Issues: (i) Whether the appeal should be restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication despite ex parte assessment and first appellate proceedings; (ii) Whether attachment of bank accounts should be released pending fresh adjudication; (iii) Whether the stay application for suspension of recovery and release of bank accounts should be granted.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal should be restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The proceedings below were completed ex parte due to the assessee's repeated non-compliance, but the matters involve examination of facts and supporting evidence. The Tribunal considered the need for factual inquiry and the interest of substantial justice in deciding the appropriate course.

Conclusion: The appeal is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication; the assessee is directed to cooperate and furnish necessary details and evidence.

Issue (ii): Whether attachment of bank accounts should be released pending fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The outstanding demand includes penalty under Section 270A and the Revenue objected to releasing all attached accounts. The Tribunal balanced the impact on business operations against the existence of penalty liability and the need to protect the revenue.

Conclusion: The attachment of HDFC Bank Account No. 50200069844496 is directed to be released to enable business operations; attachment of other bank accounts shall continue subject to further lawful orders by the Assessing Officer.

Issue (iii): Whether the stay application seeking stay of recovery and lifting of bank attachments should be allowed.

Analysis: The principal appeal has been restored for fresh adjudication, which affects the relevance of the stay application; the Tribunal considered the procedural effect of restoration on pending interlocutory reliefs.

Conclusion: The stay application is dismissed as infructuous.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, granted limited interim relief by directing release of one bank account to enable business operations, imposed costs on the assessee for non-cooperation, and dismissed the stay application as infructuous; the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where factual examination and evidence are necessary despite ex parte proceedings, the Tribunal may restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in the interest of substantial justice while granting limited interim relief and imposing costs for non-cooperation.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of salary recharge and reimbursement of expenses amounting to Rs. 62,50,720/- under section 37(1) read with section 40A(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable in law.

Analysis: The statutory requirement under section 40A(2) mandates a recorded opinion that the expenditure is excessive or unreasonable with regard to fair market value, legitimate business needs or benefit derived; such a finding is a prerequisite before invoking disallowance. The onus under section 37(1) is on the assessee to establish that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The material shows the existence of cost sharing agreements, accounting entries evidencing reimbursements, and that the payee entities are domestic companies taxed at the same rate. The assessing authority and the appellate authority disallowed the expenditure primarily because minute individual deputation details and a formal mechanism of apportionment were not produced, but they did not record any finding that the payments were excessive or that tax evasion was intended or occurred. Where there is no finding of excessiveness or tax arbitrage and an arrangement for sharing personnel and corresponding reimbursements is not disputed, mere absence of granular deputation particulars does not satisfy the statutory threshold for disallowance under section 40A(2) nor negate the assessee's case under section 37(1).

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 62,50,720/- under section 37(1) read with section 40A(2)(b) is not sustainable and is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 5,60,00,000 made by the Assessing Officer on account of alleged unexplained increase in trade payables - based on comparative ratio analysis without identifying specific creditors or undertaking age-wise verification - was sustainable.

Analysis: The addition was founded on a mathematical/comparative ratio method that assumed trade payables could not exceed a prescribed percentage of turnover and treated the excess as income. The approach did not identify any particular creditor as non-existent or fictitious, did not apply section 41(1) findings, and lacked age-wise analysis or other verification to establish that recorded liabilities were not genuine. Confirmations and particulars of recipients were on record and were not rebutted by independent material demonstrating falsity of the liabilities. The period under consideration coincided with abnormal business conditions due to the COVID-19 lockdown, which affected cash flows and payment timelines. Absent concrete evidence disproving the recorded liabilities, estimation by ratio alone cannot supplant examination of individual entries or replace the requirement to prove that liabilities have ceased to exist or are bogus.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 5,60,00,000 is not sustainable and is deleted; the Assessing Officer's action based solely on comparative ratio analysis without specific verification is rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether the Centralized Processing Center (CPC) had jurisdiction to make prima-facie adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prior to 01.04.2021 to deny Chapter VI-A deductions; (ii) Whether the assessee's claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be allowed despite the claim being entered under an incorrect sub-clause in the return (typographical/clerical error).

Issue (i): Whether the CPC had power to deny Chapter VI-A deductions by prima-facie adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prior to 01.04.2021.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether returns for the assessment years were filed within the due date under section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and reviewed coordinate decisions on CPC's powers. It found that the assessee's returns for both years were filed within the prescribed due dates and noted precedents holding that prior to 01.04.2021 CPC did not have jurisdiction to make disallowances of Chapter VI-A deductions by prima-facie adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(v).

Conclusion: The CPC's prima-facie adjustment under section 143(1)(a)(v) to deny Chapter VI-A deductions prior to 01.04.2021 is not sustainable and, on the facts, the returns were not belated; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's deduction properly claimable under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be denied because the amount was entered under the wrong sub-clause in the e-return.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered that the assessee is a credit cooperative society fulfilling the substantive conditions for section 80P(2)(a)(i) and that the only defect was a clerical/typographical error in selecting the incorrect sub-clause (80P(2)(c)(ii)) in the e-return. Relying on authorities recognising rectification of mistakes apparent on record and the principle that substantive entitlement should not be defeated by form errors, the Tribunal treated the error as rectifiable and noted analogous precedents allowing claims where the substantive conditions are met despite incorrect entry in the return.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowed for the amounts claimed (Rs. 4,75,747 for AY 2018-19 and Rs. 8,74,180 for AY 2019-20); conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: On the combined effect of findings on CPC jurisdiction and rectification of the clerical error, the appeals are allowed and the assessee's claimed deductions under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are directed to be granted for the stated amounts.

Ratio Decidendi: A substantive entitlement to a Chapter VI-A deduction, when supported by material facts and filed within the due date, cannot be defeated by a clerical or typographical error in the e-return; such mistakes apparent on record are rectifiable and CPC lacked jurisdiction prior to 01.04.2021 to make prima-facie adjustments under section 143(1)(a)(v) to deny such deductions.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 5,55,960/- made under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of discrepancy between physical stock and stock recorded in books can be sustained where the assessee contends the difference is nominal and offers no independent evidence or satisfactory explanation.

Analysis: The discrepancy in stock was quantified during survey under Section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and compared item-wise with books, resulting in an aggregate difference of Rs. 5,55,960/-. The statutory scheme in Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits deeming of value of bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles as income where such articles are not satisfactorily explained by the assessee. The record shows the assessee asserted the difference was insignificant relative to total stock and suggested measurement tolerances, but produced no independent valuation, no corroborative documentary evidence, and no explanation that met the statutory test. The Assessing Officer applied Section 69A in the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the appellate authority confirmed the addition after examining the material. Given the absence of satisfactory explanation or supporting evidence to rebut the deemed income provision, the criteria for displacing the addition under Section 69A are not met.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 5,55,960/- under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustained; the appeal is dismissed and the decision is against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of the assessee's books of account by the Assessing Officer under Section 145(3) is sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs.72,45,860 made as unexplained cash deposits during the demonetisation period under Section 69A (and consequential treatment under Section 115BBE) is sustainable; (iii) Whether the disallowance of deduction claimed under Section 80C for Rs.30,000 is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the rejection of books of account by the Assessing Officer under Section 145(3) is sustainable.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer recorded that the assessee maintained manual books but could not produce them because the business was closed, and no bills/vouchers were furnished; the AO estimated business profits at 3% of stock put to sale under Section 143(3). The Tribunal examined the assessment record, the profit & loss account and balance sheet produced, and the assessment sheet noting that books were not produced and expenditures were unsupported. The Tribunal considered whether the facts justified rejection of book results and whether the AO's estimation was reasonable in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The rejection of the books of account and the AO's estimation of income are upheld; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs.72,45,860 as unexplained cash deposits during the demonetisation period under Section 69A (with tax treatment under Section 115BBE) is sustainable.

Analysis: The AO treated the deposits in Specified Bank Notes as unexplained when the assessee did not produce documentary evidence to substantiate source. The Tribunal examined bank statements showing regular daily cash deposits and corresponding utilisation for purchases of liquor, and noted that the AO had already accepted the assessee's retail liquor business and estimated income from stock/sales. The Tribunal observed that the bank balance at year end matched the balance sheet and that the deposits were reflected in the assessee's records produced (profit & loss and balance sheet). Applying the legal test under Section 69A-whether money is unrecorded in books and the assessee offers no satisfactory explanation-the Tribunal found that the deposits were part of recorded business transactions and were utilised for purchases.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69A (and consequential invocation of Section 115BBE) is not sustainable and is deleted; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance of deduction of Rs.30,000 claimed under Section 80C is sustainable.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction for lack of documentary proof of payment; the assessee did not produce supporting evidence before the AO or during appellate proceedings. The Tribunal reviewed the record and found no documentary proof to substantiate the claim.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the Section 80C claim is confirmed; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal confirmed the rejection of books and the disallowance of the 80C deduction, but deleted the large addition made under Section 69A after finding the deposits were recorded and accounted for in the business transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 69A can be invoked only where the money is not recorded in the assessee's books and the assessee fails to offer a satisfactory explanation; where deposits are reflected in the accounting records and reasonably matched with business receipts and utilisation, additions under Section 69A are not sustainable.

Issues: Whether the claim of Rs. 11,24,472/- towards indexed cost of acquisition of a demolished structure can be allowed against capital gains on sale of land.

Analysis: The authorities below recorded conflicting findings: the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim and the CIT(A) affirmed the disallowance on the ground that the claim was not made in the return and no documentary proof of demolition expenditure was furnished. The Tribunal observed that the factual question whether a structure existed and was demolished at the buyer's insistence (and whether expenditure was actually incurred by the assessee) was not conclusively determined on the record. The Tribunal noted that if demolition expenditure was genuinely incurred as a pre-condition to sale, such expenditure would be relevant to computation under Section 48 and could be treated as cost of improvement or otherwise linked to the transfer. Given absence of documentary substantiation and the lack of a definitive factual finding, the Tribunal found it appropriate in the interest of justice to remit the matter for fresh enquiry by the Assessing Officer, with opportunity to the assessee to produce evidence.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification of facts and documentary proof regarding existence and demolition of the structure and the actual expenditure incurred; in consequence the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether the impugned adjudication order dated 5th February 2025, which denied the Petitioner copies of verification reports and proceeded without granting an opportunity to deal with those reports in relation to transition of input tax credit, breached the principles of natural justice and required quashing and remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Court examined the record of correspondence, the show cause notice process, the verification reports prepared on 27th January 2025 and 3rd February 2025, and the personal hearing held on 4th February 2025. The impugned order records that not all invoices were verified due to the large declared stock and notes submissions regarding columns of TRAN-1/TRAN-2 entries; the verification reports were influential in the conclusions reached. The Court found that the verification reports were not furnished to the Petitioner and that the adjudicating officer proceeded on an apparently hurried and incomplete verification of documents. The absence of furnishing verification reports and a meaningful opportunity to address observations in those reports resulted in the Petitioner being unable to rectify alleged classification/column errors or to have the cited documentary evidence considered before adverse conclusions were drawn.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 5th February 2025 is quashed and set aside. The proceedings are remitted to the adjudicating authority for de novo consideration. The adjudicating authority is directed to furnish the verification reports to the Petitioner, grant an opportunity of hearing to permit rectification of entries and to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law within two months.

Ratio Decidendi: Where verification reports materially inform adverse findings in tax adjudication, failure to furnish those reports and deny the affected party an opportunity to respond violates the principles of natural justice and requires quashing and remand for fresh adjudication after giving the party the requisite opportunity to be heard.

Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal was correct in upholding the taxation of the sum of Rs. 1,14,20,100/- voluntarily offered by the assessee during survey and declared in the return, and in refusing to entertain for the first time before it a plea that the admitted sum was not taxable.

Analysis: The Court noted that a survey under Section 133A was conducted and the assessee voluntarily offered Rs. 1,14,20,100/- by letter dated 29.09.2016 and subsequently declared that amount in the return filed on 20.11.2017. The statutory framework permits revision of returns under Section 139(5) and confines limited scrutiny to the matters for which selection is made. The Tribunal has discretion under Section 254 to entertain new grounds of law if foundational facts are on record; however, where the contention raised for the first time before the Tribunal involves mixed questions of fact and law and foundational facts were not placed before the lower authorities, the Tribunal cannot adjudicate the matter on merits. The Court observed that the assessee neither retracted the admission nor revised the return, paid tax on the declared amount, and did not challenge the taxability of the admitted amount before the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals), who was only asked to examine applicability of Section 115BBE. The Court further noted that allowing the assessee to challenge the admitted income at the Tribunal stage, in the absence of foundational facts and without availing statutory remedies, would undermine the finality of admissions in returns.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's decision upholding taxation of Rs. 1,14,20,100/- and declining to entertain the plea of non-taxability raised for the first time before it is justified; the appeal is dismissed and the assessment confirmed in that respect.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority correctly applied the principle of telescoping in adjusting unaccounted business income derived from seized documents against cash seized during search; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs. 35,79,000 determined by applying a 4% commission on transactions recorded in seized documents as unaccounted business income is sustainable; (iii) Whether deletion of the AO's full addition for cash seizure was erroneous and the correct quantum of unexplained cash to be sustained; (iv) Whether the total additions made u/s. 69A should be upheld in entirety.

Issue (i): Whether telescoping could be applied to adjust unaccounted income determined from seized documents against cash seized during search.

Analysis: The issue required (a) establishing that the seized documents were attributable to the taxpayer, (b) quantifying unaccounted income from those documents, and (c) determining whether the unaccounted cash found represented application of that income. The seized documents were held to fall within the statutory presumption regarding seized material. The quantified unaccounted income from seized documents and related calculations were compared with the total cash seized; relevant authorities on the telescoping doctrine and its application to avoid double taxation of income and its application were considered.

Conclusion: Telescoping was correctly applied to the quantified unaccounted income from seized documents and the cash seized; the adjustment reducing the cash addition was appropriate in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether sustaining an addition of Rs. 35,79,000 by applying 4% commission on the aggregate transactions shown in seized documents is justified.

Analysis: The seized documents recorded property transaction values attributable to the taxpayer under the statutory presumption for seized material. Given the taxpayer's admitted engagement in property dealing, applying an industry-accepted commission rate to the total transactional value to estimate unaccounted business income was used as a method of quantification. The method and rate were assessed for reasonableness in the factual matrix.

Conclusion: The Rs. 35,79,000 addition, computed as 4% commission on the transactions recorded in the seized documents, was sustained against the taxpayer.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition for cash seized (Rs. 50,15,000) was correctly deleted in full by the appellate authority or whether a portion should be sustained.

Analysis: The taxpayer provided partial explanations and some documentary material claimed to explain portions of the cash. Application of the telescoping principle against quantified unaccounted income and consideration of reasonable allowances (wife's savings and gifts) led to recalculation of explained amounts. The remaining excess cash was compared to the quantified unaccounted income to determine the undisclosed balance properly taxable.

Conclusion: A limited cash addition of Rs. 4,15,110 (excess over adjusted explained/unaccounted income) was correctly sustained; the remainder was appropriately adjusted or allowed.

Issue (iv): Whether the AO's entire additions under section 69A should be upheld.

Analysis: Each component addition based on seized documents and cash seizure was examined for attribution, quantification, and applicability of legal presumptions and doctrines (including telescoping). Portions where documentary evidence and reasonable allowances justified adjustment were distinguished from portions where additions were supported by the seized material and statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: Not all additions were upheld in full; specific additions were sustained (Rs. 35,79,000; Rs. 2,48,000; Rs. 1,01,890; and Rs. 4,15,110) and the remaining additions challenged by the Revenue were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appellate findings adjusting and sustaining specific additions while applying the presumption as to seized documents and the telescoping doctrine were affirmed, resulting in dismissal of the Revenue's appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized documents are attributable to the taxpayer under the statutory presumption, the contents may be used to quantify unaccounted business income; such quantified income may be set off against cash seized by applying the telescoping principle so as to tax either the income or its application but not both.

Issues: (i) Whether a charitable trust can claim exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when the return claiming the exemption is filed as an updated/belated return under section 139(8A)/139(4) after the due date under section 139(1), and whether late filing of Form No.10B or audit report (procedural delay) can justify denial of the exemption.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the statutory scheme requiring returns to be filed within the time allowed under section 139 and the subsequent amendments and explanatory materials clarifying scope of section 12A(1)(ba). It considered CBDT circulars and precedents holding that returns filed within the time allowed under section 139(4) qualify as returns within the time allowed under section 139 for purposes of claiming exemption, and that filing of audit report/Form No.10B is procedural and at most directory where substantial compliance is shown. The Tribunal followed coordinate-bench decisions which treated updated/belated returns filed within the time available under section 139(4) (and returns updated under section 139(8A) within that timeline) as eligible for claiming exemption under section 11, and held that denial of exemption by CPC on account of updated return or procedural delay in filing Form No.10B was not justified.

Conclusion: The claim for exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable where the return was filed within the time allowed under section 139(4)/updated under section 139(8A) and the audit report/Form No.10B involves only procedural delay; late filing of the updated return or Form No.10B does not disentitle the trust from exemption under section 11. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in directing the appellants to deposit Rs. 1 crore with interest into the liquidation estate on the basis that the sum received by the appellant company was part of sale consideration for estate property sold during liquidation without the authority of the Liquidator.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the factual matrix showing (i) commencement of CIRP and liquidation of the corporate debtor prior to the alleged Agreement to Sell dated 13.12.2019, (ii) receipt of Rs. 1 crore by the appellant company on the date of the Agreement, and (iii) close family and business nexus between the corporate debtor's promoter and the appellant entities, indicating that the transaction affected the liquidation estate. The Tribunal considered the scope of Sections 60(5), 33 and 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and authorities on what issues are suitable for summary treatment in insolvency proceedings. It noted that the Adjudicating Authority did not decide criminal guilt or finally determine forgery; rather it addressed whether an unauthorised dealing with estate property during moratorium resulted in monies that ought to be restored to the liquidation estate. The timing, conduct, and belatedness of allegations of forgery and the absence of contemporaneous criminal proceedings weakened the appellants' defence that the amount was an independent unsecured loan. The Tribunal found the Adjudicating Authority's restorative approach, to protect creditor interests and preserve the liquidation estate, legally sustainable within the Code's framework.

Conclusion: The impugned direction to deposit Rs. 1 crore with interest into the liquidation estate is upheld and the appeal is dismissed; the decision is in favour of the Respondent (liquidator).

Issues: (i) Whether the Revisional Authority erred in dismissing the departmental revision under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 and upholding the appellate order permitting redemption of detained gold upon payment of redemption fine, penalty and duty; (ii) Whether the Revisional Authority exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence or by permitting redemption despite alleged statutory ineligibility and classification of the goods.

Issue (i): Whether the Revisional Authority erred in dismissing the departmental revision and upholding the appellate order permitting redemption.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the revisional order disclosed jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest illegality. The appellate order had accepted a retraction and documentary proof of ownership which the Department had not displaced by independent material. The revisional exercise affirmed the appellate conclusion on the limited ground that the Department failed to adduce material to dislodge the ownership claim or to establish carrier or habitual offending. The relief granted by the appellate and revisional orders was conditional, involving payment of redemption fine, penalty and applicable duty, rather than immunity from liability.

Conclusion: The Revisional Authority did not err in dismissing the revision; the order falls within available discretionary remedies and does not reveal jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest arbitrariness. The appellate and revisional orders are to be given effect to.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revisional Authority exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence or by permitting redemption despite alleged statutory ineligibility and the characterisation of goods.

Analysis: The Court applied the principle that writ jurisdiction does not permit reappreciation of evidence and is confined to jurisdictional errors. The Revisional Authority's conclusions were based on the record showing absence of independent material from the Department to contradict the retraction and ownership documents, and on the nature of the lapse being non-declaration rather than organised smuggling, concealment or habitual offending. The discretion under the statutory redemption provision is fact-sensitive and may be exercised where absolute confiscation is disproportionate; the revisional order calibrated consequences by retaining fines, penalties and duty obligations.

Conclusion: The Revisional Authority did not exceed its jurisdiction under Section 129DD and did not improperly reappreciate evidence; permitting redemption on payment of imposed sums was within its discretionary power.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the revisional order is not maintainable on grounds of jurisdictional error or perversity; the revisional order upholding the appellate order is affirmed and must be given effect to, subject to payment of redemption fine, penalty and applicable duty, and directions already issued regarding warehousing charges continue to apply.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a revisional authority affirms an appellate order on the record and there is no independent material displacing accepted retraction or ownership evidence, exercise of discretion to permit redemption with payment of prescribed fines, penalties and duty does not amount to jurisdictional error or impermissible reappreciation of evidence and is not susceptible to interference in writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the petitioner has established exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and invoke the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against cancellation of GST registration.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which empowers the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry and to confirm, modify or annul the order appealed against and expressly bars remand to the adjudicating authority. Given the wider inquiry and disposal powers conferred on the Appellate Authority, the statutory appeal constitutes an efficacious alternative remedy. The Court analysed the petitioner's contention of violation of principles of natural justice and the claim that department withheld documents, noting the established requirement that a claimant must demonstrate prejudice caused by any alleged breach of natural justice. The petitioner failed to produce documents showing active business or to identify specific prejudice; moreover, where a party possesses best evidence and withholds it, an adverse inference is permissible. The disputed questions of fact regarding alleged issuance of fake invoices are matters for inquiry and determination by the Appellate Authority under Section 107(11).

Conclusion: The petitioner has not made out any exceptional circumstance to bypass the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the petitioner must pursue the remedy of appeal.

Issues: Whether a person whose GST registration has been cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for non-filing of returns for six continuous months can seek restoration of registration by furnishing all pending returns and making full payment of tax dues with interest and late fee as provided in the proviso to sub-rule (4) of Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, and whether the appropriate authority is obliged to consider such an application filed within a limited time.

Analysis: The statutory framework permits cancellation of registration where returns have not been furnished for a continuous period of six months (Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017) and prescribes the procedural notice and reply mechanism under Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The proviso to sub-rule (4) of Rule 22(4) provides that if, instead of replying to the show cause notice, the person furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee, the proceedings shall be dropped and an order in the prescribed form passed. The impugned cancellation therefore engages the proviso; restoration under that proviso requires submission of pending returns and payment of dues. The order also addresses computation of limitation for recovery proceedings, indicating that the period under Section 73(10) is to be computed from the date of the court order, with the financial year 2025-26 addressed as per Section 44 of the Act.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to seek restoration of GST registration by approaching the proper officer within the stipulated period, furnishing all pending returns and making full payment of tax dues with applicable interest and late fee, whereupon the authority has jurisdiction to consider and, if the conditions of the proviso to Rule 22(4) are met, drop the cancellation proceedings and pass the prescribed order. The authority shall consider such application expeditiously within the time directed by the Court.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be interfered with and whether the registration could be restored upon furnishing pending returns and payment of tax dues, interest and late fee under the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

Analysis: The cancellation was based on non-filing of returns for more than six months under Section 29(2)(c) of the GST law. The proviso to Rule 22(4) permits the proper officer to drop cancellation proceedings where the person, instead of replying to the notice, furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues together with applicable interest and late fee. The Court treated cancellation of registration as carrying serious civil consequences and held that, if the petitioner approaches the authority and complies with the stated requirements, the authority may consider restoration in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The petitioner was granted liberty to seek restoration of GST registration by approaching the competent authority and complying with the proviso to Rule 22(4); the authority was directed to consider restoration expeditiously.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with directions enabling the petitioner to pursue restoration of registration on compliance with the required statutory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST registration has been cancelled for non-filing of returns, the proper officer may drop the proceedings and restore registration if the taxpayer furnishes all pending returns and clears the tax dues, interest and late fee as contemplated by the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 130(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits provisional release of goods pending adjudication by accepting fine in lieu of confiscation; (ii) Whether authorities can retain possession of goods/conveyance proposed for confiscation pending final confiscation in the absence of an order of detention under the statutory procedure.

Issue (i): Whether Section 130(2) permits provisional release of goods by payment of fine in lieu of confiscation pending adjudication.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory text of Section 130 read with Section 130(7), the amendments effected by the Finance Act, 2021, and the specific provision for provisional release under Section 67(6). It noted deletion of earlier provisos and the removal of subsection cross-references that previously enabled provisional release practices, observed that Section 130(2) speaks of release in the context of an authorisation to confiscate (i.e., upon final confiscation order), and that the statutory scheme provides provisional release expressly under other provisions but not under Section 130. The Court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and considered precedents and prior orders dealing with provisional release but distinguished them in light of legislative amendments.

Conclusion: Section 130(2) does not permit provisional release of goods pending adjudication; the provision contemplates release consequent to or after authorization/confiscation. (Conclusion against the assessee's claim that Section 130(2) permits provisional release.)

Issue (ii): Whether authorities may retain possession of goods/conveyance proposed for confiscation absent a valid order of detention passed following the procedure and timelines in Section 129 and the Board's Circular.

Analysis: The Court analysed Sections 67, 68, 129 and the Board's Circular issued under Section 168(1), observing that inspection powers under Section 68 and forms MOV-1/MOV-2/MOV-4 are for inspection and have prescribed timelines. Detention in transit requires an order of detention under Section 129 with the statutory timelines; mere directions in MOV-02 or initiation of Section 130 proceedings do not constitute lawful detention. The Court held that retention without the statutory order and within the prescribed timelines violated the owner's proprietary right under Article 300A and that possession can be lawfully continued only if the detention procedure in Section 129 is validly invoked or after a confiscation order under Section 130 followed by taking possession.

Conclusion: The respondents were not entitled to continue detention of the goods in the absence of a valid detention order under Section 129; retention was illegal and the petitioner is entitled to release of the goods. (Conclusion in favour of the assessee on unlawful retention.)

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed to the extent of directing release of the detained goods forthwith upon the petitioner furnishing a simple bond; the statutory confiscation proceedings under Section 130 shall be adjudicated by the competent authority after giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute expressly provides for provisional release under a specific provision, that power cannot be read into a different provision; Section 130(2) provides for release in consequence of final confiscation authorization and does not authorize provisional release pending adjudication, and detention of goods in transit is lawful only if effected by an order under the statutory procedure in Section 129 within the prescribed timelines.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent (supplier of construction services) profiteered by failing to pass on the additional benefit of input tax credit arising on introduction of GST for the period 01.07.2017 to 29.01.2020, and if so, the quantum of profiteering and relief to be granted.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined DGAP's re-investigation report which computed pre GST and post GST ratios of available input tax credit to purchase value, finding an increase from 5.08% to 12.28% (an additional 7.20%). Applying that increase to post GST purchase value and attributing savings per square foot to units sold in the pre GST period, DGAP calculated a total profiteered amount of Rs. 4,65,07,296 plus GST @12% (total Rs. 5,20,88,172). DGAP further verified that the respondent had already passed ITC benefits aggregating Rs. 6,63,41,543 to 253 pre GST buyers, resulting in an excess benefit for 240 buyers and a shortfall of Rs. 5,80,280 in respect of 13 buyers. The Tribunal also considered the respondent's written acceptance of the DGAP report and its undertaking to pay the outstanding amount with applicable interest. The Tribunal applied Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (anti profiteering) and Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 regarding payment of interest, and noted applicability of penalty under Section 171(3A) for the relevant period.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the respondent profiteered by failing to pass on the full additional ITC benefit; the balance profiteered amount of Rs. 5,80,280 is liable to be refunded to 13 eligible buyers along with applicable interest. The DGAP investigation report is accepted and the respondent is directed to pay the balance amount with interest within 30 days and submit compliance to the jurisdictional CGST/SGST Commissioner with intimation to DGAP within two months.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the accompanying interlocutory application(s) stood disposed of.

Issues: Whether the assessing officer was justified in issuing the certificate under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 directing withholding tax at 7% by treating the petitioner's receipts as royalty/fees for technical services (taxable under Section 44DA) instead of as income taxable under Section 44BB.

Analysis: The Court examined the interplay between Section 44BB and Section 44DA (post the Finance Act, 2010 amendments) and the necessity that receipts qualify in substance as royalty or fees for technical services for Section 44DA to apply. The Court noted that the AO issued a provisional certificate at 7% without articulating reasons for departing from the prior year's treatment (3.5%) and without addressing binding/authoritative precedent on identical facts. The Court considered the petitioner's earlier decision of this Court (PGS Exploration (Norway) AS) and the Supreme Court's decision in ONGC which held that seismic survey services connected with oil exploration fall within the exclusion in Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vii) and are taxable under Section 44BB. The impugned order merely recorded that the services are FTS/Royalty without specifying whether receipts were royalty or FTS or providing reasoning linking contract facts to the definitions in Explanation 2 to Sections 9(1)(vi) or 9(1)(vii). Given the absence of reasons, failure to engage with the petitioner's prior binding decision and the legal tests established in ONGC, the AO's conclusion that receipts were taxable under Section 44DA could not be sustained. The Court therefore set aside the certificate and remanded the matter to the AO to consider the applicable law (including ONGC and PGS Exploration (Norway) AS) and the question of any element of royalty, and to pass a fresh order within three weeks.

Conclusion: The impugned certificate and order under Section 197 directing withholding at 7% is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with law; decision is in favour of the assessee.