Issues: (i) Whether Route Navigation Facility Charges (RNFC) and Terminal Navigation Landing Charges (TNLC) are exigible to service tax under Section 65(105)(zzm) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether miscellaneous income received by the appellant is exigible to service tax; (iii) Whether the assessments for the period 10.09.2004 to 28.02.2005 can be treated as provisional and whether the show cause notice was issued within the normal limitation period.

Issue (i): Whether RNFC and TNLC are taxable under sub-clause (zzm) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Sub-clause (zzm) brings within taxable service any service provided by airport authorities in an airport or civil enclave. The Tribunal's remand required determination whether the navigational services were provided entirely by personnel deployed inside the airport/civil enclave; if not entirely so, the services fall outside clause (zzm). Evidence showed RNFC is provided en route across the airspace and by ground/aeronautical stations located outside airport/civil enclave areas; AAI did not produce corroborative material showing the service was manned entirely from within airport/civil enclaves. TNLC by its definition relates to assistance during landing and use of airport facilities and is provided within the airport/civil enclave.

Conclusion: RNFC is not exigible to service tax (in favour of assessee). TNLC is exigible to service tax (in favour of revenue) and remanded for quantification.

Issue (ii): Whether miscellaneous income (profit on sale of fixed assets, interest on staff advances, sale of scrap, etc.) is exigible to service tax.

Analysis: The miscellaneous receipts were analysed by reference to their nature; the amounts claimed arise from transactions (sale of fixed assets, interest recoveries, sale of scrap) that do not represent consideration for taxable services. The adjudicating authority had not addressed these pleas in initial order; in de-novo proceedings ledger details were available and the nature of receipts indicated absence of service provision.

Conclusion: Demand of service tax on miscellaneous income is set aside (in favour of assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether the assessments for 10.09.2004 to 28.02.2005 were provisional and whether the show cause notice was within limitation.

Analysis: The jurisdictional communication permitted payment on provisional basis under Rule 6(4) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 only for the month of March 2005; no provisionally accepted assessment period covering September 2004 to February 2005 was shown. Periodical returns (ST-3) were filed on 26.07.2005 (and revised 02.03.2006); the show cause notice dated 18.07.2006 was issued within one year from the relevant date under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 as applicable.

Conclusion: The assessments for 10.09.2004 to 28.02.2005 cannot be treated as having been provisionally assessed for that entire period; the show cause notice was issued within the normal limitation period (not time-barred) (in favour of revenue as to limitation).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the demands relating to RNFC and miscellaneous income are set aside while the demand relating to TNLC is upheld and remanded for quantification; the show cause notice is within the limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: Sub-clause (zzm) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies only where the service is provided in an airport or civil enclave by personnel deployed entirely within that airport or civil enclave; services provided en route by stations or personnel outside the airport/civil enclave are not covered by clause (zzm).

Issues: (i) Whether the services provided by the appellant to TCS fall within "business support services" under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994 and whether the demand can be sustained for the extended period of limitation; (ii) Whether amounts received as rent constitute "renting of immovable property service" under Section 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994 and whether demand for the extended period of limitation is maintainable; (iii) Whether the charges for training and related activities rendered by the appellant are taxable as "management or business consultancy service" under Section 65(65) of the Finance Act, 1994; (iv) Whether penalties imposed under the Finance Act, 1994 are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the services provided to TCS are business support services (including infrastructural support) and whether extended period invocation is justified.

Analysis: The agreement shows provision of campus space, classrooms, faculty rooms, office, reprographic room, library, store room, computer labs, server room, conference hall, auditorium, maintenance of those facilities and residential accommodation for trainees. The Explanation to Section 65(104c) expressly includes infrastructural support services such as providing office along with office utilities and related facilities. The extended period was invoked on the basis of alleged suppression; record shows demand based on assessee's accounts and no evidence of willful suppression to evade tax.

Conclusion: The services qualify as business support services (infrastructural support) under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994; however, the extended period of limitation is not sustainable absent proof of suppression, and tax is confirmed only for the normal period along with interest.

Issue (ii): Whether rent received by the appellant is taxable as renting of immovable property and whether extended period invocation is justified.

Analysis: The matter of taxability of renting of immovable property was the subject of litigation and was made taxable by the Finance Act, 2010 (retrospective amendment). Courts have upheld the retrospective amendment. There is no evidence of mala fide non-payment by the appellant during the relevant period; the disputed nature of the law during the period negates intent to evade.

Conclusion: The rent receipts are taxable under Section 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994, but the demand for the extended period is not sustainable; tax is confirmed only for the normal period with interest.

Issue (iii): Whether training and related charges constitute management or business consultancy service under Section 65(65) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The definition of management or business consultancy covers services connected with management of an organisation, including advice, consultancy or technical assistance in areas like financial, human resources, marketing or similar management functions. The appellant is an educational institution providing training facilities and conducting seminars primarily to promote education; it is not engaged in providing management consultancy or related advisory services as defined.

Conclusion: The charges for training and related activities do not fall within management or business consultancy services under Section 65(65) of the Finance Act, 1994; the demand under this category is set aside.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties imposed under the Finance Act, 1994 are sustainable.

Analysis: Penalties were imposed in conjunction with demands raised for extended periods. Given that suppression with intent to evade is not established for the demands held unsustainable for extended period and for those set aside, no penal liability subsists.

Conclusion: All penalties imposed on the appellant are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed - tax for business support services and renting of immovable property is confirmed for the normal period with interest; tax for management or business consultancy is set aside; all penalties are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Provision of campus facilities, accommodation and maintenance services falls within "infrastructural support services" under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994; invocation of the extended period of limitation requires proof of suppression with intent to evade, which is absent here.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of central excise duty (with interest and penalty) confirmed against the assessee based solely on private records recovered from a third party (M/s SPRML) and statements of that third party is sustainable; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed on the director under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is sustainable in the absence of evidence of his involvement in clandestine manufacture and clearance.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of central excise duty, interest and penalty confirmed on the basis of documents seized from a third party and statements of that third party is legally sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the evidentiary basis for alleging clandestine manufacture and clearance and identified the categories of tangible corroborative evidence ordinarily required (e.g., excess/raw material purchase, production/consumption records, transportation and delivery proof, receipt of sale proceeds, electricity consumption, links between recovered documents and factory activities). The Tribunal found that the Department relied solely on loose private records recovered from the third party and statements of third-party personnel, that copies of those documents were not furnished to the appellants and that the appellants were not permitted to cross-examine the persons whose statements were relied upon. The Tribunal applied its precedents and relevant High Court authority emphasising that clandestine removal is a serious allegation requiring direct and corroborative evidence and that private third-party records alone, without corroboration and without opportunity for cross-examination, cannot form the sole basis for confirming demands.

Conclusion: The demand of central excise duty, interest and penalties confirmed on the basis of documents and statements recovered from the third party is unsustainable and is set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 imposed on the director is sustainable absent evidence of his involvement in clandestine activities.

Analysis: The Tribunal observed that neither the director nor the general manager accepted the allegation of clandestine removal in their statements, that there was no corroborative evidence establishing clandestine manufacture and clearance, and that the primary demand itself was set aside for lack of admissible and corroborative evidence and for denial of cross-examination. In that factual and evidentiary context, imposition of penalty on the director was examined.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the director under Rule 26(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is unwarranted and is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order confirming demands of central excise duty, interest and penalties and imposing penalty on the director is set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand for clandestine manufacture and clearance cannot be sustained where it is based solely on private records recovered from a third party and statements of third-party personnel without corroborative tangible evidence (such as excess raw material, production/consumption anomalies, transportation and receipt proofs, or receipt of sale proceeds) and where the assessee is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon; in such circumstances the burden on Revenue to produce direct corroborative evidence remains unmet and the demand must be set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether Notification No.16/2009-CE(NT) dated 07.07.2009 is applicable retrospectively; (ii) Whether appellant is entitled to cenvat credit after 07.07.2009 on disputed items where those items were used in fabrication of supporting structures and storage tanks; (iii) Whether appellant is entitled to take cenvat credit beyond one year after receiving invoices.

Issue (i): Whether Notification No.16/2009-CE(NT) dated 07.07.2009 is applicable retrospectively.

Analysis: The notification amended Explanation 2 to Rule 2(k) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Relevant High Court authorities have considered whether that amendment is clarificatory or prospective. The judgment in Vandana Global Ltd. concluded the amendment is not clarificatory and therefore operates prospectively from its commencement date.

Conclusion: Notification No.16/2009-CE(NT) dated 07.07.2009 is prospective and not retrospective; cenvat credit taken prior to 07.07.2009 is sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether appellant is entitled to cenvat credit after 07.07.2009 on disputed items used in fabrication of supporting structures and storage tanks.

Analysis: The entitlement depends on whether the disputed inputs were used in or in relation to manufacture of excisable goods or capital goods. Production of Chartered Engineer certificates and supporting records showing use for fabrication of storage tanks, supporting structures and plant components satisfies the connection between inputs and manufacture of dutiable final products according to relevant Tribunal and court decisions cited in the order.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to retain cenvat credit after 07.07.2009 for disputed items demonstrably used in fabrication of supporting structures and storage tanks.

Issue (iii): Whether appellant is entitled to take cenvat credit beyond one year after receiving invoices.

Analysis: The CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 did not impose a one year limitation for taking credit prior to the introduction of a time limit effective 01.09.2014. Consequently, availment beyond one year for periods before 01.09.2014 is not barred by the Rules in force at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to take cenvat credit beyond one year for invoices relating to the period prior to 01.09.2014.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand, show cause notice and order are unsustainable on the decided issues and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment to the CENVAT Credit Rules that is not expressly clarificatory operates prospectively from its commencement; inputs shown to be used in fabrication of capital goods or for manufacture of excisable products qualify for cenvat credit; no statutory one year bar existed for taking cenvat credit prior to 01.09.2014.

Issues: (i) Whether transportation costs for FOR destination sales form part of the assessable value. (ii) Whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand.

Issue (i): Whether transportation costs for FOR destination sales form part of the assessable value.

Analysis: Excise valuation turns on the place of delivery for FOR destination sales, which is the buyer's premises rather than the factory gate. Transportation to that point is relevant to determining the assessable value.

Conclusion: The transportation costs are includible in the assessable value. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand.

Analysis: Under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, invocation of the extended period requires the specified conduct, including suppression or contravention with intent to evade duty. Conflicting decisions during the relevant period made it possible for the assessee to believe that transportation costs were not includible. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression or intent to evade was established. The entire demand related to a period beyond normal limitation.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period does not apply. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although freight was includible in the assessable value, the time-barred demand and its associated interest and penalty cannot stand.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand beyond the normal limitation period cannot be sustained without the statutory grounds for invoking the extended period; a bona fide belief arising from conflicting decisions does not establish intent to evade duty.

Issues: Whether penalty notices issued without specifying whether the charge was concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income were valid.

Analysis: The notices retained both distinct limbs of Section 271(1)(c) without striking off the inapplicable limb, leaving the charge unspecified and denying a clear opportunity to meet the case. Such vagueness reflected non-application of mind and rendered the notices legally infirm under the governing jurisdictional precedent. The dismissal of a special leave petition in a factually distinguishable matter did not result in merger or amount to a declaration of law under Article 141; that matter also involved circumstances in which both limbs were attracted and the objection had not been raised at the earlier stages.

Conclusion: The penalty notices were invalid, and the consequential penalties under Section 271(1)(c) were liable to be deleted.

Issues: Whether prior attachment orders without a legally required proclamation can prevail against the petitioner's claim; and whether the proclamation requirement applies to the Central Goods and Services Tax Department.

Analysis: The State authorities sought time to place further material concerning steps allegedly taken after the attachment orders, including proceedings for issuance of proclamation. The applicability of the proclamation requirement to the Central Goods and Services Tax Department was also kept for consideration at the next hearing.

Outcome: The petition was adjourned for filing of an additional affidavit and further hearing.

Issues: Whether an assessment founded on a show-cause notice allowing less than seven days for response, contrary to the applicable faceless-assessment SOP, was liable to be set aside.

Analysis: Clause N.1.3 of the applicable SOP requires at least seven days for responding to a show-cause notice. The impugned notice allowed only six days. This procedural illegality deprived the assessee of the stipulated opportunity to respond and violated principles of natural justice. Alleged lack of diligence in earlier proceedings did not cure the defect in the notice under challenge.

Conclusion: The assessment and consequential orders were set aside and the matter was restored for a fresh opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the first appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal in limine on the ground of delay without adjudicating the matter on merits, and whether the matter required remand for consideration of condonation of delay and fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Analysis: The appeal before the first appellate authority had been rejected for want of condonation of a substantial delay. The Tribunal noted that, in the interest of substantive justice and natural justice, the assessee should be given one final opportunity to explain the delay before the appellate authority. It further held that, once the question of condonation is examined, the appellate authority must then dispose of the appeal on merits in accordance with the statutory scheme governing appellate procedure.

Conclusion: The order dismissing the appeal in limine was set aside and the matter was remanded to the first appellate authority to decide condonation of delay under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and thereafter adjudicate the appeal on merits in accordance with Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to section 149(1), and whether the consequential assessment order could be sustained.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued on 02.04.2022 for AY 2015-16, whereas, under the pre-amended limitation regime, it could have been issued only up to 31.03.2022. The amended first proviso to section 149(1) prohibited issuance of notice where, on the date of commencement of the Finance Act, 2021 regime, such notice could not have been issued under the old limitation. The period contemplated in the fifth and sixth provisos was held not to extend or revive a notice already barred under the first proviso. On that basis, the notice was treated as time-barred and the assessment made pursuant to it as without valid jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid and the assessment order based on it was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order-in-original was liable to be entertained despite inordinate delay, and whether the petitioner should be relegated to any statutory remedy under the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The petition challenged an order-in-original pertaining to the tax period October 2014 to March 2017 after a delay of about four years. The explanation that the proprietor was not well educated and depended on an authorised representative was not accepted as sufficient, particularly because the petitioner had participated in the original proceedings and furnished a reply. The Court held that the belated challenge attracted the principle against entertaining stale writ claims, and relied on the cited precedent to decline interference. It also noted that any statutory remedy, if permissible, remained open.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not fit to be entertained on account of inordinate delay and was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction against the impugned tax demand, leaving the petitioner to pursue any permissible statutory relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition challenging a tax demand may be declined at the threshold where there is inordinate delay and the explanation for approaching the Court belatedly is insufficient, especially when the petitioner participated in the original proceedings.

Issues: Whether Rule 86A permits restriction of debit from an Electronic Credit Ledger beyond the input tax credit available in that ledger at the time of its invocation.

Analysis: Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 authorises a temporary restriction on debit of input tax credit available in the Electronic Credit Ledger where the prescribed officer has recorded reasons to believe that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. Availability of credit in the ledger is a condition precedent to exercise of that power. The rule permits restriction of available credit; it does not authorise debit entries by the department or creation of a negative ledger balance. Recovery of wrongly availed or utilised credit must be pursued through the statutory recovery provisions. Prior notice is not necessary for a valid emergent restriction under Rule 86A, but the restriction must remain within the credit available when the action is taken.

Conclusion: Rule 86A does not permit negative blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger or restriction exceeding the input tax credit available therein at the relevant time; the impugned entries were invalid to that extent, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the interest charged on the foreign-currency loan advanced to the associated enterprise was at arm's length; (ii) Whether the arm's length fee for the standby letter of credit was correctly restricted to 0.5%; (iii) Whether weighted deduction for expenditure incurred on an approved in-house research and development facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR.

Issue (i): Whether the interest charged on the foreign-currency loan advanced to the associated enterprise was at arm's length.

Analysis: The loan was benchmarked under the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method at LIBOR plus 340 basis points, whereas interest was charged at LIBOR plus 350 basis points. The associated enterprise had independently obtained a Hong Kong bank loan at LIBOR plus 275 basis points. The foreign lending rate and the external comparable supported the rate charged by the assessee; the domestic cost-of-funds approach did not provide a comparable uncontrolled price for the international loan transaction.

Conclusion: The interest charged was at arm's length and no transfer-pricing adjustment was warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the arm's length fee for the standby letter of credit was correctly restricted to 0.5%.

Analysis: The standby letter of credit issued for the associated enterprise's external borrowing constituted an international transaction requiring arm's length benchmarking. The adopted judicial benchmark for corporate guarantee fee was 0.5%, and no material justified the higher rate of 1.62% determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer.

Conclusion: The arm's length standby letter of credit fee was correctly restricted to 0.5%, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether weighted deduction for expenditure incurred on an approved in-house research and development facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR.

Analysis: Approval by DSIR under Section 35(2AB) related to the in-house research and development facility. The deduction for eligible expenditure incurred on that approved facility was not dependent upon, or restricted by, the amount reported or quantified by DSIR in Form 3CL.

Conclusion: The weighted deduction could not be restricted to the expenditure quantified by DSIR, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions of the loan-interest adjustment and research-and-development disallowance, and the restriction of the standby letter of credit fee to 0.5%, remain operative.

Issues: Whether the statutory housing board was eligible for exemption under section 11 where it charged consideration for residential units, plots and allied housing activities.

Analysis: The statutory housing functions of providing accommodation, particularly for lower-income and weaker sections, fall within advancement of an object of general public utility. Under the proviso to section 2(15), as interpreted in relation to statutory boards and authorities, charging consideration does not by itself establish trade, commerce or business. Consideration that merely covers cost, administrative expenses and a nominal mark-up, including an amount needed for reasonable growth, is not commercial in character. The determinative inquiry is whether the charges are substantially or significantly above cost and driven by a profit motive; section 11(4A) operates consistently with this inquiry for incidental business activity.

Conclusion: Eligibility for exemption under section 11 depends upon verification of whether the consideration charged for residential units and plots exceeded cost plus a nominal mark-up. The Assessing Officer must undertake that verification and allow exemption if no profit element is found.

Issues: Whether a notice for scrutiny assessment under Section 143(2) must disclose the reasons for selecting the assessee's case for scrutiny or specify whether scrutiny is limited or complete.

Analysis: The circulars governing selection and nature of scrutiny operate as inter-departmental instructions for identifying cases to be scrutinised. The initial notice under Section 143(2) serves to intimate selection for scrutiny; the Assessing Officer is required during assessment proceedings to seek particular information and documents through a specific notice. An assessee has no right to demand reasons for selection unless arbitrariness or vendetta in such selection is demonstrated.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 143(2) need not disclose the reasons for scrutiny selection or state the nature of scrutiny; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the tender condition requiring availability of an office in the State and in the consignee district or specified districts during the last three years, as reflected in GST registration, was arbitrary and violative of the right to carry on trade and business.

Analysis: The condition was examined against the object of public procurement and the requirement that tender eligibility criteria bear a rational nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. The Court held that GST registration is valid across India and cannot be used to insist on multiple district-specific registrations or to confine participation to bidders having a local establishment in the tender district. The Court further held that procurement objectives can be met by assessing financial capacity, technical competence, and past performance, without creating an artificial barrier based on place of business. The restrictive condition was therefore found to be unreasonable and inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity in public tenders.

Conclusion: The tender condition was held to be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and was quashed in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The tender authority was directed to delete the impugned eligibility condition and proceed with the tender after extending the relevant dates.

Ratio Decidendi: A tender eligibility clause that creates an artificial local-barrier and lacks a rational nexus with the object of procurement is liable to be struck down as arbitrary and infringing the right to carry on trade and business.

Issues: (i) Whether the Joint Commissioner had jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice and pass the order imposing penalty under the GST enactments in the light of Circular No. 254/11/2025-GST dated 27.10.2025.

Analysis: The proceedings were initiated and culminated in the order by the same proper officer. The Court noted that the officer was already competent to initiate proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and that, by the time the order-in-original was passed, the circular relied upon had come into force. The challenge was also weakened because the notice was acted upon, no jurisdictional objection was taken before the authority, and Section 160 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 protects proceedings from invalidation merely on account of defect or omission when they are otherwise in substance and effect in conformity with the statute.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional objection was rejected and the impugned penalty order was held to be valid.

Issues: Whether, in a writ petition challenging cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns and non-payment of tax, directions could be issued permitting revocation, payment of tax dues, filing of draft returns, and restoration of registration.

Analysis: The proceeding was disposed of by issuing structured directions to enable the petitioner to seek revocation of cancellation. The petitioner was required to file an application for revocation, submit draft returns, and deposit all tax dues by the stipulated date. The registering authority was directed to receive the tax payment before considering revocation, decide the application within 15 days, and, if revocation was accepted, restore the registration with consequential filing of returns. Manual filing was also permitted if online filing caused difficulty.

Conclusion: The petitioner obtained conditional relief enabling revocation of cancellation and possible restoration of GST registration, subject to compliance with the directed requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with directions facilitating consideration of revocation and restoration of registration on compliance with tax and filing obligations.

Ratio Decidendi: Where registration has been cancelled for non-compliance, the Court may, in an appropriate case, direct consideration of revocation subject to payment of dues and filing of returns.

Issues: Whether the assessees were liable to pay an amount equal to 6% of the value of electricity generated and sold to the electricity distribution company under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 when common inputs and input services were used for manufacture of excisable goods and generation of electricity.

Analysis: The controversy was treated as covered by an earlier adjudication on an identical issue, which had held that electricity generated from bagasse and sold outside could not be subjected to the 6% payment under Rule 6(3). The same statutory framework applied to the present period, and the earlier decision had attained finality. In those circumstances, a different view could not be adopted for the same issue.

Conclusion: The assessees were not liable to pay 6% of the value of the electricity sold, and the demand under Rule 6(3) could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed in favour of the assessees.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an identical issue under the same statutory regime has already been conclusively decided in favour of the assessee and has attained finality, the liability under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 cannot be reimposed on the same footing.

Issues: Whether service tax paid on commission agent services used for sale of goods qualifies as an input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, so as to entitle the assessee to CENVAT credit.

Analysis: The inclusive part of the definition of input service expressly covers sales promotion. The Tribunal noted the CBEC clarification stating that credit is admissible on services of sale of dutiable goods on commission basis, and also relied on the consistent view taken in the assessee's own subsequent period and other Tribunal decisions allowing credit on commission paid to agents who effect sales. On this basis, the Tribunal held that commission paid for sale of goods falls within the scope of input service.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit on commission agent services was unsustainable and the assessee was entitled to the credit.