Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner, having demonstrated a semblance of acting on behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, should be permitted to approach the proper officer with supporting documents and be granted a post-decisional hearing against the order dated 21 January 2025; (ii) Whether the impugned order dated 21 January 2025 and garnishee proceedings based thereon should be kept in abeyance/stayed pending the adjudicating authority's reconsideration.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be allowed to file a representation with the proper officer with supporting documents and be granted a post-decisional hearing.

Analysis: The petitioner produced a letter dated 7 March 2019 and a possession certificate in court which, while not part of the adjudicating record, indicate a prima facie case that the petitioner may have collected parking charges on behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. The adjudicating order criticized the absence of an agreement on record. Given the petitioner's assertion and the existence of documents not previously placed before the adjudicating authority, procedural fairness requires an opportunity to present such documents and obtain a hearing before final adverse consequence is enforced.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted liberty to approach the proper officer within two weeks with all supporting documents and is entitled to a post-decisional hearing; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned adjudicating order and garnishee proceedings should be kept in abeyance or stayed pending reconsideration.

Analysis: To preserve the petitioner's rights while the proper officer reconsiders the claim on the basis of fresh documents and submissions, the adjudicating order is directed to remain in abeyance for a limited period and garnishee proceedings are stayed. The adjudicating authority retains the discretion to affirm its earlier conclusion if the documents and submissions are found unacceptable in law or fact; conversely, if the authority finds no liability, it must refrain from enforcing the impugned order. Time limits for filing representation and for the authority to decide are prescribed.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 21 January 2025 shall remain in abeyance for four weeks and garnishee proceedings shall remain stayed for eight weeks; this conclusion is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicating authority must reconsider the petitioner's claim on the basis of documents to be filed within the specified period and grant a post-decisional hearing; enforcement measures are temporarily suspended to enable such reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer demonstrates a prima facie case and possesses documents not placed before the adjudicating authority, fairness requires permitting a representation with supporting documents and granting a post-decisional hearing, and temporarily staying enforcement pending timely reconsideration by the proper officer.

Issues: Whether the erstwhile resolution professional was entitled to calculate liquidator fee in the first or second bucket, and whether the amount already withdrawn in excess of the fee admissible under the liquidation regulations had to be refunded.

Analysis: The relevant fee under Regulation 4(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 depends on the period within which realisation of assets takes place. The exclusion claimed for the additional period relating to the resumption of auctions on medical grounds was not accepted, as the record showed that the effective realisation occurred after more than one year. The fee computation made on the third-bucket basis was therefore upheld, and the earlier withdrawal by the appellant was found to exceed the amount legally payable, with liability to refund the excess along with GST.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to higher fee computation on the basis claimed, and the direction to refund the excess amount was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the determination of liquidator fee on the third-bucket basis was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the liquidation fee framework, the applicable fee bucket is determined by the actual period of realisation, and a claimed exclusion of time will not be accepted unless it is properly established and justified on record.

Issues: Whether the assessing authority adjusted refunds in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Office Memorandum and whether the petitioner is entitled to refund of amounts adjusted beyond 20% of the disputed demand and restraint on recovery pending disposal of appeals.

Analysis: The Court examined the assessing authority's communications calling for deposit of 20% of the disputed demand and the Office Memorandum F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC dated 29.02.2016 as amended by Office Memorandum F. No. 404/72/93-ITCC dated 31.07.2017 which prescribes payment/adjustment up to 20% of disputed demand as condition for stay where appeals are pending. The Court compared the quantified demands, the 20% threshold for each assessment year, and the refunds adjusted by the revenue, finding that the adjustments made exceeded the 20% limit shown in the petition's table for the assessment years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20. The Court held that where applications for stay are pending and refunds are adjusted, the mandate of the Office Memorandum permits adjustment only up to the prescribed 20% in cases under paragraph 4(A), and therefore adjustments beyond that ceiling cannot stand.

Conclusion: The petition is allowed; respondent No.1 is directed to refund amounts adjusted in excess of 20% of the disputed demand for assessment years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, and respondents are restrained from recovering any portion of the demands for those years pending finalisation of the appeals.

Issues: Whether the Competent Authority erred in issuing a tax withholding certificate at the rate of 10% under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2026-27 and whether a certificate at a lower rate should be issued.

Analysis: The Court examined the impugned order and found that the Competent Authority failed to record any sustainable or prima-facie reasons concerning the nature of the petitioner's transactions or to deal with the petitioner's contentions and judgments relied upon. The Court noted competing contentions: the petitioner asserted that the transactions do not attract royalty or fees for technical services under the India-Ireland tax treaty and relied on precedent, while the Revenue emphasised that the nature of transactions was not yet examined and that withholding certificates are not final and refunds may follow on assessment. Balancing the Revenue's interest in safeguarding potential tax liabilities and the petitioner's hardship from substantial tax deduction where transactions prima facie appear non-taxable, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to grant interim relief by directing issuance of a lower rate withholding certificate for the specified assessment year, while preserving the Revenue's right to examine and assess the transactions in due course.

Conclusion: The petition is partly allowed; the respondent is directed to issue a tax withholding certificate requiring deduction of tax at 2% for Assessment Year 2026-27 (financial year 2025-26) within 10 days; the direction applies only to the certificate issued pursuant to the petitioner's application for AY 2026-27 and the Competent Authority shall consider subsequent years in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the immovable properties and proceeds realised from sale of part of the lands are benami properties within the meaning of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; (ii) Whether the Amending Act, 2016 applies where the transfer pre-dates the amendment but the property is held by the alleged benamidar subsequent to the amendment; (iii) Whether the appellants fall within the fiduciary exception under sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the immovable properties and proceeds realised from sale of part of the lands are benami properties under the PBPT Act, 1988.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined admissions of lack of financial capacity by the ostensible holder, custody and non-possession of original title deeds by the ostensible holder, the conduct of the alleged beneficial owner in executing agreements to sell and receiving sale proceeds, bank records showing absence of consideration paid by the ostensible holder, and the treatment of sale proceeds derived from benami land as derived from the benami property. The Tribunal also considered the statutory definition of "benami property" under section 2(8) and the elements in section 2(9) requiring that the property be transferred to or held by a person while consideration is provided by another and that the property be held for the immediate or future benefit of the person providing consideration.

Conclusion: The immovable properties and the sale proceeds realised from a portion of the said lands are benami properties; this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Amending Act, 2016 is applicable when transfer occurred prior to amendment but the property is held by the alleged benamidar after the amendment.

Analysis: The Tribunal relied on the amended definition and prior Tribunal reasoning that the definition of benami transaction covers both transfer and holding; where a property is held by the ostensible holder subsequent to the Amending Act 2016, the amended provisions apply provided other conditions of the definition are satisfied. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court's earlier decision relied upon by the appellants has been recalled and that jurisprudence and statutory text support applying the Amending Act to property held post-amendment.

Conclusion: The Amending Act, 2016 applies where the property, though transferred earlier, is held by the alleged benamidar subsequent to the amendment; this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants are protected by the fiduciary exception in sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act, 1988.

Analysis: The Tribunal interpreted sub-clause (ii) as inclusive but held that a fiduciary relationship requires exclusive trust and absence of personal benefit by the fiduciary. The factual matrix showed that the alleged fiduciary exercised dominion and control, retained title deeds, orchestrated transfers, and personally received sale proceeds, indicating an adverse financial interest inconsistent with fiduciary obligations and not within the recognized or notified categories under the clause.

Conclusion: The appellants do not fall within the fiduciary exception under sub-clause (ii) of section 2(9)(A); this conclusion is against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal finds the impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority confirming the provisional attachment and holding the properties to be benami correct on the facts and law, and there is no merit in the appellants' grounds; the appeals are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a property transferred prior to the Amending Act, 2016 is nonetheless held by the alleged ostensible holder after the amendment, the amended definition of benami transaction applies; further, proceeds derived from sale of benami property are themselves benami property, and a claimed fiduciary relationship is negated where the purported fiduciary derives personal benefit and exercises dominion and control inconsistent with exclusive trust.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be relegated to the alternate remedy despite a jurisdictional challenge to the reassessment notice, and whether interim protection should be granted pending final disposal.

Analysis: The challenge raised two jurisdictional objections to the notice under section 148: first, that the notice was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer when, according to the petitioner, only the Faceless Assessing Officer could issue it; and second, that the notice granted only 30 days to file the return though the amended provision was said to require a minimum period of three months. In such circumstances, the existence of an appellate remedy was not treated as a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court found that arguable jurisdictional questions were raised and that the writ petition was therefore fit to be entertained.

Conclusion: The Court declined to relegate the petitioner to the alternate remedy and granted interim protection against the reassessment order, demand notice, and penalty show-cause notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition raising arguable jurisdictional defects in reassessment proceedings may be entertained notwithstanding the availability of an alternate statutory remedy.

Issues: Whether the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 30.07.2022 and the consequential assessment and related orders are time-barred under the limitation calculus (surviving period) as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal, having regard to the 30-day window granted in Ashish Agarwal for providing reasons/material.

Analysis: The controlling authorities establish a two-step timeline: (i) Ashish Agarwal granted a one-time 30-day period from 04.05.2022 for the Revenue to furnish information/material, and (ii) Rajeev Bansal prescribes computation of the surviving period by adding the period allowed to the Department and the period allowed to the assessee to reply (four weeks plus two weeks). Any notice issued by the Department beyond the one-time 30-day window under Ashish Agarwal cannot be used to extend or reset the surviving period. A fresh notice dated 26.07.2022 issued after the Ashish Agarwal window cannot lawfully extend limitation; reliance on the fourth proviso to Section 148A to claim an additional seven days is inconsistent with the Rajeev Bansal mechanism which defines the surviving period without such further extension.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 dated 30.07.2022 and the consequential orders, including the assessment order dated 29.01.2026, are time-barred and are quashed. The writ petition is allowed insofar as it seeks quashing of the said notice, the order under Section 148A(d), the second notice dated 26.07.2022, the order disposing objections dated 13.01.2026, the assessment order dated 29.01.2026 and consequential demand and penalty notices.

Issues: Whether the assessment order dated 9th June 2021 and the notice of demand dated 9th June 2021 could be sustained where, despite a draft assessment order having been made, no notice was served on the assessee to show cause as required by Section 144B(1)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 144B(1) provides the faceless assessment procedure and, in particular, requires the assessment unit to prepare a draft assessment order (Section 144B(1)(xiv)) and the National Faceless Assessment Centre to examine that draft and, if any variation prejudicial to the assessee is proposed, to provide an opportunity to the assessee by serving a notice calling upon the assessee to show cause (Section 144B(1)(xvi)). The statutory scheme mandates that only after serving such notice and considering any response can a final assessment be passed. In the present matter the Revenue accepts that although a draft assessment order was prepared, no show-cause notice was communicated to the assessee and no opportunity to reply was afforded prior to passing the final assessment and issuing the demand notice. This absence of the mandated procedural step constitutes a breach of the specific statutory procedure set out in Section 144B(1)(xvi).

Conclusion: The assessment order dated 9th June 2021 and the notice of demand dated 9th June 2021 are quashed and set aside for failure to comply with the mandatory show-cause requirement under Section 144B(1)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The writ petition is allowed in these terms.

Issues: (i) Whether addition of Rs. 12,25,00,000/- under section 68 in respect of share capital subscribed by a foreign investor could be sustained; (ii) Whether disallowance of Rs. 4,30,91,544/- under section 40A(2)(b) in respect of payments to a related party could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the addition under section 68 in respect of share subscription by a foreign holding/investment company is sustainable.

Analysis: The material shows subscription through banking channels supported by FIRC and regulatory filings, and audited financial statements of the investor disclosing the investment as an asset. For an investment/holding company, balance sheet and cash flow disclosures are more probative of capacity than operating profit. The revenue/assessing authorities did not produce affirmative material disproving identity, genuineness or source after production of audited accounts and reconciliatory documents; alleged non-authentication of certain annexures and the investor's negligible operating income were relied upon without correlating to the audited disclosures and regulatory reporting.

Conclusion: Addition under section 68 of Rs. 12,25,00,000/- is deleted and the explanation furnished by the assessee is accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) for payments to a related party is sustainable.

Analysis: The apparent discrepancy arose from comparing Form 26AS receipts of the service provider with only revenue expenses in the assessee's profit and loss account without accounting for capitalised invoices. The assessee produced audited related-party schedules and a detailed reconciliation demonstrating capitalisation of significant invoices and adjustments for provisions and taxes, reducing the residual difference to a nominal amount. Section 40A(2)(b) requires formation of an opinion based on objective material such as fair market value benchmarking or demonstrable excess; a mere unexplained mismatch, once reconciled by documentary disclosures, does not justify disallowance.

Conclusion: Disallowance of Rs. 4,30,91,544/- under section 40A(2)(b) is deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed in respect of both issues, resulting in deletion of the addition under section 68 and deletion of the disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) as recorded above.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee explains a cash credit by establishing identity, genuineness and source through audited balance sheet and cash flow disclosures and regulated banking/regulatory evidence, the addition under section 68 cannot be sustained in absence of affirmative rebutting material; similarly, disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) requires objective material demonstrating excess after accounting for capitalisation and reconciliatory adjustments, and cannot rest on an unreconciled mismatch.

Outcome: The advance ruling application was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly.

Issues: Whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that is left unsigned and blank is violative of Section 282A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and, if so, whether such unsigned notice invalidates the reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The statutory text of Section 282A(1) requires that a notice or other document issued by an income-tax authority shall be signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form in accordance with prescribed procedure. Section 282A(2) contains a deeming provision for authentication where the name and office of a designated authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon, but does not relieve compliance with the mandatory signing requirement of Clause (1). Authorities holding that an unsigned notice cannot be treated as a mere clerical irregularity and that defects in signature are not curable for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction to proceed with reassessment have been applied. Where a notice under Section 148 is unsigned and blank in the signature/seal fields, the issuing authority lacks the valid authenticated instrument required by Section 282A(1), and consequently no valid jurisdiction to complete reassessment under Sections 147/143(3) can be exercised.

Conclusion: The unsigned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is violative of Section 282A(1) and is held invalid, arbitrary and void ab initio; the reassessment proceedings under Sections 147/143(3) therefore lack jurisdiction and are quashed. The decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment orders passed without considering cancellation of registered sale deeds and reversal of payments are sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment proceeded without verification of documents showing cancellation of registered sale deeds and reversal of transaction consideration which were produced before the Court for the first time. Relevant legal framework includes reassessment procedure under Section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and judicial precedent addressing when transactions are found to be terminable or cancelled and whether income truly accrued. The cited precedent holds that if transactions are cancelled and accounting reflects the reversal, income may not have truly accrued and reassessment based on hypothetical accrual is impermissible. The respondent admitted non-possession of those documents during the 148A proceedings and sought remand for verification.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders are quashed and set aside; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment or reassessment cannot be sustained where the assessing authority failed to consider documentary evidence showing cancellation of transactions and reversal of consideration such that income did not truly accrue.

Issues: (i) Whether the Transfer Pricing Officer's and Assessing Officer's upward adjustments disallowing the royalty payments (determining ALP at NIL) were legally sustainable, and whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the adjustment; (ii) Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was correct in allowing deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of participation in the Andhra Pradesh Micro Irrigation Project.

Issue (i): Whether the addition on account of royalty payments determined at NIL by the TPO/AO was sustainable in law and whether aggregation under TNMM and deletion by CIT(A) was correct.

Analysis: The dispute concerns benchmarking of royalty paid to an associated enterprise. Statutory methods under section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 require the TPO to apply a prescribed transfer pricing method to determine ALP. The appellate authority examined the TPO's order and found no application of any prescribed methodology, noted that the assessee had maintained transfer pricing documentation and applied CUP/TNMM approaches, and relied on coordinate Bench decisions of the Tribunal and higher court judgments which treated the royalty as within the scope of aggregated benchmarking with manufacturing transactions or otherwise supported the assessee's benchmarking. The appellate authority also relied on the proviso to section 92C(2) concerning permissible variation and compared operating margins of the assessee with comparables. The Tribunal, following preceding coordinate Bench decisions and absence of any contrary higher forum reversal, applied those precedents and found the TPO/AO's ALP determination at NIL to be ad hoc and unsustainable.

Conclusion: The determination of ALP of royalty at NIL by the TPO/AO is not sustainable; the deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is upheld. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was rightly allowed deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for amounts relating to APMIP despite a typographical name discrepancy in the agreement.

Analysis: The appellate authority examined documentary evidence including the executed agreement, work orders, invoices, payment advices, performance certificates, Form 10CCB and TDS records. The sole basis of AO's disallowance was a name discrepancy on the agreement's first page, alleged to indicate contracting on behalf of the holding company and characterization as a works contract. The appellate analysis applied the legal test of dominant intention for classification of contracts and found that the assessee independently executed supply, installation and commissioning obligations and accounted income and expenditure in its books. No contrary material was placed on record by Revenue.

Conclusion: The deduction claimed under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is correctly allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue - relating to disallowance of royalty payments (transfer pricing adjustment) and denial of deduction under section 80IA(4) - are without merit; the Tribunal dismisses the Revenue's appeals and upholds the CIT(A)'s deletions and allowance, following applicable transfer pricing methodology requirements and relevant coordinate Bench and higher court precedents.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a Transfer Pricing Officer determines arm's length price, he must apply one of the prescribed methods under section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; an ad hoc determination without applying statutory methods or rejecting the taxpayer's documented benchmarking is legally unsustainable, and documented evidence establishing the assessee as the contracting party satisfies eligibility for deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor and whether its claim is a secured financial debt; (iii) Whether the covenant to pay in the Mortgage Deed creates an enforceable guarantee and whether the Mortgage Deed is an English mortgage.

Issue (i): Whether direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The statutory definition of financial debt requires disbursement against consideration for the time value of money, but it does not expressly stipulate that disbursement must be made directly to the Corporate Debtor. A transaction may still answer the description of financial debt where funds are disbursed for the benefit of the Corporate Debtor or the transaction otherwise has the commercial effect of borrowing. The existence of direct disbursement is relevant, but not indispensable in every case.

Conclusion: Direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor is not a sine qua non for financial debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor and whether its claim is a secured financial debt.

Analysis: The Mortgage Deed contained an express covenant to pay and also provided for recovery of any deficiency from the Mortgagor. The Corporate Debtor had undertaken liability under the security documents, and the arrangement was treated as having the commercial effect of borrowing. On that basis, the debt was held to fall within the scope of financial debt, and the Appellant was held to be more than a mere other secured creditor. The claim was therefore considered to be a secured financial debt.

Conclusion: The Appellant qualifies as a Financial Creditor in respect of the mortgage-based claim and its claim is a secured financial debt.

Issue (iii): Whether the covenant to pay in the Mortgage Deed creates an enforceable guarantee and whether the Mortgage Deed is an English mortgage.

Analysis: The covenant to pay, read with the deficiency liability and the enforcement structure in the deed, was treated as creating a liability akin to a contract of guarantee. The deed also expressly stated that the mortgage would be by way of a legal mortgage in English form, satisfying the essential attributes of an English mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The covenant to pay operates as an enforceable undertaking and the Mortgage Deed qualifies as an English mortgage.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A mortgage document that contains an express covenant to pay and deficiency liability may constitute financial debt and support classification as a secured financial creditor, even where the disbursement was not made directly to the Corporate Debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether disbursement of debt to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Code; (ii) Whether the Appellant qualifies as a financial creditor under Section 5(7) read with Section 5(8) of the Code and whether its claim was a secured financial debt; (iii) Whether the covenant to pay in the mortgage deeds created an enforceable guarantee or merely secured the mortgage; (iv) Whether the covenant to pay undertaken by the Corporate Debtor in respect of debt disbursed to a third party amounted to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (v) Whether the liability of the Corporate Debtor under the covenant to pay was limited only to the extent of the mortgage provided by it.

Issue (i): Whether disbursement of debt to the Corporate Debtor is a prerequisite for classification of a debt as financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Code.

Analysis: Financial debt under the Code requires disbursement against consideration for the time value of money, but the text of Section 5(8) does not insist that the disbursement must be made directly to the corporate debtor. The nature of the transaction, the existence of a liability, and the commercial effect of borrowing remain material. A payment routed to a third party can still satisfy the requirement where it is made for the benefit of the corporate debtor and forms part of the relevant financial arrangement.

Conclusion: Direct disbursement to the Corporate Debtor was held not to be a sine qua non for financial debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellant qualifies as a financial creditor under Section 5(7) read with Section 5(8) of the Code and whether its claim was a secured financial debt.

Analysis: The Debenture Trust Deed, the supplemental mortgage deeds, and the associated security documents were read together as one composite transaction. The Corporate Debtor, though not the original borrower, executed the mortgage deeds and undertook obligations in relation to the secured obligations arising from the debentures. The Court treated the covenant to pay and the joint and several liability of the security providers as bringing the Appellant within the definition of a financial creditor, and not merely an other secured creditor.

Conclusion: The Appellant was held to be a financial creditor and its claim was held to be a secured financial debt.

Issue (iii): Whether the covenant to pay in the mortgage deeds created an enforceable guarantee or merely secured the mortgage.

Analysis: The covenant to pay was not read as a bare security clause confined to the mortgaged property. The Court read Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the mortgage deeds jointly and held that the Corporate Debtor undertook to discharge the secured obligations and not merely to permit enforcement against the mortgaged assets. The covenant was treated as creating personal liability and an enforceable assurance akin to a guarantee.

Conclusion: The covenant to pay was held to create an enforceable guarantee and not merely a security interest over the mortgaged property.

Issue (iv): Whether the covenant to pay undertaken by the Corporate Debtor in respect of debt disbursed to a third party amounted to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Applying the ingredients of Section 126, the Court found an existing debt, a creditor, a principal debtor, and a surety-like undertaking by the Corporate Debtor to discharge the liability in case of default. The composite documentation showed that the Corporate Debtor stepped into the shoes of the obligors for the secured obligations and that the arrangement was functionally equivalent to a guarantee.

Conclusion: The covenant was held to amount to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Issue (v): Whether the liability of the Corporate Debtor under the covenant to pay was limited only to the extent of the mortgage provided by it.

Analysis: The Court rejected the contention that liability was confined to the value or enforcement of the mortgaged assets. The covenant to pay, read with the deed as a whole, imposed an obligation to ensure discharge of the secured obligations and not merely a property-linked liability. Clause 2.2 was held not to whittle down the broader undertaking contained in Clause 2.1.

Conclusion: The liability of the Corporate Debtor was held not to be limited only to the mortgaged property.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to succeed on merits, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor executes mortgage or security documents containing an express covenant to pay the secured obligations, the arrangement may constitute a contract of guarantee and financial debt under the Code even if the disbursement was made to a third party rather than directly to the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether the period from 12.06.2024 to 21.11.2025 should be excluded from the CIRP timelines by allowing IA No.410 of 2026 challenging the Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the exclusion application.

Analysis: The dispute concerns an insolvency proceeding of a real estate corporate debtor with multiple projects where project-wise segregation affected the ability to proceed with the CIRP and to issue Form G. The Resolution Professional relied on CoC resolutions and events relating to negotiation and settlement for the CHD Vann project, and on the fact that the project was segregated by order dated 21.11.2025. The Adjudicating Authority rejected exclusion because hearings had occurred and orders were pronounced on 21.11.2025; however, the record shows substantive impediments arising from ongoing project-specific negotiations and the need to await segregation and related instructions before issuing Form G. The appellate court found these facts sufficient to constitute causes beyond the control of the Resolution Professional that prevented timely progress of the CIRP and justified exclusion of the specified period.

Conclusion: IA No.410 of 2026 is allowed and the period from 12.06.2024 to 21.11.2025 is excluded from the CIRP timelines, setting aside the Adjudicating Authority's order dated 20.02.2026; appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether a pre-existing dispute regarding the existence and veracity of the claimed debt was raised by the corporate debtor prior to the issue of the demand notice so as to render the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 inadmissible.

Analysis: The petition under Section 9 was founded on four invoices and related correspondence. The corporate debtor, prior to receipt of the demand notice, communicated detailed objections disputing the existence of the claimed debt and sought substantiation of the alleged services, identities of customers, proof of delivery and related particulars. The invoices lacked particulars such as customer identities, specifications or delivery proof and no contemporaneous contract was placed on record. The legal standard from Mobilox Innovation Pvt. Ltd. requires only a plausible contention requiring investigation and not satisfaction of merits; subsequent Supreme Court decisions reinforce that a non-spurious pre-existing dispute raised before the demand notice bars admission of a Section 9 petition. Applying that standard to the materials on record yields a genuine dispute that is neither illusory nor patently feeble.

Conclusion: The existence of a pre-existing dispute prior to the demand notice renders the Section 9 application inadmissible and the appeal challenging the NCLT order rejecting the Section 9 petition is dismissed in favour of the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor raises a genuine dispute about the existence or veracity of the claimed debt prior to issuance of the demand notice, and the dispute is not patently feeble or spurious, the adjudicating authority must reject an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Department could adjust/set-off an outstanding demand for assessment year 2011-12 against tax deducted at source deposited from auction proceeds (claimed as refund by the liquidator) without having filed a claim in the liquidation proceedings.

Analysis: Regulation 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 permits mutual credits and set-off where mutual dealings exist and claims are adjudicated in the liquidation process. Sections 36 and 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 treat refunds as part of the liquidation estate and prescribe realisation and distribution in accordance with the Code. Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 gives the Code overriding effect over inconsistent provisions of other laws, subject to the limited exception under Section 178(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the present case the Income Tax Department had not filed any claim in the liquidation proceedings; the amount was deposited by the successful auction purchaser as TDS and the liquidator filed an income-tax return claiming refund. Absent a claim filed by the Department and adjudication in the liquidation process, adjustment of the refund against an earlier demand was not permissible under the Code and Regulations; the proper course for the Department to seek set-off was to present a claim in the liquidation process and seek relief under the insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority correctly directed refund of the TDS amount to the liquidator; adjustment by the Income Tax Department against the outstanding demand for A.Y. 2011-12 without filing a claim in the liquidation proceedings was not permissible. The appeal is dismissed and the order allowing the liquidator's application is upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether the defaults arising from invoice-based supply transactions fell within the suspension period under section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether the issuance and subsequent dishonour of cheques shifted the date of default and established a running account so as to take the case outside the pre-25.03.2020 default period.

Issue (i): Whether the defaults arising from invoice-based supply transactions fell within the suspension period under section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The operational debt arose from invoices issued between 20.04.2019 and 19.09.2019, each carrying a stipulation that payment would become due within 30 days. On that basis, the liability became due and payable on or before 19.10.2019. Section 10A bars initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process only for defaults arising on or after 25.03.2020. Since the defaults in question had already occurred before that date, the suspension under section 10A was held inapplicable. The existence of debt was also not disputed.

Conclusion: The defaults did not fall within the section 10A suspension period and the objection based on section 10A failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the issuance and subsequent dishonour of cheques shifted the date of default and established a running account so as to take the case outside the pre-25.03.2020 default period.

Analysis: The dishonour of cheques issued towards outstanding liability did not alter the original due dates of the invoices. The liability had already matured before 25.03.2020, and the dishonour did not defer the date of default. No material was shown to establish a settlement between the parties, and the asserted running account did not change the fact that the invoice amounts had become due within the earlier period. The application under section 9 was therefore founded on the pre-25.03.2020 default and not on the cheque dishonour as an independent trigger.

Conclusion: The cheque dishonour did not shift the date of default and the running account contention was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to be without merit because the insolvency application was based on defaults that had occurred before the statutory suspension period, leaving the admission of the section 9 proceeding undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of section 10A, the relevant date is the date when the operational debt first became due and payable; subsequent dishonour of cheques issued towards the same liability does not postpone that date or bring an earlier default within the suspension window.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge a show cause notice issued under Section 74 and Section 74A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The petition challenges the validity of a show cause notice issued under Sections 74 and 74A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court examined the pleadings and noted that the petitioner himself pleaded that he was the supplier. The Court relied on the established principle that writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not available to decide the merits of revenue demands raised by way of a show cause notice, as reflected in binding precedents. The Court observed that the other grounds raised by the petitioner could not be adjudicated in a writ petition which is directed only against the show cause notice. The petitioner was, however, permitted procedural relief to file a reply to the notice and have his contentions considered by the competent authority without prejudice.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the show cause notice is dismissed; liberty granted to the petitioner to file a reply within 15 days, and the competent authority to consider the reply without being influenced by the Court's observations or the respondent's reply. In favour of Respondent.