Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file an appeal before the tribunal; (ii) Whether the time spent in pursuing the writ petition should be taken into account for the purpose of limitation for filing the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file an appeal before the tribunal.

Analysis: The Court noted that the tribunal's IT infrastructure has been put in place and hearings are being conducted in a virtual/e-court enabled mode with stabilized systems and scrutiny/marking of defects having commenced; on that basis the Court considered allowing the petitioner to proceed to file the appeal.

Conclusion: Permission granted to the petitioner to file the appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the time spent in pursuing the writ petition should be taken into account for the purpose of limitation for filing the appeal.

Analysis: The Court directed that the period consumed in prosecuting the writ petition shall be taken into account if limitation is to be reckoned for filing the appeal, thereby addressing the relevance of that period to any limitation objection.

Conclusion: The time spent in pursuing the writ petition shall be taken into account for limitation purposes in filing the appeal.

Final Conclusion: The petition is disposed of permitting the petitioner to file the appeal and directing that time spent in the writ petition be reckoned for limitation purposes; the petition and any pending applications stand disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned attachment could be sustained on the basis of the director's alleged personal liability under the VAT regime; (ii) Whether the transfer of the property and the absence of an attachment on the date of transfer barred attachment of the subject property under the VAT and GST provisions.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned attachment could be sustained on the basis of the director's alleged personal liability under the VAT regime.

Analysis: Section 37 of the VAT Act was applied on the footing that a director's personal liability arises only where the company is wound up and the tax dues cannot be recovered from the company. The company concerned was still in existence and had not been wound up. On that basis, joint and several liability of the director had not crystallized so as to justify attachment of the property.

Conclusion: The attachment could not be sustained on the basis of the director's personal liability.

Issue (ii): Whether the transfer of the property and the absence of an attachment on the date of transfer barred attachment of the subject property under the VAT and GST provisions.

Analysis: Sections 43 of the VAT Act and 82 of the GST Act were treated as applying only where a transfer is made to defeat revenue after tax dues have become payable and crystallized. The property had already been transferred before the attachment order was issued, and on the date of attachment it was no longer owned by the company or the director. The Court also held that third-party property cannot be attached unless the statutory conditions are strictly satisfied.

Conclusion: The impugned attachment over the subject property was illegal and unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the prohibitory communication and check slip were quashed, with a direction to register the sale deed without insisting on a no objection certificate.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax recovery attachment cannot be sustained against property transferred before the attachment order unless the statutory prerequisites for director liability or avoidance of revenue-defeating transfer are strictly established.

Issues: Whether the writ order directing refund of tax deducted at source from land acquisition compensation could be sustained when the compensation amount had already been refunded in income-tax proceedings and the writ petition was founded on incorrect and misleading facts.

Analysis: The writ petitioner had sought refund of the tax deducted at source on compensation paid for acquisition of land and had also sought a declaration that such compensation was exempt from income tax under Section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The appeal disclosed that the refund had already been processed under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and that the amount, including interest under Section 244-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, had been credited to the respondent's bank account long before the writ petition was filed and decided. The explanation that the refund was unknown to the respondent was rejected, and the Court inferred that the writ petition had been prosecuted on misleading and incomplete facts with an attempt to secure the same refund twice.

Conclusion: The writ order could not be sustained and was set aside. The appeal was allowed and costs were imposed on the respondent.

Final Conclusion: Relief based on alleged non-refund of tax deducted at source was declined because the same amount had already been refunded in income-tax proceedings, and the writ order obtained on misleading facts was annulled with consequential costs.

Ratio Decidendi: An order obtained on the basis of misleading or suppressed material facts, especially where it would result in a double refund of the same tax amount, is liable to be set aside and may justify the imposition of costs.

Issues: Whether the respondents are obliged to process and grant the petitioner's pending refunds of Fringe Benefit Tax for Assessment Years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10, together with statutory interest, notwithstanding technical constraints in the Department's ITBA system, and whether relief by way of mandamus under Article 226 should be granted.

Analysis: The facts concerning filing of FBT returns, claims for refunds, rectification applications and follow-up correspondence are admitted and not disputed. The entitlement to the refunds and the denial of credited advance tax were not controverted on merits. The sole defence rests on technical limitations of the Department's ITBA system which prevented uploading or finalisation of rectification orders and refunds. A system created and maintained by the Department cannot lawfully be allowed to deprive a taxpayer of a statutory entitlement indefinitely. Administrative or technical difficulties do not extinguish the legal right to a refund or the statutory obligation to process rectification and grant interest as provided by the statute. The statutory framework provides for payment of interest on delayed refunds under Section 244A read with Section 115WL of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and for rectification and adjustment under the provisions invoked in the proceedings. Given the admitted entitlement and prolonged inaction, the appropriate remedy is to direct the respondents to rectify demands, process pending applications and grant the due refunds with statutory interest within a specified timeframe.

Conclusion: Relief granted in favour of the petitioner (assessee). The respondents are directed to process and grant the specified refunds for AY 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 along with interest under Section 244A read with Section 115WL of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and to pass necessary rectification orders within eight weeks from the date of the order.

Issues: (i) Whether impugned orders passed ex parte as a consequence of notices/SCNs being uploaded only under the 'Additional Notices' tab on the GST portal, which did not effectively bring the SCNs to the notice of the petitioner, required setting aside and remand for fresh adjudication; (ii) Whether the petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to file replies and for personal hearings with effective communication safeguards.

Issue (i): Whether lack of effective notice caused by uploading SCNs under the 'Additional Notices' tab warrants setting aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The petitions concern SCNs dated 23 September 2023 and 28 May 2024 which, as pleaded, were uploaded under the 'Additional Notices' tab and were not effectively brought to the petitioner s attention, resulting in non-filing of replies and ex parte orders. Prior decisions of this Court on similar facts have treated portal-only uploads under that tab as not constituting effective communication where access was not demonstrably available, and have set aside orders to permit adjudication on merits. The factual distinction between notices dated before and after the portal changes was considered but the overarching concern is that adjudication proceeded on the basis of non-filing owing to alleged deficient communication.

Conclusion: The impugned orders are set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication on the ground of lack of effective notice arising from the mode of portal upload.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file replies and be heard by personal hearing with specified safeguards for communication.

Analysis: The petitions by the same petitioner raise a common grievance regarding portal-based intimation. To ensure adjudication on merits and to meet requirements of fair opportunity and natural justice, specific procedural safeguards were directed: a time period for filing replies, issuance of personal hearing notices, and communication of those notices via registered mobile number and e-mail, together with access to the GST portal to enable uploading of replies and access to notices and documents.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted four weeks to file replies; the Adjudicating Authority shall issue and communicate personal hearing notices by registered mobile and e-mail, allow portal access, consider the replies and hearing submissions, and pass fresh orders.

Final Conclusion: The relief sought to set aside the impugned ex parte orders and to secure an opportunity to be heard has been granted by setting aside the orders and remanding the matters for fresh adjudication with specified communication safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory notices are uploaded on a portal in a manner that does not effectively bring them to the notice of the addressee, resulting in non-filing of replies and ex parte adjudication, the appropriate remedy is to set aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh adjudication after affording an effective opportunity to file replies and be heard.

Issues: Whether the additions made by the Assessing Officer for unexplained cash deposits can be sustained where the assessee has filed returns under the presumptive taxation scheme and placed documentary evidence of regular business receipts and payments.

Analysis: The appeal engages assessment under notice issued u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B and appellate disposal u/s 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with contention that the ex parte treatment and addition for unexplained cash deposits were improper. Documentary evidence in the appellate record shows regular business invoices reflecting quantities and rates, bank statement entries of receipts from the buyer through bearer cheques, and subsequent deposits into a loan/FD account used to make payments to suppliers. The assessee had declared income under the presumptive taxation regime and returned turnover; however, total credits in the bank records exceeded declared turnover. On examining the documentary record, the receipts and mode of payment were found to be consistent with a regular milk purchase-and-sale business, and the cash flows reflected encashment of bearer cheques and subsequent use for business payments. The Tribunal adjusted the turnover upward based on bank credits and allowable estimation method under the presumptive taxation framework, computed presumptive income at 8% of the revised turnover, and compared it with the income declared by the assessee to quantify the sustainable addition.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits is not fully sustainable; part of the addition is deleted and a limited addition of Rs. 66,470 is sustained after estimating turnover at Rs. 46,00,000 and applying the presumptive rate, resulting in part relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee carrying on small business has documentary evidence of regular business transactions and bank credits consistent with declared business activity, the presumptive taxation framework permits estimation of turnover from bank credits and documentary record and limits additions for unexplained cash deposits to the extent not covered by such estimation and evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the salary expenditure debited to profit and loss account of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable in full for the assessment year; (ii) If allowable, the correct method to apportion the salary expenditure between the power generation unit and the share trading business for computing deduction under Section 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the salary expenditure of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the tax audit report and supporting details which showed the salary debited in the profit and loss account. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's audit-backed figure as properly substantiated.

Conclusion: The salary expenditure of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable in full in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): The proper basis for apportioning the salary between the power generation unit and the share trading business for computation of deduction under Section 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the competing approaches adopted by the Assessing Officer (50:50), the CIT(A) (allocation of one-fourth to power generation), and the assessee (apportionment by turnover). The Tribunal found apportionment by turnover to be a rational and scientific method to allocate common salary expenses between distinct business undertakings.

Conclusion: The salary expenditure shall be apportioned between the power generation unit and the share trading business in the ratio of their respective turnovers; direction given to the Assessing Officer to recompute deduction under Section 80IA accordingly, which is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by accepting the full salary claim and directing recomputation of Section 80IA deduction after apportioning salary between businesses on turnover basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Where common expenses relate to distinct businesses, apportionment by the relative turnover of each business is an acceptable method for allocating such expenses for the purpose of computing business-specific deductions under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the Order-in-Original passed against the petitioner should be set aside and the show-cause proceedings reopened where a no due certificate and cancellation of registration had been issued in favour of the erstwhile company that underwent amalgamation.

Analysis: The existence of a no due certificate and cancellation of registration raised a substantive question about the validity of proceedings conducted against the petitioner. The petitioner undertook to deposit the entire amount stated in the impugned Order-in-Original within two weeks and to submit a reply to the show-cause notice along with written submissions. On that basis, the impugned Order-in-Original was quashed and a direction given to the authority to evaluate the petitioner's claim afresh after allowing an opportunity of hearing, subject to the deposit and submission of reply and written submissions. The authority was directed to communicate its fresh order within three months and to refund the deposit if the show-cause notice was discharged; otherwise the deposit could be adjusted against any liability.

Conclusion: The petition is partly allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned Order-in-Original dated December, 2025, subject to the petitioner depositing the entire amount within two weeks and submitting the reply and written submissions, and by directing the respondent authority to pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity of hearing and communicating the order within three months.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a no due certificate and cancellation of registration raise a real issue as to liability, an impugned order may be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication with directions for deposit and an opportunity of hearing to the affected party.

Issues: Whether the Settlement Commission/competent authority was justified in rejecting the assessee's settlement application under Section 245C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for alleged failure to make full and true disclosure in respect of Rs. 80 crores claimed as undisclosed income linked to inflated refinery loss.

Analysis: The assessee submitted a confidential enclosure detailing the manner in which the additional income was derived, describing the process of inflating refinery loss and correlating stock in trade with the claimed undisclosed income. The authority's rejection recorded that full and true particulars and evidential materials were not disclosed, but did not adequately examine the detailed explanation provided by the assessee. Given that rejection under Section 245C(1) carries consequences including interest, penalty and potential prosecution, the authority was required to closely scrutinize and verify the manner in which the undisclosed income was shown to have been derived before concluding there was no full and true disclosure. The record shows that, on the remaining amounts, the revenue accepted eligibility for settlement.

Conclusion: The rejection cannot stand without a detailed re-scrutiny of the materials tendered by the assessee; the matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration of the settlement application keeping in view the detailed disclosures made by the assessee. The writ appeal is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.

Issues: Whether the appeal preferred under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 properly lies to the High Court or, having regard to the questions involved, falls to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 set out the jurisdictional criteria for appeals to the High Court and to the Supreme Court respectively. Section 35G permits an appeal to the High Court where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, subject to certain exclusions. Section 35L provides for appeals to the Supreme Court from High Court judgments delivered under section 35G and includes matters involving determination of taxability or excisability. The materials and submissions were examined in light of these provisions to determine the appropriate forum for appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The matter falls to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944; accordingly the appeal under Section 35G is dismissed and no interference is made in favour of the appellant (revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the disputed MS frame parts and transformer tanks were correctly classifiable under CTH 85049010 as parts of transformers or under CTH 73269099 as articles of iron and steel; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked and penalty sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the disputed MS frame parts and transformer tanks were correctly classifiable under CTH 85049010 as parts of transformers or under CTH 73269099 as articles of iron and steel.

Analysis: The goods were manufactured against specific purchase orders and drawings supplied by the buyers, and the buyer certificates as well as the independent professional certificate supported the position that the items were exclusively used in transformer manufacture. The cited precedent on transformer tanks and frames supported treatment of such items as parts of transformers. On the facts, the goods were not mere general articles of iron and steel but components made for use in transformers.

Conclusion: The classification under CTH 85049010 was correct and the contrary classification under CTH 73269099 was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked and penalty sustained.

Analysis: The periodic returns disclosed the classification adopted by the appellant, and the department was aware of the clearances from the beginning. In the absence of suppression or concealment, the demand could not be raised by invoking the extended period. Since the classification dispute failed in favour of the Revenue, the penalty and demand based on the disputed classification also could not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable and the penalty was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appellant succeeded on merits and on limitation, and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods manufactured to specific buyer drawings and exclusively used as transformer components are classifiable as parts of transformers, and where the classification adopted is fully disclosed to the department, the extended period cannot be invoked absent suppression of facts.

Issues: (i) Whether service of notices solely by making them available on the GST common portal is valid when the petitioner's GST registration stood cancelled; (ii) Whether the impugned order violates the statutory mandate under Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not granting an opportunity of personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether portal-only service is valid after cancellation of GST registration.

Analysis: Section 169 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes multiple permissible modes of service including direct tender, registered post/courier, email, availability on the common portal and, where other modes are impracticable, affixation or publication. Where the petitioner's registration was cancelled, reliance solely on portal-based service imposes a duty to monitor the portal on a non-registered person and may fail to communicate the notice effectively. Prior authority dealing with identical facts was considered and applied.

Conclusion: Portal-only service is not a valid mode of service where the petitioner's registration had been cancelled; service was not effected in accordance with Section 169 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order violated the requirement of Section 75(4) to grant an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) embodies the principle of audi alteram partem and requires that an opportunity of hearing be granted where a request is received in writing or an adverse decision is contemplated. Fiscal adjudications must comply with principles of natural justice and failure to afford a hearing renders proceedings vulnerable. The absence of personal hearing in the circumstances was examined in light of settled principles.

Conclusion: The impugned order violates Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not providing the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order is quashed; the petitioner is permitted to file a reply to the show-cause notice and the Department may issue a fresh notice and adjudicate afresh, ensuring effective service and providing personal hearing in terms of Section 75(4) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Where registration has been cancelled, service solely by making notices available on the GST common portal does not satisfy the service requirements of Section 169 and an adjudicatory order affecting rights must be preceded by an opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) to comply with audi alteram partem and natural justice.

Issues: Whether the ex parte best judgment assessment order dated 24.03.2025 passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income tax Act, 1961, can be set aside on the ground that the Interim Resolution Professional (appointed under Section 16 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016) and the company's management were bona fide prevented from placing material before the Assessing Officer during the stay/seizure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under Section 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and whether the assessee is entitled to a fresh notice and opportunity to be heard.

Analysis: The record shows appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional and subsequent stay that effectively halted the CIRP, resulting in the IRP being de jure in charge but lacking effective access to facts, transactions and documents, while the management lacked legal authority to represent the company. The additions made by the Assessing Officer relate to the cost of acquisition of property which was not placed before the Assessing Officer. Given the inability of the IRP and management to present factual and legal pleas before assessment, and the practical obstacles to obtaining effective relief on appeal (including payment conditions that would be onerous for a company emerging from insolvency), the appellate remedy would be illusory. In these circumstances, the impugned ex parte best judgment assessment requires setting aside and remanding for issuance of a fresh/comprehensive notice with an adequate period to respond; on receipt of the reply and documents the Assessing Officer should pass a fresh order in accordance with law and, if expedient, afford an audience to the authorised representative.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 24.03.2025 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed; the Assessing Officer shall issue a fresh/comprehensive notice (if any additions are proposed), allow at least thirty days to respond and furnish documents, and thereafter pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to a fresh opportunity to be heard.

Issues: (i) Whether the funds sold by the assessee are equity-oriented funds and liable to tax as long-term capital gains under Section 112A or taxable as short-term capital gains; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer's acceptance of declared Annual Letting Value (ALV) for various properties was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue requiring revision under Section 263; (iii) Whether non-initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271C for alleged failure to deduct TDS under Section 194C renders the assessment order erroneous and subject to revision under Section 263.

Issue (i): Whether the funds sold are equity-oriented funds and liable to tax under Section 112A as long-term capital gains.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the fund details, including ISIN codes and fund statements submitted with the assessment record, and noted that the Assessing Officer had considered these details during scrutiny and formed an opinion that they were equity-oriented. The revisional order did not indicate materials or reasoning by which the Authority for Revision could legitimately conclude the funds were not equity-oriented; the revisional exercise under Section 263 requires material basis for concluding an assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on this issue and found the funds to be equity-oriented for the purposes of taxation under Section 112A.

Issue (ii): Whether the ALV declared and accepted by the Assessing Officer for various properties was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Analysis: For each property, the Tribunal reviewed materials on record (declarations, earlier years' acceptance, municipal/authority assessment where applicable, use of property for professional/commercial purposes, and evidence of sale or construction status). The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had before him material and explanations and had formed an opinion accepting the declared ALV or the commercial/residential use. The revisional order failed to set out a reasoned basis or specific contrary material to justify treating the assessment as erroneous and prejudicial; generalized references to market yields or an AI overview were insufficient to displace the Assessing Officer's considered view.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee and quashed the revisional directions on ALV for the properties addressed.

Issue (iii): Whether the Commissioner could, under Section 263, set aside the assessment for non-initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271C for alleged failure to deduct tax under Section 194C.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied established precedent that initiation of penalty proceedings is a matter of satisfaction of the Assessing Officer and that the Commissioner cannot, by invoking Section 263, set aside an assessment solely to direct initiation of penalty where no material justifying such revision is recorded in the revisional order.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee and held that the revisional direction to initiate penalty proceedings was not sustainable under Section 263.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the revisional order lacked requisite material and reasoned findings to sustain revision under Section 263 on the issues of fund classification, ALV of properties, and initiation of penalty proceedings; accordingly, the revision order was quashed and the appeal allowed, subject only to verification of the purchase/cost of acquisition of one fund item as directed.

Ratio Decidendi: A revisional order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid only where the Commissioner records material and reasons showing that the subordinate authority's order is prima facie erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue; absent such material and reasoned findings, the revisional power cannot be exercised to substitute an alternate view or to direct fresh investigation.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to consideration for Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) benefits despite filing manual/non-EDI bills of export and inability to submit e-BRC details through the DGFT e-Com portal.

Analysis: The Court examined prior decisions of coordinate and other High Courts which have held that where exports are validly effected on the strength of bills of export, procedural requirements such as e-EDI registration or issuance of e-BRCs cannot be used to deny statutory benefits under schemes like MEIS. The Court noted directions in earlier Division Bench decisions permitting manual transmission or correction of bills and mandating processing of MEIS claims where entitlement exists. Applying those precedents and the principle of maintaining parity in treatment, the Court found that the petitioner's inability to complete the online application due to non-issuance of e-BRCs (attributable to manual bills) should not result in summary rejection of the claim.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to have its MEIS claim considered on merits and the petitioner shall be permitted to submit manual application and supporting documents; the respondents shall not reject the claim solely on the ground of non-submission through the online process and shall consider the claim in accordance with extant policy. The minutes dated 09.06.2020 are set aside and the petition is disposed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where exports are validly effected on the strength of bills of export, procedural or electronic compliance requirements (such as e-EDI registration or e-BRC issuance) cannot be invoked to deny entitlement to benefits under MEIS; administrative authorities must consider such claims on merits and permit manual submissions or corrections to ensure parity of treatment.

Issues: Whether the attachment of an ancestral property as "equivalent value" under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible where the actual tainted property cannot be traced and the property was not purchased by the accused from proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The adjudicatory framework permits provisional attachment of property believed to be proceeds of crime. The definition of "proceeds of crime" in Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 encompasses not only property derived from criminal activity but also the value of such property and property equivalent in value when the tainted property is taken or held outside the country. Where the investigating authority is unable to locate the actual tainted property, the statute allows attachment of untainted property equivalent in value. There is no statutory exemption for ancestral or inherited property; prior acquisition does not automatically preclude attachment as equivalent value if evidence supports that the attached property represents the value equivalent of proceeds of crime. The impugned findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority that the property represented value equivalent to proceeds of crime were considered on the material placed on record, and the appellate forum applied the statutory scheme to uphold the attachment.

Conclusion: The attachment of the subject ancestral property as equivalent value under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible; the appeal is dismissed in favour of the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where actual tainted property cannot be traced, Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 authorises attachment of property equivalent in value, and ancestral or prior acquisition of property does not by itself prevent such attachment.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest on delayed refund of excise duty deposited under protest and, if so, from which date and at what rate.

Analysis: The petitioner deposited excise duty under protest and obtained favourable orders on appeal. Multiple letters seeking refund were sent to the respondent, and the respondent eventually directed formal applications and processed the refund only after pursuing appellate remedies. Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (w.e.f. 26.05.1995) prescribes entitlement to interest on refunds and provides the framework for rate and commencement; for pending refund applications interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of introduction of the Finance Bill, 1995. The record shows the petitioner sought refund prior to 26.05.1995 and continued to press for refund thereafter; the respondent did not contest receipt of earlier refund requests and delayed sanction until 29.12.2000.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to interest on the refunded excise duty at the rate notified by the Government and prevailing for the relevant period, commencing after the expiry of three months from 26.05.1995. The petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017 is vitiated for non-compliance with the requirement of personal hearing under Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017 and consequent violation of the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The petition record shows a show cause notice dated 23.07.2024 fixing personal hearing on 23.12.2024, non-appearance by the petitioner on that date, and an original order under Section 74 dated 20.01.2025 passed without giving a fresh notice specifying date, time and venue for hearing on 20.01.2025. The decision follows the precedent of the Coordinate Bench in Shubham Steel Traders v. State of U.P., which addresses the requirement of granting an opportunity of personal hearing in similar circumstances. The analysis focuses on compliance with the statutory hearing requirements in Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017 and the application of principles of natural justice where no fresh hearing opportunity was afforded before passing the impugned order under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The order dated 20.01.2025 passed under Section 74 of the GST Act, 2017 is quashed for failure to afford the petitioner a personal hearing in compliance with Section 75(4) and Section 75(6) of the CGST/UPGST Act, 2017; authorities are directed to grant fresh opportunity of hearing and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, resultantly disposal is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, under Section 83(7) of the Finance Act, 2010, provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (including Section 11A relating to recovery) could be made applicable to assessment and recovery of Clean Environment Cess by notification, and whether the impugned Notification No. 2/2010 is intra vires.

Analysis: Section 83(7) of the Finance Act, 2010 authorises the Central Government to declare applicability of specified provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to matters relating to cess. The text of Section 83(7) employs the legislative device of incorporation by reference, enabling direct extension of an existing statutory regime. Established authorities and lexical meaning support a broad understanding of the term "levy" to encompass assessment, computation and collection processes. Section 84 confers a separate rule-making power to prescribe detailed procedures, but the existence of that power does not preclude use of Section 83(7)'s incorporation device. The legislative scheme-read as a whole-permits the Central Government either to frame detailed rules under Section 84 or to adopt, by notification under Section 83(7), the existing Central Excise provisions for assessment and recovery of the cess. Given that "levy" includes assessment and collection, extending Central Excise provisions by notification for recovery of Clean Environment Cess falls within the scope of Section 83(7).

Conclusion: The impugned Notification No. 2/2010-Clean Energy Cess, dated 22-6-2010, insofar as it makes applicable provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (including Section 11A) to assessment and recovery of Clean Environment Cess, is intra vires the Finance Act, 2010; the writ petition is dismissed.