Issues: (i) Whether the clean slate theory under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 extinguishes statutory tax dues that arise during the currency of the corporate insolvency resolution process and are not included in the resolution plan; (ii) Whether the insolvency forum can be treated as the forum to adjudicate or override assessment and recovery disputes arising under income tax and GST enactments during the insolvency period.

Issue (i): Whether the clean slate theory under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 extinguishes statutory tax dues that arise during the currency of the corporate insolvency resolution process and are not included in the resolution plan.

Analysis: The binding effect of an approved resolution plan under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was held to protect the successful resolution applicant from surprise claims relating to the pre-CIRP period. The line of authorities on clean slate theory was treated as having dealt with pre-CIRP liabilities, not with liabilities arising after commencement of CIRP. The Court held that tax dues arising during CIRP are not shown to be claims capable of being extinguished by the approved plan, and that the statutory scheme contemplates continued compliance with law during CIRP, including the responsibility of the resolution professional to ensure observance of fiscal laws. The Court also held that extending clean slate to current-period tax dues would create inconsistency with the statutory scheme and with the constitutional character of taxing powers.

Conclusion: The clean slate theory does not wipe out tax dues that arise during CIRP and are not dealt with in the resolution plan; such dues remain exigible.

Issue (ii): Whether the insolvency forum can be treated as the forum to adjudicate or override assessment and recovery disputes arising under income tax and GST enactments during the insolvency period.

Analysis: The residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was held not to extend to ordinary public law assessment disputes under income tax or GST, since those matters are within the domain of the statutory tax authorities and their appellate fora. The Court held that NCLT and NCLAT cannot be converted into forums for judicial review of tax assessments, and that parallel adjudication would create administrative chaos and conflicting orders. The Court also held that any restriction on the sovereign power to levy and collect tax must be express, and cannot be inferred merely from the object of insolvency law.

Conclusion: Insolvency forums cannot adjudicate tax assessment disputes as a substitute for the statutory tax hierarchy, and tax liabilities arising during CIRP must be examined under the relevant tax law framework.

Final Conclusion: The batch was disposed of by remitting several matters for fresh consideration and by directing the authorities to examine the resolution plan, the CIRP-cost issue, and the effect of insolvency proceedings on the impugned tax actions, while holding that clean slate does not automatically extinguish tax liabilities arising during CIRP.

Ratio Decidendi: Clean slate under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 extinguishes only pre-CIRP claims that are not part of an approved resolution plan, and it does not by itself nullify statutory tax liabilities that arise during CIRP or confer on insolvency forums jurisdiction to finally determine tax assessments.

Issues: Whether the retention and continuation of freezing of the appellant's bank accounts was valid under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, including the contention that the freezing could not subsist beyond 180 days.

Analysis: Section 20 provides that where property is seized or frozen and the authorised officer forms the requisite belief, the property may be retained or continue to remain frozen for a period not exceeding 180 days, and the property may remain frozen beyond that period if the Adjudicating Authority permits retention or continuation of freezing. The material showed that the retention order was passed within the statutory period, so the freezing did not lapse merely with the passage of 180 days. The record also disclosed the appellant's involvement in the alleged laundering activity, including his recorded statement, role in inspections and RMA proposals, and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the source of the bank balances. That material was sufficient to support the conclusion that the accounts were prima facie involved in money-laundering and were liable to be retained.

Conclusion: The challenge to the retention of the frozen bank accounts failed, and the appeal was not maintainable on merits.

Issues: Whether induction of an additional member into an existing resolution-applicant consortium after inclusion in the final list of prospective resolution applicants violates the CIRP Regulations and vitiates consideration of the resolution plan.

Analysis: Regulation 39(1B) bars consideration of a resolution plan received from a person not in the final list of prospective resolution applicants. The expression "person" in Section 3(23) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not include a consortium as such, and the Code does not create a separate prohibition on addition of a member to an already participating consortium. The consortium had already participated in the process through its lead member, the plan remained the same, and no objection was raised by the lead member. The decision-making process for evaluation and comparison of resolution plans lies within the domain of the Committee of Creditors, and the material placed did not show any statutory violation or prejudice warranting interference.

Conclusion: The induction of the additional consortium member was not illegal, Regulation 39(1B) was not attracted, and no interference with the impugned order was called for.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the order permitting consideration of the resolution plan was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Regulation 39(1B) cannot be invoked to prohibit the addition of a member to an already eligible resolution-applicant consortium where the consortium was already in the final list, the plan itself was not a new submission by an outsider, and no statutory bar or illegality is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition under section 68 was sustainable for the alleged unexplained credits for assessment year 2013-14 when the assessee sought to rely on additional documents at the appellate stage. (ii) Whether the additions under section 68 for assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17 were justified where the assessee produced confirmations, bank statements, income-tax returns, audited accounts and evidence of repayment through banking channels, and whether the related interest disallowance could survive.

Issue (i): Whether the addition under section 68 was sustainable for the alleged unexplained credits for assessment year 2013-14 when the assessee sought to rely on additional documents at the appellate stage.

Analysis: The additional evidence was not admitted because the assessee did not justify non-production before the lower authorities and the new documents were found to be inconsistent with the stand taken earlier. The assessee had treated the receipts as unsecured loans before the lower authorities but attempted to characterise them as share application money before the Tribunal. No bank evidence of repayment was produced to support the claim of telescoping or repayment during the relevant year.

Conclusion: The addition was sustained and the assessee's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions under section 68 for assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17 were justified where the assessee produced confirmations, bank statements, income-tax returns, audited accounts and evidence of repayment through banking channels, and whether the related interest disallowance could survive.

Analysis: The assessee discharged the initial burden by producing documentary evidence showing identity, banking trail, financial statements and repayment of the loans in later years. The Revenue relied mainly on general inquiry material, statements of third parties and suspicion regarding accommodation entries, but no direct or proximate nexus was established between any cash of the assessee and the impugned credits. In the absence of a cash trail or contrary evidence, the additions could not be sustained merely because the lenders had low income or were not found at their stated addresses. Once the principal additions were deleted, the consequential interest disallowance also could not stand.

Conclusion: The additions were deleted and the related interest disallowance also failed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the assessee's relief in the revenue appeals on the section 68 additions and corresponding interest issue, while the assessee's appeal for assessment year 2013-14 did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition under section 68 cannot be sustained on suspicion or general third-party material when the assessee produces primary banking and financial evidence establishing identity, creditworthiness and genuineness, and the Revenue fails to show a cash trail or live nexus between the assessee and the alleged accommodation entries.

Issues: (i) Whether an intimation under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 automatically merges with a subsequent scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to nullify the earlier adjustment. (ii) Whether the disallowance relating to PF and ESIC contributions required verification to determine whether it pertained to employer's contribution under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or employees' contribution under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether an intimation under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 automatically merges with a subsequent scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to nullify the earlier adjustment.

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats processing under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as a prima facie exercise based on the return and apparent adjustments, whereas assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is made on scrutiny of evidence and issues selected for examination. Merger is not automatic in every case. It applies only where the same issues arise in both proceedings and the later assessment covers the same matter. On the facts, the challenged adjustment was not shown to have been superseded merely because a scrutiny assessment was also completed.

Conclusion: The plea of automatic merger was rejected and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance relating to PF and ESIC contributions required verification to determine whether it pertained to employer's contribution under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or employees' contribution under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The legal position distinguishes employer's contribution, which falls for consideration under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, from employees' contribution, which is governed by section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The record suggested that the impugned disallowance may have been based on a tax audit reporting error and could include employer's contribution as well. The additional ground was admitted as a pure question of law, and the matter was restored for limited factual verification because the issue could not be conclusively resolved without examining the contribution-wise details.

Conclusion: The additional ground was allowed for statistical purposes and the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification.

Final Conclusion: The appeal did not succeed on the merger argument, but the disallowance issue was sent back for limited verification, resulting in only partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An intimation under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 merges with a later scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 only where the same issue is common to both proceedings, and a contribution-based disallowance must be examined by distinguishing employer's contribution from employees' contribution before applying the relevant provision.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 are confined to a narrow summary exercise that prevents scrutiny of the documents and surrounding material bearing on debt and default; (ii) whether a pre-existing dispute barred admission of the Section 9 application.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 are confined to a narrow summary exercise that prevents scrutiny of the documents and surrounding material bearing on debt and default.

Analysis: The relevant enquiry in insolvency proceedings is whether debt and default are established before insolvency commencement. The records relied upon by the parties, including the commercial arrangements, termination terms, subsequent acknowledgments, and communications concerning repayment, had to be read and assessed to determine whether the corporate debtor had defaulted. Such scrutiny of documents and admissions does not amount to a civil trial and does not transgress the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authority. The procedure under the insolvency framework permits evaluation of material on record to determine the existence of default.

Conclusion: The objection based on alleged summary jurisdiction was rejected, and the Section 9 admission could not be faulted on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether a pre-existing dispute barred admission of the Section 9 application.

Analysis: A pre-existing dispute must be a real and substantiated dispute capable of showing that the claim was genuinely contested before the demand notice. On the material placed, the termination agreement, the stock audit, the subsequent agreement acknowledging the dues, the part payment, and the email assurances together indicated an admitted liability rather than a genuine prior dispute. The plea that the returned stock was damaged was found inconsistent with the earlier records and unsupported by contemporaneous objection. In the absence of any independent pending adjudication establishing such dispute, the defence of pre-existing dispute was not made out.

Conclusion: The plea of pre-existing dispute failed, and admission of the Section 9 application was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was without merit, the finding of debt and default was sustained, and commencement of the corporate insolvency process against the corporate debtor remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In insolvency proceedings, the adjudicating authority may scrutinize the material on record to determine debt and default, and a pre-existing dispute must be a real, substantiated dispute existing before the demand notice, not a belated or unsupported denial of liability.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 16,11,000 represented taxable interest or premium in the assessee's hands for the year under appeal.

Analysis: The refund correspondence showed that the buyer was to first return the principal amount and only thereafter release the premium or interest component. The assessee had received only part of the total amount and had not claimed TDS credit on the unpaid balance, supporting the case that the disputed sum had not accrued or been received as income. No material was found to justify treating the balance as part of the principal already received.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 16,11,000 was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of expenditure in the intimation issued under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was a permissible adjustment and whether the intimation was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The adjustment made in the processing of the return went beyond the limited scope of Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The fact that the assessee had filed an incorrect return did not authorise the CPC to make a substantive disallowance of expenditure at the intimation stage. The order also treated the impugned intimation as unsustainable in law.

Conclusion: The adjustment was impermissible and the intimation was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating part of the cash deposit of Specified Bank Notes during demonetisation as unexplained money, was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had disclosed the impugned bank transactions in the computation of total income and was engaged in the business of supplying fruits on commission basis, a line of business involving cash collections. The Assessing Officer accepted a substantial portion of the deposit as probable business transaction but offered no cogent basis for treating the balance as undisclosed income. In the absence of any reasoned distinction between the accepted and rejected portions of the same deposit, the addition could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment addition based on the demonetisation cash deposit did not survive and the assessee obtained complete relief in the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a cash deposit is disclosed as part of business transactions and the revenue accepts a substantial part of the same deposit as genuine, the remaining portion cannot be treated as unexplained money without a specific and reasoned basis.

Issues: Whether the addition made as unexplained investment on the basis of alleged on-money payment, founded only on statements and material seized in the search of a third party, could be sustained in the absence of corroborative evidence and without allowing cross-examination.

Analysis: The addition rested on search material and statements recorded in the case of the builder group, while no seized material specific to the assessee was brought on record to show payment of any amount over and above the recorded consideration. The assessee consistently denied cash payment and the record did not show any independent evidence linking the assessee to the alleged on-money. The order also proceeded without confronting the adverse material fully to the assessee and without granting cross-examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon. On identical facts in connected matters, additions based solely on third-party information and untested statements had been deleted for want of corroboration and for breach of natural justice.

Conclusion: The addition was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The consolidated appeals were allowed and the additions made on account of alleged on-money payments were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition cannot be sustained merely on third-party statements or seized material from another person's search unless the material is corroborated by independent evidence specific to the assessee and the assessee is afforded a fair opportunity to rebut the adverse material, including cross-examination where relied-upon statements are used.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under section 148 was invalid for want of sanction from the correct specified authority under section 151. (ii) Whether the section 263 revisionary order could survive when the reassessment proceedings were void for lack of valid jurisdictional sanction.

Issue (i): Whether the notice issued under section 148 was invalid for want of sanction from the correct specified authority under section 151.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. For such cases, section 151(ii) required approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner, and not from the Principal Commissioner. The limitation provisions in section 149 could not be used to dilute the separate sanction requirement under section 151. The proviso inserted in section 151 by the Finance Act, 2023 was held to be prospective and could not validate a prior notice issued on approval from the wrong authority.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid in law for want of sanction from the correct specified authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the section 263 revisionary order could survive when the reassessment proceedings were void for lack of valid jurisdictional sanction.

Analysis: Once the reassessment initiation itself was found to be without jurisdiction, the foundation for the revisionary exercise ceased to exist. A revision under section 263 cannot independently stand where the underlying reassessment proceeding is legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The section 263 order could not survive and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded because the reassessment notice was held invalid for want of proper approval, and the revisionary order based on that defective proceeding was annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is initiated beyond three years, approval must be obtained from the authority specified in section 151(ii), and a revisionary order cannot survive if the underlying reassessment proceeding is void for want of such jurisdictional sanction.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner could invoke revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 when the reassessment order was already the subject matter of a pending appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Analysis: Explanation 1(c) to section 263(1) extends the revisionary power to matters not considered and decided in appeal, but it also makes clear that where the very order is under appeal, the Commissioner cannot revise issues that form part of the appellate subject matter. As the assessee's appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was pending on the same issue concerning the sale of shares and the reassessment order, the prerequisite for valid invocation of section 263 was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 was invalid and the revision order was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded because the revisionary order could not stand once the same issue was already carried in appeal before the appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under section 263 is barred to the extent the very matter is the subject of a pending appeal and has not been finally kept outside the appellate adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping benefit on the basis of surplus funds available from earlier assessment years so as to delete the additions for unexplained income and investment in vehicle for the later year. (ii) Whether the capital gains addition for the later year required modification and whether deduction under section 54 was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping benefit on the basis of surplus funds available from earlier assessment years so as to delete the additions for unexplained income and investment in vehicle for the later year.

Analysis: The available fund position, as worked out from the bank accounts and accepted receipts, showed surplus funds in the earlier year sufficient to cover the disputed additions in the later year. The surplus of the earlier year, together with the remaining balance from the next year, was more than enough to absorb both the addition for unexplained income and the investment in the vehicle.

Conclusion: The additions for unexplained income and investment in the vehicle were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the capital gains addition for the later year required modification and whether deduction under section 54 was allowable.

Analysis: The capital gains had been computed by the assessee himself at a lower figure than that mentioned in the order, and the higher figure was found to be inadvertent. The claim for deduction under section 54 was not substantiated on record and therefore could not be granted.

Conclusion: The capital gains addition was restricted to the amount computed by the assessee, and the claim for deduction under section 54 was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the extent of deletion of the telescoped additions and correction of the capital gains figure, with the remaining relief denied.

Ratio Decidendi: Where proved surplus funds from earlier years are sufficient to explain later investments or additions, telescoping relief must be allowed, but a statutory deduction cannot be granted without substantiation.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings and the consequent additions could be sustained when the reopening and assessment were based on third-party material that was not confronted to the assessee.

Analysis: The reassessment was founded on data allegedly recovered from another group and used to infer suppression of sales in the assessee's business. The assessee sought the underlying material, statements and related records relied upon for reopening and assessment, but those materials were not furnished or confronted. The basis of the addition therefore remained untested by the assessee, resulting in breach of natural justice. Following the earlier order in the assessee's own case on identical facts, the reassessment proceedings were held to be vitiated for non-confrontation of the material relied upon by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were quashed and the additions were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 262 days in filing the appeals deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the registration granted under section 12AB treating the assessee as a religious trust, and the consequential rejection of approval under section 80G(5), were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 262 days in filing the appeals deserved condonation.

Analysis: The delay was explained by the assessee's late discovery, through audit and management transition, that the registration had been granted treating it as a religious trust, which also affected eligibility for approval under section 80G(5). The explanation was accepted as showing sufficient cause, and the appeals were admitted.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the registration granted under section 12AB treating the assessee as a religious trust, and the consequential rejection of approval under section 80G(5), were sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee was found to be running educational institutions and had long been treated as a charitable institution. The record contained no material or reasoned finding showing that its objects or activities were in nature or confined to a particular community. The order also did not disclose any confrontation of adverse material or a speaking basis for classifying the assessee as a religious trust. In these circumstances, the classification and the consequential refusal of approval under section 80G(5) could not be sustained without reconsideration of the relevant material and a hearing to the assessee.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for fresh examination and a speaking order, with reconsideration of both registration and approval issues.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, and the impugned matters were restored for fresh adjudication after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: A trust cannot be classified as religious for registration and approval purposes without recorded material, confrontation of adverse material, and a reasoned speaking order based on its objects and activities.

Issues: Whether the refusal to condone a delay of 1460 days in filing the revision application under section 264 could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The revision application was filed far beyond the statutory period under section 264(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the explanation offered for the delay was found to be vague. The assessee continued to comply with statutory obligations during the relevant period, including filing returns and completing audit requirements, which supported the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause preventing timely filing. The decision not to condone delay was therefore treated as a plausible view, warranting no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The observations on merits were directed to be ignored and not treated as precedent.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone delay was upheld and the writ petition failed.

Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be sustained where the alleged debt arose from a partnership firm, the firm was not impleaded or served with statutory notice, and the accused was proceeded against in his personal capacity.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires that criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 arises only where the cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The architecture of Section 141, read with its explanation, treats a firm as a principal legal person whose liability must be prosecuted by arraigning the firm; liability of persons in charge is derivative. The evidence on record shows the complainant's transaction and alleged liability were with the partnership firm, and the firm was neither served with the demand notice nor impleaded as an accused. The presumption under the provision corresponding to Section 139 is rebuttable; an admission in the complainant's testimony that the transaction was with the firm raises a probable defence on the existence of personal liability of the accused. Successive presentations and notices were noted on the record but the primary issue is the absence of the firm before the forum and absence of material proving a subsisting personal liability of the accused. The penal nature of the offence mandates strict adherence to statutory conditions and proof of personal liability on the balance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The conviction cannot be sustained; the revisional application is allowed and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the alleged liability arises from a partnership firm and the firm is not impleaded or served with the statutory demand, prosecution and conviction of an individual partner in his personal capacity for cheque dishonour is unsustainable absent proof that the cheque was issued to discharge a legally enforceable personal debt of that individual.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147/notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid; (ii) Whether the element of profit in undisclosed 'on-money' receipts should be estimated at 16% (as held by CIT(A)) or at a different rate; (iii) Whether ICDS-III applies and whether the unaccounted profit must be taxed in the year of receipt of on-money or in the year of execution of sale deed; (iv) Whether the assessee is entitled to telescoping benefit against additions for alleged unaccounted cash loans (addition under section 69A read with section 115BBE).

Issue (i): Validity of reassessment initiated under section 147 by issuing notice under section 148.

Analysis: The assessing officer reopened assessments after search operations and relied on incriminating seized material, seized digital data and third party statements; approval under section 151 was obtained; amendments to section 148 providing deemed satisfaction for three years prior to search (post 01.04.2021) were applicable; the reassessment covered both searched party and third parties under the new scheme of search assessments.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings and notice under section 148 are valid and the ground challenging the reopening is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Appropriate rate for estimating profit element embedded in 'on-money' receipts.

Analysis: Authorities and precedents were examined including jurisdictional High Court and Tribunal decisions holding that only the profit element, not entire on money, is taxable; assessing officer had estimated 35%, CIT(A) reduced to 16% without adducing comparable basis; assessee's audited average profit was 7%; the Tribunal reasoned estimation must be based on facts, past results and comparable cases and adopted a rate nearer to truth taking into account expenditure funded from on money and business nature.

Conclusion: The Tribunal reduces the estimated profit on on money to 10% and directs the assessing officer to compute additions accordingly; appeals of the assessee are partly allowed on this issue and revenue appeals in respect of sustaining higher estimates are dismissed.

Issue (iii): Applicability of ICDS-III and year of taxation for unaccounted profit on on money (year of receipt vs year of execution of sale deed).

Analysis: ICDS-III (Income Computation and Disclosure Standard III) applies to contractors using percentage of completion method; the assessee is a contractee (developer employing contractors) and has consistently followed project completion / percentage of completion recognition, and judicial precedents including Supreme Court and jurisdictional High Court support recognition of income on execution/registration of sale deed when risk and rewards transfer; hence ICDS-III not applicable to contractee and unaccounted profit should be taxed in year of sale deed execution.

Conclusion: ICDS-III does not apply to the assessee; unaccounted profit on on money is taxable in the year of execution/registration of sale deed; revenue grounds seeking taxation in year of receipt are dismissed.

Issue (iv): Entitlement to telescoping benefit against addition of Rs. 97,30,000 made for alleged cash loans (section 69A r.w.s.115BBE).

Analysis: The assessing officer made addition for alleged cash loans based on seized loose papers; CIT(A) found confirmed unaccounted profit (even after re estimation) exceeded the alleged cash advances and applied telescoping principle by setting off estimated confirmed unaccounted profit against the alleged loans; relevant precedent supports telescoping where additions relate to same source and confirmed/unaccounted profit covers the impugned advances.

Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds deletion by CIT(A) and dismisses the revenue's ground; telescoping benefit is allowed in favour of the assessee on the facts.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the validity of reopening under section 147/148, allows the assessee's appeals partly by directing estimation of profit on on money at 10% and holding that unaccounted profit is taxable on execution of sale deeds, allows telescoping against alleged cash loans, and dismisses all cross appeals by the revenue; overall the decision is partly in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where undisclosed 'on money' receipts are established from seized material, only the profit element (not entire receipts) may be estimated for taxation; such estimation must be factually grounded and approximately nearer to truth, and where a taxpayer is a contractee (not a contractor) ICDS III does not apply and unaccounted profit is taxable in the year of execution/registration of sale deed when significant risks and rewards transfer.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest on the refund amount of Rs. 62,01,371/- for the period during which the refund remained unpaid.

Analysis: Section 20 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 governs refund, approval, and interest on refundable amounts. A refund found due on assessment or pursuant to appellate proceedings attracts the statutory interest consequence where payment is not made within the prescribed period. The earlier Division Bench view in the same statutory setting held that the approval mechanism under the refund rules cannot be used to defeat the statutory period for payment without interest, and that interest follows when the refund is released beyond that period. In the present case, the refund was held due by the assessing authority and was ultimately released only on 28.08.2019, whereas the application for refund had been made on 22.04.2016.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to interest on the refund amount at the prescribed rate for the period from 22.04.2016 till 28.08.2019.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order dated 30.05.2023 rejecting the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for condonation of delay in filing the return for assessment year 2018-19 should be entertained despite the delay and laches in filing the writ petition.

Analysis: The petition challenges an order under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 rejecting condonation of delay in filing the return. The Court examined whether the petitioner has furnished any reasonable explanation for the long delay in approaching the High Court since the impugned order dated 30.05.2023 and considered settled principles on delay and laches in invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court applied the established tests that (i) there is no fixed limitation for filing a writ petition but the petitioner must approach the court within a reasonable time depending on the nature of rights and liabilities; (ii) delay and laches are relevant discretionary factors that may disentitle a litigant from extraordinary relief; and (iii) the cause for delay must be examined to determine whether it constitutes sufficient cause. Reliance was placed on precedent establishing that unreasonable delay ordinarily disentitles a party to the extraordinary remedy and that the discretion under Article 226 must be exercised with care and caution, taking into account the absence of any acceptable explanation for delay.

Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed for delay and laches; relief denied and challenge to the order under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is refused (result adverse to the petitioner and in favour of the revenue).