Issues: Whether assignment/transfer of leasehold rights (including leasehold of land with building) constitutes a "supply" liable to GST under the charging provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act; and whether interim protection should be granted to stay recovery and adjudication pending final disposal.

Analysis: The Court examined prior decisions, notably the Gujarat High Court's decision in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry and subsequent Gujarat rulings (including Life Sciences Chemicals), and noted that those decisions concluded that assignment of leasehold rights does not amount to a taxable supply under the charging provisions. The Supreme Court has been seised of related appeals but has not stayed the Gujarat decisions. In light of the existing High Court and coordinate bench decisions and the absence of a stay by the Supreme Court, the Court considered it appropriate to afford interim protection to petitioners who challenge show cause notices and orders concerning the levy of GST on assignments of leasehold rights.

Conclusion: Interim protection granted in favour of the assessee; pending final disposal no recovery shall be effected under impugned orders and adjudication of outstanding show cause notices shall remain stayed.

Issues: (i) Whether steel items (angles, channels, plates, bars etc.) used in the Central Engineering Maintenance Shop for fabrication of spares and for repair and maintenance of plant and machinery are eligible for cenvat credit under Rule 2(k) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 for the period June 2006 to March 2011.

Analysis: The issue requires interpretation of the expression "used in or in relation to manufacture" and the scope of "input" under Rule 2(k) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, including Explanation 2 to Rule 2(k) as in force during the relevant period. Documentary material furnished by the appellant included department-wise letters specifying items manufactured from the subject steel goods, the exact machinery/capital goods where those spares were used, and a Chartered Engineer's Certificate certifying verification of those details. The position laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kisan Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. recognises a wide import to the phrase "used in or in relation to manufacture" and expressly includes items used for maintenance, repair, upkeep or fabrication of plant and machinery within the ambit of admissible credit. Applying that legal framework to the verified factual material presented, the subject steel items were used to manufacture spares and parts incorporated into capital goods/plant and machinery employed in the manufacture of dutiable products, thereby satisfying the definition of "input" under Rule 2(k) and Explanation 2 as applicable in the material period.

Conclusion: The cenvat credit availed on the steel items used for fabrication of spares and for maintenance and repair of plant and machinery is admissible; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee and the impugned demand, interest and equal penalty confirmed by the adjudicating authority are set aside, with consequential relief, if any.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained when the underlying assessment has been set aside and restored to the assessing officer for de novo assessment; (ii) Whether the show-cause notice seeking penalty under section 271(1)(b) was legally valid when it failed to specify the particular notices under section 142(1) alleged to have been not complied with.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty under section 271(1)(b) survives where the assessment has been set aside and remitted for de novo assessment.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the connection between the assessment order and the consequential penalty proceedings. The assessment order for the relevant year was set aside by the first appellate authority with directions for de novo assessment, thereby removing the foundation on which the penalty proceedings had been initiated and levied.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(b) does not survive when the underlying assessment has been set aside and remitted for de novo assessment; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the show-cause notice dated 30.03.2024 was legally tenable despite not specifying the particular notices under section 142(1) alleged to have been not complied with.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the show-cause notice merely referred to non-compliance with "the following notices" without identifying them. The absence of specific details prevented the assessee from knowing which notices were alleged to have been ignored and deprived the assessee of a proper opportunity to explain non-compliance, thereby affecting principles of natural justice and the validity of the penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was legally defective for failure to specify the notices relied upon; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal and deleted the penalty of Rs. 30,000 imposed under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, holding the penalty unsustainable both because the assessment was set aside for de novo consideration and because the show-cause notice was deficient in specifying the notices alleged to have been not complied with.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be upheld where the assessment on which it is founded has been set aside and where the show-cause notice does not identify the specific statutory notices alleged to have been not complied with, thereby denying the assessee a fair opportunity to respond.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 237 days in filing the Review Petition can be condoned; (ii) Whether the Review Petition merits interference with the earlier order.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 237 days in filing the Review Petition can be condoned.

Analysis: The Court examined the applicant's explanation for delay and found it unsatisfactory. The petition was considered despite the admitted delay, but the reasons provided did not justify condonation under the governing principles for extension of time and laches applicable to review proceedings.

Conclusion: Delay not condoned; decision adverse to the Revenue and favourable to the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Review Petition merits interference with the earlier order.

Analysis: On consideration of the Review Petition on merits, the Court found no arguable ground to reopen or review the order dated 16.04.2025 in Civil Appeal No.1208 of 2025, applying the narrow scope of review and the requirement of demonstrable error or miscarriage of justice for review relief.

Conclusion: No case made out for review; review petition dismissed on merits; decision adverse to the Revenue and favourable to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Review Petition is dismissed both on the ground of unexplained delay and on merits, and any pending interlocutory application is disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: A review petition will not be entertained where there is unexplained, inordinate delay and where no arguable error or manifest injustice is shown to justify reopening a final order.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order and summary orders were liable to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration in view of the petitioner's claim of exemption under Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: The petitioner asserted that the taxable character of the services had been wrongly determined because the relevant exemption entry under the notification had not been properly placed before the authority. It was also noticed that the petitioner claimed a mismatch between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B could be reconciled if an effective opportunity were granted. In view of the claimed exemption, the alleged failure to place material such as invoices at the proper stage, and the substantial tax recovery already made, the matter warranted reconsideration on merits.

Conclusion: The adjudication order and the summary orders were set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner secured a remand for reconsideration on merits, with all contentions kept open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax demand is founded on a disputed exemption claim and the assessee has not had an adequate opportunity to place material on record, the adjudication may be set aside and remitted for fresh decision on merits.

Issues: Whether the confiscation order dated 03.06.2024 passed under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 is valid in the absence of issuance of a show cause notice and whether the impugned order must be quashed and remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The undisputed facts include that no show cause notice was issued prior to the confiscation order, a detention receipt recorded non-release due to non-payment of duty, and duty was paid by the petitioner on 02.05.2024. A disputed letter purporting to waive show cause notice is placed on record by the respondents but is contested by the petitioner. Recent authority of this Court has held that issuance of a show cause notice is mandatory prior to confiscation under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 even if a waiver letter is produced. In view of the admitted absence of a show cause notice before the confiscation order, the confiscation order suffers from procedural infirmity and violation of principles of natural justice. Questions regarding the propriety of the seizure under Section 110 and whether detention was for non-declaration or for non-payment of duty involve disputed facts and require fresh consideration by the respondents.

Conclusion: The confiscation order dated 03.06.2024 is quashed and the matter is remitted to the second respondent for fresh consideration. The petitioner is directed to furnish a reply within two weeks and the second respondent shall afford three personal hearings and pass a final speaking order on merits within 12 weeks. The seized goods shall not be disposed of until final orders are passed. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a creditor who has an admitted claim in a CIRP can update that claim by withdrawing it (including where it is satisfied partly or fully) under Regulation 12A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016; and (ii) Whether the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP)/Resolution Professional (RP) had authority to refuse withdrawal and whether the IRP could move the Adjudicating Authority seeking directions on withdrawal.

Analysis: The Code and CIRP Regulations require the IRP/RP to receive, collate, verify and maintain an updated list of claims and to constitute the Committee of Creditors (CoC) on that basis. Regulation 12A expressly mandates that a creditor shall update its claim as and when the claim is satisfied partly or fully after the insolvency commencement date. The IRP/RP has administrative duties but not adjudicatory power to conclusively decide a change in the status of a claim; where adjudication is required, the IRP/RP may approach the Adjudicating Authority. The Tribunal examined prior precedents and the effect of the post amendment Regulation 12A and concluded that updation under Regulation 12A includes the situation where a claim is fully satisfied and effectively withdrawn, but any final determination on withdrawal requires decision by the Adjudicating Authority since the IRP/RP lacks adjudicatory power.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order dismissing the IRP's application is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority to decide IA No. 3965 of 2023 afresh after affording parties an opportunity of hearing. The IRP was justified in approaching the Adjudicating Authority for directions.

Issues: Whether the petitioners are entitled to bail in proceedings under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where investigation is complete, trial has not commenced, there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a reasonable time, and petitioners have been in custody for a prolonged period.

Analysis: The legal framework comprises Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which prescribes twin conditions for grant of bail in PMLA matters, and Article 21 of the Constitution of India guaranteeing the right to personal liberty including the right to a speedy trial. Recent authoritative decisions have held that while Section 45 imposes restrictions, it does not extinguish judicial discretion and that 'bail is the rule and jail is the exception'. Constitutional courts must consider prolonged pre-trial detention, the documentary nature of evidence already seized, the stage of proceedings, the likelihood of trial concluding within a reasonable time, and whether continued custody would convert pre-trial detention into punishment. On the facts here, prosecution relies on documentary evidence; investigation is complete; the prosecution proposes 27 witnesses and about 4,408 pages of documents; trial had not commenced and there was no prospect of conclusion in the near future; and the petitioners had been in custody for more than a year. The petitioners have undertaken to cooperate and there is no convincing material showing risk of flight or real prospect of tampering with evidence that cannot be mitigated by suitable conditions.

Conclusion: Bail is granted to the petitioners on furnishing bonds of Rs. 1,00,000 each with two sureties of like amount, and subject to conditions concerning attendance, no leaving the country without permission, provision of contact details, and non-influence of witnesses. This conclusion is in favour of the petitioners.

Issues: Whether the maturity amount received under a keyman insurance policy assigned to the assessee is taxable in the hands of the assessee for Assessment Year 2017-18 (i.e., whether exemption under Section 10(10D) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available).

Analysis: Section 10(10D) excludes certain sums from exemption including amounts under a keyman insurance policy; Explanation 1 to Section 10(10D) (inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2013) clarifies that a keyman insurance policy includes a policy assigned to a person at any time during its term. The Tribunal examined the timing of purchase (2001-02), assignment (24.03.2011) and maturity, and considered authoritative decisions. The Madras High Court in Allu Arvind Babu held that Explanation 1 is clarificatory and applies retrospectively such that the character of a keyman policy does not change on assignment and amounts on surrender/maturity are taxable as perquisite; the Tribunal followed that view and distinguished the earlier Delhi High Court decision in Rajan Nanda in light of the statutory explanation. On the facts, the policy remained a keyman insurance policy notwithstanding assignment and the assessee did not pay consideration; therefore the maturity receipt falls within the exclusion from exemption under Section 10(10D) as clarified by Explanation 1.

Conclusion: The maturity amount received on the keyman insurance policy is taxable in the hands of the assessee; the question is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the differential customs duty collected during DRI investigation was paid by the petitioner under protest or voluntarily; (ii) Whether the notification/clarification relied upon by the petitioner operates retrospectively or prospectively; (iii) Whether Notification No.25/2019-Customs dated 06.07.2019 is an amendment and its temporal effect; (iv) Whether collection of differential duty during DRI investigation without issuance of a show cause notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 was proper; (v) Whether the petitioner is entitled to refund after requesting closure of the DRI investigation upon payment; (vi) Whether refund under Section 27 is permissible absent proof against unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the differential customs duty collected during DRI investigation was paid by the petitioner under protest or voluntarily.

Analysis: The petitioner's letter dated 05.03.2019 did not state that the payment was made under protest; the petitioner requested DRI to conclude the investigation and between 05.03.2019 and 03.07.2019 did not raise any dispute. DRI accepted closure under Section 28(2) on receipt of the payment. The Court applied the doctrine of estoppel by conduct to the petitioner's post-closure attempt to treat the payment as under protest.

Conclusion: The payment was made voluntarily and not under protest; it was not a payment under protest in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the notification/clarification relied upon by the petitioner operates retrospectively or prospectively.

Analysis: The Court contrasted the Finance Bill wording with the Finance Act and examined Notification No.25/2019-Customs. The Finance Act did not adopt the Finance Bill wording as a retrospective clarification; the amendment language and notification indicate prospective operation.

Conclusion: The notification/clarification relied upon by the petitioner is prospective, not retrospective, and does not operate to alter duty for imports made during 2014-2017.

Issue (iii): Whether Notification No.25/2019-Customs dated 06.07.2019 is an amendment to the earlier notification and its effect.

Analysis: The text of Notification No.25/2019-Customs shows it amends Notification No.50/2017-Customs; the amendment language and the statutory exercise of power under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act indicate an amendment made in public interest and prospective effect.

Conclusion: Notification No.25/2019-Customs is an amendment to the earlier notification and is prospective in effect.

Issue (iv): Whether collection of differential duty during DRI investigation without issuance of a show cause notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 was proper.

Analysis: The petitioner voluntarily paid the differential duty and requested closure; DRI concluded the investigation under Section 28(2). Given the voluntary payment and the petitioner's request for closure, the Court found no legal necessity to issue a separate show cause notice under Section 28 before collecting the payment in the circumstances of this case.

Conclusion: Collection of the differential duty under these facts was proper and did not require issuance of a show cause notice prior to collection.

Issue (v): Whether the petitioner is entitled to refund after requesting closure of the DRI investigation upon payment.

Analysis: The petitioner's conduct in requesting closure upon payment and acquiescing until DRI's closure letter, followed by later seeking refund, was held to be inconsistent and to attract estoppel by conduct; reopening the matter would undermine finality and the sanctity of investigations.

Conclusion: The petitioner is not entitled to seek refund after requesting and obtaining closure of the investigation upon payment.

Issue (vi): Whether refund under Section 27 is permissible absent proof against unjust enrichment.

Analysis: An application under Section 27 requires evidence that the claimant did not pass on the duty to buyers to avoid unjust enrichment. The petitioner filed an application under Section 27(1)(a) but did not produce evidence to dispel unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: Refund under Section 27 is not permissible because the petitioner failed to prove absence of unjust enrichment.

Final Conclusion: The cumulative effect of the findings is that the petitioner's claim for refund fails on multiple grounds - voluntary payment, prospective operation of the amendment, propriety of collection without a separate show cause in the factual matrix, estoppel by conduct, and lack of proof against unjust enrichment - and the writ petition is without merit.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an importer voluntarily pays differential customs duty and requests closure of an investigation, then allows the investigation to be closed without contemporaneously protesting the payment, the importer is estopped from later treating the payment as made under protest and seeking refund under Section 27 absent timely protest and satisfactory evidence negating unjust enrichment; an amendment notification that operates prospectively cannot be applied retrospectively to alter liability for past imports.

Issues: Whether the discharge petition was liable to be allowed on the ground that the prosecution materials, including statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, approver statements, and CCTV material, did not disclose a prima facie case against the accused.

Analysis: The allegations against the accused included receipt of illegal gratification and criminal breach of trust, and the charge-sheet contained specific materials linking the accused to the alleged acts. The statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were treated as substantive evidence for the limited purpose of assessing whether a trial should proceed, though their evidentiary value and the need for corroboration were matters for trial. The statements of persons who had been granted pardon assumed the character of approver evidence, which could not be discarded at the discharge stage. The Court also reiterated that the stage of discharge does not permit a meticulous appraisal of evidence or a mini-trial, and the court must only see whether a prima facie case or strong suspicion exists. The CCTV-related contentions and the reliance on the earlier quashment order did not negate the materials available against this accused.

Conclusion: The discharge petition was rightly rejected, as sufficient prima facie materials existed to proceed to trial.

Issues: (i) Whether refund under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is available only for physical exports or also for deemed exports; (ii) Whether the amendment by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 (inserting explanation 1(1A) to Rule 5) is retrospective or prospective; (iii) Whether the precedent holding deemed exports equivalent to physical exports for refund purposes is applicable in presence of the said amendment.

Issue (i): Whether refund under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is available only for physical exports or also for deemed exports.

Analysis: Rule 5 and Notification No.27/2012 compute refund with reference to export turnover and speak of exports made without payment of central excise duty under bond or letter of undertaking; the scheme and allied notifications require proof of physical export such as shipping bills or customs certification; coordinate authorities and precedents applied the statutory wording to require goods to be taken out of India.

Conclusion: Refund under Rule 5 is confined to physical exports (goods taken out of India) and does not extend to deemed exports for the period under consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 inserting explanation 1(1A) to Rule 5 is retrospective or prospective.

Analysis: The test for a clarificatory explanation requires comparing the meaning of the provision before and after insertion; Rule 5 and Notification No.27/2012, read without the explanation, already indicated coverage of exports under bond or letter of undertaking (physical exports); the inserted explanation restates that 'export goods' means goods to be taken out of India and aligns with the pre-existing statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The insertion of explanation 1(1A) is clarificatory and has retrospective effect.

Issue (iii): Whether decisions treating deemed exports (clearances between export-oriented units) as equivalent to physical exports for refund under Rule 5 remain applicable after insertion of explanation 1(1A).

Analysis: The clarification by explanation 1(1A), having retrospective effect, restricts the scope of Rule 5 to physical exports; earlier decisions that did not consider this explanation or its clarificatory effect are not applicable to alter the statutory requirement of physical export under Rule 5 and the governing notification.

Conclusion: Precedents treating deemed exports as physical exports for refund purposes do not apply where explanation 1(1A) is held to clarify that only physical exports qualify under Rule 5.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme and the clarification introduced by explanation 1(1A) limit eligibility for cash refund under Rule 5 to physical exports (goods taken out of India), and claims based on deemed exports between export-oriented units are not entitled to refund under the provision as clarified.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No.27/2012, confines refund entitlement to goods exported without payment of central excise duty under bond or letter of undertaking (i.e., physical export), and the explanation inserted by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 is a clarificatory provision with retrospective effect that limits Rule 5 to physical exports.

Issues: Whether the impugned rejection of the petitioners' refund applications on the ground of delay was sustainable in light of the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the purposes of limitation, and whether the deficiency memos and consequent rejection should be quashed and the refund applications reconsidered.

Analysis: The petitioners filed refund applications under the GST regime which were rejected by respondent on the ground that the period of limitation under Section 54(1) had expired. The Supreme Court by its order dated 10.01.2022 directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation and provided for availability of the balance period or a 90-day period from 01.03.2022 as applicable. The exclusion period applies to computation of limitation for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings including proceedings for refund where limitation is prescribed. The respondent did not dispute the applicability of the Supreme Court's exclusion. In view of the exclusion, the ground of delay relied upon in the impugned deficiency memos and the rejection cannot be sustained and the matter requires fresh adjudication after affording opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned deficiency memos and the order rejecting the refund applications are quashed and the matter is remitted to the respondent to decide the refund applications afresh in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order after affording the petitioners a hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a higher court has directed exclusion of a specified period from computation of limitation, that exclusion must be applied in computing limitation for statutory refund proceedings and a dismissal solely on the ground of delay ignoring such exclusion is unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.50,00,000 made under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the individual assessee's hands was justified on substantive basis or ought to have been treated as a protective addition, and whether the assessee proved that the investment originated from HUF funds.

Analysis: The reopening under Section 147 read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was previously upheld and is not reopened. The Assessing Officer recorded factual findings that the LIC policy stood in the individual's name, transactions in the intermediary's bank account preceded the alleged Memorandum of Understanding, and no contemporaneous documentary evidence (books of account, sale records, cash flow, proposal form or MOU) was produced to establish that the funds originated from the HUF. Section 2(31) confirms that HUF is a separate taxable entity but ownership of an asset standing in an individual's name requires cogent proof of source if claimed to be HUF property. The statutory presumption under Section 69 applies where the assessee fails to satisfactorily explain the source of investment. Protective assessment is available only where the Assessing Officer himself entertains doubt as to the person chargeable and proceeds alternatively; it is not a remedy the assessee can invoke to convert a concluded substantive finding into a protective one. Applying these principles to the established facts, the Assessing Officer reached a conclusive satisfaction that the investment was unexplained in the individual's hands and made a substantive addition.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.50,00,000 under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified as a substantive addition in the individual's hands; the plea to treat the addition as protective is rejected.

Issues: Whether the Section 7 application filed by the Financial Creditor was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether limitation was extended by (a) fresh period of limitation from the Recovery Certificate dated 26.07.2018, (b) exclusion of period by the Suo Moto orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and (c) acknowledgments constituting extension under Section 18 of the Limitation Act as reflected in the audited financial statements and correspondence. The court applied settled principles that entries in balance sheets may constitute an acknowledgment of liability depending on context and tenor, and considered authoritative precedents holding that such entries require case-by-case scrutiny. The Recovery Certificate triggered a fresh three year limitation from 26.07.2018; the period falling within 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was excluded under the Suo Moto order, making the balance of limitation available from 01.03.2022. The audited financial statements (notes regarding bank guarantees and counter guarantees) and the settlement correspondence dated 18.04.2022 and 02.06.2022 were held to be clear acknowledgments within the meaning of Section 18, thereby further extending limitation and rendering the Section 7 application filed on 13.06.2024 within time.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not barred by limitation; the impugned order admitting the Section 7 application is upheld. In favour of Respondent.

Issues: Whether the Section 9 application filed by the operational creditor should be rejected on the ground that a pre-existing dispute and plausible defence existed between the parties.

Analysis: The record contained an earlier written communication and replies evidencing a dispute prior to or contemporaneous with the demand notice, including an audit confirmation and balance sheet entries showing amounts allegedly payable by the operational creditor to the corporate debtor. The adjudicating authority noted these materials and a prior proceeding in which overlapping invoices had been rejected. Relevant statutory tests require rejection of a Section 9 application if a notice of dispute exists or there is a plausible contention that requires further investigation (as reflected in Section 8 and Section 9(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the controlling authorities on operational debt). The materials on record raised a defence that was not patently feeble or illusory and included documentary indicia (audit confirmation, audited balance sheet entries and ledger statements) sufficient to constitute a pre-existing dispute or a plausible contention requiring adjudication outside the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application was rightly rejected because a pre-existing dispute and a plausible defence were shown on the record, warranting dismissal of the insolvency petition.

Issues: (i) Whether NCLT, on transfer of a winding-up petition already admitted by a High Court, must proceed from the stage of admission or re-examine admission under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code when the petition is converted into a Section 9 application; (ii) Whether the operational creditor must satisfy the statutory parameters for admission of a Section 9 application after such transfer; (iii) Whether the threshold amount applicable to the transferred petition converted into Section 9 in 2022 is Rs. 1 Lakh or Rs. 1 Crore; (iv) Whether interest claimed unilaterally at 24% per annum can be included in computing the debt for meeting the threshold; (v) Whether there existed a pre-existing dispute justifying rejection of the Section 9 application.

Issue (i): Whether NCLT, on transfer of a winding-up petition admitted by the High Court, must re-examine admission under the IBC or proceed from the stage of admission.

Analysis: The transfer proviso to Section 434(1)(c) and Rule 5 of the Transfer Rules permit transfer of winding-up proceedings to the Tribunal, to be dealt with under the Code. Authoritative decisions hold that petitions transferred must be considered under the IBC; Section 7 and Section 9 proceedings are independent and require adjudication on the IBC parameters even if a winding-up petition was earlier admitted by a court.

Conclusion: After transfer, NCLT must examine the petition under the IBC provisions and is not bound to mechanically treat prior High Court admission as automatic admission under Section 9.

Issue (ii): Whether the operational creditor must satisfy the statutory parameters for admission of a Section 9 application after transfer.

Analysis: The Transfer Rules and the order directing conversion and compliance require submission of information necessary for admission under Sections 7/8/9. Precedent confirms that transferred matters converted to Section 9 must satisfy all parameters for admission under the Code.

Conclusion: The operational creditor must satisfy all parameters for admission of the Section 9 application, including the threshold requirement.

Issue (iii): Applicable threshold amount for the Section 9 application converted in 2022 - Rs. 1 Lakh or Rs. 1 Crore.

Analysis: The statutory threshold under Section 4 of the IBC was increased to Rs. 1 Crore effective 24.03.2020. The petition was converted into a Section 9 application after that date (conversion in 2022), and the adjudicating order directed the applicant to satisfy maintainability under the amended Section 4.

Conclusion: The threshold applicable to the converted Section 9 application is Rs. 1 Crore and the operational creditor must fulfil that threshold.

Issue (iv): Whether unilateral claim of interest at 24% per annum can be included in the debt for meeting the threshold.

Analysis: Invoices unilaterally stating an interest term do not establish an agreed contractual obligation to pay interest unless there is agreement, acceptance, or conduct showing acceptance. Tribunal precedent rejects addition of unilateral interest claims in absence of contractual acceptance; inclusion of such interest for threshold computation is impermissible if not proved.

Conclusion: Interest at 24% per annum, being unaccepted and unproved, cannot be included in the debt; the debt remains the principal of Rs. 7,62,500 which does not meet the Rs. 1 Crore threshold.

Issue (v): Whether there was a pre-existing dispute warranting rejection of the Section 9 application.

Analysis: The corporate debtor executed an account confirmation acknowledging outstanding of Rs. 7,62,500 as on 28.02.2004. A subsequent reconciliation-letter months later alleging exaggerated rates did not provide particulars nor was a claim raised within contractual timelines; earlier judicial findings regarded the dispute as not bona fide. Precedent and record indicate that the post-confirmation letter did not constitute a bona fide pre-existing dispute.

Conclusion: No pre-existing bona fide dispute existed; the objection of pre-existing dispute is rejected.

Final Conclusion: On transfer and conversion of the winding-up petition into a Section 9 application after the amendment raising the threshold, the Tribunal must apply the IBC admission criteria; the operational creditor failed to prove an agreed interest component and failed to meet the Rs. 1 Crore threshold, warranting setting aside of the admission order.

Ratio Decidendi: A winding-up petition transferred to the NCLT and converted into an insolvency application must be adjudicated under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and meet the Code's admission requirements in force on conversion; unilateral invoice terms for interest cannot be added to the debt for threshold computation absent agreement or acceptance by the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether limitation for filing the appeal against the impugned order commenced from the date of pronouncement in open court or from the later date on which the order was uploaded on the portal, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned.

Analysis: The order was found to have been pronounced in open court on 11.06.2025 in the presence of the appellant and its counsel. The appellant's own pleadings and the material from the committee meeting recorded that the matter had been heard and an order was passed on that date. The later uploading of the order on 04.07.2025 did not postpone the commencement of limitation. The authorities relied upon by the appellant were distinguished because they concerned situations where no substantive order had been pronounced on the hearing date. The governing principle applied was that limitation runs from the date of pronouncement, and the time for obtaining a certified copy can be excluded only in accordance with the applicable limitation rules. Since the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period counted from 11.06.2025, the delay exceeded the condonable limit.

Conclusion: Limitation commenced on 11.06.2025, not on 04.07.2025, and the delay was not condonable. The application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal also stood rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether appeals against interlocutory applications I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 survive after reconstitution of the committee of creditors and subsequent orders; (ii) Whether the order recording confirmation of the interim resolution professional as resolution professional in I.A. No.1716 of 2024 is liable to be set aside; (iii) Whether the appellant's remedy in respect of disputed claim admission lies in the present appeals or in the pending proceedings arising from reconstitution (I.A. No.76 of 2025).

Issue (i): Whether appeals against I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 survive consideration.

Analysis: I.A. No.2154 recorded the constitution of an earlier committee of creditors and I.A. No.1712 recorded a subsequent reconstitution. The adjudicating order in I.A. No.1418 of 2024 set aside the earlier constitution and directed reconsideration and reconstitution. Following that direction the resolution professional reconstituted the committee and initiated fresh proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). The effect of the order in I.A. No.1418 of 2024 is to supersede and merge the earlier I.A.s to the extent they record the now-set-aside constitution; the later reconstitution and pending application supplant the earlier recorded positions.

Conclusion: The appeals against I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 do not survive. Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the order in I.A. No.1716 of 2024 confirming the interim resolution professional as resolution professional is liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The application under Section 22(3) sought recording of the appointment arising from the committee of creditors' decision. The order recording confirmation is procedural in character. The respondent-side position includes that claim admission and voting shares were revisited under the December 18, 2024 direction and the resolution professional reaffirmed his earlier claim admission, a step which has not been challenged separately. The admissibility and quantum of the disputed claim and any allegation of connivance require determination in the proceedings instituted for reconsideration and in the pending I.A. No.76 of 2025 rather than by annulling a procedural confirmation order where no separate challenge has been pursued.

Conclusion: The challenge to I.A. No.1716 of 2024 is without merit. Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant's challenge to claim admission can be sustained in these appeals or must be pursued in the pending proceedings.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority directed the resolution professional to revisit claim admission and reconstitute the committee; the resolution professional revisited and reaffirmed the admitted amount and has initiated fresh proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). The appellant has not separately challenged the reaffirmation order of the resolution professional. The tribunal indicated that any factual or legal contest on claim admission is to be placed before the pending application arising from the reconstitution process.

Conclusion: The appellant must pursue relief in the pending proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Final Conclusion: The appeals lack merit and are dismissed; no effective relief arises from the challenged interlocutory orders in view of the reconstitution and pending proceedings, and the appellant's available remedy lies in the ongoing reconstitution-related application.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjudicating order directs reconsideration and reconstitution, earlier interlocutory orders recording a superseded constitution merge into and are displaced by the reconsideration process, and procedural confirmations of appointment are not set aside in the absence of a separate successful challenge when substantive claim reconsideration and fresh proceedings are pending.

Issues: (i) Whether the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor could challenge the validity of the equitable mortgage after the award had attained finality; (ii) whether the revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was maintainable despite the earlier liberty to pursue the remedy under Rule 107(13) and (14) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961; (iii) whether non-deposit of the balance purchase money within the period prescribed under Rule 107(11)(h) rendered the auction sale void and whether that requirement could be waived by the creditor bank; (iv) what consequential order should follow once the auction sale was found void.

Issue (i): Whether the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor could challenge the validity of the equitable mortgage after the award had attained finality.

Analysis: The award passed by the Co-operative Court had become final. The judgment-debtor was liable jointly and severally under the award, and the property in dispute formed part of his assets available for execution. Once the award attained finality and the recovery certificate stood as a decree for execution, the property could be proceeded against for realization of the decretal amount. In that setting, the objection based on want of prior governmental permission for mortgage did not affect the recoverability of the property in execution.

Conclusion: The challenge to the auction on the ground of invalid mortgage was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was maintainable despite the earlier liberty to pursue the remedy under Rule 107(13) and (14) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961.

Analysis: Section 154 confers wide revisional power on the State Government or the Registrar to examine legality, propriety, and regularity of a decision or proceeding of a subordinate officer. The remedies under Rule 107(13) and (14) are applications to set aside a sale on specified grounds and do not curtail the statutory revisional power. The pre-deposit requirement in Section 154(2A) applies to revisions against recovery certificates, not to a revision challenging confirmation of sale. Accordingly, the revision could be entertained notwithstanding non-availment of the rule-based remedy.

Conclusion: The revision was held maintainable under Section 154.

Issue (iii): Whether non-deposit of the balance purchase money within the period prescribed under Rule 107(11)(h) rendered the auction sale void and whether that requirement could be waived by the creditor bank.

Analysis: Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) require deposit of 15 per cent at the time of purchase and payment of the balance within the stipulated period. The rule does not confer discretion to extend time for the balance purchase money. Non-compliance attracts forfeiture and resale, and the provision serves not only the creditor's interest but also the integrity of public auctions. The record did not show any waiver by the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives, and the principle applied in the SARFAESI context was held inapplicable because the cooperative rules did not contain a comparable enabling provision for extension.

Conclusion: The auction sale and its confirmation were held void and null.

Issue (iv): What consequential order should follow once the auction sale was found void.

Analysis: Since the sale was void, the appropriate consequence was restoration of the parties to the extent possible through a fresh auction in accordance with Rule 107(11)(j). The auction purchaser could not be penalized for the procedural fault in the recovery process, and refund with interest was necessary to balance equities. The Court therefore modified the High Court's operative directions and substituted them with an order setting aside the sale, annulling the confirmation, directing a fresh auction, and requiring refund of the deposit with interest.

Conclusion: The High Court's order was modified, and a fresh auction with refund of the purchaser's money was directed.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by upholding the finding that the auction sale was void, while altering the consequential relief so that the property would be re-auctioned and the auction purchaser would receive refund with interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Mandatory conditions governing deposit of auction purchase money under the cooperative recovery rules, when not complied with, render the sale a nullity and may be enforced through revisional jurisdiction even if the statutory rule-based sale challenge was not invoked.