Issues: Whether the scrutiny notice and assessment were invalid for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, and whether the jurisdictional defect could be cured by participation in proceedings.

Analysis: The assessee's returned income placed the case within the monetary limit requiring assessment by an Assistant or Deputy Commissioner under the applicable CBDT instruction, whereas the scrutiny notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued by an Income-tax Officer. No order transferring jurisdiction under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was shown. In these circumstances, the notice was issued by an lacking the requisite jurisdiction, and the defect went to the root of the proceedings. The plea that the defect was cured by section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not accepted, since that provision does not validate a notice issued without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The notice was bad in law and the consequential assessment could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge succeeded, and the additions and disallowance were not examined on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A scrutiny notice issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction is a foundational jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured by participation or by section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the resulting assessment is void.

Issues: Whether the services classified as construction of complex service were exigible to service tax for the period prior to 01.07.2010, and whether the confirmation of demand, interest and penalties was sustainable.

Analysis: The period in dispute fell before 01.07.2010. The liability was examined in the light of the Board circulars and the amendment to section 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994 by insertion of the explanation from 01.07.2010. On that basis, construction of complex service for the relevant period was held not liable to service tax. Since the demand itself was unsustainable for the relevant period, the associated interest and penalties could not survive.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax for the period prior to 01.07.2010 was unsustainable, and the confirmation of interest and penalties was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned order and the appellate rejection warranted interference and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication on payment of an additional pre-deposit.

Analysis: The Court noted the petitioner's willingness to deposit an additional 15% of the disputed tax over and above the 10% already pre-deposited, and recorded an endorsement to that effect. Following the consistent course adopted in similar matters, the Court found it appropriate to remit the matter for fresh decision on merits, subject to deposit of the additional amount within the stipulated time. The Court also directed filing of a reply to the show cause notice with supporting documents, provided for adjustment of amounts already recovered, and ordered that the bank attachment would stand lifted upon compliance, while preserving the respondent's right to proceed in case of default.

Conclusion: The matter was remitted for fresh adjudication subject to the stipulated additional pre-deposit and compliance conditions, with consequential relief regarding bank attachment upon compliance.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained conditional relief by way of remand for reconsideration on merits, while the impugned determination was not finally affirmed.

Issues: Whether the applicant's query on utilisation of SGST input tax credit for discharging IGST liability, while SGST output liability remained unpaid and CGST credit was still available, was an admissible question for advance ruling and whether the application was liable to be rejected at the admission stage.

Analysis: The advance ruling jurisdiction is confined to the specific classes of questions enumerated in Section 97(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The query raised did not seek a ruling on classification, notification, time or value of supply, admissibility of input tax credit, liability to pay tax, registration, or whether a transaction amounts to supply. Instead, it sought clarification on the procedure for setting off an already ascertained tax liability, which is governed by the statutory mechanism under Section 49(5), Section 49A and Rule 88A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The Authority therefore held that the issue lay outside the scope of advance ruling and was not liable for admission.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable as an advance ruling request and was rejected under Section 98(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the collection of subscription and provision of services to members, and the organisation of educational seminars and workshops for member doctors, constitute business under section 2(17)(e) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. (ii) Whether those activities amount to supply under section 7(1)(aa) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, despite the plea of mutuality. (iii) Whether member subscription fees collected from members are a supply under GST.

Issue (i): Whether the collection of subscription and provision of services to members, and the organisation of educational seminars and workshops for member doctors, constitute business under section 2(17)(e) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The provision defines business to include activities of a club, association, society, or similar body supplying facilities or benefits to its members for subscription or other consideration. On the facts found, the activities relating to collection of subscription and provision of services to members, as well as seminars and workshops for member doctors, fell within that inclusive definition.

Conclusion: Yes. Those activities constitute business under section 2(17)(e) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (ii): Whether those activities amount to supply under section 7(1)(aa) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, despite the plea of mutuality.

Analysis: Section 7(1)(aa), inserted retrospectively and accompanied by an explanation deeming a body and its members to be separate persons, brings transactions by a person other than an individual with its members within the scope of supply for GST. The deeming provision overrides the mutuality objection for the activities in question, and the cited authorities do not alter that statutory position.

Conclusion: Yes. Those activities are supply under section 7(1)(aa) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the plea of mutuality does not apply.

Issue (iii): Whether member subscription fees collected from members are a supply under GST.

Analysis: The subscription fees were part of the consideration for the association's dealings with its members and, on the reasoning applied to the second issue, fell within the statutory deeming of supply under section 7(1)(aa).

Conclusion: Yes. Member subscription fees collected from members are a supply under GST.

Final Conclusion: The ruling holds the impugned member-related activities taxable under GST as business and supply, and rejects the mutuality-based exclusion for those transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute creates a deeming fiction treating a body and its members as separate persons for transactions between them, mutuality cannot exclude such member-related transactions from the scope of supply, and subscription-based member benefits fall within taxable supply.

Issues: (i) whether the value of scrap generated during manufacture on job-work basis was includible in the assessable value of the drums cleared to the principal manufacturer; (ii) whether delivery charges received from the principal manufacturer were liable to be included in the assessable value.

Issue (i): whether the value of scrap generated during manufacture on job-work basis was includible in the assessable value of the drums cleared to the principal manufacturer.

Analysis: The drums were cleared after taking into account the entire cost of the metal sheets supplied free of cost by the principal manufacturer, and the scrap generated in the course of manufacture was separately cleared on payment of duty. In such circumstances, the value of scrap could not again be added while computing duty on the finished drums. The reasoning followed the settled principle that where the intermediate or scrap element is itself duty-paid, its value is not to be loaded into the assessable value of the finished product.

Conclusion: The value of scrap was not includible in the assessable value, and the demand on this count was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): whether delivery charges received from the principal manufacturer were liable to be included in the assessable value.

Analysis: The delivery charges were in the nature of transportation charges paid by the principal manufacturer, and duty or service tax treatment on those charges was not disputed. The governing valuation principle permits exclusion of transportation cost beyond the place of removal, and on the facts the charges did not constitute an additional element of assessable value of the manufactured drums. The prior dispute history and the revenue-neutral character of the transaction also supported the conclusion that the demand could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The delivery charges were not includible in the assessable value, and the demand on this count was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed demands on both scrap and delivery charges were set aside, and the appeals succeeded with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: In job-work valuation, amounts attributable to separately duty-paid scrap or to transportation/delivery charges beyond the assessable stage are not includible in the assessable value as additional consideration.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment order dated 23.08.2024 (Assessment Year 2019-2020) passed in absence of a reply to the show cause notice is liable to be quashed and remitted for fresh adjudication subject to a condition of pre-deposit of a portion of the disputed tax.

Analysis: The impugned order was passed without the reply to the Show Cause Notice in Form GST DRC-01 dated 20.05.2024. A portion of the demand related to disputed input tax credit that had already been allowed by the Appellate Authority by order dated 16.12.2025 relying on Circular No.193/15/2023 dated 17.07.2023. The petitioner offered to pre-deposit fifty percent of the disputed tax (less the amount covered by the appellate order) to enable de novo adjudication. In similar precedents, orders passed in absence of a reply have been quashed and remitted with directions for fresh adjudication on merits subject to deposit of a specified portion of the disputed tax; compliance with stipulated conditions leads to vacation of provisional attachments and an opportunity for final adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 23.08.2024 is quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh adjudication on merits. Fresh adjudication is to be proceeded with only if the petitioner deposits 50% of the disputed tax (less the amount covered by the appellate order dated 16.12.2025) within thirty days and files a reply to the Show Cause Notice; on compliance, provisional attachment, if any, shall be vacated and respondent shall pass final order expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment order is passed without considering the reply to the statutory show cause proceedings and the assessee offers a pre-deposit, the order may be quashed and the matter remitted for de novo adjudication on merits subject to a specified pre-deposit and filing of the requisite reply, with provisional attachments being vacated upon compliance.

Issues: Whether the impugned ex parte assessment order dated 31.05.2023 confirming demand in Form GST DRC-01 dated 24.01.2023 should be set aside/remitted for fresh adjudication in view of recovery from the Electronic Liability Ledger and the petitioner's entitlement to an opportunity to file reply and substantiate defence.

Analysis: The Court noted that the impugned assessment order was passed ex parte in absence of the petitioner's reply to the show cause notice. The record indicates that the disputed tax and penalty were recovered from the petitioner's Electronic Liability Ledger on 04.03.2024. In these circumstances the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to restore the opportunity of hearing by remitting the matter to the assessing authority for a fresh decision on merits, subject to the petitioner filing a reply with supporting documents within thirty days and subject to the authority verifying whether recovery from the electronic ledger has indeed taken place. The Court directed that, if the petitioner complies, the authority shall pass a final order on merits expeditiously, and any bank attachment shall stand vacated provided there are no other arrears for other tax periods; conversely, non-compliance permits the authority to proceed as if the writ petition were dismissed.

Conclusion: The impugned ex parte assessment order is remitted to the respondent for fresh adjudication on merits after affording the petitioner the stipulated opportunity to file a reply and produce documents. Conditional relief (vacation of bank attachment) is granted subject to compliance and verification of recovery.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking quashing of the criminal prosecution and directions for reconsideration of the tax assessment and related representation was maintainable in the circumstances, and what relief, if any, could be granted to the petitioner.

Analysis: The petitioner, being the former Managing Director during the relevant financial year, was treated as a person responsible for the company's tax compliance and therefore had a connection with the assessment orders and the consequent prosecution. At the same time, the assessment orders remained operative, and the petitioner had already pursued statutory remedies. The proper course against the appellate and tribunal orders lay in an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The writ court declined to unsettle or review the tribunal order in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Court noted that the Official Liquidator ought to have considered the petitioner's representation and that the petitioner should not be left remediless pending such consideration.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable only to a limited extent for protective and ancillary relief. The Court declined to grant the substantive prayer to quash the prosecution or directly order reassessment, and instead left the petitioner to pursue an appeal under Section 260A while directing consideration of the representation and granting interim protection against precipitative action.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained limited relief in aid of pursuing the statutory appellate remedy, but the substantive tax and criminal challenges were not decided in his favour in these writ proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment order remains in force and a statutory appellate remedy is available, writ jurisdiction will not be used to bypass or review the tribunal process, though limited protective directions may be issued to prevent immediate prejudice pending recourse to the proper remedy.

Issues: Whether a reassessment initiated and a notice under Section 148 issued in the name of an erstwhile company that had ceased to exist on conversion into an LLP is valid, and whether the reassessment order passed in the name of the non-existent company is liable to be quashed.

Analysis: Applicable law includes provisions on reopening and reassessment under Section 148 and Section 147 and succession to business under Section 170 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; Section 292B as to procedural irregularities; and statutory effect of conversion under Section 58(4)(c) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act. Authorities of coordinate benches and higher courts establish that where a predecessor entity ceases to exist before assessment is made, the assessment in the name of that non-existent entity is invalid unless the successor is assessed under section 170(2). Prior findings of the appellate authority that the notice was issued in the name of a non-existent entity were not challenged by the revenue before the Tribunal. The record shows the company had been converted into an LLP with effect from 16.10.2017 and therefore ceased to exist for purposes of assessment when the notice dated 30.03.2019 was issued; established precedent and statutory succession principles require assessment to be made on the successor where the predecessor cannot be found.

Conclusion: The notice issued under Section 148 in the name of the non-existent erstwhile company is invalid and the consequent reassessment order is quashed; the revenue appeal is dismissed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and consequent reassessment orders passed in the name of an erstwhile company which stood amalgamated and ceased to exist are valid, and whether such reassessment proceedings and assessment orders are to be quashed.

Analysis: Section 170 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 governs succession to a business otherwise than on death and provides that where a predecessor cannot be found the successor is to be assessed in like manner and to the same extent; by amalgamation the amalgamating company ceases to exist and the amalgamated company succeeds to the business. The record shows the amalgamation order was placed on company records and the MCA master data reflected the status as "Amalgamated" prior to issuance of notices dated 27.07.2022. Binding authority establishes that issuance of jurisdictional notices and assessment orders in the name of a non-existent entity is a substantive illegality (referenced precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pr. CIT vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and consistent decisions of coordinate benches and High Court), and assessments made on entities that have ceased to exist are void ab initio. Applying section 170(2) and the cited precedents to the facts, notices issued and reassessment proceedings initiated in the name of the non-existent amalgamating company are invalid.

Conclusion: Notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequent reassessment orders passed in the name of the erstwhile company are invalid and are quashed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether semen sorting services qualify as an exempt service under GST similar to exemption granted to semen doses; (ii) Whether semen sorting services are classifiable under SAC 9986; (iii) In absence of a specific notification or classification, under which HSN/SAC code should semen sorting services be categorised.

Issue (i): Whether semen sorting services qualify as an exempt service under GST similar to exemption granted to semen doses.

Analysis: Semen sorting is an intermediate production process performed on semen belonging to semen stations and returned to them after processing. The activity supports artificial insemination and the rearing of animals, and falls within the scope of support services to animal husbandry. Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) entry for Heading 9986 provides nil rate for intermediate production processes as job work related to rearing of all life forms of animals. Entry No. 55A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and notifications exempting bovine semen demonstrate legislative intent to exempt activities related to artificial insemination.

Conclusion: Semen sorting services are exempt from payment of GST.

Issue (ii): Whether semen sorting services are classifiable under SAC 9986.

Analysis: The service is rendered as job work on goods (semen) belonging to another registered person within the meaning of Section 2(68) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The service is a specialized intermediate process that supports animal husbandry and artificial insemination. Heading 9986 specifically covers support services to agriculture and animal husbandry, including intermediate production processes carried out as job work related to rearing of animals. Prefatory guidance requires choosing the most specific description where differential treatment is possible.

Conclusion: Semen sorting services are classifiable under SAC 9986.

Issue (iii): In the absence of a specific notification or classification, under which HSN/SAC code should semen sorting services be categorized?

Analysis: A specific heading takes precedence over a residual 'not elsewhere classified' entry. Since Heading 9986 specifically covers intermediate job work processes related to rearing of animals and applies to the services in question, resort to a residual entry is not warranted.

Conclusion: Not applicable in view of the rulings on Issues (i) and (ii).

Final Conclusion: Semen sorting services are support services to animal husbandry and qualify as job work; they are exempt from GST and are to be classified under SAC 9986 rather than under any residual SAC.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a service is an intermediate production process performed as job work on goods belonging to another registered person and specifically falls within a heading providing exemption, the specific heading (here Heading 9986) prevails over residual 'not elsewhere classified' entries, entitling the service to the exemption prescribed by the relevant notification.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of declared value based on a statement recorded in English when the declarant claims limited education is correct; (ii) Whether rejection of declared value based on soft copies of two invoices downloaded from the appellant's laptop dated later than import is correct; (iii) Whether rejection of declared value when the appellant produced local sale invoices is correct; (iv) Whether re-determination of value on the basis of contemporaneous imports from same supplier is correct; (v) Whether demand of differential duty, confiscation, fines and penalties under specified provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 is correct.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of declared value based on a statement recorded in English when the declarant claims limited education is correct.

Analysis: The statement contains an English-language handwritten attestation but the declarant asserts limited education and that the statement was not recorded in a language known to him. The legal requirement is that a statement must be recorded in a language understood by the deponent for it to be treated as voluntary. Reliance on the single English attestation is insufficient to establish voluntariness where the deponent disputes comprehension.

Conclusion: The statement cannot be legally treated as a voluntary statement and cannot be the sole basis for rejection of declared value. Conclusion in favour of the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of declared value based on soft copies of two invoices downloaded from the appellant's laptop dated later than import is correct.

Analysis: One of the downloaded invoices post-dates the imports under dispute and the other invoice dates do not match the bills of entry; contemporaneity and direct linkage are absent. The appellant retracted his earlier statement admitting the documents, engaging Section 138C compliance issues. Precedents relied upon by Revenue are distinguishable on facts where dates and corroborative packing details matched; here those features are missing.

Conclusion: The soft copies of the two downloaded invoices cannot be treated as parallel invoices or reliable evidence to reject declared value. Conclusion in favour of the Appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether rejection of declared value when the appellant produced local sale invoices is correct.

Analysis: Local sale invoices showing resale prices were submitted and were not rebutted by Revenue. The adjudicating authority rejected those invoices by conjecture that sales may have been at loss without examining whether the sale invoices corroborate the declared import value. Rule 12 requires that rejection be based on reasoned enquiry and opportunity to the importer; comparable commercial factors must be considered before overriding such evidence.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authorities erred in disregarding local sale invoices without proper evaluation; this weighs in favour of the Appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether re-determination of value on the basis of contemporaneous imports from same supplier is correct.

Analysis: Re-determination requires demonstration that contemporaneous imports are identical or sufficiently comparable considering quantity, quality, model differences and other commercial factors. The Worksheets supplied lacked item descriptions for most comparators; only two items had adequate particulars. Absent adequate particulars and notice to the importer, reliance on higher contemporaneous prices for global re-determination is unsustainable.

Conclusion: Re-determination of value on the basis of the contemporaneous imports relied upon is not justified except insofar as two specifically identified items; overall conclusion in favour of the Appellant.

Issue (v): Whether demand of differential duty, confiscation, fine and penalties under Sections 28(4), 111(d), 111(m), 125, 114A and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 is correct.

Analysis: The fiscal consequences flow from lawful rejection and re-determination of value and from admissible evidence establishing mis-declaration. Given that the foundational bases for rejection and re-determination (voluntary statement and parallel invoices) are either inadmissible or unproved for most items, the consequential demand, confiscation and penalties cannot stand.

Conclusion: The demand of differential duty, confiscation, fine and penalties as imposed is not sustainable. Conclusion in favour of the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: All appealed issues are decided in favour of the Appellant and against Revenue; the impugned order-in-appeal is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statement relied upon for valuation is retracted or not shown to be voluntary and contemporaneous electronic invoices lack date linkage or corroborative particulars, declared transaction value cannot be rejected and re-determination cannot be upheld absent specific, verifiable contemporaneous comparators and proper compliance with procedural safeguards under Rule 12 and Sections 108/138C framework.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority's approval of the resolution plan complied with the requirement that operational creditors (employees) receive not less than the higher of (i) their liquidation entitlement or (ii) the percentage payable to unsecured financial creditors, and whether the order dated 05.12.2025 recording the undertaking regarding employees' payout was contravened.

Analysis: The resolution plan earmarked a fixed aggregate amount for employees and proposed payments which, when compared with amounts payable to unsecured financial creditors under the plan, resulted in employees receiving a higher percentage than unsecured financial creditors. The admitted liquidation value of operational creditors was nil given the insufficiency of the plan consideration against secured creditors' claims. The relevant statutory benchmark is the requirement in Section 30(2)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that operational creditors be paid not less than the higher of (i) the amount payable in liquidation or (ii) the amount that would be paid if distribution followed the priority in section 53. The order recorded on 05.12.2025 stated that employees' payout would be the higher of twelve months' entitlement or the percentage payable to unsecured financial creditors; the practical application requires comparison of actual percentages under the resolution plan and liquidation realizations. The figures on record show unsecured financial creditors were to receive approximately 0.96% of their claims while employees were allocated amounts greater than that percentage and greater than their liquidation entitlement (which was nil). The undertaking recorded on 05.12.2025 is therefore satisfied when assessed by the comparative payout test mandated by Section 30(2)(b). No valid ground was established for interfering with the approval of the resolution plan.

Conclusion: Appeal dismissed; the approval of the resolution plan is in compliance with Section 30(2)(b) and the 05.12.2025 undertaking was not contravened.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a resolution plan allocates payments such that operational creditors receive a percentage higher than that payable to unsecured financial creditors and their liquidation entitlement is nil, the requirement of Section 30(2)(b) that operational creditors receive not less than the higher of liquidation entitlement or the percentage payable to unsecured financial creditors is satisfied.

Issues: Whether the impleadment application filed by the suspended director seeking to be made a party to the appeal should be allowed.

Analysis: The application for impleadment was examined against the standard for joinder under the civil procedure rule governing impleadment, namely whether the lis cannot be effectively decided in the applicant's absence. The application did not establish that the appeal could not be effectively adjudicated without the applicant; the grounds asserted were not substantiated by supporting material demonstrating necessity. The subject matter of the appeal is confined to the admission of a petition under the insolvency statute and the alleged non-consideration of allegations falling within fraud provisions. The resolution professional had entered appearance and filed responses, and the professional's statutory powers and capacity to obtain information from former management were noted as adequate to protect the corporate debtor's interests. The application appeared aimed at affecting the decree in separate commercial proceedings rather than demonstrating a direct, indispensable interest in the instant lis. On these bases, the impleadment application failed to satisfy the impleadment test.

Conclusion: The impleadment application is rejected; the applicant is not a necessary party and need not be impleaded in the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant is eligible for cum tax benefit under Section 67(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 when invoices show service tax separately but the tenant did not pay the service tax; (ii) Whether invocation of extended period of limitation and imposition of penalty is sustainable where duty along with interest was paid prior to issuance of show cause notice and there was no suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant can claim cum tax benefit under Section 67(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 though invoices issued by the appellant separately show service tax which the tenant did not pay.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the invoices relied upon by the adjudicating authority which expressly showed service tax separately. It noted that where tax is shown separately in invoices, the service provider has the option to recover the tax component by debit note or other lawful recovery; mere non-receipt of the tax component from the recipient does not permit treating the gross amount as inclusive of tax. The Tribunal distinguished authorities relied upon by the appellant on facts where invoices did not separately disclose tax.

Conclusion: The appellant is not entitled to treat the gross amount as inclusive of service tax under Section 67(2) for the invoices that expressly showed service tax; demand of duty and interest on the gross amount is upheld (against the appellant).

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty are to be invoked where the appellant had paid duty with interest prior to issue of show cause notice and no suppression of facts is established.

Analysis: The Tribunal recorded that the appellant paid the differential duty along with interest before issuance of the show cause notice and had filed statutory returns; the conduct demonstrated bonafide, and there was no material to show deliberate suppression of facts. The adjudicating authority and Commissioner (Appeals) had noted prior payment and partial payment of penalty; taking these facts into account, the Tribunal considered provisions permitting mitigation of penalty.

Conclusion: Invocation of extended period of limitation and penalty is not sustained in the appellant's favour; the Tribunal set aside the penalty while upholding the duty and interest.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed insofar as penalty is set aside; the demand of duty and interest as assessed is sustained. The decision confirms that where invoices expressly show service tax separately, non-receipt of the tax component from the recipient does not permit treating the gross amount as inclusive under Section 67(2), but payment of duty with interest prior to show cause may justify relief from penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Where invoices expressly disclose service tax separately, the service provider cannot treat the gross amount as inclusive under Section 67(2) merely because the recipient did not pay the tax; however, payment of duty with interest prior to show cause notice and absence of deliberate suppression can justify setting aside penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether value of granite slabs and tiles cleared by a 100% EOU into DTA is to be determined by reference to the DGFT minimum import price (MIP) or under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the benefit of Notification No.23/2003-CE dated 31.03.2003 is available to the appellant for advance DTA sales permitted under para 6.8(k) of the Foreign Trade Policy.

Issue (i): Whether value of granite slabs and tiles cleared by the appellant (a 100% EOU) in DTA sales will be governed by DGFT notification fixing Minimum Import Price (MIP) or under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 3(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 directs that duties on excisable goods produced by a 100% EOU and brought to any other place in India shall be an amount equal to customs duties leviable on like imported goods and that where customs duties are chargeable by reference to value the value of such excisable goods shall be determined in accordance with the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. There was no independent evidence of manipulation of transaction value or of payment equal to MIP; the department enhanced assessable value solely by applying DGFT MIP notification. The Tribunal has precedent authority (Crystal Granite and Marble Pvt. Ltd.) holding that MIP fixed by DGFT for imports cannot automatically supplant transactional value determined under customs valuation rules where no special circumstances justify rejection of transaction value.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The value of the goods cleared into DTA by the 100% EOU must be determined under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Customs Valuation Rules, 2007; the departmental enhancement based solely on DGFT MIP is set aside and the demand of Rs.3,33,83,762/- is annulled.

Issue (ii): Whether benefit of Notification No.23/2003-CE dated 31.03.2003 is available to the appellant on advance DTA sales made by it.

Analysis: The conditions of Notification No.23/2003-CE require that concessional duty apply only to DTA clearances made in accordance with specified sub-paragraphs (a), (d), (e) and (g) of para 6.8 of the Foreign Trade Policy. Advance DTA sales permitted to the appellant were governed by para 6.8(k). The permission letter contained conditions including execution of a differential duty bond and monitoring requirements; the permission was operable only upon fulfillment of those conditions. The record shows non-execution of the differential duty bond and ER-2 returns that did not disclose the specific para 6.8(k) basis, supporting the department's invocation of extended limitation. Relevant tribunal and court precedents uphold denial of Notification No.23/2003-CE benefit for advance DTA sales under para 6.8(k) where conditions are not satisfied.

Conclusion: In favour of the revenue. Benefit of Notification No.23/2003-CE is not available for the appellant's advance DTA sales under para 6.8(k); the demand of Rs.28,59,386/- along with interest is confirmed, but penalty under Section 11AC is not imposed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed - valuation-based demand founded solely on DGFT MIP is quashed while the demand relating to non-entitlement to concessional Notification No.23/2003-CE for advance DTA sales is upheld; consequential interest is sustained and penalty is remitted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where duties on goods manufactured by a 100% EOU and cleared into DTA are chargeable by reference to value, the value must be determined under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007; a DGFT minimum import price cannot by itself displace transaction value absent cogent evidence justifying rejection of transaction value.

Issues: (i) Whether modular kitchens imported in CKD/SKD condition are classifiable as furniture under Chapter 94 and whether DGOV furniture guidelines can govern valuation; (ii) Whether rejection of declared value in 11 Bills of Entry under Rule 12 and redetermination under Rule 4 was legally justified; (iii) Whether acceptance of declared value in the remaining Bills of Entry was contrary to Rule 3(3).

Issue (i): Whether modular kitchens imported in CKD/SKD condition are classifiable as furniture under Chapter 94 and whether DGOV furniture guidelines can govern valuation.

Analysis: Classification is to be determined at the time of import and in the condition in which the goods are imported. Modular kitchen components imported in CKD/SKD condition remain movable goods at import and are covered by Chapter 94, which includes unit furniture designed to be fixed to walls or assembled according to space requirements. The subsequent installation at site does not alter tariff classification. However, classification under Chapter 94 does not by itself authorise use of DGOV benchmark guidelines in place of the statutory valuation scheme under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.

Conclusion: Modular kitchens imported in CKD/SKD condition are classifiable under Chapter 94 as furniture, but DGOV guidelines cannot override the statutory valuation rules.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of declared value in 11 Bills of Entry under Rule 12 and redetermination under Rule 4 was legally justified.

Analysis: The rejection rested mainly on relationship between the parties and a derived per kilogram comparison with earlier imports. The invoices were not weight-based, and the per kilogram figure was only an arithmetical construct made by dividing CIF value by weight. Rule 4 requires comparison with identical or similar goods at the same commercial level and in substantially the same quantity, with real comparability in model, specification and sale conditions. No adequate evidence of identicality or similarity was established, nor was it shown that the relationship influenced the price by any flow-back, additional consideration or compensatory arrangement. The variation in derived per kilogram values, by itself, was insufficient to reject transaction value under Rule 12 read with Rule 4.

Conclusion: Rejection of the declared value in the 11 Bills of Entry was not legally sustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether acceptance of declared value in the remaining Bills of Entry was contrary to Rule 3(3).

Analysis: Rule 3(3)(a) requires acceptance of transaction value if examination of the circumstances of sale indicates that the relationship did not influence the price. The record showed broad consistency across the bulk of the consignments, and no reliable contemporaneous third-party data was produced to show systematic undervaluation in the remaining Bills of Entry. Mere existence of relationship does not justify rejection of transaction value absent specific grounds.

Conclusion: Acceptance of declared value in the remaining Bills of Entry was consistent with Rule 3(3)(a).

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the imported modular kitchens were correctly treated as furniture for classification purposes, but the Department did not establish a lawful basis for rejection of transaction value or for enhancement of assessable value under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification of imported goods must be determined on their condition at the time of import, but valuation can be disturbed only on the specific statutory grounds prescribed under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007, with real comparability and proof that relationship influenced price.

Issues: (i) Whether aircraft imported claiming exemption under Notification No. 21/2002-Customs (S. No. 347B, Condition No. 104) for non-scheduled (passenger) services can be used for non-scheduled (charter) services without forfeiting the exemption; and whether the impugned order denying the exemption, demanding duty, confiscating the aircraft and imposing penalties can be sustained.

Analysis: The matter concerns the scope and applicability of Condition No. 104 of Notification No. 21/2002-Customs (S. No. 347B) which grants conditional exemption to aircraft imported for providing non-scheduled (passenger) or non-scheduled (charter) services, subject to approval by the competent civil aviation authority and an undertaking limiting use to the specified purpose and liability to pay duty if the condition is violated. The larger bench decision in VRL Logistics answered the reference holding that aircraft imported for non-scheduled (passenger) services can be used for non-scheduled (charter) services, that the customs authority cannot re-examine DGCA approval in absence of its cancellation, and that the exemption conditions should be interpreted consistently with the notification's text and related civil aviation regulatory framework. Applying that precedent to the present facts, where the import was under the cited notification and the factual finding was charter use, the larger bench principle governs the legal question of interchangeability of non-scheduled passenger and charter uses under the notification.

Conclusion: The impugned order denying exemption and imposing duty, confiscation and penalties is set aside; the exemption under Notification No. 21/2002-Customs (S. No. 347B, Condition No. 104) applies and relief is granted to the appellants (in favour of the assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether payments drawn by the suspended management towards managerial remuneration for FY 2019-2020 constitute wrongful or fraudulent trading under Section 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) If so, whether the amounts withdrawn ought to be refunded to the corporate debtor.

Issue (i): Whether payments drawn by the suspended management towards managerial remuneration for FY 2019-2020 constitute wrongful or fraudulent trading under Section 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined documentary evidence including ledger entries, claim admissions on the IBBI claims portal, the Transaction Audit Report and bank statements. It applied the high evidentiary threshold applicable to Section 66, requiring cogent proof of intent to defraud beyond suspicion or presumption. The records showed admitted remuneration claims for the appellants, corresponding ledger entries and withdrawals dated substantially before the commencement of CIRP. There was no pleading or evidence of falsification of records or conclusive proof linking the withdrawals to an intent to defraud creditors. Proximity of withdrawal dates to CIRP was factually disproved for the principal withdrawals and routing through a sister concern was found to be a standard business practice absent specific proof of siphoning.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the withdrawals of managerial remuneration for FY 2019-2020, except as noted separately, do not satisfy the requirements of Section 66 and cannot be characterised as wrongful or fraudulent trading. This conclusion is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the amounts withdrawn ought to be refunded to the corporate debtor.

Analysis: The Tribunal distinguished between the different withdrawal dates and transactions. While most withdrawals were supported by ledger entries and occurred well before CIRP commencement, one cheque for Rs. 2,00,000 was drawn on 30.06.2022 and was cleared after CIRP admission, and the appellants conceded recovery of Rs. 2.78 lakhs relating to a post-CIRP transaction. Given the timing and the appellants' knowledge of imminent insolvency as to the 30.06.2022 cheque and the admitted ineligibility of the Rs. 2.78 lakhs, the Tribunal found that those specific amounts should be restored to the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The Tribunal directed restoration of Rs. 2,00,000 (cheque dated 30.06.2022) and Rs. 2.78 lakhs (amount agreed to be restored) to the corporate debtor. This disposition is partly against the appellants for the specified sums and partly in their favour for the remainder.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order holding the managerial remuneration withdrawals for FY 2019-2020 to be vitiated by fraud under Section 66 is set aside, except that specified sums (Rs. 2,00,000 and Rs. 2.78 lakhs) are to be restored to the corporate debtor; the appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 can be invoked only on cogent and unimpeachable evidence demonstrating deliberate intent to defraud creditors; payments made in the ordinary course with admitted claims and supporting ledger entries, and occurring prior to CIRP commencement, do not attract Section 66 absent specific proof of fraudulent intent.