Issues: Whether the impugned Prohibition Order in Form GST INS-03 dated 07.02.2024 and Seizure Order in Form GST INS-02 dated 27.02.2024 can be continued in view of the remand proceedings and the prior order quashing the assessment insofar as limitation under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The orders under challenge arise from an inspection and subsequent seizure/prohibition under Section 67 of the GST enactments, while the assessment order challenging belated availment of input tax credit was quashed insofar as limitation under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and within the period under Section 16(5) of the said Act. There is no proposal for confiscation under Section 67(2). In the absence of any confiscation proposal and given the quashing of the assessment insofar as limitation, the statutory scheme does not permit continuance of prohibition/seizure measures without lawful basis. No de novo orders have been passed after remand that would sustain the impugned prohibition or seizure.

Conclusion: The impugned Prohibition Order dated 07.02.2024 in Form GST INS-03 and Seizure Order dated 27.02.2024 in Form GST INS-02 are quashed; relief is granted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether jewellery seized during search should be released to the petitioner where the ITAT set aside the assessment addition and no fresh assessment order was passed within the statutory time limit under Section 153(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The ITAT remanded the matter for a fresh adjudication of the addition relating to the seized jewellery and the remand order was served on the Principal Commissioner in September 2016. Section 153(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribes the outer time limit for completion of reassessment proceedings after receipt of such a remand order; that statutory period expired on 31st December, 2017. Section 132B(1)(i) and Section 132B(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permit application of seized assets towards recognized liabilities and require return of any surplus to the person from whose custody the assets were seized once liabilities are discharged. The Revenue did not complete the reassessment within the statutory period and no fresh assessment order has been passed despite the lapse of several years. Prior authority of this Court on similar facts recognises that failure by the Revenue to act pursuant to an appellate remand and within the statutory time frame warrants release of seized jewellery.

Conclusion: The seized jewellery shall be released to the petitioner within six weeks, as the reassessment is time barred and no liability now subsists that would justify continued withholding of the jewellery.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing Form No. 10 for Assessment Year 2015-16 should be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and, consequently, whether the Petitioner is entitled to have its return processed and exemption under Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 given effect to on the basis that Form No. 10 was filed within time.

Analysis: The Petitioner, a registered charitable trust, filed its return and tax audit report within the statutory period but the statement of accumulation in Form No. 10 was disputed as not being filed within time; Rule 17 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 and the Finance Act, 2015 amendments prescribing time and electronic filing applied prospectively from A.Y. 2016-17. The Court considered the factual explanation for delay, the consequences of denial of exemption including potential double taxation under Section 11(3) of the Act, and precedent endorsing liberal and equity oriented exercise of discretion under Section 119(2)(b). The Court noted authorities applying substantial compliance and condoning similar delays and found that a justice oriented approach was warranted in the circumstances. Having regard to these legal and factual aspects, the Court concluded that relief by condonation was appropriate and that the impugned administrative order rejecting condonation should be set aside to allow statutory benefits to be given effect to.

Conclusion: The delay in filing Form No. 10 is condoned (423 days) and the impugned order dated 24.02.2025 passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income tax Act, 1961 is quashed and set aside; the Respondents are directed to process the Petitioner's return within eight weeks giving effect to Form No. 10 as filed within time.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment framed under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid in view of the reasons recorded, allegation of borrowed satisfaction and the contention that objections to reopening were not disposed of; (ii) Whether amounts received by the assessee from Orange Tradex should be taxed as unexplained credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or restricted to commission income for acting as a conduit, and whether the quantum of transaction is Rs. 89.23 crores or Rs. 46.95 crores.

Issue (i): Validity of reassessment under Section 147/148 read with Section 151 in light of alleged borrowed satisfaction and non-disposal of objections.

Analysis: The reasons recorded for reopening relied on information and investigative material supplied by the Investigation Wing indicating circulation of funds through Orange Tradex and substantial transactions involving the assessee; those materials and the reasons were supplied to the assessee during proceedings. The objections raised by the assessee were general and did not specifically refer to or controvert the detailed material made available by the department. The procedural steps, including sanction where applicable and supply of reasons, were recorded in the file and communicated.

Conclusion: The reassessment under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid; the contentions of borrowed satisfaction and non-disposal of objections are rejected.

Issue (ii): Taxability of receipts from Orange Tradex - unexplained credit under Section 68 versus commission income as a conduit; and determination of quantum of transactions for computing commission.

Analysis: The assessee failed to controvert adverse investigative information showing Orange Tradex as a shell and the transactions as bogus. Material on record indicates that amounts received from Orange Tradex were immediately transferred by the assessee to another entity (Matrix International), supporting treatment of the assessee as a conduit/accommodation entry provider rather than the real beneficiary. The lower authorities did not verify the conflicting contentions on quantum: the assessee produced ledger/bank extracts alleging a lower total (Rs. 46.95 crores) while investigation records showed receipts of Rs. 89.23 crores; verification of the correct quantum was not undertaken by the authorities below.

Conclusion: The receipts from Orange Tradex cannot be taxed in full as unexplained credits in the hands of the assessee; taxability is restricted to commission income for acting as conduit. The matter of quantum is remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification and computation of commission at 2% on the verified transaction amount.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment is sustained as valid and the finding that the assessee acted as an accommodation entry provider is upheld; the assessee's appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes solely to the extent that the Assessing Officer shall verify and compute the correct quantum of transactions and apply 2% commission accordingly, while the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where investigative material establishes that a taxpayer merely acted as a conduit by receiving and immediately transferring funds from a shell entity, the receipts are not chargeable in full as unexplained credits in the taxpayer's hands and liability may be limited to commission earned, subject to verification of the actual quantum of transactions.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner (PCIT) correctly invoked powers under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to revise the assessment on the ground that the Assessing Officer failed to determine the source of cash deposits and that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue.

Analysis: Applicable law requires that revision under Section 263 be exercised only if the assessment order is both erroneous (contrary to law) and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. A distinction exists between lack of inquiry and inadequate inquiry; only lack of inquiry can justify exercise of revisionary jurisdiction. Where the Assessing Officer has raised queries, received and examined explanations and supporting audited books and schedules, and accepted the return after enquiry, the essential condition of lack of inquiry is not satisfied. In the present case, the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment, specifically examined cash deposits during the demonetisation period, obtained schedules and audited balance sheet entries showing advances recoverable/imprest to staff, and accepted the explanation. The PCIT re-appreciated balance sheet classifications and reached a different view, treating an amount recorded in audited books under advances as unexplained cash credit. Such re-appreciation amounts to change of opinion rather than correction of an assessment that is erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. Judicial authority confirms that inadequate inquiry does not permit Section 263 revision and that revision cannot be based on mere difference of opinion or on an incorrect appreciation of record entries.

Conclusion: The invocation of Section 263 was not justified; the impugned revision order dated 31.01.2024 is quashed and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is permissible only where there is lack of inquiry and the assessment order is shown to be erroneous and prejudicial to revenue; where the Assessing Officer has made enquiries, considered explanations and accepted audited books and schedules, a revisional order based on mere disagreement or different appreciation of those records is invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under section 148 and reassessment initiated under section 147 for the assessment year 2014-15 is valid where the material relied upon was seized from a third person and the pre-conditions of section 149(1)(b) are not shown to be satisfied; (ii) Whether the sanction/approval under section 151 for issuance of notice under section 148 was valid when the approving authority recorded satisfaction in a mechanical manner without application of mind.

Issue (i): Whether the reopening of assessment by issuance of notice under section 148 is sustainable when the seized material was from a third person and the conditions of section 149(1)(b) are not objectively shown to be satisfied.

Analysis: The material relied upon consisted of electronic data and workbooks seized from the residential premises of a third person and related statements. The seized records were summaries of cash receipts/payments maintained for the entire group and were not shown to be entries in the assessee's books of account nor to represent identifiable assets or specified expenditures as defined in Explanation 1 to section 149(1). The reasons recorded for reopening did not identify particular assets or book-entries for the relevant assessment year or demonstrate that escaped income represented an asset/expenditure or entries likely amounting to Rs. 50 lakhs or more. The assessing authority adopted quantifications produced by investigation without allocating receipts/payments to the assessee with necessary prima facie verification.

Conclusion: The conditions of section 149(1)(b) were not satisfied on the record and the notice under section 148 issued beyond three years was invalid; reopening under section 147 is void ab initio for the assessment year in question.

Issue (ii): Whether the sanction recorded under section 151 for issuance of notice under section 148 was valid where the specified authority's approval reflected no independent application of mind.

Analysis: The approval form submitted to the specified authority repeated the assessing officer's narrative and the sanctioning authority endorsed the proposal without independent reasoning, thereby reflecting a purely formal or mechanical endorsement. The approval did not set out reasons or any objective satisfaction linking the seized material to the statutory threshold or to entries/assets as required to justify reopening beyond the three-year period. Authorities and precedents require that the sanctioning authority record satisfaction demonstrably arrived at after application of mind.

Conclusion: The sanction under section 151 was recorded in a mechanical manner without application of mind and is therefore invalid; the consequent notice under section 148 and reassessment are vitiated.

Final Conclusion: The combined defects of failure to satisfy the requirements of section 149(1)(b) and the mechanical sanction under section 151 render the notice under section 148 and the consequent assessment void ab initio; the reassessment proceedings for the stated assessment year are quashed and the appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a notice under section 148 is issued beyond three years, the assessing authority must possess material that prima facie shows escaped income represented by an asset, specified expenditure or book-entries likely amounting to Rs. 50 lakhs or more, and the specified authority under section 151 must record a demonstrable application of mind in granting sanction; absence of these requirements renders the notice and reassessment invalid.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to writ relief (mandamus/prohibition) restraining customs authorities and the carrier from permitting entry, unloading, acceptance of import manifest, clearance or delivery of consignments purportedly consigned to the petitioner when the petitioner has disowned the consignments and where statutory procedures under the Customs Act, 1962 are available.

Analysis: The petition records that the petitioner had earlier exported goods and later received cargo arrival notices showing return consignments allegedly consigning the goods to the petitioner. The petitioner disowned the consignments by representation and did not implead the foreign buyer or other potentially necessary parties. The statutory framework under Chapter VI of the Customs Act, 1962 and specifically the procedure contemplated by Section 48 for goods not cleared, warehoused or transshipped within the prescribed period applies to such situations. Granting the extraordinary writs sought would displace the statutory procedures and impermissibly restrain authorities from acting according to the Customs Act. The availability of independent remedies in respect of contractual or commercial disputes with the foreign buyer and the absence of necessary parties to adjudicate competing claims further make writ relief inappropriate.

Conclusion: The petition seeking writs to prohibit entry, acceptance of import manifest, unloading, clearance or delivery of the consignments is not maintainable and is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the consignee disowns goods and statutory procedures under the Customs Act, 1962 (including Section 48) govern the treatment of goods not cleared or transshipped, courts will not grant extraordinary writ relief to pre-empt those statutory procedures or restrain authorities from acting under the Act; such relief is inappropriate in the absence of necessary parties and where statutory remedies are available.

Issues: Whether dues under the Central Sales Tax Act constitute secured debt so as to justify rejection of the resolution plan and declaration of the State Tax Officer as a secured creditor.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied its earlier decision that Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act is only a machinery provision for assessment and recovery and does not create a statutory first charge on the assets of the corporate debtor. The existence of a first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat VAT Act was distinguished, because that provision expressly creates such charge, whereas no corresponding charge can be implied under the Central Sales Tax Act. On that basis, treating CST dues as secured debt was held to be legally unsustainable, and rejection of the resolution plan on that ground could not stand.

Conclusion: Dues under the Central Sales Tax Act are not secured debt, and the orders rejecting the resolution plan and declaring CST dues as secured creditor were unsustainable; the appeals were allowed and the plan approval application was revived.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, and the resolution plan approval process was restored before the Adjudicating Authority for consequential consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act does not create a statutory first charge on the corporate debtor's assets, and CST dues therefore cannot be treated as secured debt in insolvency proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment was vitiated for want of a valid reason to believe under section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, including the second proviso thereto. (ii) Whether the attached aircraft had a sufficient nexus with the alleged proceeds of crime and whether the attachment was excessive or unsupported by a money trail.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional attachment was vitiated for want of a valid reason to believe under section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, including the second proviso thereto.

Analysis: The recorded reasons in the provisional attachment order expressly stated that the property represented proceeds of crime and that non-attachment was likely to frustrate confiscation proceedings. The reasons also referred to the pendency of the predicate investigation and the likelihood of alienation or creation of third-party interests. The Tribunal found these reasons to be specific and cogent, and held that the statutory requirement for invoking the provisional attachment power was satisfied.

Conclusion: The challenge on the ground of absence of reason to believe was rejected, and the attachment was held to be valid on this aspect.

Issue (ii): Whether the attached aircraft had a sufficient nexus with the alleged proceeds of crime and whether the attachment was excessive or unsupported by a money trail.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the source of funds for acquisition of the aircraft and found that the payments were traced to diverted funds from the main accused company and to loan repayments routed through associated entities and cash deposits linked to the same tainted fund flow. It held that the appellant failed to produce documentary evidence to discharge the statutory burden under the PMLA, and that the Directorate had established a clear nexus between the property and the proceeds of crime. The plea that the attachment was excessive was also rejected because the appeal concerned only the aircraft attached in the appellant's hands and not the overall quantum of attachment in other proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge to the attachment on the grounds of absence of nexus and excessiveness was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in entirety, and the confirmed attachment of the aircraft was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For provisional attachment under the PMLA, recorded reasons showing likely frustration of confiscation proceedings are sufficient, and once the enforcement authorities trace the property to proceeds of crime, the person in possession must disprove the tainted source with cogent evidence.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to a refund in terms of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal order as modified, and whether the matter should be remitted to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax for determination in view of missing/aged records.

Analysis: The petitioner seeks refund founded on a Tribunal order which was the subject of a reference to this Court but which was ultimately not proceeded with. The record indicates that both parties lack certain historical documents due to the passage of decades. Given the evidentiary lacuna and the practical difficulty in final adjudication on the existing record, a direct adjudication by the writ court is impracticable. A fact-sensitive enquiry by a competent tax authority of the rank of Commissioner or above, empowered to call for available records, receive the petitioner's submissions, and decide in accordance with law, is an appropriate mechanism to determine entitlement to refund.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & Sikkim, to nominate a Commissioner-level officer who shall enquire, hear the petitioner, and pass a reasoned order determining the refund claim in accordance with law within the directed timeframe.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 2,80,507/- made by the Assessing Officer and upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) towards alleged undisclosed interest income for A.Y. 2016-17 is justified.

Analysis: The assessee's books showed interest receipts of Rs. 4,51,804/- from M/s SKZ Realities which corresponds with Form 26AS, and the profit and loss account reflected a net interest income of Rs. 1,69,208/- after appropriate netting. The Assessing Officer treated the difference between the amount in Form 26AS and the net interest shown in the profit and loss account as taxable addition without accepting the accounting treatment and without requiring or establishing any further contrary evidence. The appellate authority below confirmed the addition by noting the numerical difference without addressing the netting shown in the books. The appellate tribunal accepted the reconciliation between Form 26AS and the books and found no basis for the addition.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 2,80,507/- is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 resulting in the impugned addition does not sustain where the interest receipts recorded in Form 26AS are reflected in the books and the net interest income is correctly brought to profit and loss account; therefore the assessment addition is set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where interest receipts shown in Form 26AS are recorded in the books and the net interest income is properly reflected in the profit and loss account after admissible netting, an addition based solely on difference between gross receipts and net accounting figure is not sustainable.

Issues: Whether the amount paid by the employer to LIC for purchase of a deferred annuity policy in favour of the employee, payable in future, can be taxed as a perquisite in the hands of the employee in the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether the employer's payment to purchase a deferred annuity created any vested or enforceable right in the employee in the relevant year. The Tribunal applied the principles in sections 15 and 17(2)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and followed the coordinate-bench decision in Biswas Manik v. Income-tax Officer which held that for an employer's payment to be taxed as salary or perquisite the amount must be due, paid or allowed to the employee and a contingent or non-vested future entitlement cannot be taxed in the year of payment. The Tribunal noted that the annuity was structured to commence after a future period, the employer paid the amount directly to LIC, and the employee had not acquired any vested or enforceable right in the relevant year; further, the employee had offered annuity receipts to tax on accrual/receipt basis, and taxing the employer's contribution in the earlier year would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The addition made on account of the employer's contribution to LIC for deferred annuity is not sustainable and is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 66,00,000 as unexplained cash deposits during the demonetisation period can be sustained against the assessee who claims the deposits were from cash sales.

Analysis: The assessee is a trader whose audited books, trading account showing turnover, VAT returns, cash book entries, and sales and purchase registers were placed on record. Survey disclosed substantial stock but no adverse finding was recorded by the assessing authority against the stock. The assessing officer treated an unusually high monthly turnover and the cash deposits as indicia of unaccounted income and made an addition. On the facts, the documentary evidence showing recorded cash sales and accepted turnover, absence of any noted cash shortage, and lack of contradictory evidence by the revenue undermine making an addition based on mere assumption. The legal framework requires that additions not be made on conjecture and that unexplained deposits be established as income if not satisfactorily explained by the assessee; where supporting books and records and external acceptance (such as VAT acceptance) substantiate the claimed source, the addition is not sustainable.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 66,00,000 as unexplained cash deposits is deleted and the assessing officer is directed to recompute the income accordingly.

Issues: Whether the addition made by the Assessing Officer of unexplained cash deposits during the demonetization period can be sustained where the assessee has produced audited books of account, VAT returns, stock records and has shown the cash as recorded in cash book and offered to tax.

Analysis: The assessee is a partnership firm engaged in trading with audited books, VAT returns matching sales turnover and no discrepancies in stock quantification. Cash deposits during the relevant period were shown in the cash book and related to sale proceeds of jewellery. The Assessing Officer disallowed part of sales for certain days solely because bills lacked proper name and address and treated the residual as unexplained cash credit, applying provisions relating to unexplained cash and section 115BBE. The tribunal evaluated documentary evidence including audited accounts, VAT filings and stock sufficiency and found no material to conclude the sales were not genuine. The tribunal observed that treating sales already offered to tax as unexplained cash would amount to double taxation and that the assessee's explanation that deposits originated from cash-in-hand in books was supported by records.

Conclusion: Addition of unexplained cash deposits deleted and the assessee's explanation accepted; assessing officer directed to recompute income accordingly.

Issues: Whether stamp duty on a composite scheme of amalgamation sanctioned by the NCLT can be assessed by treating the underlying amalgamation steps as distinct transactions under Section 5 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, and whether the Maharashtra authorities could assess duty on a reference to an NCLT order from Chennai.

Analysis: The scheme was sanctioned by the NCLT as an instrument chargeable under the stamp law, and the statutory framework recognises the court order sanctioning amalgamation as the relevant instrument for duty. The charging provisions and the relevant schedule entry make the sanction order, not the commercial arrangement underlying it, the subject of levy. Section 5, which applies where one instrument relates to several distinct matters, cannot be invoked to dissect a composite amalgamation order into separate taxable transactions, because that would require the authorities to assess the underlying transaction rather than the instrument itself. The earlier Full Bench view that duty attaches to the instrument and not to the transaction controlled the case, and the attempt to treat the Chennai order as having been brought into Maharashtra merely because it was referred to in the Mumbai order was rejected. The Maharashtra authorities therefore lacked jurisdiction to levy duty on the Chennai order in these proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge succeeded. The impugned stamp duty assessment was unsustainable, and the levy was confined to the Mumbai NCLT order as the instrument, with the excess duty liable to be refunded to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A composite amalgamation sanction order is taxable as an instrument, and the scheme cannot be split into separate transactions for enhanced stamp duty; the impugned demand was quashed with consequential refund relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Stamp duty is chargeable on the sanction order as the operative instrument, and Section 5 cannot be used to segregate a composite amalgamation into distinct taxable transactions or to assess an out-of-State order merely because it is referred to in the local sanction order.

Issues: (i) Whether the prosecution proved the demand, acceptance and recovery necessary to establish offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (ii) Whether the acquittal recorded by the trial court suffered from perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference in appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the prosecution proved the demand, acceptance and recovery necessary to establish offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: The complainant did not fully support the prosecution version and materially departed from the complaint allegations. The evidence showed inconsistencies regarding the alleged demand, the pending official work, the alleged recording of conversation, and the role of the shadow witness. The alleged demand of illegal gratification was not reliably proved, and the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could not operate effectively in the absence of foundational proof of demand and acceptance.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the prosecution and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal recorded by the trial court suffered from perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference in appeal.

Analysis: An appellate court interferes with an acquittal only when the finding is unreasonable or perverse. On reappreciation of the evidence, two views were possible and the view favourable to the accused was supported by the record. The trial court's appreciation of the contradictions and deficiencies in proof did not disclose any compelling ground for reversal.

Conclusion: The acquittal did not call for interference and was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove the corruption charges to the required standard, and the acquittal remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for corruption, proof of demand and acceptance is essential, and an appellate court will not disturb an acquittal where the evidence reasonably supports the view favourable to the accused.

Issues: Whether the seized jewellery, including jewellery claimed by third parties and jewellery sought by the assessee against an already furnished bank guarantee, was liable to be released in terms of the CBDT circular governing release of seized assets, and whether the revenue could insist upon an enhanced bank guarantee because of delay in release and increase in gold prices.

Analysis: The CBDT circular issued under Section 119(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribed a specific procedure and fixed timelines for release of seized jewellery against adequate security. Once the assessee unconditionally accepted ownership and valuation, obtained approval for release, and furnished a bank guarantee covering the valuation assessed by the department's valuer, the competent authority was required to release the jewellery within the stipulated period. The delay in release was attributable to the revenue and was explained only on vague administrative grounds. Such delay could not be used to prejudice the petitioners by demanding a higher bank guarantee on the basis of subsequent increase in gold prices. As regards the jewellery claimed by petitioner Nos. 3 and 4, the revenue had no objection to its release once ownership affidavits were furnished and the assessee expressed no objection.

Conclusion: The seized jewellery claimed by petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 was directed to be released on the filing of the requisite affidavits, and the remaining seized jewellery was directed to be released to the assessee against the bank guarantee already furnished, subject to the required ownership and no-objection affidavits.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the revenue was bound to release the seized jewellery in accordance with the CBDT circular without insisting on an enhanced security amount caused by its own delay.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the department has approved release of seized jewellery and the assessee has furnished security sufficient to cover the valuation then obtained, the revenue cannot, because of its own delay, insist upon a higher bank guarantee on account of later price escalation; the circular's release timelines are binding and must be followed.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to pass the Assessment Order dated 17.03.2025 and consequential penalty orders in respect of Assessment Year 2022-23 despite a search under Section 132/132A having been conducted on 26.11.2024, in light of the abatement provision contained in Section 158BA(2) read with the definition of "block period" in Section 158B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 158BA(1)-(2) and the definition of "block period" in Section 158B newly frame a special Chapter XIV-B procedure limiting assessments to "total undisclosed income" discovered by search/requisition; subsection (2) provides that pending assessments relating to assessment years falling in the block period shall abate. The statutory scheme in Chapter XIV-B must be read as a whole to determine the scope of abatement and the conditions for exercise of jurisdiction under that Chapter. The factual record, including the panchnama, shows the search was conducted in relation to juristic persons/entities and not specifically against the petitioner in his individual status; the assessment framed on 17.03.2025 arose from scrutiny (CASS) of the petitioner's individual return and does not, on the pleadings, demonstrate that any "total undisclosed income" of the petitioner was discovered in the search or that incriminating material relating to his individual undisclosed income was found. The petitioner did not establish that Chapter XIV-B conditions for abatement of the pending (re)assessment were satisfied or that the assessment in question was confined to undisclosed income as a result of the search. In absence of those material facts, and having regard to the statutory distinction between assessments of "total income" (e.g., Section 153A context) and "total undisclosed income" under Chapter XIV-B, the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction to quash or hold the assessment abated would require resolution of disputed factual questions which the petitioner has not established before this Court.

Conclusion: Issue decided against the petitioner; the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to proceed with assessment and consequential penalty orders in the circumstances pleaded, and the writ petition seeking abatement under Section 158BA(2) is not maintainable on the record before the Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing appeals before the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) was sufficiently explained so as to warrant condonation; (ii) Whether non-filing of audit report in Form No.10B within the due date or omission to mention details of registration/approval disentitles the assessee to exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and to approval under Section 80G(5)(vi).

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing appeals before NFAC was sufficiently explained to condone the delay.

Analysis: The assessee is a registered society dependent on office-bearers and external professionals for tax compliance. The reasons for delay include non-receipt of intimations under Section 143(1) due to reliance on a deceased person who handled filings and a change in professional assistance; an affidavit from the secretary explaining these facts was placed on record. The Tribunal recognised that strict observations about self-responsibility of an individual appellant are not directly applicable to a trust/corporate entity that relies on office bearers and professionals. The Tribunal also noted precedent holding that exceptional circumstances (including death of the person handling compliance) can justify delayed action.

Conclusion: The delay in filing appeals before NFAC was satisfactorily explained and is condoned; the appeals on delay grounds are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-filing of Form No.10B within the due date or omission to mention registration/approval details disentitles the assessee to exemption under Sections 11 and 12 and approval under Section 80G(5)(vi).

Analysis: The Tribunal applied settled law that filing of Form No.10B is a procedural requirement and directory in nature; non-filing before the due date does not automatically lead to disallowance under Sections 11 and 12. The Tribunal relied on higher authority precedent upholding that Form No.10B is procedural. With respect to omission of registration/approval details for AY 2021-22, the Tribunal noted precedence that active original registration under Section 12AA protects the assessee. Given these legal positions, the Tribunal found no substantive basis to sustain denial of exemption on these procedural grounds.

Conclusion: Denial of exemption for the years under consideration on account of non-filing of Form No.10B within the due date or omission of registration details cannot be sustained; conclusions are in favour of the assessee on merits.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed; the impugned orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dismissing the appeals on delay and denying exemption on procedural non-compliance are set aside, and the matters are restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration of Form No.10AB and the returns on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Procedural requirements such as filing of Form No.10B are directory and failure to file within the due date does not warrant automatic disallowance under Sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; sufficient justification for delay in institutional taxpayers (including reliance on office-bearers or professionals and exceptional events) warrants condonation of delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under Section 148 (dated 25.07.2022) for assessment year 2014-15 is time barred and the consequent reassessment order is invalid; (ii) Whether the notices issued under Section 148 (dated 23.07.2022) for assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18 are invalid for being granted approval by an authority not competent under Section 151; (iii) Whether the notice and reassessment for assessment year 2019-20 are invalid for want of jurisdiction because the officer who issued the notice lacked pecuniary/territorial jurisdiction and there was no transfer order under Section 127.

Issue (i): Whether the notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022 for AY 2014-15 was issued beyond the surviving period available after the deemed notice under Section 148A(b) and is therefore time barred.

Analysis: The decision applies the legal framework established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal and Ashish Agarwal and the interplay with the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA). Under that framework a notice originally issued under the old regime is deemed to be a show cause notice under Section 148A(b); time for the assessing officer to complete action is limited to the surviving period calculated from the original issuance date up to 30.06.2021 as extended by TOLA, with exclusions for the period of stay and two weeks allowed for the assessee to reply. Once the assessee filed its first reply on 01.06.2022, the surviving period of 15 days expired on 16.06.2022 and the assessing officer was required to complete the Section 148A(d) action and issue any fresh Section 148 notice within that surviving period. The AO issued Section 148 on 25.07.2022 which is beyond the surviving period; therefore the notice was issued after the time limit prescribed by the combined scheme of Section 149 read with TOLA and the controlling Supreme Court decisions.

Conclusion: The Section 148 notice dated 25.07.2022 for AY 2014-15 is time barred and the consequent reassessment order is quashed. (In favour of the assessee)

Issue (ii): Whether Section 148 notices dated 23.07.2022 for AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18 are invalid because the approval under Section 151 was granted by an authority not competent under the amended statute.

Analysis: Section 151 as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 prescribes the specified authority whose approval is required where more than three years have lapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. The approval for issuing notices after the three-year period must come from the Principal Chief Commissioner/Principal Director General or, where applicable, the Chief Commissioner/Director General. The record shows that approval was granted by Pr. Commissioner of Income-tax (Pr.CIT) whereas the statutory scheme required approval from the higher specified authority for notices issued after expiry of three years. Reliance on Rajeev Bansal and supportive High Court/Tribunal precedents confirms that defective or improper sanction vitiates the jurisdiction to issue a reassessment notice.

Conclusion: The Section 148 notices for AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18 issued on 23.07.2022 after approval by an authority not competent under Section 151 are invalid and the consequent reassessments are quashed. (In favour of the assessee)

Issue (iii): Whether the reassessment for AY 2019-20 is invalid because the officer who issued the Section 148 notice lacked pecuniary/territorial jurisdiction and there was no transfer order under Section 127.

Analysis: CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 allocates pecuniary jurisdiction; where returns declare income below the specified threshold the ITO (not ACIT) retains jurisdiction absent a proper transfer order under Section 127. The record does not show any Section 127 transfer to vest jurisdiction in ACIT, Circle-43(1). Precedent of the jurisdictional High Court and coordinate benches holds that initiation of reassessment by an officer without pecuniary/territorial jurisdiction vitiates the notice and assessment since jurisdictional conditions cannot be cured by consent or subsequent steps.

Conclusion: The reassessment for AY 2019-20 based on a notice issued by an officer lacking jurisdiction (and with no Section 127 transfer) is invalid and the assessment order is quashed. (In favour of the assessee)

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals and quashed the reassessment notices and consequent assessment orders for the decided assessment years on the grounds of time bar, defective statutory approval, and lack of jurisdiction, resulting in the appeals being allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reassessment notice is deemed under Section 148A(b) and TOLA applies, any fresh Section 148 notice must be issued within the surviving period computed under Section 149 read with TOLA; further, a Section 148 notice issued after expiry of the surviving period, issued with defective sanction under Section 151, or issued by an officer lacking pecuniary/territorial jurisdiction (absent a valid Section 127 transfer) is invalid and vitiates the reassessment.