Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking relief against an order passed under Section 73 of the GST Act is maintainable when the statutory appellate forum under Section 112 is or becomes functional, and whether the statutory pre deposit requirement under Section 112(8) must be complied with before filing an appeal before the GSTAT.

Analysis: The Court found that where a statutory forum for second appeals is provided and has been made functional, the writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily supplant that remedy; however, in circumstances where the appellate tribunal is not constituted or functional a writ may be entertained to prevent remedilessness. The Court noted the legislative requirement in Section 112(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 imposing a pre deposit (payment of admitted amount and ten per cent of the remaining tax in dispute subject to the statutory cap) as a condition precedent to filing an appeal, and observed that this statutory condition must be strictly complied with even where the writ jurisdiction is sought. The Court took into account the executive timeline and notifications including the Government notification extending and specifying the period for filing appeals before the GSTAT and the User Advisory for the GSTAT e Filing Portal, and concluded that since the GSTAT has been made functional and filing timelines have been prescribed, the petitioner should avail the appellate remedy by complying with Section 112(8).

Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed; the petitioner is directed to comply with the pre deposit requirement under Section 112(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and to file the appeal before the GSTAT within the timeline specified by the notified portal advisory. This conclusion is against the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer could validly refer valuation of construction to the District Valuation Officer without first rejecting the assessee's books of account; (ii) Whether the valuation adopted should be based on State PWD rates rather than CPWD rates.

Issue (i): Whether referral to the District Valuation Officer was permissible in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The issue required examination of whether the Assessing Officer recorded sufficient contradiction or rejection of the books of account before seeking the DVO's opinion, and whether the material on record justified forming a belief to reopen assessment and seek valuation. The facts show initial return disclosures, subsequent inconsistent disclosure in the balance sheet, inquiries, and express findings in the assessment order that the books and documents exhibited discrepancies and were not relied upon. The Assessing Officer then sought the DVO's valuation after recording those inconsistencies. Precedents on the point were considered to determine the procedural precondition for seeking DVO's opinion.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer validly rejected the books of account on record and therefore the referral to the District Valuation Officer was permissible; this conclusion is against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the cost of construction ascertained by the DVO should be determined by adopting State PWD rates instead of CPWD rates.

Analysis: The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) examined the method of valuation used by the DVO and directed that State PWD rates be applied in place of CPWD rates. The Tribunal reviewed the records, the CIT(A)'s direction, and the parties' submissions regarding applicable valuation rates and found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s modification of the DVO's valuation method.

Conclusion: The assessment stands on the valuation adjusted in accordance with State PWD rates as directed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals); this determination is against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: On the questions presented, the impugned assessments and the appellate authority's decision were upheld; the Tax Case Appeal is dismissed and the additions determined as escaped income remain sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessing officer records and relies on specific inconsistencies in the books of account and documentary disclosures, the officer may reject the books for the limited purpose of forming a belief and validly refer valuation to the District Valuation Officer; valuation methodology is to be applied in accordance with appropriate public works department rates as directed by the appellate authority.

Issues: Whether the penalty appeal u/s 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 should be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC for adjudication after disposal of the pending quantum appeal.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the penalty appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC was dismissed for non-compliance while the quantum appeal remained pending. The Tribunal held that the penalty question is dependent on the outcome of the quantum proceedings and observed that the penalty appeal ought to be decided only after the quantum appeal is adjudicated. Considering the facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the penalty issue to the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC to be decided after the quantum appeal, with directions to afford the assessee an opportunity of hearing and decide the matter on facts and law.

Conclusion: The penalty appeal is restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC for adjudication after the quantum appeal is decided; decision given in favour of the assessee (grounds allowed for statistical purposes).

Issues: (i) Whether the Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) can be held liable for non-registration of sales contracts when those contracts, though registered with the Turkish Grain Board (TMO), were not reflected on the online portal accessible to the CBN; (ii) Whether the fixation of the Country Cap and the conduct surrounding registration/uploading violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India or otherwise amounted to arbitrariness warranting judicial interference.

Issue (i): Whether CBN is legally obliged to register contracts not reflected on the portal maintained by TMO.

Analysis: The MOU and Guidelines allocate the responsibility to maintain the online system to TMO and prescribe that CBN's role is to verify registrations as per details accessible on that portal and thereafter register and upload details. The Guidelines further distinguish registration by TMO and subsequent uploading for CBN's processing. The learned Single Judge's interpretation of these contractual and procedural provisions was plausible and within appellate restraint. The evidence shows the Appellants' contracts were not reflected on the portal because TMO did not upload them after the Country Cap was exhausted; there is no material establishing CBN overlooked contracts that were reflected or acted arbitrarily in processing reflected contracts. Judicial intervention to supervise procedures internal to a foreign authority operating under its own law is not warranted in the absence of a legal duty on the domestic authority to intervene.

Conclusion: CBN cannot be held liable for non-registration of contracts that were not reflected on the TMO portal; no legal duty arose on CBN to register or to override the TMO's uploading procedure.

Issue (ii): Whether fixation of the Country Cap or the registration/uploading process breached Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) by being arbitrary or unfair.

Analysis: Allocation of a limited state-controlled commercial opportunity (import quantity) engages principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness, but policy decisions on import regulation and country caps lie within the realm of economic policy and international arrangement. Legitimate expectation requires an enforceable right or established procedure. Here, the MOU places responsibility on the TMO to ensure registrations do not exceed the Country Cap and does not impose on CBN a supervisory obligation over TMO's internal uploading. No material established mala fides, manifest arbitrariness, or discriminatory countersigning by CBN; grievances about TMO's uploading procedure concern a foreign authority and do not supply a ground for writ relief against CBN.

Conclusion: The fixation of the Country Cap at the notified level and the non-uploading by TMO do not constitute a breach of Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) by CBN and do not attract judicial interference.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court finds the Single Judge's view plausible and declines to substitute its own assessment; the impugned judgment is upheld and the appeals lack merit.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a bilateral MOU and implementing Guidelines assign maintenance of an online registration portal and the initial registration function to a foreign authority, the domestic authority's duty to register arises only upon verification of contracts reflected on that portal; absent reflection and absent material showing arbitrariness or mala fides by the domestic authority, courts will not impose liability or supervise the procedural choices of the foreign authority.

Issues: Whether enhancement of the penalty imposed under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 was warranted in the appeal.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 prescribes only the ceiling of penalty and does not fix any irreducible minimum. The quantum of penalty is therefore left to the adjudicating authority's discretion, which must be exercised judiciously on the facts and evidence. The adjudicating authority had already imposed a substantial penalty in relation to the alleged contravention, and the record did not show any perversity or non-application of mind warranting interference. In the circumstances, enhancement was not considered justified.

Conclusion: The request for enhancement of penalty was rejected and the adjudication order was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute prescribes only a maximum penalty and no minimum, the quantum of penalty is discretionary and will not be interfered with in appeal if the discretion has been exercised judiciously on the facts of the case.

Issues: Whether the appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) was time barred under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The appellate time limits under Section 85(3A) require filing within two months of receipt of the order with an additional one month only upon showing sufficient cause. Proof of postal receipt requires evidence beyond mere despatch, such as delivery confirmation or postal acknowledgement. The departmental record showed despatch and absence of return; the recipient's affidavit established that the impugned order was received at the address in departmental records and was handed over to the appellant's representatives only on a later date due to the occupant's delay in informing them. The affidavit thereby evidences actual receipt at the recorded address and supports the conclusion that the department discharged the burden of establishing delivery.

Conclusion: The appeal was time barred and the appellate authority correctly rejected the appeal on grounds of delay.

Issues: (i) whether the amounts received from BCCI and the other receipts connected with cricket activities were liable to service tax as taxable services, (ii) whether the demand and penalty could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation, and (iii) whether the disallowance of CENVAT credit on account of absence of supporting documents and on rent-a-cab services was sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the amounts received from BCCI and the other receipts connected with cricket activities were liable to service tax as taxable services.

Analysis: The receipts were treated as grants and subventions from BCCI for promotion of cricket and not as consideration for any identified service. The services performed by the appellant were found to be naturally bundled with the primary activity of promoting sport. The ruling also applied the exemption available to promotion of sporting events before 30.06.2012 and under the Mega Exemption thereafter. The doctrine of mutuality was accepted to hold that receipts flowing inter se within the association structure could not be treated as taxable consideration.

Conclusion: The service tax demand on the receipts from BCCI and the other cricket-related receipts was not sustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): whether the demand and penalty could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The record showed regular filing of returns and disclosure of the relevant activities, so the department was not shown to have discovered any concealed material outside the assessee's records. In the absence of suppression with intent to evade tax, the extended limitation and the consequential penalty could not survive.

Conclusion: The invocation of the extended period of limitation and the related penalty were not sustainable.

Issue (iii): whether the disallowance of CENVAT credit on account of absence of supporting documents and on rent-a-cab services was sustainable.

Analysis: The denied credit was not shown to relate to ineligible input services, and the credit had been used against output tax liability. The rent-a-cab credit was held to have a business nexus, since the vehicles were used for players, match officials and staff in connection with matches, and there was no finding of personal use. The absence of the proof demanded in the impugned order was therefore not a valid basis for denial.

Conclusion: The disallowance of CENVAT credit on both counts was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned tax demand, interest, penalty and credit disallowances failed on merits and on limitation, and the assessee obtained complete relief while the revenue challenge did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Receipts that are grants or subsidies for promotion of sport, arising from a mutual association structure and forming part of naturally bundled sporting activities, are not taxable as consideration for service, and where disclosure is made in the assessee's records, extended limitation and related penalty cannot be invoked without proof of suppression.

Issues: (i) Whether suspension of the customs broker's licence under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 was justified on the basis of alleged contraventions of Regulation 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(n) of CBLR, 2018 and available prima facie material; (ii) Whether the suspension order was vitiated by delay or absence of immediate necessity.

Issue (i): Whether suspension under Regulation 16(1) CBLR, 2018 was justified on the available prima facie material and alleged breaches of Regulation 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(n) of CBLR, 2018.

Analysis: The material before the Tribunal included a vigilance/investigation report forwarded by the investigating agency, record of container scanning showing a scanned mismatch and marking for 100% examination under Public Notice No. 01/2018-19 dated 20.04.2018, and examination records indicating only one bag was opened despite instruction for 100% examination. The documents provided to the broker by a third party did not reliably establish that the third party was authorised, and the importer's trade profile was materially different from the imported goods, which should have prompted heightened verification. The investigation indicated large-scale smuggling involving narcotic drugs, raising national security and public interest concerns. The Tribunal found these prima facie factual and procedural lapses relevant to the obligations imposed by Regulation 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(n) and sufficient to invoke emergent suspension power under Regulation 16(1) pending completion of inquiry.

Conclusion: Suspension under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 was justified on the available prima facie material and alleged contraventions of Regulation 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(n) of CBLR, 2018; the impugned suspension is upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the suspension order was vitiated by delay or absence of immediate necessity.

Analysis: The investigative process was conducted by a national investigative agency and the vigilance report was forwarded to the customs authority before suspension was imposed. The suspension was imposed after receipt of the investigation/vigilance report and confirmed subsequently. Given the nature of the alleged offences involving narcotic smuggling and the timeline of receipt of investigative material, the Tribunal found no undue delay or lack of immediate necessity for suspension; precedents addressing delayed suspensions were distinguished on facts.

Conclusion: The suspension order was not vitiated by delay or absence of immediate necessity; the ground of delay is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismisses the appeal and upholds the suspension of the customs broker's licence under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018, while directing that the inquiry proceed in accordance with the timelines prescribed by the Regulations.

Ratio Decidendi: Where prima facie evidence indicates serious contraventions by a customs broker implicating national security or large-scale contraband, and an investigation/vigilance report supports such prima facie findings, suspension under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 is a permissible emergent measure pending completion of inquiry.

Issues: Whether Provisional Attachment Order No. 07/2018 dated 31.03.2018 relating to cash of Rs. 50 lakhs should be confirmed as proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The attachment proceedings arose after CBI investigations, arrest and filing of charge-sheet for scheduled offences; trial and framing of charges in the predicate criminal proceedings were on record. The evidentiary record includes recovery of cash in a trap, voluntary statements by the persons in possession, and recorded telephone communications corroborating the chain of delivery. The defence that the cash represented sale proceeds was recorded as a later explanation supported by a sale deed executed much later; the explanation involved payment in cash and raised credibility concerns. Section 23 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 creates a presumption in inter connected transactions, which coupled with the predicate charge sheet and investigative material, supports a reason to believe for attachment. The proviso and procedural requirements to Section 5(1) and Rule 7 of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Taking Possession of Attached or Frozen Properties Confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2013 do not preclude provisional attachment where there is reason to believe and the property is at risk; attachment under the Act is an interim protective measure pending conclusion of trial, and the availability of the property in custody of a criminal court does not automatically bar confirmation of attachment. The Adjudicating Authority's conclusion rejecting confirmation as lacking prima facie material was inconsistent with the existence of a charge sheet, voluntary disclosures and corroborative investigative material.

Conclusion: Provisional Attachment Order No. 07/2018 dated 31.03.2018 is confirmed; appeal allowed in favour of the appellant Directorate of Enforcement.

Ratio Decidendi: Where there is a filed charge sheet and corroborative investigative material creating a prima facie case that seized property is proceeds of crime, provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be confirmed as an interim protective measure to preserve property for possible confiscation upon conviction.

Issues: (i) Whether supply of fresh water by the appellant to vessels is a sale of goods or constitutes part of "port services" liable to service tax for the period prior to 01.07.2010; (ii) Whether extended period of limitation and penalties (Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994) were rightly invoked/levied.

Issue (i): Classification of supply of fresh water to vessels as sale of goods or as port service liable to service tax prior to 01.07.2010.

Analysis: CBEC clarification (F No. B.11/1/2001-TRU dated 09.07.2001) and the Annexure reproduced therein treat water supply charges as part of port services. The definition of port service in Section 65(82) of the Finance Act, 1994, and pre-01.07.2010 requirements regarding authorization support treating water supplied in relation to vessels within port operations as a service. Notification No.31/2010-ST dated 22.06.2010 exempts supply of water within a port w.e.f. 01.07.2010, confirming that prior to that date such supply was leviable to service tax. The Tribunal examined invoices and records and found they reflected charges beyond mere cost of water (procurement, transport to vessel, related service elements) and evidence did not establish pure agent treatment or bona fide sale of goods to displace classification as port service.

Conclusion: The supply of fresh water by the appellant to vessels before 01.07.2010 forms part of "port services" and is liable to service tax. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Validity of invocation of extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The department discovered non-payment during audit and invoked the extended period based on available facts. On penalties, the Tribunal found absence of mens rea to evade tax and noted that the appellant failed to prove pure agent status; thus the substantive demand stands but culpability for willful evasion under Section 78 was not established. The Tribunal applied a lenient view on penalty under Section 78 while upholding the penalty under Section 77.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was upheld and the service tax demand sustained. Penalty under Section 78 is set aside; penalty under Section 77 is affirmed. The conclusions are partly against and partly in favour of the assessee as specified.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed inasmuch as penalty under Section 78 is remitted; otherwise the appeal is dismissed and the service tax demand along with interest and penalty under Section 77 is sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Supply of water to vessels, when it includes procurement, transportation to the vessel and related port operations, constitutes port service under Section 65(82) of the Finance Act, 1994 and was taxable prior to the exemption effective 01.07.2010.

Issues: Whether a discharge acknowledged under the Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES) bars a subsequent demand or proceedings for the same issue and period.

Analysis: Section 106(1) and the second proviso thereto restrict declarations where a notice or order has been issued earlier on the same issue; Section 107(7) contemplates issuance of an acknowledgement of discharge on full payment of declared tax dues; and Section 108(1) provides immunity from penalty, interest and further proceedings upon payment and issuance of the discharge acknowledgement. Where a VCES declaration has been accepted and a discharge certificate issued without any allegation of substantial falsity, subsequent proceedings seeking to assess or recover a liability that overlaps with the declared and discharged dues fall within the bar created by Section 108(1). The concept of "same subject matter" or "same issue" encompasses proceedings that seek to assess or recover an identical liability or that have even a slightest overlap in tax liability or obligation. The legality of classifying the activity as site formation service or as GTA service is not required to be examined once the declared liability for the relevant issue and period has been discharged under VCES and accepted without dispute.

Conclusion: The discharge under VCES bars the subsequent demand and proceedings in respect of the same issue and period; the impugned demand is unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the authorities could adjust the refund determined for an earlier tax period against the settlement dues of a subsequent tax period under the Maharashtra Settlement of Arrears of Tax, Interest, Penalty or Late Fee Act, 2023, and whether the impugned settlement order could be sustained despite the absence of a defect notice and opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The Settlement Act was enacted as a self-contained amnesty scheme to settle specified arrears period-wise and to give quietus to old disputes. The scheme requires assessment of arrears and payment obligations with reference to each financial year and operates on its own footing. The provisions governing settlement did not authorise importing the refund-adjustment mechanism under Section 50 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 into the settlement computation. A refund for one year was not treated as an amount that could be appropriated to reduce settlement dues of another year in the absence of a lawful refund adjustment order under the MVAT Act. The impugned order was also made without giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing, although adverse action under the Settlement Act required such opportunity where the application was not in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The adjustment of the refund against the settlement dues was impermissible and the impugned settlement order could not be sustained. The challenge succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settlement application for the relevant year had to be accepted without setting off the earlier-year refund, and the refund amount was directed to be released with statutory interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Settlement Act, authorities cannot invoke the MVAT refund-adjustment machinery to appropriate a refund of one tax period against the settlement dues of another tax period, and any adverse settlement action must comply with the Act and the requirements of fair hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether a State tax attachment lacking the prescribed public proclamation can take priority over the registered security interest of a secured creditor; (ii) Whether Central Excise dues supported only by demand or attachment orders, without statutory recovery action, can take priority over such security interest.

Issue (i): Whether a State tax attachment lacking the prescribed public proclamation can take priority over the registered security interest of a secured creditor.

Analysis: Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 accords priority to a secured creditor over government revenues, taxes, cesses and other dues. A pre-amendment attachment can displace that priority only where the attachment was validly made and followed by a public proclamation in the manner required under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Recovery of Land Revenue) Rules, 1967. The State authorities admitted that no action beyond the attachment order had been taken. The secured interest had also been registered with CERSAI on 30.05.2014.

Conclusion: The State tax attachment and charge do not have priority over the petitioner's secured charge.

Issue (ii): Whether Central Excise dues supported only by demand or attachment orders, without statutory recovery action, can take priority over such security interest.

Analysis: Section 11 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires recovery first through attachment and sale of excisable goods and, if unrecovered, through a certificate executed by the Collector as arrears of land revenue. No material established compliance with those recovery steps or transmission of any certificate to the Collector. Section 11E of the Central Excise Act, 1944 preserves the overriding priority conferred upon a secured creditor under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Conclusion: The Central Excise demand and attachment orders do not have priority over the petitioner's secured charge.

Final Conclusion: The secured creditor's registered security interest prevails over the competing State tax and Central Excise charges; the encumbrances are liable to be removed, without affecting the authorities' independent right to recover their dues in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Government tax attachments or demands that have not been perfected through the prescribed statutory recovery and public-proclamation process cannot defeat the priority of a secured creditor under Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Issues: Whether the applicant satisfied the conditions for bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, notwithstanding the statutory rigours, in light of prolonged incarceration, delay in trial and parity with co-accused.

Analysis: Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 prescribes twin conditions for bail. Those conditions must be applied consistently with the right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The prosecution relied on 107 witnesses and 63,749 pages of documentary material; charges had not been framed either in the money-laundering proceedings or in the predicate-offence trial. The conclusion of both trials was therefore not foreseeable within a reasonable period. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration cannot become punishment, and statutory restrictions on bail cannot justify indefinite detention where trial is unlikely to conclude promptly. The applicant had not misused bail in the predicate case, stringent conditions could secure his attendance and protect the process, and similarly placed co-accused had been granted bail. Parity did not require the applicant to first undergo the same duration of custody as those co-accused.

Conclusion: The twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 stood satisfied, and the applicant was entitled to conditional bail pending trial.

Issues: Whether the earlier appellate order required recall for re-adjudication of the disallowance of transportation expenses because it proceeded on an erroneous factual premise regarding the date of the assessee's existence.

Analysis: The earlier order treated the assessee as having come into existence only on 17.04.2017 and consequently doubted its ability to undertake work or execute an arrangement before that date. The joint-venture agreement, however, referred to an earlier memorandum of understanding dated 28.11.2016; the departmental PAN recorded that date as the incorporation date, and work orders had been allotted before 17.04.2017. These records demonstrated an apparent factual error in the premise on which the ground concerning transportation expenses had been decided.

Conclusion: The earlier order was recalled for fresh adjudication of ground No. 1, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether modification of the redemption terms of preference shares at the annual general meeting complied with the requirements for variation of class rights; (ii) Whether the interim asset-preservation relief sought was in aid of the substantive relief in the suit; (iii) Whether prior interlocutory orders operated as res judicata.

Issue (i): Whether modification of the redemption terms of preference shares at the annual general meeting complied with the requirements for variation of class rights.

Analysis: The notice, attendance record, minutes and written consents established that the proposed alteration applied on identical terms to preference shareholders as a class. Written consent was obtained from holders exceeding the prescribed three-fourths threshold; shareholders opposing the proposal represented only 0.9% of the paid-up preference capital. Where identical terms are offered to a class, a separate meeting of a sub-class is not required. The additional documentary evidence was admitted.

Conclusion: The alteration of redemption terms complied with Section 106 of the Companies Act, 1956 and was binding on the respondents; this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the interim asset-preservation relief sought was in aid of the substantive relief in the suit.

Analysis: The suit sought declarations concerning the validity of the annual general meeting resolution and injunction against its enforcement, whereas the interlocutory application sought restraint on dealing with assets and preservation of assets. The monetary claim was also being pursued independently. Interim relief must be ancillary to, and capable of supporting, the final substantive relief claimed.

Conclusion: The asset-preservation relief was not in aid of the substantive relief in the suit and could not be sustained; this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether prior interlocutory orders operated as res judicata.

Analysis: The earlier appellate arrangement expressly continued only pending adjudication of the application and stated that prior observations would not bind the parties, with all issues remaining open for decision on affidavits.

Conclusion: The earlier interlocutory orders did not attract res judicata; this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of the interim order was invalid because the class-rights variation was duly approved and the interlocutory protection sought was disconnected from the substantive suit relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A variation of rights affecting a class of shareholders is valid where the statutory written-consent threshold of that class is met, and interlocutory relief is unavailable unless it is ancillary to the final relief claimed.

Issues: Whether the stamp duty value prevailing on registration of an immovable property could be adopted where the property had been allotted earlier for a fixed consideration and the entire consideration had been paid before the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The allotment letter dated 20.07.2008 fixed the consideration at Rs.36,00,000, and the payments were made through banking channels between 2008 and 2014. The subsequent registered agreement dated 16.02.2017 merely acknowledged that consideration. The allotment letter constituted the agreement for purposes of the proviso to Section 56(2)(vii)(b), making the stamp duty value as on the allotment date relevant. No investment was made during the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The addition based on the stamp duty value as on the registration date was unsustainable and was deleted; the assessing authority must verify the stamp duty value as on the allotment date and determine the consequential tax liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the demands raised by invoking the extended period of limitation were sustainable in the absence of suppression of facts; (ii) Whether royalty recovered from buyers was excludible from transaction value as an "other tax" under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; (iii) Whether Stowing Excise Duty was deductible from assessable value and no duty was payable thereon; (iv) Whether penalty and interest were leviable, including in the appeal relating to the month for which duty had already been paid.

Issue (i): Whether the demands raised by invoking the extended period of limitation were sustainable in the absence of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The disputes were held to arise from interpretation of valuation provisions and were being litigated up to the Supreme Court. The notices in most appeals were issued beyond the normal limitation period then applicable, and the record did not disclose a case of wilful suppression with intent to evade duty. In such circumstances, invocation of the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was held to be unavailable, and the demands beyond the normal period were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether royalty recovered from buyers was excludible from transaction value as an "other tax" under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Royalty was treated as not being a tax. Therefore, it could not be excluded from transaction value under the statutory exclusion for "other taxes". On that basis, duty liability on royalty was sustained for the appeal where the demand fell within the normal period.

Conclusion: Royalty was held not deductible from transaction value, and excise duty was confirmed on royalty in the appeal where the demand survived within limitation.

Issue (iii): Whether Stowing Excise Duty was deductible from assessable value and no duty was payable thereon.

Analysis: Stowing Excise Duty was treated as a duty of excise and, for valuation purposes, fell within the exclusion for other taxes. It was therefore not includible in the assessable value for central excise duty.

Conclusion: No excise duty was held payable on Stowing Excise Duty, and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty and interest were leviable, including in the appeal relating to the month for which duty had already been paid.

Analysis: Since the controversy was interpretational and the extended period could not be sustained, the penalties were not justified. For the month falling within the normal period in the surviving appeal, the duty had already been paid and only interest was in issue; interest was also set aside in view of the governing valuation and limitation principles applied in the connected precedent.

Conclusion: Penalty and interest were set aside, including in the surviving appeal, and no further monetary consequence remained apart from the confirmed royalty duty within limitation.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were substantially allowed on limitation, SED, penalty, and interest, while duty on royalty survived only to the limited extent found within the normal period in one appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: In valuation disputes under central excise, a non-tax levy that is not covered by the statutory exclusion for "other taxes" remains includible in transaction value, but the extended period and penalty cannot be invoked without suppression where the dispute is one of interpretation.

Issues: Whether the order blocking the petitioner's electronic credit ledger and input tax credit under Section 86A could be sustained without prior notice and hearing.

Analysis: The blocking of the electronic credit ledger has serious civil consequences, and the requirement of natural justice must be read into the exercise of power under Section 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The order under challenge did not disclose issuance of notice or conduct of hearing before blocking the credit ledger.

Conclusion: The impugned blocking order was set aside for breach of natural justice. The respondent authorities were left at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law and procedure.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded, and the impugned action could not stand for want of compliance with audi alteram partem before depriving the petitioner of use of input tax credit.

Ratio Decidendi: Even where Section 86A does not expressly provide for prior hearing, principles of natural justice apply before blocking the electronic credit ledger because such action entails serious civil consequences.