Issues: Whether cash deposits made by an educational society during the demonetisation period, being receipts already reflected in the books and returned as gross receipts, could be assessed as unexplained cash credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and taxed under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was a registered society engaged in education and enjoyed exemption status. The cash deposits were explained as fee collections and were supported by the cash book, fee records, course details and other documentary evidence. The receipts had already been disclosed as gross receipts in the return of income and in the books of account. On these facts, the addition was made only because of the pattern and quantum of cash deposited during the demonetisation period. The governing principle applied was that section 68 does not apply where the receipts are already disclosed as income or gross receipts of a charitable entity, and the same income cannot be brought to tax again merely because it was deposited in cash.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 and the consequential application of section 115BBE were not sustainable, and the relief was granted to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a charitable or educational has already disclosed receipts as income or gross receipts in its books and return, section 68 cannot be invoked again merely because those receipts were later deposited in cash in the bank account.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of carting expenses on the footing of double debit was justified when the assessee produced separate invoices, debit notes, and vouchers showing that transportation charges were separately billed and paid to cement suppliers.

Analysis: The assessee consistently maintained that the carting charges were separately invoiced by the cement suppliers through debit notes and were not included in the purchase value recorded under purchases. Sample invoices, debit notes, and accounting vouchers were placed on record to support this stand. The detailed reply dated 10.04.2021 and the supporting material were not dealt with in the assessment order or the appellate order. Where relevant submissions and evidence are ignored, the foundation of the disallowance cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: The disallowance of carting expenses was not justified and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether depreciation on goodwill arising from amalgamation was allowable; (ii) Whether disallowance under section 14A could be made by invoking Rule 8D without recording dissatisfaction; (iii) Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 was time-barred; (iv) Whether the assessment framed in the name of a non-existing entity was valid.

Issue (i): Whether depreciation on goodwill arising from amalgamation was allowable.

Analysis: The goodwill in question was the same goodwill that had arisen on amalgamation and had been carried forward through subsequent restructuring and conversion. The prior co-ordinate Bench decision had already held that such goodwill, being the excess of purchase consideration over net asset value, is an acquired intangible asset falling within the scope of business or commercial rights of similar nature and is eligible for depreciation under section 32(1). No fresh factual or legal distinction was shown for the year under appeal.

Conclusion: Depreciation on goodwill was allowable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 14A could be made by invoking Rule 8D without recording dissatisfaction.

Analysis: The assessee had made a suo motu disallowance. The Assessing Officer proceeded to apply Rule 8D without first recording dissatisfaction regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim having regard to the accounts. The controlling requirement under section 14A(2) was not complied with, and the Tribunal followed the jurisdictional precedents holding that Rule 8D cannot be invoked mechanically in the absence of such recorded satisfaction.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was unsustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 was time-barred.

Analysis: The original notice issued on 30.06.2021 was treated as a deemed notice under section 148A(b) in terms of the Supreme Court's directions. After supply of material and receipt of reply, the reassessment proceedings had to be completed within the surviving limitation under the old regime as extended by TOLA. The fresh notice under section 148 was issued beyond the surviving period, rendering the reassessment initiation invalid.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was barred by limitation and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the assessment framed in the name of a non-existing entity was valid.

Analysis: The company had ceased to exist upon conversion into an LLP, yet the assessment was framed in the company's name. The governing principle is that an assessment on a non-existent entity is a nullity and without jurisdiction. No distinguishing feature was shown to depart from that rule.

Conclusion: The assessment framed in the name of the non-existing entity was invalid and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All the revenue appeals failed. The Tribunal upheld the relief granted to the assessee on depreciation on goodwill, rejected the section 14A disallowance, and sustained the quashing of reassessment and the assessment on jurisdictional grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Goodwill arising on amalgamation is a depreciable intangible asset when it represents an acquired commercial right, section 14A disallowance under Rule 8D requires prior recorded dissatisfaction, reassessment must be initiated within the surviving statutory time limit, and an assessment framed against a non-existing entity is void.

Issues: Whether the protective addition made under section 69A on account of alleged on-money payment for purchase of property could be sustained.

Analysis: The addition was founded on material relating to alleged on-money payment to the developer, but the record did not show any direct evidence linking the assessee to the alleged undisclosed payment. The Tribunal noted that the case rested on presumption rather than concrete proof and that the absence of specific, corroborative material made the addition unsustainable. Following the legal position applied in the cited co-owner and jurisdictional precedents, the Tribunal held that a protective addition cannot stand without reliable evidence establishing the assessee's actual involvement in the alleged transaction.

Conclusion: The protective addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged unexplained expenditure for purchase of cryptocurrency was sustainable when the same assessing unit had accepted presumptive income from the same crypto transactions in the preceding assessment year and the material relied upon lacked transaction-level particulars.

Analysis: The assessment was reopened on information regarding crypto currency transactions, but the information did not contain specific particulars such as the name of the cryptocurrency, broker details, dates, quantity, or transaction-wise trail. In the assessee's own case for the earlier year, the same assessment unit had accepted the returned income on presumptive basis from the sale of cryptocurrency and had not made any addition for the purchase side. For the year under appeal, the same unit adopted a different approach and treated the purchase value as unexplained expenditure under section 69C. The record did not disclose any cogent basis for such inconsistent treatment, and the assessee's disclosure of presumptive income was accepted for the preceding year on the same set of general information.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69C was not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the revenue relies on general crypto transaction information without transaction-specific particulars, and the same assessing unit has accepted presumptive income from the identical activity in an earlier year, a later addition of the purchase value as unexplained expenditure under section 69C without a consistent factual basis is unjustified.

Issues: Validity of the satisfaction note recorded for initiating proceedings under section 153C and the consequential assessment framed thereunder.

Analysis: The satisfaction note was held to be identically worded to earlier cases where the Tribunal had already found that the recording did not expressly state that the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the total income of the assessee. In the absence of such recorded satisfaction, the initiation of proceedings under section 153C was treated as mechanical and legally unsustainable. The assessments made pursuant to that satisfaction note were therefore held to be vitiated.

Conclusion: The satisfaction note and the consequent assessments under section 153C were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether the Tribunal's earlier observation regarding corporate guarantee fee required rectification under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) whether the reference made to the basis of relief on MEIS export incentives required modification in the rectification order.

Issue (i): Whether the Tribunal's earlier observation regarding corporate guarantee fee required rectification under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The rectification power extends to correcting an error apparent from the record. The earlier order had stated that the issue stood settled by orders of co-ordinate Benches, whereas the record showed that relief had been granted by the first appellate authority on the footing that the corporate guarantee transaction had been accepted at arm's length in earlier years and that there was no change in facts. The reference in the earlier order therefore needed clarification to reflect the actual basis of the relief.

Conclusion: The earlier observation was modified to state that the transaction had been accepted at arm's length by the TPO and AO in earlier years and, in the absence of any change in facts, no interference was warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the reference made to the basis of relief on MEIS export incentives required modification in the rectification order.

Analysis: The rectification application pointed out that the earlier order referred to co-ordinate Bench decisions as the basis for the relief on MEIS incentives, whereas the appellate authority had also relied on other judicial decisions while treating the incentives as capital receipts and granting relief under the normal computation and book profit provisions. Since the challenge was confined to correcting the descriptive basis recorded in the Tribunal's order, the relevant paragraph was amended accordingly.

Conclusion: The reference in the earlier order was replaced to reflect reliance on the cited judicial decisions and the appellate authority's order.

Final Conclusion: The rectification application succeeded and the Tribunal's earlier order was clarified on both disputed aspects without disturbing the substantive relief already granted.

Ratio Decidendi: A rectification under section 254(2) may be used to correct an apparent misdescription of the basis of an appellate conclusion where the underlying relief remains unchanged.

Issues: Whether an unsigned and blank notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid and capable of conferring jurisdiction to complete assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The notice was found to be left unsigned and blank. Section 282A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 makes signature of the notice mandatory, whether the notice is issued in paper form or communicated electronically. The deeming provision in section 282A(2) concerns authentication by printing or stamping of the name and office of the designated authority and does not dispense with the requirement of signature under section 282A(1). An invalid notice under section 143(2) cannot serve as the jurisdictional foundation for assessment proceedings under section 143(3).

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid, void ab initio, and incapable of conferring jurisdiction; the assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was therefore quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice required by the Act must be signed as mandated by section 282A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and an unsigned notice under section 143(2) is invalid and cannot confer jurisdiction for assessment under section 143(3).

Issues: (i) whether the proportionate disallowance of deduction under section 80IA on profits from NLD/ILD services and exclusion of other services income was justified; (ii) whether telecom payments made to foreign operators were chargeable as royalty so as to attract disallowance under section 40(a)(i); (iii) whether the ad hoc disallowance for alleged non-deduction of tax on office running and maintenance expenses required verification; and (iv) whether the transfer pricing adjustment, including rejection of the assessee's TNMM and limited risk model and adoption of the other method, was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the proportionate disallowance of deduction under section 80IA on profits from NLD/ILD services and exclusion of other services income was justified.

Analysis: The deduction under section 80IA was already available to the assessee's telecommunication undertaking, and the dispute concerned whether the later NLD/ILD activity constituted a separate new undertaking or only an of the existing eligible business. The Tribunal followed its own earlier orders in the assessee's case and accepted that the factual matrix remained the same, with the telecommunication business having commenced before the sunset date and the later licences not creating a separate undertaking for deduction purposes.

Conclusion: The disallowance was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether telecom payments made to foreign operators were chargeable as royalty so as to attract disallowance under section 40(a)(i).

Analysis: The payments were for data transmission and telecom connectivity services outside India. The Tribunal applied the jurisdictional High Court view that retrospective amendments to the domestic royalty definition do not expand the scope of the treaty definition, and that such telecom services do not constitute royalty under the applicable tax treaty. As the sums were not chargeable to tax in India, no withholding obligation arose under section 195.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the ad hoc disallowance for alleged non-deduction of tax on office running and maintenance expenses required verification.

Analysis: The assessee asserted that the amount had already been disallowed suo motu in the return computation, and the Revenue sought remand for verification. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify the factual claim and apply the law accordingly.

Conclusion: The issue was remanded for verification and was not finally decided on merits.

Issue (iv): Whether the transfer pricing adjustment, including rejection of the assessee's TNMM and limited risk model and adoption of the other method, was sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the group's telecom operating model, the inter-company service arrangement, the agreed compensation mechanism, and the benchmarking adopted by the assessee. It held that the assessee's entity-level remuneration structure and the consistent acceptance of the model in earlier years could not be ignored without cogent contrary material. At the same time, the Tribunal accepted only part of the assessee's computation and found that the TPO's approach was overly simplistic in ignoring the agreed mechanism and the commercial structure of the global operations. The adjustment was therefore not sustained in full.

Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was partly deleted and the issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained substantial relief on the deduction under section 80IA and the royalty-based disallowance, received remand on one ancillary disallowance issue, and secured partial relief on transfer pricing, leaving only limited adjustment to be dealt with in accordance with the Tribunal's directions.

Ratio Decidendi: A telecommunication activity that is only an expansion of an already eligible undertaking does not lose section 80IA benefit merely because later licences are obtained, and telecom data transmission payments are not royalty where the treaty definition cannot be enlarged by retrospective domestic amendment.

Issues: Whether the respondent's acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was unsustainable because the cheque was signed by the accused, statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose, and the accused failed to rebut the case of legally enforceable debt or liability.

Analysis: The cheque signature was admitted and both courts accepted that the cheque was executed by the accused. Once execution is admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operate that the cheque was issued for consideration and towards discharge of a debt or other liability. The surrounding facts, including presentation of the cheque, dishonour, service of statutory notice, and the absence of any reply or rebuttal evidence from the accused, supported the complainant's version. The defence regarding loss of cheque book, security cheque, or absence of funds was neither put effectively to the complainant nor established by independent evidence. The explanation regarding the complainant's financial capacity was found acceptable on the evidence and did not displace the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The respondent failed to rebut the statutory presumptions, and the acquittal was not justified. The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the sentence were restored in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether leave should be granted to the petitioner to amend the writ petition to join Daiwa Securities Group INC as a necessary party and related directions on amendment, service and listing.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual position that, if the Department's contention succeeded, Daiwa Securities Group INC would be the affected party and therefore a necessary party to the writ petition. The Court considered the petitioner's request to join Daiwa Securities Group INC and found it appropriate in the circumstances to permit the procedural amendment. The Court specified timelines for carrying out the amendment, dispensing with re-verification, and directed service on the newly added respondent with a returnable date for further directions.

Conclusion: Leave is granted to the petitioner to amend the writ petition to join Daiwa Securities Group INC as Respondent No. 3 within two weeks from uploading of the order; re-verification is dispensed with; the petitioner shall effect service on the newly added respondent returnable on 16th April, 2026; the matter is listed for directions on 16th April, 2026.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of properties belonging to the appellant under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was justified on the finding that such properties represented proceeds of crime or were purchased with proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The appeal challenged confirmation of a provisional attachment order under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The record shows multiple FIRs and an ECIR describing a scheme of collecting funds from investors and diverting them into purchases and transfers. Material on record includes direct transfers from the main accused to sellers and transfers into the appellant's bank account and property acquisitions in the appellant's name. The appellant relied on asserted transfers to her husband and on her alleged government service and savings, but did not produce the husband's bank statements or other documentary evidence to establish that the impugned transfers derived from legitimate savings and not from proceeds of crime. The principle that provisional attachment may be made in respect of property in the possession of a person who is a recipient of proceeds of crime, even if not an accused, applies; the precondition under Section 5(1) is satisfaction from material in possession that the property is derived from criminal activity. The appellant failed to discharge the reverse burden to show that the impugned transfers were legitimate and maintained over the intervening period.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment of the appellant's properties was justified and the confirmation of the provisional attachment order is upheld; the appeal is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge to the confirmation of provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is rejected for failure to rebut material indicating that the properties or funds were proceeds of crime.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, provisional attachment under Section 5(1) may be ordered against a person in possession of proceeds of crime even if not an accused, and the recipient must discharge the reverse burden by adducing credible evidence that the property or transfers are not derived from criminal activity; failure to do so permits confirmation of provisional attachment.

Issues: (i) Whether registration under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be cancelled with retrospective effect where the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation; (ii) Whether an order of cancellation is unsustainable where supporting documents relied upon are not supplied, and the cancellation order is cryptic/non speaking and shows no due application of mind.

Issue (i): Whether registration under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be cancelled with retrospective effect where the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the powers to cancel registration retrospectively, and considered authorities emphasising that retrospective cancellation is permissible only upon specific contingencies and that both the show cause notice and the consequent order must reflect the proposal and reasons for retrospective effect. The Court noted that the show cause notice did not propose retrospective cancellation nor supply the material relied upon, and that principles of fair procedure require notice of the specific action proposed so that the affected person can meet the case.

Conclusion: Registration cannot be validly cancelled with retrospective effect where the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation and the affected person was not put on notice of the retrospective character of the action. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an order of cancellation is unsustainable where supporting documents relied upon are not supplied, and the cancellation order is cryptic/non speaking and shows no due application of mind.

Analysis: The Court considered the content of the show cause notice and the cancellation order, and applicable rules (including Rule 21 and Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017), finding that the order merely reproduced the notice without identifying or discussing the material basis for cancellation or demonstrating application of mind. The Court applied settled principles that a quasi judicial authority must act fairly, disclose the material relied upon where indicated, afford an opportunity of hearing, and record reasons especially when invoking retrospective consequences; absence of such reasoning and disclosure renders the order vitiated.

Conclusion: The cancellation order is unsustainable where supporting documents were not supplied, and the order is cryptic/non speaking and shows no due application of mind. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned cancellation order is set aside, subject to the authorities being free to recommence proceedings or recover dues in accordance with law after serving proper notice, supplying material relied upon and affording an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Retrospective cancellation under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires that the show cause notice propose retrospective effect and that any order of retrospective cancellation state reasons and demonstrate due application of mind; failure to supply supporting documents or to record reasons and provide proper notice renders the cancellation order unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether registration can be cancelled retrospectively when the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation; (ii) Whether proceedings are vitiated where supportive documents mentioned in the show cause notice were not supplied to the taxpayer; (iii) Whether an order of cancellation that is cryptic and non-speaking is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether registration can be cancelled retrospectively when the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation.

Analysis: Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retrospective cancellation subject to the conditions within the provision. An order cancelling registration with retrospective effect must reflect the reasons and contingencies relied upon and the show cause notice must put the taxpayer on notice of the intention to cancel retrospectively; absent such proposal or material, retrospective cancellation cannot be mechanically applied.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation is not sustainable where the show cause notice does not propose retrospective cancellation and the order does not disclose reasons for retrospective effect; conclusion favours the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings are vitiated where supportive documents mentioned in the show cause notice were not supplied to the taxpayer.

Analysis: A show cause notice that refers to attached supporting material must either supply that material or identify the material on which action is proposed so that the taxpayer can meaningfully respond; failure to supply or identify such material undermines the fairness of the proceedings.

Conclusion: Proceedings are vitiated by non-supply of supportive documents; conclusion favours the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether an order of cancellation that is cryptic and non-speaking is sustainable.

Analysis: An order exercising the power under Section 29 must record application of mind and reasons that disclose the factual basis and legal justification for cancellation; an order that is cryptic, lacks reference to material relied upon and does not demonstrate due application of mind is unsustainable.

Conclusion: A cryptic and non-speaking cancellation order is unsustainable; conclusion favours the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The cancellation order is set aside and respondent authorities are granted liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, including retrospective cancellation only after serving proper notice, supplying supporting material and affording an opportunity of hearing in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An order under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 cancelling registration with retrospective effect must be reasoned and the show cause notice must propose the retrospective action and supply or identify the material relied upon; absent these, retrospective cancellation and cryptic non-speaking orders are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 03/08/2022 and the consequent assessment dated 12/03/2024 are valid where the satisfaction note recording that seized material relates to the assessee was recorded and notice issued about ten months after completion of assessment of the searched person.

Analysis: The issue requires examination of the timing and validity of recording satisfaction and issuance of notice under provisions materially akin to Section 158BD as interpreted by higher courts and applied to Section 153C. The legal framework includes the requirement that a satisfaction note is a prerequisite and may be recorded at or along with initiation of proceedings against the searched person, in the course of assessment proceedings, or immediately after completion of assessment, together with CBDT Circular No.24/2015 which implements and directs compliance with the Supreme Court's guidelines. Authorities referenced establish that where recording of satisfaction and issuance of notice after completion of assessment is not done immediately and there is an undue delay (as in a gap of about ten months), the action falls outside the permissible temporal contours and the notice and consequent assessment are vitiated by lapse of the immediacy requirement. The divergent authority relied upon by the Revenue does not negate the applicability of the favourable view to the assessee where higher courts and CBDT guidance require prompt action.

Conclusion: The notice issued under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 03/08/2022 and the assessment order dated 12/03/2024 are invalid and void ab initio and are quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the final assessment orders passed under section 153C read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 17/01/2025 for assessment years 2016-17 to 2019-20 are barred by limitation under section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the timeline: search in the case of the searched person occurred on 22/10/2019; satisfaction for initiation under section 153C was recorded on 02/08/2022 and notice under section 153C was issued on 03/08/2022. Section 153B prescribes the time limit for completion of assessments in cases of search assessments, and, for searches conducted on or after 1 April 2019, the relevant period for persons covered by section 153C is twelve months from the end of the financial year in which books of account or documents seized are handed over to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over the other person (or twelve months from end of the financial year in which the last authorization was executed, whichever is later). The Tribunal held that the fourth proviso or other extensions relied upon by the Revenue do not operate to extend the twelve-month period under section 153B except where a reference under section 92CA (transfer pricing) is made. Applying section 153B to the facts, the Tribunal concluded that the assessments required completion by 31/03/2024 (twelve months from end of the financial year in which notice under section 153C was issued) and that the final orders dated 17/01/2025 were therefore beyond the statutory period.

Conclusion: The final assessment orders passed under section 153C read with section 144C(13) dated 17/01/2025 for assessment years 2016-17 to 2019-20 are barred by limitation under section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and are quashed; the appeals are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where assessments are framed under section 153C consequent to search and seizure, the time limit prescribed by section 153B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies; the twelve-month period (as substituted for searches on or after 1 April 2019) governs completion of assessment for persons under section 153C and an extension of that period is available only where a reference under section 92CA is made for transfer pricing, and not otherwise.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to cash refund of accumulated unutilized credit of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess lying unutilised as on 30.06.2017 under Section 140 and Section 142 of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The question turns on the scope of the transitional provisions in Section 140 of the CGST Act, 2017 and the availability of refund under Section 142(3). Section 140(1) permits carry forward/transition only of eligible duties and taxes as defined in the Act, which does not include Education Cess, Secondary & Higher Education Cess or Krishi Kalyan Cess. The Tribunal relied on the Larger Bench decision in M/s. KEI Industries Ltd., relevant circulars and judicial precedents (including the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sutherland Global Services and the Supreme Court in UOI & Ors. vs. VKC Footsteps) which collectively establish that these cesses were not subsumed in the GST regime and that no statutory provision permits their transition or cash refund. Prior decisions holding otherwise (e.g., Slovak India) were distinguished or doubted by later authoritative rulings. The statutory scheme of Cenvat Credit Rules and prior case-law also show that such cesses were subject to specific utilization rules and in many instances had been held to be non-refundable or lapsed prior to GST, thereby negating a vested refundable right.

Conclusion: The appellant is not entitled to refund or transition of accumulated unutilized credit of Education Cess, Secondary & Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess as on 30.06.2017. Decision against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings and assessment under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were validly initiated against the assessee in absence of a satisfaction note recorded by the AO of the searched person; (ii) Whether assessment for AY 2010-11 under Section 153C is barred by limitation when computed from the date of satisfaction/handing over of seized material.

Issue (i): Jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 153C in absence of satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person.

Analysis: The record shows no satisfaction note recorded by the AO of the searched person in the name of the assessee; precedents establish that recording of a satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person is a pre requisite before transmitting material and initiating proceedings under Section 153C. Relevant tribunal and higher court decisions construe the satisfaction note requirement as jurisdictional.

Conclusion: Proceedings and the assessment under Section 153C are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed for lack of the required satisfaction note. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Computation of limitation for making assessment under Section 153C - whether AY 2010-11 is time barred when limitation is computed from the date of satisfaction/handing over of seized material.

Analysis: The satisfaction/handing over of seized material to the AO occurred on 24.6.2022 (deemed search year AY 2023 24); applying the established rule that the date of satisfaction/handing over is to be treated as the search date for reckoning assessment years, AY 2010 11 falls outside the permissible block of years. Recent authoritative decisions support computing limitation from the date of satisfaction/handing over.

Conclusion: The assessment for AY 2010 11 is barred by limitation and is quashed. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both jurisdictional defect (absence of satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person) and limitation computed from the date of handing over of seized material render the impugned assessment unsustainable in law; the appellate order deleting the additions is upheld and the revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Recording of a satisfaction note by the assessing officer of the searched person is a jurisdictional prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the date of satisfaction/handing over of seized material is to be used for computing the limitation period for assessments under Section 153C.

Issues: (i) Whether registration under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be cancelled with retrospective effect when such retrospective cancellation was not proposed in the show cause notice; (ii) Whether proceedings are vitiated where supporting documents referred to in the show cause notice were not supplied to the registrant; (iii) Whether an order of cancellation that is cryptic or non-speaking and does not reflect reasons or application of mind is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether registration under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be cancelled with retrospective effect when such retrospective cancellation was not proposed in the show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retrospective cancellation subject to the conditions contained therein. The power to cancel retrospectively must be exercised on specified contingencies and the order of cancellation with retrospective effect must reflect the reasons and premises for such action. A show cause notice initiating cancellation proceedings is required to put the registrant on notice of the specific proposal sought to be acted upon, including retrospective cancellation if intended.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation cannot be validly imposed where the show cause notice did not propose retrospective cancellation and the order does not state reasons justifying retrospective effect; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings are vitiated where supporting documents referred to in the show cause notice were not supplied to the registrant.

Analysis: A show cause notice that refers to case-specific supporting documents must either supply such material or identify the material on which the authority relies, to enable effective response. Failure to supply or disclose the relied-upon supporting documents deprives the registrant of a meaningful opportunity to contest the proposal.

Conclusion: Proceedings are vitiated by non-supply of supporting documents; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether an order of cancellation that is cryptic or non-speaking and does not reflect reasons or application of mind is sustainable.

Analysis: An order under Section 29 must demonstrate due application of mind and set out reasons for cancellation, particularly when retrospective effect is imposed. A cryptic or non-speaking order that merely records cancellation without referencing material or reasons fails to meet this requirement and cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: A cryptic or non-speaking cancellation order is unsustainable; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned cancellation order is set aside; respondent-authorities are granted liberty to proceed lawfully, including serving proper notice, supplying relied-upon material, affording an opportunity of hearing, and passing a reasoned order if justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retrospective cancellation only when expressly proposed and supported by reasons and material; absence of proposal in the show cause notice, failure to supply supporting documents, and issuance of a non-speaking order negate the validity of retrospective cancellation.