Outcome: The appeal was dismissed for low tax effect, leaving the question of law open.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee, being a single-member LLC, was entitled to treaty benefits under Article 4 of the India-USA DTAA. (ii) Whether receipts from offshore aircraft engine repair and overhaul services were taxable as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and as fees for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee, being a single-member LLC, was entitled to treaty benefits under Article 4 of the India-USA DTAA.

Analysis: The relevant test was whether the assessee was "liable to tax" in the United States, not whether tax was paid in its own hands. The tax residency certificate treated the LLC as a business unit of a U.S. corporation resident in the United States for U.S. taxation purposes, and the assessee was allotted a tax identification number. The absence of direct taxation in the hands of the LLC did not defeat treaty residence where the income was taxed in the hands of the U.S. tax resident member. The cited co-ordinate bench decisions on fiscally transparent entities were followed.

Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to the benefit of the India-USA DTAA, and the Revenue's objection on residence was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from offshore aircraft engine repair and overhaul services were taxable as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and as fees for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA.

Analysis: The services were rendered entirely offshore and involved repair, overhaul, inspection, replacement and refurbishment of aircraft engine parts. For treaty purposes, the decisive question was whether technical knowledge, skill, know-how or processes were made available to the Indian customers so that they could perform the services independently in future. The record did not show transfer of technology, technical plan or technical design, nor any enabling of the customers to carry out the repairs on their own. Continued recourse by customers to the assessee also negatived the make-available condition. The Tribunal followed earlier co-ordinate bench rulings on materially similar repair-and-maintenance receipts.

Conclusion: The receipts were held not taxable as fees for technical services or fees for included services, and the addition was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The treaty benefit issue and the taxability issue were both decided in favour of the assessee, resulting in deletion of the impugned addition, while the penalty ground remained premature and the interest ground was consequential.

Ratio Decidendi: For treaty residence, liability to tax is distinct from actual payment of tax; for repair and maintenance receipts to qualify as treaty-based technical fees, the service provider must make available technical knowledge or skills enabling the recipient to perform the service independently in future.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee (M/s Micro Finance Industry Network) is entitled to registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and consequential approval under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the activities of the assessee qualify as advancement of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or fall within the exclusion for services in relation to trade, commerce or business.

Issue (i): Entitlement to registration under Section 12AB and consequential approval under Section 80G.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed the activities, expenditures and documentary material produced by the assessee including grievance redressal in vernacular languages, depositor education and awareness workshops, digital capacity building, consumer awareness campaigns, pan-India research commissioned for policy, data collection for regulatory compliance and the fact that the assessee is recognised as an SRO by the Reserve Bank of India. The Tribunal observed that the assessing authority's cancellation/rejection was premised on viewing the assessee as an industry body serving only members and functioning like a commercial entity. The Tribunal found that the record contains substantial evidence of activities directed at borrowers and the larger public and noted that the question of registration under Section 12AB and consequential 80G approval requires fresh adjudication in light of Supreme Court guidance applying the proviso to Section 2(15).

Conclusion: The matter of registration under Section 12AB and consequential Section 80G approval is remitted to the file of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) for fresh adjudication.

Issue (ii): Characterisation of the assessee's activities under Section 2(15) - whether excluded as services in relation to trade, commerce or business.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the proviso to Section 2(15) and the Supreme Court's analysis in ACIT v. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority regarding trade-promotion bodies and the need to examine whether services constitute provision of services "in relation to" trade or whether the receipts fall within prescribed limits. The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s conclusion that the assessee's functions are regulatory or member-focused, and therefore non-charitable, did not adequately appreciate evidence of public-facing activities (grievance helpline, awareness workshops, research for RBI, consumer protection measures). The Tribunal directed that the CIT(E) should re-examine the applicability of the proviso to Section 2(15) and the quantum/nature of receipts and services in light of the Supreme Court ratio.

Conclusion: The issue whether the assessee's activities are excluded under the proviso to Section 2(15) is to be reconsidered by the CIT(E) in conformity with the Supreme Court's ratio; no final adverse finding is sustained by the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are directed to be remitted for fresh consideration by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) to determine entitlement to registration under Section 12AB and consequential 80G approval after applying the Supreme Court's guidance on the proviso to Section 2(15); the Tribunal allows the appeals for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an organisation performs regulatory, awareness, grievance redressal and consumer-protection functions that demonstrably benefit end-users or the public at large, the question whether such functions fall within the exclusion in the proviso to Section 2(15) must be examined year-wise and factually; if the activities and receipts satisfy the limits and tests laid down by the Supreme Court, registration under Section 12AB and related approvals cannot be rejected without fresh, reasoned adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer was justified in treating the amount declared under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 as unexplained investment and bringing it to tax in Assessment Year 2017-18; (ii) Whether the higher tax rate under Section 115BBE (60%) applies to the undisclosed income in the present case.

Issue (i): Whether the amount of Rs. 25,62,000 declared under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 can be treated as unexplained investment and taxed in Assessment Year 2017-18.

Analysis: The declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 was not fully discharged by payment of tax, surcharge and penalty within the time specified. Section 187(3) of the Finance Act, 2016 deems a declaration not paid within the specified time to have never been made. Section 197(b) of the Finance Act, 2016 provides that where tax, surcharge and penalty are not paid within the time specified, the undisclosed income shall be chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act in the previous year in which the declaration is made. The declaration was made during Financial Year 2016-17, and no satisfactory explanation for the source of the declared amount has been furnished, permitting the invocation of provisions relating to unexplained investment.

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the 60% tax rate under Section 115BBE applies to the undisclosed income in this case.

Analysis: The relevant provision increasing the tax rate to 60% was not retrospective. The higher rate applies from 1 April 2017 (Assessment Year 2018-19) onwards; prior to that date the 30% rate applies. The undisclosed income is chargeable in Financial Year 2016-17 relevant to Assessment Year 2017-18 and therefore the higher 60% rate under Section 115BBE is not applicable to this case.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 25,62,000 as unexplained investment is upheld and taxable in Assessment Year 2017-18, but the tax rate applied to that addition must be computed at 30% rather than 60%; appeal is partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 is not fully paid within the time specified, Section 187(3) of the Finance Act, 2016 deems the declaration never made and Section 197(b) of the Finance Act, 2016 renders the undisclosed income chargeable in the previous year of declaration; further, Section 115BBE's increased 60% tax rate is not retrospective and does not apply to income chargeable for Financial Year 2016-17.

Issues: Whether the substitution of condition (6) of Notification No. 110/95-Cus dated 05.06.1995 by Notification No. 42/98-Cus dated 30.06.1998 (adding the word "premises") operates with retrospective effect and thereby entitles the appellant to the benefit of exemption despite installation of imported capital goods at a testing laboratory rather than the registered factory premises.

Analysis: The substituted text of condition (6) replaces the earlier requirement that capital goods be installed in the importer's "factory" with installation in the importer's "factory or premises", thereby curing an omission in the original notification. Substitution in subordinate legislation can effect repeal of the earlier provision and introduce the new provision in its place; where the substitution corrects an obvious omission and advances the benevolent purpose of an exemption notification, it may be given retrospective effect. Exemption notifications are to receive a beneficent construction so that eligible parties are not deprived of benefits by a drafting omission. The show cause proceedings were issued after the substituted notification was in force and the authority was therefore required to consider the substituted wording adding "premises" when determining entitlement to exemption.

Conclusion: The substituted condition (6) introduced by Notification No. 42/98-Cus dated 30.06.1998 applies with retrospective effect in the circumstances of this case; the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the exemption under Notification No. 110/95-Cus as amended by Notification No. 42/98-Cus, and the impugned orders confirming duty are quashed in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether the Respondents were justified in rejecting the Petitioner's claim under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 and refusing to issue Form SVLDRS-4 on the ground that payment was not made within the stipulated time when the Petitioner made the payment during the extended period but faced technical difficulties in generation/upload of challan.

Analysis: The petition challenges the administrative rejection dated 13.12.2023 and seeks quashing of that rejection and the earlier attachment dated 18.01.2016. The Court examined the object and purpose of the SVS, 2019 as a one-time measure intended for liquidation of legacy disputes and disclosure of unpaid taxes and noted authoritative decisions holding that benefits under the scheme should not be denied on hyper-technical grounds for which the assessee is not at fault. The Petitioner demonstrated payment during the period extended because of the COVID-19 pandemic and showed repeated attempts and communications regarding technical failure to generate/upload the challan; the Department relied on non-payment within the original timeframe. Considering the scheme's remedial object, the Court treated the technical inability to complete electronic payment (including automatic CPIN expiry and returned payment) as a genuine difficulty and found the rejection to be arbitrary and to amount to non-application of mind, contrary to settled precedents permitting relief where procedural formalities break down due to factors beyond the petitioner's control.

Conclusion: The letter/order dated 13th December 2023 rejecting issuance of Form SVLDRS-4 is quashed and set aside; the order of attachment dated 18th January 2016 is quashed and set aside; the Respondents are directed to issue Form SVLDRS-4 to the Petitioner within four weeks.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory or executive settlement scheme is intended as a one-time remedial measure, benefits under the scheme cannot be denied on hyper-technical grounds for which the applicant is not responsible; genuine technical inability to comply with electronic payment formalities, especially during a period extended for force majeure, warrants relief and quashing of administrative rejection.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned show cause notice in Form GST REG-17 dated 15.04.2025 and the order of cancellation in Form GST REG-19 dated 14.05.2025, issued/passed under Rule 22(1) and Rule 22(3) of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 read with Section 29(2)(e) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, are vitiated for want of reasons and findings; (ii) Whether the appellate authority's disposal dated 29.12.2025 violated procedural fairness by obtaining para-wise remarks from the Deputy State Tax Officer and not providing those remarks to the petitioner, thereby denying an opportunity to controvert them.

Issue (i): Whether the show cause notice and order of cancellation were invalid for failure to record reasons and findings.

Analysis: The impugned proceedings only referenced Section 29(2)(e) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 without attaching supporting materials or recording specific findings on the facts forming the basis for cancellation. The absence of reasons and any application of mind in the notice and the cancellation order deprived the petitioner of a clear factual and legal basis to respond, undermining the procedural requisites inherent in administrative cancellations under the cited provisions and Rules.

Conclusion: The show cause notice dated 15.04.2025 and the cancellation order dated 14.05.2025 are set aside for failure to record reasons and findings and for non-application of mind.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority's procedure in seeking para-wise remarks and not furnishing them to the petitioner denied a fair opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The appellate authority obtained para-wise remarks from the Deputy State Tax Officer and proceeded without furnishing those remarks to the petitioner for rebuttal, despite the petitioner's appearance. This procedure denied the petitioner an opportunity to controvert material relied upon at the appellate stage and breached the requirement of fair hearing in adjudicatory and appellate processes under the GST framework.

Conclusion: The appellate order dated 29.12.2025 is set aside for violation of procedural fairness by not providing the petitioner an opportunity to controvert the para-wise remarks obtained from the assessing officer.

Final Conclusion: The show cause notice, the cancellation order and the appellate order are quashed and the matter is remanded to the proper officer for fresh adjudication in accordance with law with an opportunity to submit reply and for personal hearing; the writ petition is disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative orders of cancellation under Section 29(2)(e) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rules 22(1) and 22(3) of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 must record sufficient reasons and findings and afford the affected person an opportunity to receive and controvert material relied upon, failing which the orders are liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh decision.

Issues: Whether adjudication proceedings under the Telangana Goods and Services Tax regime for assessment years 2019-20 to 2023-24 can proceed without relying on certain seized original files that are missing from the department's custody, and whether the petitioner is entitled to rely upon or require production of those missing originals for effective adjudication.

Analysis: The dispute concerns seized documents covering multiple tax periods, some original files of which are stated to be missing from departmental custody while scanned copies have been provided. The State has undertaken that originals that are not available will not be relied upon in the adjudication for the specified years and that other available files and materials will be placed before the petitioner with an opportunity to file replies and attend hearing in accordance with the procedural scheme governing goods and services tax adjudication. The statement on instructions about non-reliance upon missing originals and provision of other materials forms the operative basis for allowing the adjudicatory process to continue; the petitioner retains the procedural right to receive copies of available materials and to furnish supplementary replies and to participate in hearings so as to secure a fair adjudication.

Conclusion: Decision permitting adjudication to proceed on the basis of available materials while excluding reliance on missing original seized files and preserving the petitioner's right to receive copies, file supplementary replies and be heard - in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether the assessment order dated 22.12.2025 passed under Section 73 of the TNGST Act, 2017 is maintainable where the turnover appears to include the tax component and amounts from a Puducherry branch, and whether the matter requires reconsideration by the assessing Authority.

Analysis: The impugned assessment records consideration of the petitioner's contention regarding inclusion of GST in the turnover figure and the Pondicherry branch entries and does not expressly reject that contention; the assessing Authority computed totals indicating a discrepancy but proceeded to dismiss the petitioner's claims in toto. The assessment raises the possibility that inclusion of the tax component in declared turnover may result in double taxation and therefore warrants fresh examination. The petitioner had responded to the show cause notice and supplied GSTR-9C and related replies before the Authority. The question concerning inclusion of the tax component was not shown to be a mere afterthought solely to avoid the appellate pre-deposit requirement and can be addressed by the Authority on reconsideration.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 22.12.2025 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent/Authority for fresh consideration; the petitioner shall deposit Rs.5,00,000 within four weeks from receipt of certified copy, upon which the Authority shall hear the petitioner afresh and decide the matter in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging show cause notices and consequent demand orders under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is maintainable on grounds of denial of fair opportunity of hearing and to avoid the statutory pre-deposit requirement, notwithstanding availability of an alternative appellate remedy.

Analysis: The proceedings under challenge arose after notices under Section 61 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and subsequent show cause notices under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the show cause notices and final orders were uploaded on the common portal in terms of Section 169(1)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner did not respond to the notices under Section 61 nor to the show cause notices issued under Section 73 and did not seek a personal hearing before the Proper Officer within the time provided. Medical incapacity was asserted for non-participation, but no reply was filed with the authority when the show cause notices were pending. The challenges to factual determinations and clerical mismatches in GSTR-1/3B are matters that can be agitated before the Appellate Authority, subject to the statutory pre-deposit and limitation conditions. The petition invoking writ jurisdiction was primarily to avoid the statutory pre-deposit and to re-litigate issues which the statutory appeal mechanism is equipped to decide.

Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed on the ground that there was no violation of the principle of natural justice and an alternate remedy by way of appeal is available; the petition is not maintainable to bypass the statutory pre-deposit requirement.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxpayer fails to avail the opportunity of hearing before the proper officer and an effective statutory appellate remedy exists subject to pre-deposit and limitation conditions, writ jurisdiction is not to be exercised to re-open disputed tax demands or to avoid statutory pre-deposit requirements.

Issues: Whether the enhancement of income effected by processing the return under section 143(1) and reflected in the intimation could be treated as a variation within the DRP/draft assessment proceedings and required adjudication by the assessing officer on merits, including consideration of pending rectification proceedings.

Analysis: The processing adjustment under section 143(1) was carried into the draft and final assessment computations such that the intimation effectively merged with the draft assessment under section 144C(1). Evidence of pending rectification applications filed under section 154 before the jurisdictional and faceless officers, and communications made by the assessee in that regard, were on record. Given these facts, the enhancements originating in the 143(1) intimation fell within the scope of variations that required adjudication in the assessment proceedings; therefore those adjustments ought to be examined on merits after permitting the assessee to produce and rely upon relevant explanations and evidence.

Conclusion: The matter is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication on the additions made in the intimation under section 143(1), permitting the assessee to file/add evidence and requiring the AO to decide the adjustments on merits. Grounds 1 to 6 are allowed for statistical purposes; grounds 7 to 9 are consequential.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed by restoring the issue of enhancements made in the 143(1) intimation to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication and by allowing the appeal for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where enhancements in a 143(1) intimation are incorporated into draft assessment computations and rectification proceedings are pending, those enhancements constitute variations requiring merit adjudication and entitlement to opportunity to present evidence; therefore the assessment must be reopened for de novo consideration.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were validly initiated on the basis of the AO's recorded satisfaction when the AO relied on investigational information about rotation of funds without independent application of mind or tangible material linking those transactions to escapement of income.

Analysis: The tribunal examined whether the reasons recorded by the AO formed a bona fide "reason to believe" as required for reopening under Section 147 read with Section 148 and sanction under Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The material before the AO consisted principally of an investigation wing communication describing regular RTGS credits and debits showing rotation of funds among related entities, bank statements, and company account figures (paid-up capital, securities premium, investments, bank balance). The AO treated the investigational suggestion of possible rotation as indicating escapement of income and issued notice without making preliminary inquiries to establish a nexus between the material and any income chargeable to tax. The tribunal analysed authorities emphasising that the AO must have definite, relevant material having a live link to escapement of income and must apply independent mind rather than act on borrowed satisfaction. The tribunal found that the AO recorded satisfaction based on suspicion and the investigational message without placing the original material on record or conducting basic verification to show any income had arisen or escaped assessment. The rotation of funds in itself, without evidence that it generated assessable income, was not sufficient to constitute an unexplained credit under Section 68 or to justify reopening under Section 147. The prescribed authority under Section 151 also failed to apply mind to these defects.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid. The AO's satisfaction under Section 147/148 was based on suspicion and a borrowed investigational opinion lacking a live link to escapement of income and without independent application of mind; therefore the reopening is quashed and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For valid reopening under Section 147 read with Section 148 and sanction under Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the AO must have honest belief grounded on definite, relevant material that has a live link or nexus to escapement of income; mere rotation of funds or investigational suspicion without independent verification and tangible material is insufficient to form such belief.

Issues: Whether the withholding of the imported consignment of Walnut Kernels and the imposition of an additional bank guarantee for release, after provisional assessment and furnishing of a provisional duty bond and after defacement/verification of the certificate of origin, was lawful.

Analysis: The factual matrix shows that the consignment was examined (100% physical examination), documents including certificates of origin were verified and defaced by the Customs officers, and the Bill of Entry was provisionally assessed with a condition for furnishing a provisional duty bond which was furnished by the Petitioner. The Respondent Department later imposed an additional condition of furnishing a bank guarantee without assigning reasons or producing material contradicting the verified origin or the earlier provisional assessment. The impugned demand for a bank guarantee rested on the asserted uncertainty arising from vessel IGM details, but the administrative record contains verification steps taken by Customs and Plant Protection authorities and no material was produced to show the consignment did not originate from a contracting state under SAFTA.

Conclusion: The imposition of an additional bank guarantee and continued withholding of the consignment despite provisional assessment, production of the provisional duty bond and verification/defacement of the certificate of origin was arbitrary and not sustainable; relief in favour of the Petitioner is granted and the Respondent Department is directed to release the consignment on acceptance of the provisional duty bond.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a consignment has been fully examined, the certificate of origin verified and defaced by authorities, and the importer has furnished the provisional duty bond following provisional assessment, a further unilateral requirement of a bank guarantee for release cannot be imposed arbitrarily in the absence of specific contrary material.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act are independent of action taken under Section 67 of the CGST Act; (ii) Whether material collected during an allegedly illegal search and seizure can be relied upon in proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act if it is relevant; (iii) Whether the proper officer may rely upon material gathered by officers of another Commissionerate and whether writ interference with the show cause notice at the threshold is warranted.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act are independent of action taken under Section 67 of the CGST Act.

Analysis: Section 74 creates a self-contained adjudicatory scheme for cases of tax not paid, short paid, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment of input tax credit. Its initiation is not made conditional upon a prior or valid action under Section 67. The statutory text does not make the exercise of power under Section 74 dependent on the outcome or legality of inspection, search, or seizure proceedings under Section 67.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 74 are independent and are not contingent upon action under Section 67.

Issue (ii): Whether material collected during an allegedly illegal search and seizure can be relied upon in proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act if it is relevant.

Analysis: The governing principle is that relevancy, not the source of collection alone, determines whether material may be used in adjudicatory proceedings, unless the statute expressly excludes such use. Neither Section 67 nor Section 74 contains an express or implied prohibition against relying on material gathered in search and seizure proceedings. The Court applied the settled rule that illegally obtained evidence is not excluded merely for that reason if it remains relevant to the controversy and is subjected to adjudication in accordance with law.

Conclusion: Such material is not inadmissible merely because the search is alleged to be illegal, provided the material is relevant to the proceedings under Section 74.

Issue (iii): Whether the proper officer may rely upon material gathered by officers of another Commissionerate and whether writ interference with the show cause notice at the threshold is warranted.

Analysis: The statutory scheme permits the proper officer to act on material available in his possession, and the source of that material is not restricted to his own territorial investigation. Material collected by another Commissionerate may be forwarded and used if it bears on the alleged evasion and is furnished to the noticee for reply. Since the noticee has an opportunity to contest relevancy and admissibility in adjudication, interference at the stage of the show cause notice was considered premature.

Conclusion: The proper officer may rely on material gathered by another Commissionerate, and threshold writ interference with the show cause notice is unwarranted.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court restored the show cause notice, held that the adjudicatory process under Section 74 could continue on the basis of the material collected, and left the parties to contest the merits before the proper officer.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act, the decisive consideration is the relevancy of material available to the proper officer, and not whether such material originated from a search alleged to be illegal or from an officer of another Commissionerate, unless the statute expressly prohibits its use.

Issues: (i) In the facts and circumstances of the present case, whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of concessional rate of tax at 0.1% under Notification: 41/2017-I.T. (Rate), dated 23.10.2017?

Analysis: The Court examined the text of Notification No. 41/2017-I.T. (Rate) dated 23.10.2017 and the Minutes of the 22nd GST Council Meeting (06.10.2017). The Notification grants a concessional IGST rate subject to specified conditions including that (v) the registered recipient shall place an order on the registered supplier and furnish a copy to the supplier's jurisdictional officer, (vi) the registered recipient shall move the goods from the place of the registered supplier directly to the port/ICD/airport/LCS or directly to a registered warehouse from where they will be exported, and (vii) where aggregation from multiple suppliers occurs the goods shall first move to a registered warehouse with endorsed invoices and acknowledgements. The Court applied settled principles on interpretation of exemption/concession notifications, including that such notifications must be strictly construed and the assessee bears the burden of proving eligibility; purposive interpretation applies only where ambiguity exists. On the undisputed facts, the merchant exporter (registered recipient) placed the order but the supply was effected to the premises of a chemical manufacturer (a person other than the registered recipient) who packed the goods subsequently supplied to the merchant exporter. This did not satisfy the Notification's requirement that both the order and the supply/movement be between the registered supplier and the registered recipient (or to a registered warehouse as permitted by the Notification). The Court held that accepting the petitioner's construction would effectively rewrite or dilute the express conditions of the Notification, which is impermissible.

Conclusion: The petitioner is not entitled to the concessional rate of tax under Notification No. 41/2017-I.T. (Rate) dated 23.10.2017; the writ petition is dismissed (decision in favour of the Revenue).

Issues: Whether input tax credit (ITC) claimed by the petitioner for the financial year 2018-19, though belated, is permissible in view of the retrospective insertion of Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which extends the time limit for availing ITC up to 30.11.2021 for specified financial years.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 16(4) and the subsequently inserted Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Section 16(5) was inserted by Section 118 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017 and operates as a non-obstante clause overriding the time restriction in Section 16(4) for invoices pertaining to financial years 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. The Court also noted the administrative clarifications including Notification No. 17/2024-Central Tax dated 27.09.2024 and Circular No. 237/31/2024-GST dated 15.10.2024 which explain implementation of subsection (5). The petitioner's GSTR-3B for March-2019 was filed on 28.10.2019, which falls within the extended period allowed under Section 16(5) (i.e., up to 30.11.2021). The Court limited its review to the legal permissibility of claiming ITC under the extended time and did not adjudicate factual eligibility; factual aspects were remitted to the authority for examination.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to claim ITC for the invoice pertaining to financial year 2018-19 as the return was filed within the extended period permitted by Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the Orders denying the ITC are set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority for factual determination of eligibility in accordance with the law.

Issues: (i) Whether interim relief in the form of a stay of the balance demand of Rs.377 crores for A.Y. 2017-18 should be granted and on what terms and conditions.

Analysis: The petition challenges rejection of a stay application and raises objection to the Order Giving Effect (OGE) dated 17th December 2025 on limitation grounds under Section 153(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with related references to communication under Section 153(3) and the consequent issuance of a demand under Section 156. The assessment order's validity (alleged unsigned) and pending appeals before the CIT(A) and the ITAT are relevant to the interim position. Balancing the risk to revenue and the petitioner's contentions, a security deposit mechanism was applied as an equitable interim measure. Credit for refunds payable to the petitioner for other assessment years was permitted to be adjusted against the required deposit, and a time limit was fixed for deposit, failing which the stay would not operate. The stay was ordered without adjudicating the merits of the limitation or assessment validity issues and with a direction for expedited disposal of the ITAT appeal.

Conclusion: Interim relief is granted in favour of the assessee on the following terms: on depositing a total of Rs.10 Crores with credit allowed for refunds of Rs.3,63,50,550 and Rs.2,24,92,890 (resulting in a net deposit of Rs.4,11,56,560 to be paid by 31st March 2026), the balance demand for A.Y. 2017-18 shall be stayed until disposal of the appeal before the CIT(A) or the ITAT, whichever is earlier; the Income-tax Department may adjust the refunds against the demand; the ITAT is requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously, preferably within four months of communication of this order.

Issues: Whether, for the purposes of Section 80-IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee who executed works on Koyna and Srisailam projects qualifies as a developer of infrastructure facilities and is therefore entitled to deduction under Section 80-IA(4).

Analysis: Section 80-IA (as amended) grants deduction to enterprises engaged in (i) developing, (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining an infrastructure facility, subject to specified conditions including ownership by a company registered in India, an agreement with government or statutory body and transfer to the government within the period stipulated. Legislative amendments and explanatory memoranda clarify that an enterprise engaged only in development can qualify. The statutory Explanation inserted by later Finance Acts excludes persons who merely execute works contracts, but eligibility depends on factual incidence of risks, control, planning and investment rather than labels in the agreement. Relevant factors to distinguish a developer from a works contractor include whether the enterprise bore financial, geological and operational risks, furnished and deployed substantial machinery and personnel, carried out design and execution decisions, and transferred possession of the developed facility to the government as required by agreement. Receipt of periodic payments under a contract does not, by itself, convert a development contract into a mere works contract. Ownership of underlying land remaining with the government does not preclude a developer claim where the developer was handed the site for development and thereafter handed back the completed facility in accordance with the agreement. Comparative authorities applying these principles support treating an entity as a developer where it bears entrepreneurial risk, undertakes design and execution, deploys substantial assets, and effects handing over upon completion.

Conclusion: The assessee is a developer within the meaning of Section 80-IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and is entitled to the deduction claimed; the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed and the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Securities and Exchange Board of India is empowered to take evidence under Section 11C of the SEBI Act, 1992 and whether the Securities Appellate Tribunal may conduct proceedings under Section 15U of the SEBI Act, 1992; (ii) Whether external enquiry reports that do not form part of the Board's investigation/enquiry can be relied upon by the Board or the Appellate Tribunal; (iii) Whether the imposition of costs of Rs.5,00,000 on the appellant was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the Securities and Exchange Board of India is empowered to take evidence under Section 11C of the SEBI Act, 1992 and whether the Securities Appellate Tribunal may conduct proceedings under Section 15U of the SEBI Act, 1992.

Analysis: The Court examined statutory powers conferred by the SEBI Act and observed that the Board is specifically empowered to take evidence for determining disputes, and that the Appellate Tribunal, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, is empowered to effectively conduct its proceedings under the cited provision.

Conclusion: The Securities and Exchange Board of India is empowered to take evidence under Section 11C of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Appellate Tribunal is empowered to conduct proceedings under Section 15U of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.

Issue (ii): Whether external enquiry reports that do not form part of the Board's investigation/enquiry can be relied upon by the Board or the Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The Court considered the evidentiary basis required for decisions by the Board and the Appellate Tribunal and emphasised that decisions must be founded on evidence brought on record; external enquiry reports which are not part of the Board's own investigation/enquiry lack the necessary evidentiary foundation for reliance by the statutory authorities.

Conclusion: External enquiry reports that do not form part of the Board's investigation/enquiry should not be relied upon by the Securities and Exchange Board of India or the Securities Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (iii): Whether the imposition of costs of Rs.5,00,000 on the appellant was justified.

Analysis: Applying the facts and circumstances of the case to the Court's assessment of costs, the Court reviewed the Tribunal's order imposing costs and found the imposition not justified.

Conclusion: The imposition of costs of Rs.5,00,000 on the appellant is set aside in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed of with the clarifications on the Board's and the Appellate Tribunal's powers and with the costs order against the appellant set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: The Board and the Appellate Tribunal must decide disputes on the basis of evidence brought on record; Section 11C of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 empowers the Board to take evidence and Section 15U of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 empowers the Appellate Tribunal to conduct its proceedings, and external enquiry reports not part of the Board's investigation are inadmissible for reliance by those authorities.