Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 56,60,500/- made under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based solely on an unsigned Excel sheet recovered from a third party and related post-search material, is sustainable in the absence of independent corroborative evidence and where statements/records were not fully furnished for cross-examination.

Analysis: The disputed addition rested entirely on an unsigned Excel sheet seized from a third party which did not bear the assessee's name or signature and contained no direct acknowledgement of cash payment by the assessee. There was no independent documentary or testimonial evidence such as bank withdrawals, receipts, confirmations of cash receipt, or other material linking the assessee to the alleged cash payment. The evidence relied upon included third-party admissions and search statements that were not furnished in full to the assessee nor was an opportunity of cross-examination provided. Precedential authorities addressing identical facts arising from the same search action were considered, holding that mere entries in an unsigned third-party Excel sheet without corroboration cannot by themselves establish payment by the assessee. The balance of probabilities and requirement of positive evidence to fasten liability on a taxpayer were applied to the material on record.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 56,60,500/- under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unsustainable and is deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 127 days in filing the appeal should be condoned and the appeal admitted; (ii) Whether the notice for assessment under section 143(2) was time barred and the consequent assessment void; (iii) Whether non-receipt/non-service of notice rendered the assessment void ab initio.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal of 127 days is liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The assessee explained non-receipt of the appellate order and filed a condonation petition supported by facts showing discovery of the order during routine portal inspection and prompt filing thereafter. The respondent did not controvert these factual contentions. The Tribunal examined the explanation for delay and found it reasonable in the circumstances.

Conclusion: Delay condoned and the appeal admitted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 143(2) was time barred because the revised/rectified return filed at the instance of CPC cannot extend the period for issuance of the notice.

Analysis: The Tribunal treated the rectified/revised return as having relation back to the date of the original return filed within the due date. Relying on the legal principle that a revised or rectified return filed to cure defects steps into the shoes of the original return, the period for issuing a notice under 143(2) runs from the end of the financial year in which the original return was furnished. The notice in question was issued beyond that limitation period.

Conclusion: The notice was time barred and therefore invalid; the assessment based on that notice is void in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of service/non-receipt of the notice under section 143(2) independently renders the assessment void ab initio.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled requirement that a notice under section 143(2) must be served before making an assessment. The record showed no valid service of the impugned notice within the limitation period and factual reasons were found for non-receipt due to change of registered office and name/email details. The Tribunal referred to controlling precedent that assessment without valid service of the notice is liable to be quashed.

Conclusion: The assessment is invalid for want of valid service of the notice and is void ab initio in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the assessment framed under section 144 is quashed on grounds of time-bar and invalid service of the notice and the matter stands decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A revised or rectified return filed to cure defects relates back to the date of the original return for the purpose of computing the limitation for issuance of a notice under section 143(2), and an assessment framed without serving a valid notice under section 143(2) is void ab initio.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 11th September, 2025 passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer is vitiated by a breach of the principles of natural justice for failing to consider the petitioner's replies and for not giving adequate time to collate material in respect of newly proposed comparables under Section 92C(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Transfer Pricing Officer issued a show cause notice proposing new comparables under Section 92C(3). The petitioner furnished a partial reply and sought time to collate additional material relevant to the newly proposed comparables. The petitioner subsequently filed material for the "ITes" sector and later provided materials for the "IT" sector, but the impugned order was passed without referring to or considering the reply filed on 8th September, 2025 or affording adequate opportunity to supply and have considered the additional information. The factual sequence shows that the petitioner's submissions and collated material were not given consideration before passing the assessment-related order, resulting in a denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside on the ground of breach of the principles of natural justice. The matter is remanded to the Transfer Pricing Officer to examine the issue afresh after giving the petitioner an opportunity to reply to the show cause notice dated 18th August, 2025, and pass a fresh order within three months.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment-related order passed without giving adequate time to collate and consider material filed in response to a show cause notice proposing new comparables under Section 92C(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice and vitiates the order, requiring remand for fresh consideration.

Issues: (i) Whether the Orders in Original raising service tax demand based solely on information from income tax returns should be set aside and the matters remitted to the stage of reply to the show cause notice for fresh consideration; (ii) Whether bank attachment/debit freeze effected pursuant to the impugned orders should cease to have effect.

Issue (i): Whether the Orders in Original based on income tax return inputs must be set aside and the matters relegated to the stage of reply to the show cause notice for fresh adjudication in accordance with specified considerations.

Analysis: The orders of adjudication under challenge record that demand for service tax was raised on the basis of declarations in income tax returns. Reference is made to prior writ proceedings disposing similar challenges by remitting matters to the stage of reply to the show cause notice with directions to consider specified questions including applicability of Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, whether services fall under the negative list, applicability of Notification No.25/2012 ST dated 28.06.2012 or other exemptions, liability under the relevant rule read with applicable notifications, and limitation. The orders in appeal are procedural dismissals for non compliance of pre deposit and do not foreclose reconsideration of the adjudication on merits once the Orders in Original are set aside and matter remitted. Petitioners are permitted to file fresh replies and the authorities are directed to reconsider from the show cause notice stage keeping the specified considerations in mind; all contentions are kept open.

Conclusion: Orders in Original are set aside and the matters are remitted to the stage of reply to the show cause notice for fresh consideration in light of the specified observations, with all contentions kept open.

Issue (ii): Whether bank attachment/debit freeze effected pursuant to the impugned Orders in Original must be withdrawn following setting aside of those orders.

Analysis: The impugned Orders in Original have been set aside and the matters remitted for fresh adjudication; consequentially, attachments or debit freezes effected under those orders are no longer sustainable. The authorities are directed to issue instructions withdrawing the debit freeze/attachment in respect of the specified bank accounts upon receipt of certified copies.

Conclusion: Bank attachment/debit freeze effected pursuant to the impugned Orders in Original shall cease to have effect and the respondent authorities shall issue immediate instructions to withdraw such attachments upon receipt of certified copies.

Final Conclusion: The Orders in Original are set aside and the matters are remitted to the adjudicating authorities to be reconsidered from the stage of reply to the show cause notice in accordance with the observations specified; consequential attachments are to be withdrawn and petitioners are permitted to file fresh replies and pursue further remedies if aggrieved.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a service tax demand is founded solely on information from income tax returns, the proper course is to set aside the Orders in Original and remit the matter to the stage of reply to the show cause notice for fresh adjudication, requiring the authorities to examine applicability of Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, negative list and exemption notifications (including Notification No.25/2012 ST dated 28.06.2012), liability under the relevant rule read with notifications, and limitation, with all contentions left open.

Issues: Whether the assessment order dated 04.12.2025 passed under Section 144 read with Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, together with the consequential demand notice dated 04.12.2025 under Section 156, is vitiated by denial of opportunity to file reply and denial of personal hearing as directed by the appellate authority.

Analysis: The remand by the appellate authority required fresh assessment after affording sufficient opportunity to the assessee. Proceedings were conducted under the faceless assessment framework invoking Section 144B and Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and notices under Section 142(1) were issued seeking explanations. The record shows that the assessee was unable to e-file her reply due to portal closure, lodged a grievance which was not remedied, and was not offered personal hearing before the impugned order was passed. Failure to provide the statutory and remand-directed opportunity to file a reply and to be heard engages the principles of natural justice and renders the assessment process unfair and procedurally infirm.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 04.12.2025 and the demand notice dated 04.12.2025 are set aside; the assessee is permitted to file her reply to the show cause notice and shall be afforded opportunity of hearing before fresh assessment is completed; writ petition allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the application for quashing of the charge-sheet, cognizance order and criminal proceedings should be entertained on the basis of the plea that cash payment of more than Rs. 2,00,000/- attracts the statutory mechanism under the Income-tax law.

Outcome: Notice was issued to the opposite party for filing counter affidavit, and the matter was directed to be listed on a later date with instructions to be obtained.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is imposable for expiry of an e-way bill in respect of exported (zero-rated) goods where no tax is payable and the e-way bill could not be extended due to conveyance breakdown; and whether the impugned orders imposing and upholding the penalty should be quashed and the amount refunded with interest.

Analysis: The issue concerns the application of the GST scheme to interstate supplies that are zero rated by virtue of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the CGST Rules, 2017, including the availability of refund or adjustment under Rule 89 and Rule 96 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the relevant provisions of the IGST Act (Sections 5(1), 7(5), 16(1) and 17(1)). Rule 138(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits limited extension of an e-way bill; factual findings show the e-way bill expired and the vehicle was intercepted shortly thereafter and that extension was not possible due to breakdown. Section 129 provides for levy of penalty for contraventions, but where the supply is zero rated and no tax is payable, computation and imposition of a harsh penalty under Section 129(3) is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Prior decisions applying these legal principles treat procedural contraventions in contexts where no tax is payable as requiring moderation of penalty, and permit relief including reduction or quashing of penalty and direction for refund where appropriate.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed under Section 129(1)(a) and the subsequent order upholding it are quashed. The respondent orders dated 29.11.2025 and 02.12.2025 are set aside and the amount of Rs. 18,00,140/- shall be refunded with applicable interest within twelve weeks. Relief is therefore in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the order dated 20.01.2005 dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for additional interest under Section 244(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 should be quashed and remanded for fresh adjudication in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Sandvik Asia Ltd.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order rejecting the rectification application for additional interest and considered that the order was founded on a High Court decision which has since been reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court directed that on remand the competent authority shall pass a fresh order within three months after receipt of a certified/web copy of this order. While recalculating interest the competent authority or Assessing Officer must apply the extant legal provisions, including the applicable rate of interest from time to time. For the assessment year in question, the Court provided an operable timeline and specified a contingency interest rate if compliance is delayed.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 20.01.2005 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the competent authority for fresh disposal in favour of the assessee; the competent authority is directed to pass a fresh order within three months and to take into account applicable provisions and rates while calculating interest; in case of non-compliance the order shall carry interest as directed by the Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeals filed by the Revenue should be entertained despite a gross unexplained delay of 236 days; (ii) Whether the appeals merit interference on merits with the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 13-03-2025.

Issue (i): Whether the appeals should be admitted notwithstanding a gross unexplained delay of 236 days by the appellant.

Analysis: The appeals were filed with a delay of 236 days and the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. The legal framework requires a satisfactory explanation to condone delay before an appeal is admitted; unexplained or inadequately explained delay militates against exercise of appellate discretion to entertain the appeal. The Court addressed whether the explanation furnished met that requirement and found it lacking.

Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay; condonation is refused.

Issue (ii): Whether, apart from delay, interference with the Tribunal's common impugned order dated 13-03-2025 is warranted on merits.

Analysis: The Court examined whether there were substantive grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's order. After consideration, no sufficient ground was found to disturb the Tribunal's conclusions; the appeals do not demonstrate merit warranting interference with the impugned order.

Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed on merits; no interference with the impugned order is warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are finally dismissed both for failure to satisfactorily explain the delay and for lack of merit, and pending applications, if any, are disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellant seeks admission of a delayed appeal, a satisfactory explanation for delay is essential and absence thereof justifies dismissal; additionally, absent substantive defect in the Tribunal's order, appellate interference is not warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was eligible for concessional CVD under Clause 1C of Notification No. 04/2006-CE; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was eligible for concessional CVD under Clause 1C of Notification No. 04/2006-CE.

Analysis: Eligibility under Clause 1C depended on satisfaction of the statutory condition of direct purchase from the manufacturer, as required by Rule 2A(b) of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2006. The appellant had purchased the goods through High Sea Sale transactions, which severed the direct contractual nexus with the manufacturer. Exemption notifications are to be strictly construed, and the condition attached to the concession could not be treated as a mere procedural formality. The nature of end-use for government construction did not cure the failure to meet the mandatory purchase condition.

Conclusion: The appellant was not eligible for concessional CVD under Clause 1C, and this issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The imports were made between March 2009 and September 2011, while the show cause notice was issued on 14.03.2014, beyond the normal limitation period under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The record showed disclosure of the High Sea Sale basis, the relevant documents, and the exemption claim at the time of assessment. The dispute was one of interpretation of the notification and not one involving concealment of material facts. In the absence of wilful misstatement or suppression, the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation and this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 114A depends on a duty demand validly sustained under Section 28(4) on account of wilful misstatement or suppression. Once the extended period was held inapplicable and the demand failed on limitation, the foundation for penalty disappeared. The case was also essentially interpretational, with full disclosure of primary facts, which did not justify mandatory equal penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114A was not sustainable and this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the duty demand could not be sustained beyond limitation, and the consequential interest and penalty also fell with the demand, notwithstanding the finding that the concessional notification condition was not satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand founded on alleged misinterpretation of an exemption notification cannot be sustained under the extended limitation period in the absence of wilful misstatement or suppression of material facts, especially where the primary transaction details were disclosed at assessment.

Issues: Whether the proposed import of WD989/RLB989 tyres, marketed as WORRIOR/DOUBLECOIN tyres, is classifiable under Heading 4011 80 00 as tyres of a kind used on construction, mining or industrial handling vehicles and machines, or under Heading 4011 20 10 as new pneumatic tyres of a kind used on buses or lorries.

Analysis: Classification under the Customs Tariff is to be determined by the terms of the headings and the relevant Chapter or Section Notes, applying the General Rules for Interpretation. The nature, design, construction and technical characteristics of the goods are material, while claimed end-use by itself is not decisive. The product literature and manufacturer categorisation showed that RLB 989 and WD 989 are treated as TBR tyres, not OTR tyres. The tyres were found to share the essential attributes of truck tyres, including their commercial classification, design features and speed symbols, and the material also showed that tyres marketed for mining or construction use on trucks do not become OTR tyres unless specifically engineered for construction or mining machinery. The claimed OTR classification was therefore inconsistent with the manufacturer's own product description and the trade identification of the goods.

Conclusion: The tyres are classifiable under Heading 4011 20 10 and not under Heading 4011 80 00.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the civil appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the appeal should be allowed on merits challenging the decisions of the Appellate Authority and the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Regional Bench, Mumbai.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 278 days in filing the civil appeal ought to be condoned.

Analysis: The Court examined the record and submissions and considered the reasons for delay alongside the view taken by the Appellate Authority and CESTAT. The Court found no sufficient ground to take a different view from the authorities below and thus did not find reasons to condone the delay.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal is maintainable on merits against the concurrent conclusions of the Appellate Authority and CESTAT.

Analysis: Upon perusal of the materials on record and submissions, the Court found no reason to disagree with the conclusions reached by the Appellate Authority and CESTAT. The Court examined the merits and adopted the same view as the authorities below.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed both on the ground of delay and on merits, leaving intact the decisions of the Appellate Authority and CESTAT in favour of the respondent.

Outcome: Delay condonation application and Special Leave Petition dismissed.

Issues: Whether the disallowance by the Assessing Officer and the confirmation by the Commissioner (Appeals) of deduction claimed under Section 80IAC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of delayed uploading of Form 10CCB (supporting audit report) is sustainable where the form was uploaded before completion of processing under Section 143(1) of the Act.

Analysis: The appeals concern claim of deduction under Section 80IAC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 supported by Tax Audit Report filed under Section 44AB of the Act and Form 10CCB. The return declared the deduction and the specified audit form (Form 10CCB) was uploaded after filing but prior to completion of processing under Section 143(1). The Tribunal examined whether delayed uploading of the supporting Form 10CCB constitutes a substantive bar to the deduction or is a procedural/technical lapse that can be remedied by filing before completion of the assessment/processing. The Tribunal considered governing statutory framework requiring support for the deduction, the timing of filing/uploading of Form 10CCB vis-a -vis processing under Section 143(1), and binding precedents which hold that where the required form/document is filed before completion of assessment/processing, the claim of deduction should be allowed notwithstanding earlier non-filing at the time of return submission. The Tribunal found no prejudice to revenue from the belated filing and treated the omission as a procedural lapse remediable by filing prior to completion of assessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The confirmation of disallowance of the deduction under Section 80IAC by the First Appellate Authority is set aside and the appeals are allowed; the deduction claimed is accepted as valid where Form 10CCB was uploaded before completion of processing under Section 143(1), favouring the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer can make estimated additions by estimating gross profit/income without first rejecting the books of account under Section 145(3) and proceeding under Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 145(3) which empowers the Assessing Officer, if not satisfied about correctness or completeness of accounts, to make assessment in the manner provided in Section 144. The Court reviewed the factual position that the AO did not record any rejection of the books of account yet made an estimated addition by applying a gross profit rate to unrecorded sales. The Court relied on settled precedents establishing that rejection of books of account is a prerequisite before invoking best judgment/estimation under Section 144; absent such rejection the books must be accepted for computation and selective estimation over entries recorded in books is impermissible. Applying this legal framework to the present facts, the Court found the AO did not follow the statutory precondition in Section 145(3) and therefore the estimation made without rejecting books was not legally sustainable.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed and the estimated addition made by the Assessing Officer without rejecting the books of account under Section 145(3) read with Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and whether delay beyond the statutory condonable period could be excused; (ii) Whether royalty paid for mining rights was liable to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism and whether the appellant was entitled to threshold exemption.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and whether delay beyond the statutory condonable period could be excused.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 permits filing of the appeal within two months and confers power to condone delay only up to one further month. The record showed that the appeal was filed long after expiry of the prescribed period and the explanation offered for the delay was unsupported by material evidence. The alleged absence of knowledge of the order was not accepted, and the service of the adjudication order was treated as the relevant point for limitation. The first appellate authority had also recorded that personal hearing had been granted. In view of the limited statutory power to condone delay, the appellate authority could not entertain the appeal beyond the permissible period.

Conclusion: The appeal was time-barred and the refusal to condone delay was upheld against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether royalty paid for mining rights was liable to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism and whether the appellant was entitled to threshold exemption.

Analysis: Royalty paid to the Government for assignment of rights to use natural resources was treated as consideration for a taxable service under the then applicable service tax notifications and circular. The service recipient was held liable under reverse charge mechanism by virtue of the relevant notifications governing services provided by Government or a local authority. The plea for threshold exemption was rejected because the appellant failed to produce adequate documentary material establishing entitlement to the exemption.

Conclusion: The service tax demand and the consequential tax liability were sustained against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed both on limitation and on merits, and the adjudication confirming service tax, interest and penalties was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special fiscal statute prescribes a fixed appeal period with a limited condonable extension, the appellate authority cannot enlarge that period on equitable grounds, and royalty paid for mining rights may be taxed as consideration for a Government-provided service when the governing notifications so provide.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority applied independent mind and properly considered the appellant's explanations and documents in the appeal under Section 107 read with Section 73 of the WBGST Act, 2017 / CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The appellate order reproduces the adjudicating authority's findings and records that "no further explanation and supporting documents have been furnished" but does not address or assess the explanations contained in the grounds of appeal nor the documents already on record. Such omission shows non-application of mind because the appellate authority failed to examine the explanations, weigh their merit, or record reasons for rejecting them. Where explanations and documentary material are before the appellate authority, a reasoned assessment of those explanations and documents is required; absence of such assessment renders the appellate order susceptible to judicial review.

Conclusion: The appellate order dated June 17, 2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for fresh consideration on merits in the light of the documents on record and the petitioner's contentions. The conclusion is in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate authority must apply independent mind and record reasoned conclusions after assessing the explanations and documentary evidence on record; failure to do so warrants setting aside the appellate order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order dated 14.12.2023, passed under the WBGST Act, 2017/CGST Act, 2017, is vitiated for want of opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 75(4) and principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The impugned order was alleged to have been passed without affording the petitioners any personal hearing. The material before the Court shows no physical notice was served and the only asserted mode of notice was an online ACES-GST application which has been withdrawn since June 2025, leaving no record, screenshot, or proof of service. Section 75(4) of the said Act of 2017 mandates grant of opportunity of hearing before adverse orders are passed; this statutory requirement gives effect to the audi alteram partem principle. In the absence of satisfactory proof that the petitioners were afforded such an opportunity, the adjudication cannot be sustained on grounds of compliance with Section 75(4) or the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order dated 14.12.2023 is set aside for failure to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 75(4) and the principles of natural justice; the matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for fresh adjudication with liberty to the petitioners to file replies within two weeks and with a mandatory opportunity of hearing if any adverse order is contemplated.

Outcome: Delay was condoned and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The respondent's challenge to the fresh notice was left to be considered by the High Court in accordance with law.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits.