Issues: (i) Whether the imported jackets, declared as knitted, are in fact woven and properly classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90 instead of 6102 30 10; (ii) Whether extended period demand under section 28(4) and penalty under section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable on the facts.

Issue (i): Classification of the imported jackets as woven or knitted and the correct Customs Tariff Item.

Analysis: The garments declared as knitted jackets were physically found to be of woven fabric on inspection and the importer's authorised representative agreed they were woven. Chapter 61 covers knitted or crocheted articles; Chapter 62 covers articles not knitted or crocheted. Given the woven nature, Chapter 62 applies and the entry under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90 is the appropriate classification for the goods as described.

Conclusion: Classification upheld in favour of Revenue; the jackets are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90.

Issue (ii): Sustenance of demand under extended period (section 28(4)) and penalty under section 114A for fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement.

Analysis: The mis-classification arose from self-assessment and possible misunderstanding of the nature of the fabric. Re-assessment is the statutory remedy for incorrect self-assessment. The facts do not establish the requisite elements of fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement necessary to invoke the extended period of limitation under section 28(4) or to sustain penalty under section 114A.

Conclusion: Extended period demand and penalty set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the classification and associated duty under the appropriate tariff item are sustained, while demands beyond the normal period of limitation and the penalty under section 114A are set aside, with entitlement to consequential relief if any.

Ratio Decidendi: Where imported garments are found on physical examination to be woven and not knitted, they fall under Chapter 62 (including Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90), and an incorrect self-assessment of classification does not, without evidence of fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement, justify invocation of extended limitation or penalty under sections 28(4) and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether the Respondent Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) and NOIDA should be directed to register the sub-leased apartment units in favour of the Appellant after payment of the first instalment under the approved Resolution Plan; (ii) Whether the Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority succeeds.

Issue (i): Whether registration of the units in favour of the Appellant should be directed to be effected after payment of the first instalment under the approved Resolution Plan.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the pleadings, the undertaking by the Appellant to withdraw pending complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act upon registration, the NOIDA Authority's position that conveyance/registry will be effected on a pro-rata and phased basis as funds are realised from the SRA, and the SRA's timeline for payment of the first tranche. The record shows an earlier direction for parties to endeavour to complete obligations and the willingness of the SRA to permit registration once conditions are met.

Conclusion: Registration of the units is directed to be executed by the SRA and NOIDA in favour of the Appellant after payment of the first instalment under the Resolution Plan, to be completed within 60 days of such payment; the Appellant shall withdraw the complaints within seven days of registration.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan should be allowed.

Analysis: In view of the order directing registration upon payment of the first instalment and the Appellant's stated willingness to accept registration and withdraw complaints, the Tribunal found no ground to sustain the challenge to approval of the Resolution Plan. The practical relief granted on registration rendered the challenge to the plan unsustainable.

Conclusion: The Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal directed implementation of registration-related reliefs in favour of the Appellant contingent on payment under the approved Resolution Plan and dismissed the separate challenge to the plan, permitting parties to file compliance reports.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority exceeded its jurisdiction or improperly interfered with the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors by rejecting the resolution plan and directing liquidation under Section 33(1)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority examined factual and financial material including asset-sale proceeds, liquid cash on hand, absence of business operations and employees, the sequence of transactions leading to formation of a single-member CoC, and the contents of the resolution plan. The authority applied statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the criteria in Regulation 38(3) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, focusing on whether the plan addressed cause of default, demonstrated feasibility and viability, provided for effective implementation, specified required approvals and timelines, and reflected the applicant's capability to implement the plan. Material findings included that the corporate debtor had largely disposed of tangible assets, retained limited liquid assets, the plan proposed a low realisation value, and the plan lacked measures to revive the corporate debtor as a going concern or to implement a viable revival strategy. The adjudicating authority also relied on concerns of potential collusion, opacity in the CIRP process, and possible non-compliance with other legal regimes as relevant to the integrity of the resolution process. Interference with CoC commercial wisdom was treated as permissible where the approval was patently arbitrary, non-compliant with statutory criteria, or corrosive of the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority rightly found that the resolution plan failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 30(2), Section 31 and Regulation 38(3) of the CIRP Regulations, 2016, and its rejection of the plan and consequent direction for liquidation under Section 33(1)(b) is upheld; the appeals are dismissed and the adjudicating authority's order is maintained.

Issues: (i) Whether the applications were not maintainable for want of compliance with Rule 55 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Rules, 2010. (ii) Whether, on registration of the apartment owners' association, the maintenance of the project was liable to be handed over to the association under Section 14(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010.

Issue (i): Whether the applications were not maintainable for want of compliance with Rule 55 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Rules, 2010.

Analysis: Rule 55 concerns the common seal of the association and the attestation of deeds or instruments to which the seal is affixed. The applications were not deeds or instruments executed by the association but applications filed before the Tribunal and supported by affidavits sworn by the presidents of the respective associations. The objection based on absence of seal and attestation was therefore not attracted to the proceedings.

Conclusion: The objection to maintainability was rejected and the applications were held to be maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether, on registration of the apartment owners' association, the maintenance of the project was liable to be handed over to the association under Section 14(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010.

Analysis: The associations were registered and their registrations were current. A large majority of allottees had taken possession, and the respondents' objections regarding pending challenges to registration and alleged completion-related requirements were not treated as defeating the statutory position. Section 14(5) contemplates transfer of management of common areas and facilities to the apartment owners' association upon formation of the association, and the Tribunal followed its earlier view that the maintenance agency could not refuse handover once the statutory conditions were met.

Conclusion: The respondents were directed to hand over maintenance to the registered associations within the time fixed by the Tribunal, under the supervision of the IRP.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal granted both applications and directed transfer of maintenance to the respective registered apartment owners' associations, while leaving the respondents free to pursue dues against allottees in accordance with contract.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an apartment owners' association is validly registered and the statute deems the management of common areas and facilities to stand transferred, objections not going to the core statutory entitlement, including those based on the association seal formalities or pending collateral disputes, cannot defeat the obligation to hand over maintenance.

Issues: Whether the complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the process order issued against the applicant were liable to be quashed for want of material showing that the alleged property or transaction was connected with proceeds of crime and for absence of sufficient ground to proceed.

Analysis: The complaint alleged that the scheduled offence and the alleged generation of proceeds of crime arose during 2020-2021, whereas the property relied on against the applicant had been acquired in 2005-2007. On the material placed, that property could not be linked to the proceeds of crime said to have arisen much later. The existence of proceeds of crime was treated as the foundational requirement for an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the material did not disclose that the applicant knowingly assisted concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of such proceeds as untainted property. The process order also did not show application of mind to the material against the applicant, so the test of sufficient ground for proceeding was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The complaint and the order issuing process were held unsustainable qua the applicant, and relief was granted in favour of the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, there must be material showing a nexus between the applicant's acts and proceeds of crime derived from a scheduled offence, and a process order lacking such material or lacking application of mind to it is liable to be quashed to prevent abuse of process.

Issues: Whether the shortfall in minimum guaranteed CENVAT credit could be deducted from the invoices in the absence of an express contractual clause, and whether the arbitral award rejecting the claim was liable to be set aside for travelling beyond the contract.

Analysis: The contract fixed a gross price with a stipulated minimum CENVAT credit component to be passed on, but the relevant clauses only provided that failure to furnish documents for availing CENVAT credit would disentitle reimbursement of the duty component. The shortfall in CENVAT did not alter the net contract value payable for the work, and the contract contained no clause authorising deduction of the shortfall from invoices. The arbitral tribunal nonetheless proceeded on the basis that the shortfall had to be made good and relied on a non-existent contractual stipulation, which amounted to adding terms to the contract. An arbitral award must remain within the contractual framework and any departure from the express terms attracts patent illegality.

Conclusion: The deduction of the shortfall in minimum guaranteed CENVAT credit from the invoices was impermissible, and the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for patent illegality.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded and the arbitral award rejecting the claim was annulled because the tribunal had gone beyond the contract and upheld a deduction not authorised by its terms.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral tribunal cannot add to or rewrite the contract between the parties, and an award founded on a contractual term that does not exist is vitiated by patent illegality.

Issues: (i) whether conviction for the offence under section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 along with corroborative material; (ii) whether the sentence of imprisonment deserved reduction to the period already undergone.

Issue (i): whether conviction for the offence under section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 along with corroborative material.

Analysis: Statements recorded by duly authorised Customs officers under section 108 are admissible if voluntary. The challenge that the conviction rested only on such statements was rejected because the statements had led to discovery of incriminating articles and money, supported by panchnamas and testimony of Customs officers. Such recoveries constituted independent corroborative evidence, and the concurrent findings of guilt were found to be free from perversity or legal infirmity. The Court found no basis to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The conviction was upheld and the challenge to guilt failed.

Issue (ii): whether the sentence of imprisonment deserved reduction to the period already undergone.

Analysis: The recovery related to 1985, the goods were found in abandoned condition, several co-accused had been acquitted, some appellants had died, and the surviving appellants were of advanced age. They had already undergone incarceration exceeding the statutory minimum contemplated by the proviso to section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962. In these circumstances, further imprisonment was considered unduly harsh and contrary to the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.

Final Conclusion: The conviction remained intact, but the custodial sentence was brought down to the term already undergone, resulting in partial relief to the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Voluntary statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 are substantive evidence when corroborated by independent discovery or recovery, and sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone where the overall circumstances make further incarceration unduly harsh.

Issues: (i) Whether a foreign decree passed by a superior court of a reciprocating territory was executable in India under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (ii) Whether the decree was unenforceable on the ground that the monetary awards for early redemption amount, interest and damages violated FEMA and RBI directions, attracting the exceptions in Section 13(c) and Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether a foreign decree passed by a superior court of a reciprocating territory was executable in India under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The United Kingdom was treated as a reciprocating territory and the English court as a superior court for the purpose of Section 44A. The decree was final under English law and fell within the statutory mechanism for execution of decrees of reciprocating foreign courts. The objections did not displace the statutory basis for execution.

Conclusion: The foreign decree was held executable under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): Whether the decree was unenforceable on the ground that the monetary awards for early redemption amount, interest and damages violated FEMA and RBI directions, attracting the exceptions in Section 13(c) and Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The Court held that the alleged FEMA breach did not make the foreign decree unenforceable. The RBI's stand clarified that payment of the early redemption amount and related sums could be remitted subject to the extant framework, and that damages for breach of contract were not controlled by the ECB ceiling in the manner contended by the judgment debtor. The award of interest at 7.95% was also found to remain within the contractual and regulatory cap. The objections based on absence of a registered account were rejected after RBI clarified that remittance to the disclosed Euro account was not barred.

Conclusion: The decree was not hit by the exceptions in Section 13(c) or Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the FEMA objections were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The execution petition succeeded, the foreign decree was ordered to be enforced, the objections were dismissed with costs, and the decretal amounts were directed to be remitted to the specified account.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign decree of a reciprocating superior court remains executable in India unless it squarely falls within Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and alleged FEMA or RBI guideline violations do not by themselves defeat execution where the awarded sums are legally remittable and the decree is otherwise valid.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice was issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction. (ii) Whether the addition to taxable wealth based on ownership of a property was supported by evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice was issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.

Analysis: The applicable CBDT instruction assigned non-corporate returns in Delhi declaring income above Rs. 20 lakh to an Assistant or Deputy Commissioner. The assessee declared income above that limit, but the reassessment notice was issued by an Income-tax Officer. The adopted precedents treated a jurisdictional defect in the initial notice as incurable.

Conclusion: The notice was issued without jurisdiction, and the resulting assessment was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition to taxable wealth based on ownership of a property was supported by evidence.

Analysis: The record contained neither a sale deed nor evidence of payment to substantiate the alleged ownership of the property.

Conclusion: The wealth-tax addition was not supported by evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The income-tax assessment cannot stand, and the deletion of the challenged wealth-tax addition remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction under the applicable CBDT instruction cannot sustain the resulting assessment.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15, following a search conducted on 08.02.2024, was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The limitation framework under Sections 149, 152(3), 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires distinct computational regimes for the ordinary six-year search-assessment block and the extended ten-year block. While the six-year period comprises assessment years immediately preceding the search assessment year, Explanation 1 to Section 153A computes the extended period from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search. On the plain meaning of that expression, the search assessment year is included as the first year of the ten-year block. As the search occurred in Financial Year 2023-24, Assessment Year 2024-25 was the first year and Assessment Year 2015-16 the tenth year; Assessment Year 2014-15 fell outside that period.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was barred by limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars could be sustained where the reassessment accepted, without variation, the income returned in response to the notice for reassessment; (ii) Whether penalty proceedings were invalid because the penalty notice did not specify the applicable limb of concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars could be sustained where the reassessment accepted, without variation, the income returned in response to the notice for reassessment.

Analysis: The return filed in response to the reassessment notice withdrew the bad-debt claim and declared the reduced loss. The reassessment accepted that returned figure without any further addition or disallowance. The difference between the original loss return and the subsequently returned loss did not constitute an addition in the reassessment capable of forming the foundation for penalty. Explanation 1 to the penalty provision applies where an assessment addition or disallowance gives rise to deemed concealment; that foundational addition was absent.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not leviable in the absence of an addition or disallowance beyond the income returned in response to the reassessment notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty proceedings were invalid because the penalty notice did not specify the applicable limb of concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

Analysis: The notice retained both statutory limbs without striking off the inapplicable limb or otherwise making the charge explicit. A penalty notice must communicate a precise and unambiguous charge; failure to specify the charge is a breach of the mandatory requirement for a valid communication and vitiates the proceedings.

Conclusion: The penalty notice was defective for non-specification of the charge, independently invalidating the penalty proceedings, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty lacked a substantive foundation in the reassessment and was independently vitiated by the ambiguous notice.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for concealment or inaccurate particulars cannot rest on a reassessment that accepts the income returned in response to reassessment without further addition, and a notice that does not specify the applicable statutory charge is invalid.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice was validly issued within limitation where the notice was signed and dispatched on 30.06.2025, but the postal tracking reflected later booking and the notice was ultimately returned undelivered.

Analysis: The Court found, on the documentary record, that the notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued on 30.06.2025 and bore the postal seal of dispatch on the same date. Relying on the principle that the relevant requirement for limitation is the issue of notice, and not its service, the Court applied the rule that once a notice is issued within time, the jurisdiction to proceed is not defeated by later service-related difficulties. The discrepancy in postal tracking and the return of the notice did not negate timely issuance.

Conclusion: The notice was held to have been validly issued within limitation, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: For reassessment proceedings, limitation is satisfied by the timely issue of notice; subsequent failure or delay in service does not invalidate a notice that was actually issued within the prescribed period.

Issues: Whether a plaint seeking declaration and injunction on the strength of an alleged Will was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure for want of cause of action or as barred by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, having regard to a pending criminal prosecution concerning the testator.

Analysis: The inquiry under Order VII Rule 11 is confined to the averments in the plaint. The pleaded foundation of the claim was the alleged Will by which the suit properties were bequeathed, and not an assertion that the plaintiff had acquired the properties benami in the testator's name. The validity and proof of the Will, as well as the factual character of the underlying transactions, require adjudication on evidence and cannot be determined at the threshold. A pending criminal prosecution concerning the testator does not bar an accused person from pursuing an independent civil remedy.

Conclusion: The plaint disclosed a cause of action and was not liable to rejection as barred by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988; the proof of the Will and the plaintiff's entitlement must be determined at trial.

Issues: Whether Section 13(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is attracted to disallow payments made by a trust to related concerns and whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Revenue's appeals relying on consistency with earlier assessment years.

Analysis: The matter involves scrutiny of payments from a trust claiming exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the applicability of the embargo in Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(3) where concerns in which trustees or their relatives have substantial interest are concerned. The factual record shows that the concerned entities carried on activities and earned profits; the Assessing Officer did not dispute the genuineness of those entities. For earlier assessment years involving identical facts the Assessing Officer, after scrutiny under Section 143(3), had accepted the payments and did not invoke Section 13(1)(c). Mere higher profit margins or higher director remuneration, without comparative material demonstrating that payments resulted in diversion of income for the direct or indirect benefit of persons specified in Section 13(3), does not automatically attract Section 13(1)(c). The rule of consistency requires maintaining the same view in the absence of any change in factual matrix or legal position, and the Tribunal applied that principle in rejecting the Revenue's appeals.

Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed and the result is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere higher profit margins or remuneration in related concerns, without material showing diversion of trust income resulting in benefit to persons specified in Section 13(3), do not attract Section 13(1)(c); consistency requires maintaining an earlier accepted view in the absence of change in facts or law.

Issues: (i) Whether a matter remitted by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to the Transfer Pricing Officer under Section 92CA(3) is governed by the time-limit for fresh orders under Section 153(3) or by the extended time provided by Section 153(4) where a reference is made under Section 92CA(1); (ii) In the facts of the case, whether the limitation for giving effect to the Tribunal's remand is governed by Section 153(3), Section 153(4) or Section 153(5) and the date on which the limitation expired.

Issue (i): Whether a remand by the Tribunal to the Transfer Pricing Officer is governed by Section 153(3) (fresh order) rather than a reference under Section 92CA(1) made during assessment and thus by Section 153(4).

Analysis: Section 92CA distinguishes between a reference made by an Assessing Officer under sub-section (1) and an order made by the Transfer Pricing Officer under sub-section (3). Section 153(3) expressly contemplates fresh assessments or fresh orders under Section 92CA made pursuant to an order under Section 254 (Tribunal). Section 153(4) extends time where a reference under Section 92CA(1) is made during the course of assessment or reassessment. A Tribunal remand that directs a fresh order under Section 92CA(3) is therefore conceptually and legally different from an Assessing Officer's in-course reference under Section 92CA(1). Precedent of the High Court of Delhi and coordinate decisions support that a Tribunal remand to the Transfer Pricing Officer attracts Section 153(3) time-limits and is not to be treated as a Section 92CA(1) reference made during assessment for the purpose of Section 153(4).

Conclusion: Issue (i) answered in favour of the assessee. A remand by the Tribunal to the Transfer Pricing Officer requiring a fresh order under Section 92CA is governed by Section 153(3) and not by the extension provision of Section 153(4) applicable to in-course references under Section 92CA(1).

Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts, the applicable limitation for giving effect to the Tribunal's remand expired on 31-03-2024 (assessee's case) or on 31-03-2025 (revenue's case).

Analysis: Section 153(3) prescribes the period for making a fresh assessment or a fresh order under Section 92CA in pursuance of a Tribunal order received by the Commissioner, calculated from the end of the financial year in which the Tribunal's order is received. The Tribunal's orders in the matters were received in the financial year 2022-23; therefore the nine/modified twelve months period under Section 153(3) runs from the end of the financial year 2022-23. The coordinate bench rulings relied upon apply the distinction between fresh orders under Section 153(3) and in-course references under Section 153(4), and compute limitation accordingly. Seeking documents or issuing notices after remand does not extend the Section 153(3) limitation simply because the Revenue sought further material; Section 153(5)'s shorter OGE timeline is inapplicable where a fresh order under Section 153(3) is mandated. Applying Section 153(3) to the dates on record yields expiry of the limitation on 31-03-2024.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) answered in favour of the assessee. On the facts, the limitation for passing orders giving effect to the Tribunal remand expired on 31-03-2024; actions taken by the revenue after that date are time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeed on limitation grounds; the impugned communications rejecting refund claims are quashed and refund with applicable interest is directed to be processed and paid within a stipulated period, with specified consequences for non-compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal remits matters for a fresh order under Section 92CA(3), the time-limit for making that fresh order is governed by Section 153(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, computed from the end of the financial year in which the Tribunal's order is received; such remand is distinct from a reference under Section 92CA(1) made during assessment which attracts Section 153(4).

Issues: (i) Whether income tax returns and related financial particulars of an assessee constitute personal information under Section 8(1)(j) and/or information held in fiduciary capacity under Section 8(1)(e) of the Right to Information Act, 2005; (ii) Whether the husband qualifies as a "third party" under Section 2(n) of the RTI Act when the RTI request is filed by his spouse; (iii) Whether disclosure of such information to the spouse in aid of maintenance proceedings satisfies the test of larger public interest to override Section 8 exemptions; (iv) Whether Section 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 restricts or governs disclosure under the RTI Act and how it harmonises with Section 22 of the RTI Act; (v) Whether the RTI Act is the appropriate mechanism for obtaining a spouse's income tax returns for maintenance proceedings or whether the competent court should be approached; (vi) Whether the Central Information Commission's order dated 12.04.2019 directing disclosure merits interference under Article 226.

Issue (i): Whether income tax returns and related financial particulars constitute personal information under Section 8(1)(j) and/or information held in fiduciary capacity under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.

Analysis: Binding authority establishes that details disclosed in income tax returns are personal information for the purposes of Section 8(1)(j). The exemptions in Section 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) are qualified by the proviso of larger public interest. The relationship between the Income Tax Department and an assessee has characteristics of confidentiality; however, the decisive protection for the requested material arises under Section 8(1)(j).

Conclusion: Income tax returns, assessment particulars and related financial details constitute personal information within the meaning of Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The exemption is qualified and may be overridden only if larger public interest is established.

Issue (ii): Whether the husband qualifies as a "third party" under Section 2(n) of the RTI Act when the RTI request is filed by his spouse.

Analysis: Section 2(n) defines "third party" as any person other than the citizen making the request without exceptions for familial relationships. Characterisation as a third party triggers the procedural safeguards under Section 11, while the matrimonial relationship may be relevant to the later assessment of larger public interest but does not alter the statutory definition.

Conclusion: The husband is a "third party" within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the RTI Act; the marital relationship does not alter that statutory characterisation though it may be a relevant factor in assessing larger public interest.

Issue (iii): Whether disclosure to the spouse in aid of maintenance proceedings satisfies the larger public interest test to override Section 8 exemptions.

Analysis: "Larger public interest" requires an interest transcending the private dispute and impacting the public or a significant section thereof. Matrimonial maintenance claims involve important social and constitutional values (right to life and dignity), and case law recognises that in certain maintenance contexts financial information may acquire shared relevance. Nevertheless, the RTI exemption under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be displaced in every private dispute; a reasoned, case-specific satisfaction that larger public interest exists must be recorded by the authority ordering disclosure. The impugned decision lacked such an analysis.

Conclusion: On the facts of this case, disclosure through the RTI route does not satisfy the statutory test of "larger public interest" to override Section 8(1)(j).

Issue (iv): Whether Section 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 restricts disclosure under the RTI Act and how to harmonise it with Section 22 of the RTI Act.

Analysis: Section 22 of the RTI Act gives the Act overriding effect, but Section 8 exemptions already protect confidential tax information. Section 138 is a special provision governing assessee information and reinforces the confidential character of tax records. The provisions can be harmoniously construed: RTI applies to information held by the Income Tax Department subject to Section 8 exemptions; Section 138 supports and supplements the protection of assessee information and prescribes specified channels for disclosure.

Conclusion: Section 138 of the Income-tax Act regulates disclosure and reinforces the confidentiality of assessee information; it does not operate to wholly bar RTI applications but, taken with Section 8 of the RTI Act, supports limiting disclosure absent larger public interest.

Issue (v): Whether the RTI Act is the appropriate mechanism to obtain a spouse's income tax returns for maintenance proceedings or whether the competent court should be approached.

Analysis: Courts possess statutory powers to summon documents and to regulate disclosure with appropriate safeguards (sealed cover, redaction, undertakings). Judicial processes permit granular balancing of relevance, confidentiality and procedural protections that an RTI procedure cannot provide. Where maintenance proceedings are pending, the competent court is the appropriate forum to seek production of tax records.

Conclusion: The appropriate mechanism for obtaining a spouse's income tax returns in maintenance proceedings is to apply to the competent court for a production order; the RTI Act is not the proper substitute.

Issue (vi): Whether the Central Information Commission's order dated 12.04.2019 directing disclosure merits interference under Article 226.

Analysis: Judicial review empowers interference where the authority failed to apply the mandatory larger public interest test, acted without adequate reasoning, or ignored binding precedent. The impugned CIC order relied on an earlier order without independent application of mind and did not record satisfaction on larger public interest contrary to binding authority that tax returns are personal information exempt under Section 8(1)(j) absent such satisfaction.

Conclusion: The CIC order dated 12.04.2019 is set aside for failure to apply the larger public interest test and for not addressing controlling precedents. The writ petition is partly allowed and liberty is granted to the spouse to seek production of records from the competent court with directions and safeguards.

Final Conclusion: The overall legal effect is that income tax returns and related financial particulars are ordinarily protected as personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and cannot be obtained via RTI by a spouse absent a recorded finding of larger public interest; the Central Information Commission's direction for disclosure is set aside and the remedy for obtaining such records in maintenance litigation is to seek a court-ordered production with appropriate safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: Income tax returns and related financial particulars constitute personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and are exempt from disclosure under the RTI Act unless the competent authority records satisfaction that a larger public interest justifies disclosure; where maintenance proceedings require such records, the competent court, not the RTI mechanism, is the appropriate forum to order production subject to confidentiality safeguards.

Issues: Whether 75% abatement for goods transport agency services could be denied because the transporter issued a general declaration rather than consignment-specific declarations.

Analysis: Notification No. 32/2004-ST dated 03.12.2004 allowed 75% abatement for goods transport agency services subject to stipulated conditions. The notification did not require the service recipient to obtain or produce a declaration on each consignment note. A general declaration by the transporter that it had not availed Cenvat credit or the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003 was sufficient. A Board circular could not introduce an additional procedural condition not contained in the exemption notification.

Conclusion: The assessee validly claimed 75% abatement on the basis of the transporters' general declarations; the service-tax demand was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Entitlement to Cenvat credit where original invoices were not submitted but xerox invoices and GAR-7 challans were produced; (ii) entitlement to Cenvat credit where invoices contained the company's name and address along with names of other persons; (iii) entitlement to Cenvat credit despite minor discrepancies in the address shown in invoices; (iv) entitlement to Cenvat credit availed more than six months after the invoice date before the effective date of the revised time limit; (v) entitlement to refund based on the export-turnover and total-turnover computation; (vi) eligibility of Cenvat credit on consultancy and convention services used for leadership and employee-induction training; (vii) eligibility of Cenvat credit on banking and financial services used for export of services; (viii) validity of debit notes as documents for availing Cenvat credit; and (ix) eligibility of Cenvat credit on car-parking charges incurred for business purposes.

Issue (i): Entitlement to Cenvat credit where original invoices were not submitted but xerox invoices and GAR-7 challans were produced.

Analysis: The documentary-credit framework was satisfied through xerox copies of invoices and GAR-7 challans evidencing payment of service tax on the underlying services. Substantial compliance with documentary requirements was established.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.32,50,111/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to Cenvat credit where invoices contained the company's name and address along with names of other persons.

Analysis: The invoices recorded the company's name and address, and the presence of names of other persons did not displace the evidentiary basis for the tax-paid services.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.76,25,814/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Entitlement to Cenvat credit despite minor discrepancies in the address shown in invoices.

Analysis: Receipt of services and payment of service tax were undisputed. Minor address discrepancies were treated as procedural irregularities incapable of defeating otherwise eligible credit.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.23,35,013/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Entitlement to Cenvat credit availed more than six months after the invoice date before the effective date of the revised time limit.

Analysis: Notification No. 6/2015-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.2015 revised the period for availing credit from six months to one year. For credit availed before its effective date, no time limit was treated as applicable.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.3,22,104/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Entitlement to refund based on the export-turnover and total-turnover computation.

Analysis: The export turnover-based refund computation showed that the eligible credit exceeded the credit actually availed. A calculation discrepancy could not justify denial of the refund claim.

Conclusion: Refund of Rs.2,37,417/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Eligibility of Cenvat credit on consultancy and convention services used for leadership and employee-induction training.

Analysis: Leadership and employee-induction training services were used for business purposes and had the requisite input service nexus with the assessee's business.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.3,45,121/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Eligibility of Cenvat credit on banking and financial services used for export of services.

Analysis: Banking and financial services were used in relation to the export of services and qualified as input services.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.1,12,413/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Validity of debit notes as documents for availing Cenvat credit.

Analysis: The debit notes contained the particulars required under Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Their nomenclature did not undermine documentary compliance.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.93,800/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): Eligibility of Cenvat credit on car-parking charges incurred for business purposes.

Analysis: Car-parking charges incurred for employees and visitors were connected with business purposes and satisfied the input service nexus.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.47,275/- was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Cenvat credit and refund aggregating to Rs.1,45,49,227/- were found admissible, apart from the credit not pressed.

Issues: (i) Whether the selected companies were comparable for determining the arm's-length price of captive data-processing and software-development services under the transactional net margin method for assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11. (ii) Whether the disallowance of repair and maintenance expenditure for assessment year 2009-10 required fresh verification.

Issue (i): Whether the selected companies were comparable for determining the arm's-length price of captive data-processing and software-development services under the transactional net margin method for assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11.

Analysis: Rule 10B(4) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 permits consideration of data for the two preceding years. Companies having a profit in one of the relevant three years could not be treated as persistent loss-makers solely because they incurred losses in the other years. A different accounting year was also not, by itself, a ground to exclude a functionally similar company where relevant quarterly data could be extrapolated.

Analysis: Companies following materially different business models, including substantial outsourcing, high-end healthcare services, software-product development, diversified product and licensing operations, or having no reliable segmental information, were unsuitable comparables. Large entrepreneurial companies possessing substantial brands, intangibles, scale and end-to-end business operations were not comparable to the assessee's captive, limited-risk service operations. The export-revenue filter also warranted exclusion where it was not met.

Conclusion: The inclusion of KPIT Cummins Global Business Solutions Ltd., NIIT Smartserve Ltd., Allsec Technologies Ltd. and R-Systems International Ltd. was directed where applicable, while the functionally dissimilar or otherwise unsuitable companies identified for exclusion in the data-processing and software-development segments were directed to be excluded. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of repair and maintenance expenditure for assessment year 2009-10 required fresh verification.

Analysis: The claim relating to payment for elevator maintenance required examination in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions. The year-end provision was supported by material showing subsequent crystallisation of a substantial part of the provision and reversal of the balance; its allowability was therefore dependent on verification of the evidence, with an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The repair and maintenance claim was restored for verification and fresh consideration in accordance with law. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The arm's-length-price computation must be recomputed after giving effect to the directed changes in the comparable set, and the repair and maintenance claim requires fresh verification.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the transactional net margin method, comparables must be functionally and economically similar; a different accounting year or non-persistent losses alone do not justify exclusion, whereas material differences in functions, business model, scale, intangibles or availability of segmental data do.