Issues: Whether the summons issued under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 called for interference in writ jurisdiction on the grounds of harassment, arbitrariness, and non-compliance with the administrative circular.

Analysis: Section 70 empowers the proper officer to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary in an inquiry. A director is not automatically insulated from inquiry merely because the company has acted through another representative, and the investigating authority is entitled to assess whether the director's attendance is necessary. In writ review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interference is warranted only where the summons is shown to be without jurisdiction, issued for an oblique purpose, or otherwise amounts to abuse of power or harassment. The administrative circular relied upon is intended to guide the exercise of statutory power and reflects the requirement of administrative fairness, but it does not curtail the statutory power itself. Any judicial interference would depend on demonstrable arbitrariness in the exercise of that power.

Conclusion: No final adjudication was made on the validity of the summons, and the matter was kept pending with the interim protection continuing.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 61,50,000 as income from undisclosed sources on account of cash deposits in the assessee's bank account was justified.

Analysis: The assessee explained that the cash deposits were sourced from advance cash received on sale of ancestral agricultural land. The registered sale deed recorded receipt of cash of Rs. 1.18 crores, and the statement recorded during assessment corroborated the transaction. The record also showed cash withdrawals and available cash balance sufficient to explain the impugned deposit. In these circumstances, the cash receipt from sale of agricultural land constituted an available source of funds, and the addition treating the deposit as unexplained could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee establishes a credible source for cash deposits through contemporaneous documentary evidence and corroborated statements, an addition for unexplained income cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the addition made by estimating gross profit at 35% on an alleged cash receipt of Rs. 5,00,000 (based on seized diary and digital data) was justified, or whether the assessee's explanation supported by bank statements and the diary decoding negates the addition.

Analysis: The seized diary entries and digital data were examined alongside the assessee's bank statements and the decoding of symbols in the seized diary (alphabetic markers denoting cheque or cash). The entry for Rs. 5,00,000 appearing in the diary was shown by the diary's own notation to be a cheque entry (not cash). The assessee produced complete bank statements which did not show receipt of the Rs. 5,00,000. The diary also contained a separate ledger reference indicating a different business name for that entry. In view of these documentary trails, the asserted cash receipt was plausibly explained either as a cheque not actually received or as pertaining to a different concern, undermining the basis for treating the amount as unexplained cash business receipt and for estimating gross profit thereon.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,75,000 made by applying a 35% gross profit estimate on the alleged Rs. 5,00,000 cash receipt is deleted; the assessee's explanation supported by bank statements and diary decoding is accepted and the addition is not sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a seized entry is shown by the seized material itself to denote a cheque (not cash) and the assessee produces bank statements disproving receipt of the amount, the entry cannot be treated as an unexplained cash receipt for making an estimated addition; documentary contradiction of the basis for estimation negates the addition.

Issues: Whether the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioner is arbitrary or unjustified and liable to be quashed, and if so, on what conditions the LOC should be set aside.

Analysis: The Court examined the law governing LOCs as articulated in Vineet Gupta v. Union of India and other precedents which treat LOCs as a coercive executive measure impinging on the fundamental right to travel under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The factors considered include absence of a criminal FIR, absence of demonstrable necessity or proximate likelihood of absconding, cooperation of the subject with investigations, family and other ties to the country, and the need for necessity, proportionality, fairness, and due process before continuation of an LOC. On facts, there is no FIR against the petitioner; the petitioner holds tax residence abroad but has extensive family ties in India; the petitioner has previously been permitted to travel by the Court on multiple occasions and has travelled; the original complaint was withdrawn by the complainant; and the petitioner has undertaken to cooperate and appear as required. Balancing the State's interest and the petitioner's fundamental rights, and applying the principles of necessity and proportionality, the Court concluded that continuation of the LOC was not justified but that conditional relief was appropriate to safeguard any legitimate investigative requirement. The Court therefore set aside the LOC while reserving the respondents' right to reopen or reissue protective measures if circumstances so warrant, and imposed conditions requiring an affidavit undertaking cooperation, production of documents, furnishing of travel itinerary and contact details, advance notice for appearances, and a mechanism for the Investigating Officer or Court to direct restraint or reissue an LOC if reservations remain.

Conclusion: The Look Out Circular issued against the petitioner is quashed and set aside subject to conditions requiring the petitioner to cooperate with investigations and comply with procedural requirements; liberty is reserved to the respondents to reopen or reissue an LOC if justified.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to Cenvat credit of Rs. 3,99,183/- on input services received from a job worker where the service provider had paid service tax (although the service was placed in the negative list) and such payment was accepted by the supplier's jurisdictional authority.

Analysis: The appeal examines whether denial of Cenvat credit to the recipient can be sustained when the supplier had paid service tax which was neither disputed nor refunded by the supplier's jurisdictional authority, and when the services received were used as input services in manufacture. Applicable provisions include the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 concerning taxable services and the negative list. The Tribunal applied settled precedents holding that where the supplier has discharged tax obligations and the supplier's jurisdictional authority has accepted that payment, the recipient cannot be deprived of credit on the ground of re-classification or non-taxability by a different territorial assessing officer. The analysis focuses on (a) the nature of services received as input services for manufacture, (b) the effect of tax payment by the supplier and its acceptance by the supplier's jurisdiction, and (c) limits on reassessment by the recipient's jurisdictional officer concerning the supplier's tax liability.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit of Rs. 3,99,183/- is set aside and the appellant is entitled to the Cenvat credit with consequential relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the services provided by the appellant are correctly classifiable as "Works Contract Service" or as "Site Formation and Clearance, Excavation, Earthmoving and Demolition Services"; (ii) Whether post 01.07.2012 the activity falls under Section 66B(54) read with Section 66E(h) or is taxable under the composite/partial reverse charge scheme (Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9), and whether the demand raised by invoking extended period is sustainable.

Issue (i): Classification of the appellant's services as works contract service vis-a -vis site formation and excavation services.

Analysis: The contracts incorporate supply of services together with supply of materials in execution of composite contracts, including civil construction, erection, commissioning, installation, fabrication and incidental activities. The execution particulars and work orders show integrated activities involving both materials and services supplied as part of the same contractual obligation. The composite nature of performance and the concomitant payment structure were considered in relation to the statutory classification provisions cited by the parties.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Applicability of post-01.07.2012 charging provisions (Section 66B(54) read with Section 66E(h)) and Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9; validity of extended period demand.

Analysis: For the period after 01.07.2012 the services, as characterised above, do not fall within the exclusion invoked under the cited provisions and the appellant has paid service tax under the composite/partial reverse charge mechanism as reflected in Sl.No.9 of Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. The demand based on reclassification and invocation of extended period is examined in light of the contractual composite nature and the tax treatment adopted by the appellant.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand and adjudication are set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs, as the services are rightly treated as works contract service and the post-2012 tax treatment under Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9 is applicable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where contracts are composite involving supply of materials together with service in execution of a single integrated obligation, the correct classification is works contract service and not a pure site formation/excavation service; such classification governs the applicable service tax treatment including application of Notification No.30/2012-ST Sl.No.9.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 can be imposed on a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the term "person" in Rule 26(1) can extend to an artificial juristic entity such as a company for imposing penalty. The Tribunal relied on earlier decisions of the Tribunal and Larger Benches which hold that penal consequences under Rule 26 (including Rule 26(2)) are directed at natural persons who possess the requisite knowledge and conduct, and that a company as an artificial entity does not itself have a mind to form the requisite knowledge; therefore, to punish culpable individuals the corporate veil must be lifted. The Tribunal noted consistent precedents (including Rashmi Metaliks Limited and other cited decisions) concluding that penalties under Rule 26 are not imposable on an artificial entity in the absence of specific statutory provision making the company itself liable.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 cannot be imposed on the respondent company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013; the impugned order upholding the dropping of penalty is therefore upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the order rejecting the appeal as time-barred under Section 107(4) of the W.B.G.S.T. Act could be quashed and the delay condoned on the ground that the timeline is directory and the petitioner had furnished sufficient explanation for delay.

Analysis: The issue arises under Section 107(4) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act concerning time limits for filing an appeal and the scope for condoning delay. The petitioner's delay in filing the appeal was examined on the record and the petitioner furnished reasons (paragraph-6) explaining the non-filing within the statutory period. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision holding that the timeline under Section 107(4) is directory. The petitioner was found to have made out a prima facie case and was not grossly negligent in delay. The respondent did not press objection to the legal position regarding the directory nature of the provision. Based on these findings, the impugned order rejecting the appeal as time-barred was quashed and the appeal was directed to be heard on merits treating it as filed within time, with a peremptory timeframe for disposal and restraint on coercive action pending disposal.

Conclusion: The rejection order dated 29.08.2022 is quashed and set aside; the appeal shall be treated as filed within time and the respondent is directed to fix a hearing date and decide the appeal on merits, thereby ruling in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether the petitioner has a remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 against the order dated 9th February, 2026 of the Assistant Commissioner and whether the writ petition should be entertained or disposed of in light of the availability of that remedy.

Analysis: The Court examined the Division Bench judgment dated 14th March, 2023 in CUSTA 22 of 2022 which granted the petitioner liberty to apply to the concerned Customs authority for payment of the value of seized perishable goods and left the matter of payment to be processed in accordance with law. Pursuant to that liberty, the petitioner applied and the Assistant Commissioner passed an order on 9th February, 2026 permitting release of Rs.1,45,61,332/-. The Court observed that the Assistant Commissioner's order is an order passed by the concerned authority in exercise of statutory powers and that the statute provides an appellate remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. Given the availability of that specific statutory appeal remedy to challenge the Assistant Commissioner's order and to claim interest, the writ petition is not the appropriate forum to bypass the statutory appellate process.

Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by recording that the petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 against the order dated 9th February, 2026 and to claim interest before the Appellate Authority; the writ petition is not entertained further.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging an order passed under Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, filed after substantial delay and without availing the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Act, is maintainable before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provides an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which prescribes a 90-day period for filing an appeal; invocation of writ jurisdiction in lieu of the statutory remedy is permissible only if the writ is filed within a reasonable period. Delay in approaching the High Court, unexplained or attributable to the petitioner's own inaction, and failure to demonstrate when the petitioner became aware of the impugned order are relevant factors. Where a petitioner by his own fault disables himself from availing the prescribed statutory remedy, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 may not be exercised. The facts show the petitioner waited after receipt of the order and did not pursue the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed time; no satisfactory explanation for the delay or for not monitoring communication of the order has been furnished.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; the outcome is in favour of the revenue.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the petitioner's request for condonation of delay in filing two TMA applications was liable to be set aside for want of reasons and for failure to consider the petitioner's claim of parity with similarly situated applicants.

Analysis: The petitioner sought condonation for delay in submitting online applications for Transportation and Marketing Assistance under Chapter 7A of the Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020. The competent committee rejected the request, and the review committee maintained the rejection. The reasons recorded in both decisions were found to be inadequate, as they did not meaningfully engage with the petitioner's specific grievance, including the contention that similarly placed entities had been granted relief. Administrative orders affecting rights and benefits must contain reasons within the order itself, and such reasons cannot be supplied later. The absence of a reasoned consideration of the relevant submissions and the claim of parity rendered the decision vulnerable.

Conclusion: The rejection was not sustained. The matter was remitted to the review committee for reconsideration and for passing a well-reasoned order in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent of securing a fresh, reasoned reconsideration of the petitioner's claim by the review committee.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative decisions affecting civil benefits must disclose the reasons for the conclusion reached, and failure to deal with the relevant submissions and parity claims warrants reconsideration.

Issues: Whether the assessee-society was entitled to continue to hold registration granted under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (and consequentially the application for registration under section 12A) or whether the Commissioner (Exemptions) was justified in cancelling that registration by invoking the fifteenth proviso to section 10(23C) on the ground of occurrence of one or more "specified violations" as defined in Explanation 2 to the said proviso.

Analysis: The fifteenth proviso to section 10(23C) read with Explanation 2 prescribes the circumstances and the definition of "specified violation" which may justify cancellation of approval/registration, including application of income for non objects, business income not incidental or without separate books, activities not genuine or not in accordance with conditions of approval, non compliance with other laws, or incomplete/false information in the application. The assessing record and show cause proceedings disclosed that the Department's risk management system flagged large cash/fee receipts, certain payments (including an advance for purchase of land), and other expenses. The assessee produced detailed bank and fee records, explanations for the advance to J.J. Construction Co. (a bona fide land purchase agreement leading to litigation and suit for specific performance), supporting documents for various small and routine expenditures, and evidence showing fee collection through banks and multiple wings. The findings relied on by the Commissioner (Exemptions) involved factual discrepancies, minor recording irregularities in bank entries, non registration of the land agreement, and questioned necessity of certain expenditures. Those matters either fell within issues the Assessing Officer should probe in scrutiny assessments or were not shown to amount to any of the "specified violations" in Explanation 2. The Commissioner did not establish that income was applied otherwise than for the objects, or that activities were not genuine, or that payments benefitted a specified person within section 13(3). The non registration of the agreement did not, by itself, demonstrate siphoning or that the transaction was with a related person; the assessee had initiated appropriate civil proceedings including conversion to specific performance and provided supporting material. Minor discrepancies in bills or bank record aggregation were explained and, given the scale of operations (multiple branches and thousands of students, and aggregate receipts exceeding Rs.20 crore), did not justify cancellation under the proviso. The Commissioner's conclusions were therefore based on suspicions and isolated inconsistencies rather than a satisfaction that a "specified violation" had occurred as required by the proviso and Explanation 2.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration under section 10(23C)(vi) and the refusal to grant registration under section 12A were set aside. The registration under section 10(23C)(vi) is restored and the dependent application under section 12A is remitted to the Commissioner (Exemptions) for fresh adjudication in accordance with the findings recorded in the restored appeal.

Issues: Whether the assessing officer could validly invoke section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to withdraw interest allowed under section 244A on refund inclusive of excess self-assessment tax paid under section 140A, i.e. whether the disallowance constituted correction of a mistake apparent from the record.

Analysis: The powers of amendment under section 154 are confined to mistakes apparent from the record, meaning errors obvious and patent and not matters requiring long-drawn reasoning or on which two views are conceivable. The central question is whether allowance of interest on refund of self-assessment tax fell within a settled legal position such that its withdrawal was an obvious clerical or patent error. Competing judicial authorities were examined: certain High Court decisions held that refunds, including those arising from self-assessment tax, attract interest under section 244A(1)(b), while other authorities and circulars took a contrary view. The presence of multiple authoritative decisions supporting the assessee's position indicates that the issue was debatable and not a patent mistake susceptible to rectification under section 154.

Conclusion: The rectification under section 154 is not maintainable because the question of entitlement to interest on refund of self-assessment tax was debatable and not a mistake apparent from the record; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and consequential demand notices under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 were barred by limitation and therefore void.

Analysis: The reassessment power under Section 40(1) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was subject to an express five-year limit under Section 40(4). The relevant assessments related to financial years for which the reassessment orders were passed after the expiry of that statutory period. The Court applied the principle of strict construction of taxing statutes and held that the limitation period could not be extended by reference to audit objections or alleged understatement unless the statute itself so provided. It further noted that the dealer was not required to retain records beyond five years under Rule 38(3) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, reinforcing the legislative intent behind the limitation. The challenge was treated as maintainable because limitation goes to jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings, reassessment orders, and consequential demand notices were barred by limitation, void ab initio, and liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the taxing statute prescribes an express and unqualified limitation period for reassessment, proceedings initiated or concluded beyond that period are without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained on equitable or administrative grounds, including audit objections.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to challenge the impugned order dated 15.10.2025 before the Appellate Authority and on what conditions, having regard to alleged liquidation of the supplier and pending proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India grievance forum.

Analysis: The impugned order confirmed part of the demand under the GST proceedings. The petitioner asserts that input tax credit was taken based on supplier invoices and that the supplier was under liquidation, with liquidation approved by the National Company Law Tribunal and a complaint pending under Regulation 3(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Grievance and Complaint Handling Procedure) Regulations, 2017. The petition was filed within the period available for filing an appeal to the Appellate Authority. Given the existence of related proceedings before the NCLT and the grievance forum, the appropriate recourse is to allow the statutory appellate remedy to be pursued, subject to the statutory pre-deposit requirement, and to permit the Appellate Authority to take any favourable orders from the NCLT into account at final disposal.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority subject to depositing 10% of the disputed tax as pre-deposit within thirty days from receipt of the order; the Appellate Authority shall consider any favourable order obtained from the NCLT at the time of final disposal.

Issues: (i) Whether depreciation claimed on goodwill arising from amalgamation is allowable; (ii) Whether tax under section 115QA on buyback of shares is leviable and distributable income is correctly computed.

Issue (i): Whether depreciation on goodwill recognised on amalgamation between related subsidiary companies is allowable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the excess consideration recorded as goodwill represented a genuine intangible asset or an artificial balancing item created within an intra-group amalgamation. It considered accounting treatment under the pooling of interests method, the sanctioning scheme provisions concerning reserves, the absence of goodwill in the books of the transferor, post-amalgamation commercial advantages, valuation evidence, and prior authorities recognising goodwill in genuine amalgamations. The Tribunal found that the transaction involved related parties with common ownership, that the merger mechanics resulted in issuance of shares to the holding company without corresponding arm's-length consideration flow, and that the alleged goodwill served to inflate net assets and share value. On the facts the Tribunal treated the goodwill as an artificial device to obtain tax benefit and concluded that no genuine intangible asset existed for depreciation.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the alleged goodwill is disallowed; conclusion against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether section 115QA applies and distributable income on the buyback was correctly computed.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the statutory definition of "distributed income" as the consideration paid on buyback reduced by the amount received by the company for issue of such shares, the factual computation advanced by the assessee (using a DCF-based per-share value), and the assessing authority's computation (using the actual amount received on issue as recorded). Because the Tribunal concluded the goodwill was artificially created and the amalgamation was an intra-group arrangement that did not effect arm's-length receipt of consideration, it accepted the assessing officer's calculation of amount received (effectively the face-value based computation) and treated the buyback as part of the structuring to repatriate funds without paying dividend tax. The Tribunal therefore upheld the assessing officer's distributable income calculation and the tax under section 115QA.

Conclusion: Tax under section 115QA is leviable as computed by the authorities; conclusion against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: On the facts and evidence the Tribunal found the goodwill to be a colourable/artificial creation in the intra-group amalgamation and upheld the assessing officer's computation of distributable income on the subsequent buyback; both substantive claims of the appellant are dismissed, resulting in confirmation of the assessment adjustments and tax demand.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an alleged goodwill arises from an intra-group amalgamation between related companies and the factual matrix shows an artificial inflation of net assets and share value (with no arm's-length consideration or genuine commercial advantage to the transferee), such goodwill cannot be accepted as a genuine intangible asset for depreciation and the amount received for issue of shares must be determined on the true transaction value for computing distributed income under Section 115QA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in rejecting the assessee's books of account and extrapolating sales to the unsold area-thereby making additions by treating 100% of project sales as taxable-in AY 2016-17.

Analysis: The matter involves application of accounting principles for recognition of revenue under the project completion method (AS-7) read with revenue recognition principles (AS-9) and the factual question whether contractual obligations existed for unsold units. Documentary material, prior acceptance of the assessee's accounting in the preceding year, and the findings of a High-Power Committee identifying the AO's extrapolation as unsound were examined. The appellate authority accepted that revenue could not be recognized for unsold units where no agreement creating contractor-contractee obligations existed and where substantial risk had not transferred. The AO's method of extrapolating sales to the unsold area and rejecting the books resulted in a high pitched assessment without adequate basis. The appellate authority's deletion of the addition was supported by the committee's recommendations and the accounting framework applicable to recognition of revenue.

Conclusion: The addition made by the AO by rejecting books and extrapolating sales to unsold units is deleted; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether uploading of notices and orders on the portal under the "additional notices and orders" tab constitutes valid service; (ii) Whether the adjudication order supported by Notification No.56 of 2023-Central Tax and corresponding State notification, and passed without affording opportunity under Section 75(4), is vitiated and whether interim relief restraining recovery and lifting bank attachment should be granted.

Issue (i): Whether uploading of notices and orders on the portal under the "additional notices and orders" tab amounts to proper service of the adjudication order.

Analysis: The Court considered precedent of the Division Bench in Ram Kumar Sinhal which holds that mere uploading under the stated portal is not equivalent to proper service. The petitioner's lack of knowledge of the impugned order until receipt of a recovery notice and the manner of publication were evaluated in light of the requirement of effective service to trigger limitation and enforcement steps.

Conclusion: Uploading of the adjudication order on the portal under the "additional notices and orders" tab does not constitute proper service.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication order premised on Notification No.56 of 2023-Central Tax and the corresponding State notification and passed without opportunity under Section 75(4) is vitiated and whether interim relief should issue.

Analysis: The petitioner challenged the vires of the notifications under Section 168A and asserted denial of opportunity under Section 75(4). The Court found a strong arguable case on the challenge to service and on the procedural defect arising from non-compliance with Section 75(4). Given the substantial question on validity and the procedural infirmity affecting the order's legitimacy, the Court considered balance of convenience and potential prejudice, and observed that recovery steps flowing from the impugned order should be restrained pending disposal of the writ petition.

Conclusion: The adjudication order is vitiated by the procedural defect of not affording opportunity under Section 75(4), and interim relief is warranted; the respondent authorities are restrained from recovering any amount under the impugned order and shall lift the bank attachment.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner has made out a strong arguable case on service and procedural grounds, justifying interim protection against recovery and attachment until final adjudication of the writ petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjudication order affecting a taxpayer is not validly served (mere uploading under an "additional notices and orders" portal is not proper service) and the order is passed without compliance with the statutory requirement to afford an opportunity under Section 75(4), the order is vitiated in procedure and interim relief restraining recovery and ancillary attachments is appropriate pending final determination.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dated 06.06.2025 rejecting the appeal without dealing with the specific grounds (including discrepancy in laboratory sample description and report) is sustainable and whether the matter should be remitted to the appellate authority for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The writ petitioner, a registered dealer under the U.P. GST regime, challenged detention of goods and penalty under Section 129(1) after a laboratory report described the sample as a "lubricating oil sample" while the invoice declared the goods as Mixed Linear Alpha Olefins. The petitioner raised this specific discrepancy in the reply to the show cause notice and in the memo of appeal, contending that the sample/test did not correspond to the declared goods. The Court examined the record and found that the appellate authority's order records conclusions but does not independently address or reason upon the substantive grounds raised by the petitioner concerning the accuracy and reliability of the laboratory report and related factual contentions. Given that the petitioner had advanced specific objections going to the root of the evidence relied upon, the appellate authority was obliged to consider those grounds and record reasons in relation thereto. The absence of such consideration vitiates the appellate decision-making process and warrants fresh adjudication by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The appellate order dated 06.06.2025 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the appellate authority to decide afresh after dealing with each contention raised by the petitioner within two months.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by quashing the impugned appellate order and remitting the matter for fresh consideration; this provides the petitioner an opportunity for a reasoned appellate decision on the substantive grounds raised.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellant raises specific substantive grounds challenging the accuracy or reliability of primary evidence, the appellate authority must consider and record reasoned findings on those grounds; failure to do so renders the appellate order unsustainable and justifies remand for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the order and certificate issued under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 denying NIL withholding and fixing tax deduction at source at 15% should be quashed and a certificate at a lower rate be issued; and whether directions as to time limits for consideration of future Section 197 applications should be issued.

Analysis: The petitioner's services were identified as SaaS/licence-based software services supplied to Indian customers and the Competent Authority had issued a certificate at 15% under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The material on record, including the agreement and refunds previously granted for relevant assessment years, demonstrates a prima facie arguable case that the transactions may not attract the higher withholding claimed by the Competent Authority, but no adjudication on merits has been completed by an assessing authority under a regular assessment process. The Competent Authority's power under Section 197 was exercised after examining the agreement, yet the circumstances warrant directing an intermediate withholding rate to allow statutory return-filing and potential scrutiny by the assessing authority under applicable scrutiny criteria. Additionally, the delay in issuance of the certificate was noted and a direction for timely consideration of future applications under Section 197 was considered necessary.

Conclusion: The impugned order and certificate dated 04.03.2025 and 20.08.2025 are quashed; a fresh certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shall be issued fixing withholding at 2% within 15 days; and for subsequent years similar applications shall be considered within 30 days of filing.