Issues: Whether the prohibition in Section 16(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies to the entire tax component of capital goods where depreciation is claimed only on the portion of input tax credit not availed under the banking company option in Section 17(4).

Analysis: Section 16(3) bars input tax credit only on the "said tax component" on which depreciation is claimed. The provision is intended to prevent double benefit, namely, depreciation under the Income-tax Act, 1961 together with credit of the same tax component under the CGST regime. Section 17(2) restricts credit to the portion attributable to taxable supplies, while Section 17(4) creates a special option for banking companies and financial institutions to avail 50% of eligible credit and let the balance lapse. On that scheme, the unavailed 50% is treated akin to the portion attributable to exempt supplies, and no double benefit arises where depreciation is not claimed on that balance. The restriction in Section 16(3) cannot therefore be expanded to deny credit on the entire tax component merely because depreciation was claimed on the non-availed portion.

Conclusion: The prohibition under Section 16(3) applies only to the tax component on which depreciation is actually claimed, and it does not extend to the 50% input tax credit not availed under Section 17(4).

Final Conclusion: The impugned notices and the order were interfered with to the extent they proceeded on the incorrect view that depreciation on the unavailed portion of input tax credit barred credit on the entire tax component, while leaving the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy against the remaining disputes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a banking company lawfully opts for the 50% credit mechanism under Section 17(4), Section 16(3) disallows credit only for the specific tax component on which depreciation is claimed and cannot be used to deny credit on the balance unavailed portion.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment for the relevant year in a search case was required to be framed under section 153A read with section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, instead of section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the approval granted under section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mechanical and therefore unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment for the relevant year in a search case was required to be framed under section 153A read with section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, instead of section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The last panchnama recording conclusion of the search was drawn in the financial year relevant to the subsequent assessment year, and the assessment year in question fell within the ambit of the search provisions. In such a situation, the assessment machinery applicable was section 153A read with section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Framing the assessment under section 143(3) without the jurisdictional notice under section 153A rendered the assessment legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) was invalid and liable to be quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the approval granted under section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mechanical and therefore unsustainable.

Analysis: The approval was granted in a consolidated and generalized manner for multiple assessment years, without demonstrating application of mind to the specific facts of the assessee's case. Such a mechanical approval could not cure the jurisdictional defect in the assessment process and supported the challenge raised by the assessee.

Conclusion: The approval under section 153D was mechanical and could not sustain the assessment.

Final Conclusion: The revenue's challenge failed, the assessee's objection succeeded, and the assessment order stood quashed for want of valid jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: In a search case, once the search is concluded by the last panchnama in the relevant year, the assessment must be made under the search provisions applicable to that year, and an assessment framed under section 143(3) without the required jurisdictional notice is void; a mechanical approval cannot validate such a defective assessment.

Issues: Validity of reassessment proceedings where sanction under section 151 was accorded in a mechanical manner by merely endorsing satisfaction on a printed pro forma.

Analysis: The approval granted by the specified authority was recorded only by affixing a rubber-stamp endorsement expressing satisfaction, without any independent reasons or material-linked consideration. For reopening under sections 148 and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the prescribed authority must be satisfied on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, and such satisfaction must reflect application of mind. A mere formal or ritualistic endorsement does not satisfy the statutory safeguard. Following the settled law that mechanical approval is invalid, the reassessment notices based on such sanction could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid because the sanction under section 151 was mechanical and without due application of mind. The reassessment orders were liable to be quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the reassessment proceedings founded on defective approval were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Sanction for issuance of notice under sections 148 and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must reflect genuine satisfaction based on an independent application of mind; a mere rubber-stamp or pro forma endorsement is not a valid approval and vitiates the reopening.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner was justified in invoking revisional jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the footing that the Assessing Officer had erroneously allowed deduction of DPCO liability while computing book profits under section 115JB.

Analysis: The liability had already been accepted as an ascertained liability in the assessee's own case for the relevant assessment year while computing income under the normal provisions, and the record showed that the DPCO dispute remained pending before the High Court. The assumption that the liability had been settled by the Supreme Court and that the amount represented only a bank guarantee obligation was found to be factually incorrect. In these circumstances, the Assessing Officer's view that the claim could be accepted was a plausible view and could not be branded as erroneous merely because the Principal Commissioner preferred a different approach.

Conclusion: The invocation of section 263 was unsustainable and the revisionary order was set aside.

Issues: Whether the assessment order for the relevant assessment year was barred by limitation under Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, having regard to the reduced time limit and the exclusion of time relating to search proceedings.

Analysis: The time limit for completion of assessment for the relevant year was 12 months from the end of the assessment year under the fourth proviso to Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The case also fell within clause (xii) of Explanation (1) to Section 153, which excludes the period, up to 180 days, during which the seized material is handed over to the Assessing Officer. On the facts, the excluded period falling within the limitation window extended the last date for completion of assessment only up to 22.08.2024, while the assessment order was passed later. The statutory computation therefore made the order time-barred.

Conclusion: The assessment order was barred by limitation and was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: For a search-related assessment, only the period falling within the limitation window and covered by clause (xii) of Explanation (1) to Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be excluded, and an order passed beyond the resulting extended deadline is time-barred.

Issues: (i) Whether the deduction claimed under Section 80GGC in respect of political donations was allowable. (ii) Whether the deduction claimed under Section 80C was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the deduction claimed under Section 80GGC in respect of political donations was allowable.

Analysis: The donation was found to be part of a pattern of accommodation entries in which amounts paid through banking channels were allegedly routed back in cash after deduction of commission. No fresh material was produced before the Tribunal to rebut the factual findings recorded by the lower authorities. The Tribunal followed the earlier co-ordinate bench view and accepted the finding that the donation lacked genuineness.

Conclusion: The deduction under Section 80GGC was not allowable and the disallowance was upheld against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the deduction claimed under Section 80C was allowable.

Analysis: The claimed deduction exceeded the admissible statutory limit of Rs. 1,50,000 and no basis was shown to disturb the lower authority's computation.

Conclusion: The disallowance under Section 80C was upheld against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions/disallowances made by the lower authorities were sustained in full and the assessee's appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction claim fails where the underlying transaction is found to be an accommodation entry lacking genuineness, and a deduction beyond the statutory ceiling cannot be allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made in search assessment under section 153C on the basis of the seized agreement to sell was sustainable. (ii) Whether penalty under section 271D was leviable on the cash component of the property transaction.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made in search assessment under section 153C on the basis of the seized agreement to sell was sustainable.

Analysis: The seized agreement to sell was signed by the relevant parties, contained specific details of the property, consideration, cheque payment, and cash payment, and was corroborated by the registered sale deeds. The matching cheque particulars and the surrounding transaction details supported the genuineness of the document. The objection that the document was only a photocopy and that valuation material should prevail was rejected because the seized document itself constituted clear incriminating material and did not require further independent corroboration.

Conclusion: The addition under section 153C was sustained and the assessee's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271D was leviable on the cash component of the property transaction.

Analysis: Although the facts showed receipt of cash in connection with the sale transaction, the levy of penalty was held to be unsustainable because the cash payment was treated as part of a completed sale transaction and not as the kind of advance payment targeted by the amended anti-cash provisions. The reasoning followed the settled view that section 269SS, as applied through the penalty provision, does not cover such completed registered sale transactions in the same manner as prohibited cash advances.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271D was deleted and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The quantum addition was upheld, but the penalty matter was decided in favour of the assessee, resulting in a partial success overall.

Ratio Decidendi: A seized and duly corroborated agreement to sell can sustain a search assessment addition where its contents are matched by subsequent registered sale deeds, but penalty for cash receipt cannot be sustained where the payment forms part of a completed registered property sale transaction outside the mischief of the relevant anti-cash advance provision.

Issues: Whether the alleged agreement to sell recovered in search proceedings could be treated as a reliable and admissible basis to sustain the addition for alleged receipt of unaccounted on-money and the consequential penalty.

Analysis: The agreement was found to be unsigned by the purchasers, unsupported by witnesses or drafting particulars, and internally inconsistent on material aspects. The document also did not include the beneficiary intermediary as a party, and no independent enquiry was made to verify the alleged market value or receipt of cash. In these circumstances, the document lacked the sanctity of a concluded and unambiguous agreement and could not by itself furnish conclusive proof of undisclosed consideration.

Conclusion: The addition based on the alleged on-money receipt was unsustainable, and the consequential penalty also could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: An unexecuted or intrinsically ambiguous seized document, without corroboration, cannot by itself justify a conclusive inference of undisclosed consideration or sustain a consequential penalty.

Issues: Whether the condition requiring furnishing of a bank guarantee of Rs. 50 lakhs as a condition of bail was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant had already furnished a personal bond of Rs. 1 crore with two sureties of like amount, and the impugned bank guarantee condition was examined in light of the governing principles on bail conditions. Considering the nature of the case, the existing bond and surety arrangement, and the legal position relied upon, the additional bank guarantee was found to be excessively onerous and unsustainable.

Conclusion: The condition requiring furnishing of a bank guarantee of Rs. 50 lakhs as a condition of bail was set aside.

Issues: (i) whether the declared transaction value of the imported goods could be rejected on the ground of abnormal discount and assessed under the residual method; (ii) whether the matter required remand for reconsideration of the evidence on discount and valuation.

Issue (i): whether the declared transaction value of the imported goods could be rejected on the ground of abnormal discount and assessed under the residual method.

Analysis: The declared price was not shown to involve any relationship between buyer and seller or any additional payment over the invoice price. The dispute turned on whether the discounts from the manufacturer's list price were so abnormal that the transaction value could be discarded. While Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 4 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 permit acceptance of transaction value only where the statutory conditions are satisfied, rejection requires a legally sustainable basis under Rule 10A, supported by material showing reason to doubt the declared value. The record contained purchase orders, invoices, correspondence, and a communication indicating that higher discounts could be extended for strategic projects, but the authorities below did not adequately examine this material.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declared value and the straight resort to the residual method was not affirmed on the existing record.

Issue (ii): whether the matter required remand for reconsideration of the evidence on discount and valuation.

Analysis: The evidence produced by the importer and the comparable discount chart relied upon by the Revenue were not properly tested for comparability, timing, project linkage, and quantity basis. Since the admissibility of the higher discount and the consequent assessable value depended on factual scrutiny of this material, a fresh examination was necessary.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for reconsideration of the evidence and redetermination of assessable value.

Final Conclusion: The valuation dispute was not finally resolved on merits and was sent back for fresh adjudication after examination of the relevant materials.

Ratio Decidendi: Transaction value may be rejected only on a legally supportable basis with proper scrutiny of the evidence, and where material bearing on discount and valuation has not been adequately examined, remand is appropriate.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessing officer could substitute the actual sale consideration by the value adopted by the stamp valuation authority under Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without referring the matter to the departmental valuation officer when the assessee did not participate in proceedings.

Analysis: The assessing officer invoked Section 50C and adopted the stamp valuation authority's value as deemed sale consideration to compute short-term capital gain, while the assessee did not participate in assessment proceedings. The issue requires application of statutory mechanism under Section 50C which contemplates valuation by a departmental valuation officer to determine fair market value where the value adopted by the stamp authority is disputed or appears excessive. Relevant precedent recognises that, notwithstanding non-participation by the assessee, the quasi-judicial authority should, in the interest of fairness and to avoid miscarriage of justice, give effect to the valuation mechanism by referring the matter to the valuation cell before substituting the registered value as deemed consideration. The factual matrix showed prior transaction evidence indicating a substantial variance between stamp authority value and transaction consideration, supporting the need for fresh valuation and opportunity to the assessee to produce evidence.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the assessing officer to refer the property to the departmental valuation officer for determination of fair market value and for re-computation of short-term capital gain in accordance with law; the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Before substituting the sale consideration by the value adopted by the stamp valuation authority under Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessing officer must, where fairness requires, refer the matter to the departmental valuation officer for determination of fair market value and afford the assessee an opportunity to be heard, and assessment must be redetermined on that basis.

Outcome: Delay was condoned, but no interference was called for in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, and the special leave petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 12,50,000 made under the assessment framed under Section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961 as alleged 'on money' based on seized loose sheets is sustainable in the absence of independent corroboration.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment order dated 06.03.2024 and the seized loose sheets reproduced therein which reference the assessee's name and the impugned amount. The assessing authority relied on the seized material to make an addition of Rs. 12,50,000 as on money. However, the seized entries themselves do not demonstrate that any on money was actually paid; there is no independent or contemporaneous corroborative evidence establishing payment. In the context of reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961, reliance on seized documents requires evidentiary corroboration to convert entries into taxable income. Absent such corroboration, the Tribunal found the addition to be unsubstantiated.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 12,50,000 treated as on money is deleted and the assessee's appeal is allowed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether amounts adjusted against excess royalty previously paid to the State (shown as negative liability on final determination) qualify as "actual payment" for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The authorities below accepted that certain sums were paid through banking channels while treating remaining amounts as mere book adjustments against receivables arising from prior excess royalty payments. The appellate record before the Tribunal included orders of the State Mineral Superintendent showing final determination of liability and instances of negative balances reflecting excess pre-payments. The lower authorities and CPC did not verify whether the initial estimated payments, held by the State, effectively amounted to payments extinguishing liability once final determinations were made. In view of the foregoing factual materials and absence of adequate verification by the Assessing Officer and CIT(A), the issue of whether the adjustments represent actual payments cannot be conclusively resolved on the present record and requires fresh examination and opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for detailed verification of records and factual determination whether the adjustments represent actual payments qualifying under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961; appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 29.07.2022 and the assessment framed thereunder are time-barred and liable to be quashed in view of the surviving period computed following the decision in Rajeev Bansal v. Union of India (03.10.2024).

Analysis: The initial notice under section 148 was issued on 28.06.2021 which, following the precedent treating that notice as a deemed show-cause notice, created a surviving period. The assessee responded to the show-cause/148A(b) notice by filing a reply received by the Assessing Officer on 10.06.2022. Applying the surviving-period computation in Rajeev Bansal, the Assessing Officer was required to issue the order under section 148A(d) and any notice under section 148 within two days from the date the reply was furnished, i.e., by 12.06.2022. The Assessing Officer issued the impugned notice under section 148 on 29.07.2022, beyond the surviving period. Given that the appeal was decided on this legal ground, the Tribunal did not adjudicate the merits of the additions and relied solely on the limitation defect to determine validity of the proceeding.

Conclusion: The notice dated 29.07.2022 under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the assessment order framed pursuant thereto are time-barred and are quashed. The assessee's ground challenging the validity of the notice is allowed and the assessment is quashed; no merit adjudication was undertaken.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 488 days in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the expenditure incurred on renovation, repairs and electrical works of temple premises is capital in nature or allowable as revenue expenditure.

Issue (i): Condonation of delay in filing the appeal of 488 days.

Analysis: The delay was attributed to notices being sent to an incorrect e-mail id resulting in non-receipt by the appellant. The applicable legal principle permits a liberal view in condoning delay where sufficient cause is shown and substantial justice warrants condonation.

Conclusion: Delay of 488 days is condoned; appeal admitted for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Characterisation of expenditure on renovation, flooring with marble up to 20 feet, repairs and electrical works - capital or revenue.

Analysis: The renovations and repairs were undertaken to maintain and make safe the existing temple structures and to provide better facilities to devotees; there was no creation of a new asset. The expenditures rehabilitated dilapidated structures and served the purpose of upkeep rather than acquisition of a distinct enduring asset. Relevant documentary evidence was produced before authorities but the assessing officer rejected the claim and the appellate authority confirmed the disallowance.

Conclusion: The disputed expenditure is revenue in nature (repair and maintenance) and not capital; the disallowance is deleted and the full expenditure is to be allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed - delay is condoned and the assessment disallowance is deleted, directing allowance of the entire claimed expenditure.

Ratio Decidendi: Expenditure incurred on repair, renovation and electrical works that preserve and restore existing temple structures without creating a new asset qualifies as revenue expenditure and is allowable; procedural delays caused by notices sent to incorrect contact details justify condonation of delay to secure substantial justice.

Issues: Whether additions made by the Assessing Officer as commission income on alleged accommodation entries based solely on statements recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without specific corroborative incriminating material, are sustainable.

Analysis: The appeals concern search assessments framed under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with additions computed as commission income on alleged accommodation entries. The Tribunal examined whether the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority relied upon adequate incriminating material unearthed during search proceedings or merely on confessional/statements of a third party recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The decision reviews the requirement that admissions made during search must be supported by specific seized material or corroborative evidence before forming the basis of an attribution of income to the assessee. The Tribunal contrasted the factual matrix with coordinate authority where assessments were quashed because additions rested on uncorroborated statements and not on specific incriminating material, and noted the absence of independent material linking the seized entries to the assessee such that estimation of commission could be sustained. The analysis also considers the role of statements and the limits on making additions without corroboration, and the relevance of provisions invoked during assessment and appellate proceedings.

Conclusion: The additions made as commission income on the basis of uncorroborated statements recorded under Section 132(4) are not sustainable; the appeals are allowed and the impugned assessments under Section 143(3)/Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are quashed.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 1,90,36,240 under Section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified, or whether the cash payments made to farmers fall within the exception provided by Rule 6DD and related administrative guidance (CBDT Circular No. 452 dated 17.03.1986).

Analysis: The assessee produced a valid mandi licence and contemporaneous records including mandi parchis showing seller (farmer), buyer, and commission, affidavits of farmers, cash book entries and revenue records evidencing agricultural land holdings. The Revenue did not produce evidence to disprove the genuineness of these documents. Applying Rule 6DD and the clarificatory CBDT Circular No. 452 dated 17.03.1986 (distinguishing kachha arhatia and pacca arhatia), the materials establish that the assessee acted as a commission agent who merely facilitated sale proceeds to cultivators and received commission, and that the impugned payments represented disbursements to farmers for their agricultural produce rather than payments attracting the cash-payment disallowance under Section 40A(3).

Conclusion: The addition under Section 40A(3) is not attracted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and whether the assessee is entitled to refund of TDS.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The explanation for delay included bona fide ignorance of the exemption under Section 10(10B) and lack of legal knowledge, the appeals were filed after relevant precedent was rendered, and the appellate tribunal exercised discretion to consider the merits. The applicable statutory provision is Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which permits condonation of delay on sufficient cause.

Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeals is condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and whether the assessee is entitled to refund of TDS.

Analysis: The claim for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was considered on merits following a directly applicable precedent concerning the same VRS scheme. Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 governs compliance for exemption. Because the compensation was held to be not taxable under the applied legal framework, the assessee becomes eligible for refund of tax deducted at source; Section 143(1) and procedural provisions were considered only as background.

Conclusion: Compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is held exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and the assessee is entitled to refund of the TDS, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed after condoning delay and on merits, resulting in allowance of the exemption claim and direction for refund of tax deducted at source.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a bona fide failure to claim a statutory exemption is subsequently supported by directly applicable precedent, the appellate authority may condone delay under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and grant the exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Issues: Whether the deletion by the appellate authority of the addition of Rs. 3,03,91,873/- made by the assessing officer on account of alleged undervaluation and under-reporting of closing stock is sustainable.

Analysis: The assessing officer revalued closing stock on two bases-(i) alleged short reporting of quantity by 13,515 units and applying opening stock rate to that shortfall; and (ii) not accounting for change in inventory value-resulting in a total addition. The appellate authority found the reported quantity error to be a typographical error in the tax audit statement and accepted documentary evidence corroborating the actual quantity manufactured, thereby negating any shortage in closing stock. The appellate authority also accepted evidence that the reduced valuation of closing stock reflected damage due to exceptional rains, applying the accounting principle of valuing stock at cost or market whichever is lower. The assessing officer's inclusion of variation in stock as a separate addition was identified as a misunderstanding of the nature of variation (being the difference between opening and closing stock values) and thus duplicative. The appellate authority's findings were factual and supported by documentary records and accounting principle; no infirmity was shown in those findings by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 3,03,91,873/- is upheld and the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed; decision is in favour of the assessee.