as an order under Section 73. The statutory framework relevant to this issue includes Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governing demand determinations, Section 128A providing waiver benefits, Section 75(2) and the first proviso concerning related procedural provisions, Sections 16, 41(1) and 42(5) and Rule 36 and Rule 71(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 concerning eligibility and documentation for input tax credit. The adjudicating authority recorded absence of prescribed supporting documents (such as tax invoices under Section 31(3)(f) and records like GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A) and reached specific findings of fraudulent availment and deliberate utilization of ineligible input tax credit. A prior order under Section 73 for a different year was distinguishable on the ground that documentary evidence had been produced in that year; no such documents were produced in the present matter despite an opportunity to do so.

Conclusion: The petitioner's request for conversion of the order under Section 74 to an order under Section 73 is rejected for lack of documentary evidence and in view of the adjudicating authority's specific findings of fraud and ineligible availment of input tax credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal for want of mandatory pre-deposit could be interfered with on the ground that the appellant was first entitled to an intimation or calculation of the exact pre-deposit amount. (ii) Whether the writ petition, filed long after the impugned appellate order, was liable to be declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal for want of mandatory pre-deposit could be interfered with on the ground that the appellant was first entitled to an intimation or calculation of the exact pre-deposit amount.

Analysis: The appeal was not accompanied by proof of mandatory pre-deposit, and the deficiency was specifically communicated. The record also showed that the appellant was afforded opportunities to make the deposit, including before the first appellate authority, but no deposit was made even on the appellant's own showing. The plea that the authority was bound to first compute and intimate the exact amount of pre-deposit was found untenable.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground failed and the rejection of the appeal on account of non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition, filed long after the impugned appellate order, was liable to be declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Analysis: The writ petition was instituted in September 2025 against an appellate order dated 22.12.2023, with no explanation for the delay. The settled principle applied was that although no statutory limitation governs writ petitions, the remedy must be invoked within a reasonable time, and unexplained delay and laches can bar relief.

Conclusion: The writ petition was barred by delay and laches and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to relief, and the challenge to the appellate order was rejected on merits as well as on the ground of unexplained belated approach.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court may decline interference where an assessee fails to comply with a mandatory pre-deposit requirement despite opportunities, and where the writ remedy is invoked after an unreasonable, unexplained delay.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment orders dated 22.07.2025 under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments are sustainable on merits or whether the matters should be remitted for fresh consideration subject to deposit and related conditions.

Analysis: The petitions challenge assessment orders raising demand mainly based on differences between amounts in Form GSTR-3B and amounts credited to the petitioner's bank account. The petitioner filed skeletal replies and later furnished bank statements by email which, according to the petitioner, were not examined before passing the impugned orders. The Court finds that the replies lack necessary tabulation and reconciliation of bank entries with monthly and annual returns and that further opportunity to submit a clear, substantiated reply is appropriate. Consistent with the Court's established approach in similar cases, a conditional remand with an order for pre-deposit and suspension of recovery measures pending fresh adjudication is an appropriate remedy where the petitioner is given a final chance to substantiate its defence.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders are remitted to the first respondent for fresh consideration on merits. This remand is subject to the petitioner depositing Rs. 35,00,000 from its electronic cash register within 30 days and filing a proper, substantiated reply; on compliance, the first respondent shall decide the matters afresh and the bank attachment shall be vacated. The petitioners obtain interim relief conditional on compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order confirming demands for tax (RCM liability), excess ITC claim and ITC reversal under Section 42 should be re-determined in view of the deletion of Section 42 by the Finance Act, 2022 and related entitlement to retrospective benefit, and whether interim relief (vacation of bank attachment) should be granted subject to deposits.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner had sought time to contest the excess ITC claim but did not file further challenge and that the petitioner admitted the RCM liability. The Court observed that Section 42 has been deleted by the Finance Act, 2022 effective 01.10.2022, and that the deletion could affect the department's authority to levy the disputed amounts for the period in question; accordingly, the correctness of confirming demands under Section 42 required fresh consideration. Applying the Court's consistent approach in similar cases, the Court directed a remand to the Respondent for fresh adjudication on merits, requiring conditional deposits by the petitioner (25% of disputed tax relating to excess ITC and ITC reversal under Section 42; full disputed tax admitted for RCM liability; and full late fee) within thirty days, and provided that bank attachment would be vacated subject to compliance. The Respondent was directed to pass a fresh order with revised calculations including interest as per law within three months of compliance, and was given liberty to recover amounts if stipulations were not met.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Respondent for fresh adjudication and calculation of tax and interest, and the petitioner is granted conditional relief (vacation of bank attachment) subject to specified deposits; outcome is partly in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether the recovery notice in Form GST DRC-13 attaching the bank account of a director can be sustained under Section 89 of the respective GST enactments and whether the director bears the burden to prove that non-recovery of tax cannot be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty.

Analysis: Section 89(1) places liability on every person who was a director of a private company where tax due from the company cannot be recovered, subject to the director proving that the non-recovery is not attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty. The statutory scheme thus allocates the evidential burden to the director to demonstrate absence of such culpable conduct. Where an attachment has been effected without a determination on the director's discharge of that burden, the matter requires reconsideration by the adjudicating authority on merits with opportunity to the director to file a reply and lead evidence addressing the statutory criteria.

Conclusion: The recovery notice in Form GST DRC-13 attaching the director's bank account is quashed and the matter is remitted to the first respondent to pass a fresh order on merits after affording the director an opportunity to discharge the burden under Section 89(1) of the respective GST enactments.

Outcome: The civil appeals were disposed of after recording that the cause no longer survived for consideration on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the Principal Commissioner has power to condone delay in uploading Form No. 67 and exercise discretion under Section 264 read with Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in cases of default by the assessee; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer must allow foreign tax credit after subsequent filing of Form No. 67 and verification in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the Principal Commissioner can condone the delay in uploading Form No. 67 and exercise power under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, including invoking powers under Section 119, where the assessee defaulted in filing within the due date.

Analysis: The Court examined the interplay between Rule 128 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (requiring Form No. 67 by the due date under Section 139) and the discretionary powers available to the Commissioner under Section 264 and Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court considered precedent recognising the Commissioner's power to deal with defaults by assessees and weighed the consequence of a technical delay against the assessee's substantive right to foreign tax credit, noting that denial of credit solely for a venial or technical breach would result in withholding of a substantial amount without lawful authority.

Conclusion: The Commissioner has power to consider and, where appropriate, condone delay in filing Form No. 67 when exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 264 and may invoke the powers available under Section 119; denial of foreign tax credit solely on account of such technical delay is not justified in the circumstances.

Issue (ii): Whether, having subsequently furnished Form No. 67, the Assessing Officer is required to allow foreign tax credit after verification, and what relief the writ court may grant.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner furnished Form No. 67 after the due date and sought rectification under Section 154 and revision under Section 264; the AO had denied credit because Form No. 67 was not uploaded in time. Exercising writ jurisdiction, the Court directed the AO to verify the facts and allow the foreign tax credit if supported by the record, or else to pass a speaking order denying the credit, preserving the assessee's right to further remedies.

Conclusion: The AO is directed to verify the subsequently filed Form No. 67 and, if the facts warrant, to allow the foreign tax credit; if the credit is not allowed, a speaking order must be passed, preserving the assessee's rights.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions are allowed on merits: the Commissioner's rejection of the revision application on the ground of inability to condone delay is not sustained, and the AO is directed to consider and decide allowance of foreign tax credit after verification within two months; related petitions are allowed for the same reasons.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical or venial failure to file Form No. 67 by the due date cannot, by itself, justify denial of an assessee's substantive right to foreign tax credit; revisional powers under Section 264 read with Section 119 permit condonation of such default and the AO must verify and allow credit where warranted or record reasons in a speaking order.

Issues: (i) Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge. (ii) Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime. (iii) Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Issue (i): Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge.

Analysis: The governing test is whether the alleged act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty. Protection under Section 197(1) is not automatic and is not to be invoked mechanically at the threshold. The requirement of sanction may arise at a later stage and, in an appropriate case, depends upon the evidence that emerges during trial. The plea is therefore not a complete jurisdictional bar merely because it is raised before charge.

Conclusion: The plea of absence of sanction did not warrant discharge at the threshold and does not help the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering is independent of the scheduled offence and is of continuing nature so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, possessed, acquired, used, or projected as untainted property. The expression proceeds of crime is expansive and includes transformed property and equivalent value. At the stage of discharge, the Court is not to conduct a mini-trial or weigh probative value; it is sufficient if the materials disclose a prima facie nexus with the alleged laundering activity. Whether the property is genuinely acquired or otherwise is a matter for trial.

Conclusion: The temporal objection and the challenge to the existence of proceeds of crime did not justify discharge and are rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Analysis: At the stage of Section 227, the Court is required to see whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of the offence and gives rise to grave suspicion. The materials referred to in the charge-sheet were sufficient to bring the matter to trial, and the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or undertake any impermissible exercise. No patent illegality or impropriety is shown in the order refusing discharge.

Conclusion: The refusal to discharge was legally sustainable and called for no interference.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the petitioners did not establish any ground to prevent the trial from proceeding on the existing material, and the prosecution was allowed to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge, the Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and interfere only if the record clearly fails to disclose a prima facie offence; sanction under Section 197 is not an automatic threshold bar, and money-laundering liability may continue so long as proceeds of crime are dealt with in any proscribed manner.