Issues: Whether the penalty and allied customs consequences imposed on the petitioner were unsustainable for want of sufficient incriminating material and whether parity could be claimed from relief granted to the carrier.

Analysis: The statement of the passenger recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 was found to be consistent across multiple occasions and was supported by collateral material, including the statement of the other noticee and forensic extraction from the mobile phone, which connected the petitioner with the smuggling and exchange arrangement. The Court treated the Section 108 statement as admissible material capable of being used as substantive evidence in customs proceedings. On that basis, the petitioner's involvement in acts rendering the goods liable to confiscation and the imposition of penalty under the Customs Act, 1962 were held to be justified. The plea of parity based on the relief granted to the carrier was rejected, as Article 14 could not be invoked to seek equal treatment with a person who had violated the law.

Conclusion: The challenge to the customs penalties and related findings failed, and the petitioner was not entitled to relief on the ground of alleged insufficiency of evidence or parity.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail in a customs investigation alleging undervaluation and mis-declaration of imported goods, and whether custodial interrogation was necessary.

Analysis: The application was considered under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, on principles governing anticipatory bail and the need to balance personal liberty against the requirements of investigation. The allegations arose from documentary material, a statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, and a seizure of cash, but the record showed that the imported goods had been examined and cleared by the proper customs officer, and no strong prima facie material independently established undervaluation at the applicant's instance. The Court also noted the absence of past antecedents, the applicant's readiness to join investigation, and the availability of the relevant records with the respondents, which reduced the necessity for custodial interrogation.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to pre-arrest bail, and custodial interrogation was found unnecessary; the relief was granted with conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In a predominantly documentary customs investigation, anticipatory bail may be granted where custodial interrogation is not shown to be necessary, the accused is willing to cooperate, and no substantive material justifies arrest at the stage of pre-arrest protection.

Issues: (i) Whether the recall application should be allowed to set aside the Tribunal's judgment dated 25.07.2025 insofar as it held the applicant to be ineligible under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether proceedings of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the corporate debtor should continue from the stage of issuance of a fresh Form-G.

Issue (i): Whether the Applicant Cosmic CRF Limited is ineligible to be a resolution applicant under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and whether the Tribunal's earlier findings to that effect should be recalled.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed expert reports, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents addressing the temporal test for clause (c), the scope of connected persons and persons acting in concert, and the purposive object of Section 29A. The material on record showed cross-shareholding, directorships and post-resolution asset transfers connecting the applicant and its promoters with a previously NPA entity (CFAL), retention of operational roles post-resolution, and corporate guarantees linked to entities in the same group. The Committee of Creditors had relied heavily on a senior counsel's opinion in reaching eligibility, but the Tribunal examined the underlying facts and reports, applied the see-through / de facto control approach, considered the first proviso to clause (c) and the requirement that overdue amounts must be paid to remove disqualification, and observed incomplete disclosure and unresolved factual gaps (including invocation/enforcement status of guarantees). On balance and adopting a purposive interpretation of Section 29A informed by precedent, the Tribunal found that disqualifying connections and factual indicia of continued de facto control existed such that ineligibility attached under the provisions considered.

Conclusion: The recall application insofar as it sought to set aside the Tribunal's holding that Cosmic CRF Limited was ineligible under Section 29A is dismissed; the earlier findings of ineligibility are retained.

Issue (ii): Whether the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of Amzen Transportation Industries Ltd. should be directed to continue from the stage of issuance of a fresh Form-G.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted compliance steps already undertaken by the resolution professional following the earlier order and the existence of received EOIs and pending resolution-plan related timelines. Given the dismissal of the recall on eligibility grounds and the need to progress CIRP, the Tribunal considered continuation appropriate while also directing an independent inquiry by the Insolvency regulator into related procedural and disclosure issues.

Conclusion: Proceedings of the CIRP shall continue with immediate effect and further processing, including issuance of a fresh Form G and related steps, is directed to proceed.

Final Conclusion: The recall application is dismissed; the Tribunal's earlier determination that the applicant is ineligible under Section 29A stands and the CIRP process for the corporate debtor is ordered to continue without interruption while regulatory inquiry is permitted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where material facts and documentary indicia show substantive (de facto) connections, control or continuing involvement of a resolution applicant or its connected persons with an entity whose account was classified as NPA, and the statutory gateway in Section 29A (including its proviso) is not satisfied, the resolution applicant can be held ineligible; eligibility must be assessed on substance (de facto control and acting in concert) at the plan submission date and through purposive application of Section 29A.

Issues: (i) Whether the material on record established the appellant's contravention of the foreign exchange provisions invoked in the show cause notice. (ii) Whether the penalty imposed required interference in view of the long delay in adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the material on record established the appellant's contravention of the foreign exchange provisions invoked in the show cause notice.

Analysis: The seized documents, the statements of the co-noticees, and the surrounding enquiries were found to disclose the modus operandi of the transactions and the appellant's role in converting and transferring funds through the Indo-Bangladesh border. The appellant did not produce evidence to rebut the material relied upon. The finding of contravention was therefore sustained.

Conclusion: The contravention was held to be established.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed required interference in view of the long delay in adjudication.

Analysis: The delay in conclusion of the adjudication was treated as a relevant mitigating circumstance. The Tribunal considered that the earlier dispensation of pre-deposit did not terminate the proceedings, but the lapse of time and the mitigating effect of delay justified interference with the quantum of penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty was reduced.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication on merits was upheld, but the penal consequence was substantially moderated on account of the delay, resulting in partial relief to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where contravention is otherwise established on the basis of seized documents and corroborated statements, the quantum of penalty may still be reduced if protracted delay in adjudication constitutes a material mitigating factor.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty of Rs.10,00,000 and Rs.10,000 imposed on the Appellant under Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 for contraventions by the company is sustainable.

Analysis: The Appellant was the chief financial officer during the relevant period and admitted active participation in the transactions by statements under Section 37 of the Act. The penalty was imposed under Section 42(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 for contraventions established against the company. The applicable legal framework includes Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 which provides for civil penalties where mens rea is not a statutory requirement. The Tribunal applied the principle that once contravention of a statutory civil obligation is established, intention is irrelevant for imposition of penalty, relying on established precedent that civil penalties under regulatory statutes do not require proof of guilty intention. Having found the Appellant's active role and the establishment of contraventions, the Tribunal nevertheless exercised discretion to reduce the penalty to achieve proportionality and adjusted the pre-deposit against the reduced amount.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the Appellant is partially set aside by reducing the amount to Rs.1,01,000 and the pre-deposit made shall be adjusted against the reduced penalty; the appeal is partly allowed in favour of the Appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant contravened the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Foreign Exchange Derivative Regulations/RBI directions by engaging in online foreign exchange derivative trading without prior permission; (ii) Whether penalty is imposable for the contraventions and, if so, what is the appropriate quantum of penalty in light of mitigating factors.

Issue (i): Whether unauthorised online forex derivative trading without prior RBI permission constituted contravention of FEMA, 1999 and the Foreign Exchange Derivative Regulations/RBI directions.

Analysis: The material establishes that foreign exchange derivative transactions were effected via an online trading portal using credit/debit cards and that such transactions fall within the definition of foreign exchange derivative contracts under Regulation 2(v) and are prohibited without prior RBI permission under Regulation 3. RBI AP DIR (Series) Nos. 53 and 46 specifically treat overseas electronic/internet forex trading effected by residents as attracting liability under FEMA and related compliance obligations.

Conclusion: The appellant committed contraventions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Foreign Exchange Derivative Regulations/RBI directions by entering into foreign exchange derivative contracts without prior permission.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 13(1) of FEMA is imposable and what reduction, if any, is warranted by mitigating circumstances.

Analysis: Section 13(1) permits adjudicatory penalty up to three times the quantifiable amount involved. The statutory text and judicial authorities establish that mens rea is not a precondition for imposition of civil penalties under such provisions. Mitigating facts (lack of deliberate intent, financial loss suffered by the transactor, present earning capacity) are relevant to calibrate the quantum of penalty but do not preclude liability. Applying the statutory ceiling and mitigation, the penalty was reduced from the impugned amount to a proportionate reduced sum, with adjustment of pre-deposit.

Conclusion: Penalty is imposable under Section 13(1) of FEMA; on application of mitigating factors the imposed penalty is reduced to a proportionate amount and the pre-deposit adjusted accordingly, resulting in partial allowance of the appeal in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The contraventions are established and civil penalty is authorized under FEMA; however, exercising adjudicatory discretion in view of mitigating circumstances results in a reduction of the penalty and partial allowance of the appeal, producing a net benefit to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For civil penalties under Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, mens rea is not an essential element and proven contravention attracts penalty, while mitigating circumstances are relevant only to the quantum and proportionality of the penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether the retention/ debit-freeze of the appellant's bank accounts/FDRs under Section 17(1A) and continuation under Section 20(4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was justified; (ii) Whether prior encumbrance/lien in favour of DTCP on the fixed deposit bars seizure/freezing by the enforcement agency; (iii) Whether absence of opportunity of hearing before the Adjudicating Authority vitiates the freezing/retention order.

Issue (i): Whether retention/debit-freeze under Section 17(1A) and continuation under Section 20(4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was justified.

Analysis: The freezing order arose from searches and investigation which recorded proceeds of crime findings against the principal accused and group companies, and material including an FIR, ECIR and investigative recoveries were placed before the Adjudicating Authority. The authority recorded reasons to believe and relied on investigative material and absence of explanation by the appellant. The Special Court subsequently made confiscation orders in connected proceedings except insofar as an interim order restrained action on the fixed deposit.

Conclusion: The continuation of the debit-freeze and retention of the accounts/FDRs under Section 17(1A) and Section 20(4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is affirmed; findings support reason to believe and retention for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether a prior lien/encumbrance in favour of DTCP prevents seizure/freezing by the enforcement agency.

Analysis: Investigative material indicated involvement of DTCP officials in the offences and did not establish that a bank's lien precludes the enforcement agency from freezing property prima facie involved in money-laundering. The statutory scheme permits seizure or freezing where there is reason to believe property is proceeds of crime, and encumbrance alone is not an absolute bar to such action.

Conclusion: The existence of a lien/encumbrance in favour of DTCP does not operate as a bar to freezing or retention under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; this ground does not warrant vacating the freezing order.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of opportunity of hearing before the Adjudicating Authority vitiates the freezing/retention order.

Analysis: Notice was issued and the record reflects lack of effective response from the appellant during adjudication and investigation; the Adjudicating Authority recorded reasons to believe based on investigative material. The statutory provisions authorise freezing where reasons to believe are recorded and require retention for adjudication; absence of detailed adversarial exchange did not negate the recorded reasoned basis for freezing in the circumstances.

Conclusion: Absence of a fuller hearing does not invalidate the freezing/retention order where the Adjudicating Authority recorded reasons to believe on investigative material and the appellant failed to satisfactorily rebut that material.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed as the statutory prerequisites for freezing and retention under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were satisfied on the evidence and material placed before the authorities, and the appellant has not discharged the burden to negate nexus with proceeds of crime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where investigating material and recorded reasons to believe demonstrate that property is prima facie involved in money-laundering, the enforcement agency may lawfully freeze and retain such property under Section 17(1A) and Section 20(4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 notwithstanding an asserted prior encumbrance, unless the person entitled to the property satisfactorily rebuts the reason to believe.

Issues: (i) Whether the interim order dated 22.01.2026 should be modified to require the bank guarantee to cover the penalty component in addition to the tax short paid; (ii) Whether the bank guarantee directed to be furnished should be submitted in the name of respondent no.2 or respondent no.3.

Issue (i): Whether the interim order dated 22.01.2026 should be altered to increase the bank guarantee to include the penalty component in addition to the tax short paid.

Analysis: The interim order of 22.01.2026 required a bank guarantee to secure the tax alleged to be short paid (CGST and SGST totaling Rs.4,52,076) to facilitate release of perishable goods. The communication placed on record includes a calculation that also shows a penalty component, but the purpose of the interim order was to secure the tax amount prima facie to protect the revenue while ensuring release of perishable goods. The presence of a penalty component in the departmental communication does not, on the facts presented, displace the Court's prima facie assessment that securing the tax amount is sufficient for interim relief.

Conclusion: The application to increase the bank guarantee to cover the penalty component is rejected; no modification of the interim order on this ground is made (decision against the applicant on this issue).

Issue (ii): Whether the bank guarantee directed by the interim order should be furnished in the name of respondent no.2 or in the name of respondent no.3.

Analysis: The interim order directed furnishing of a bank guarantee but did not specify the precise beneficiary at the level contested. The applicant sought that the bank guarantee be submitted to respondent no.3. Given the departmental structure and the representation before the Court, the interim order is open to modification limited to the beneficiary named for receipt of the guarantee without altering the secured amount fixed by the original order.

Conclusion: The interim order is modified to direct that the bank guarantee required by the order dated 22.01.2026 be furnished in the name of respondent no.3 instead of respondent no.2 (decision in favour of the applicant on this limited point).

Final Conclusion: The interim order of 22.01.2026 is retained in substance to secure the tax short paid (Rs.4,52,076) and is modified only to change the beneficiary named for the bank guarantee to respondent no.3; the request to increase the guarantee to include penalty is declined.

Ratio Decidendi: Where interim relief is granted to secure a claimed tax demand to enable release of perishable goods, the court may limit security to the prima facie tax amount and may modify incidental administrative details of the security (such as the named beneficiary) without extending the security to cover contested penalty claims at the interim stage.

Issues: (i) Whether the consideration received for assignment of self-generated trademarks and brand name along with goodwill was chargeable as capital gains or as business income. (ii) Whether the claim for short-term capital loss of Rs. 2,50,45,545 was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the consideration received for assignment of self-generated trademarks and brand name along with goodwill was chargeable as capital gains or as business income.

Analysis: The assignment deed showed transfer of 22 self-generated trademarks for consideration of Rs. 29.10 crores, and the business itself was not wholly transferred. The governing principle from the authority on goodwill and self-generated assets is that where the asset has no ascertainable cost of acquisition, the capital gains computation machinery fails unless the statute specifically brings that asset within the charging framework. The amendment inserting trademarks and brand name within section 55(2)(a) operated prospectively from 01.04.2002, while the transfer in question was in AY 2001-02. On the facts, the receipt could not be taxed as business income under section 28(iv) or as a deemed benefit under section 41(1), and the valuation method adopted did not alter the character of the transfer.

Conclusion: The receipt from transfer of the trademarks was not taxable as business income or as capital gains for the relevant year, and the finding was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the claim for short-term capital loss of Rs. 2,50,45,545 was allowable.

Analysis: The question stood covered by binding precedent on the treatment of the claimed loss, and the Revenue did not dispute the applicability of that authority.

Conclusion: The short-term capital loss claim was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The common substantial questions of law were answered against the Revenue, the Tribunal's view was sustained, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: For a self-generated intangible asset transferred before the statutory amendment making trademarks and brand names expressly taxable, where no ascertainable cost of acquisition exists, capital gains cannot be levied; the receipt also cannot be brought to tax as business income merely because it arises from assignment of the asset.

Issues: Whether appeals filed under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 are maintainable before the High Court where the challenged CESTAT order involves determination of questions relating to an exemption notification that directly or proximately relate to the rate of duty or value of goods for purposes of assessment.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme distinguishing appeals to the High Court under Section 130 and appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court applied the test that a question which has a direct and proximate relation, for purposes of assessment, to the rate of duty or to the value of goods falls within the scope of Section 130E and thereby lies before the Supreme Court. The Court referenced the explanatory scope of Section 129D(5) which defines the expression 'determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment', including classification under the Tariff and coverage by exemption notifications. Applying that legal framework to the present facts, the Court found that the CESTAT order under challenge involved not only classification but also the grant and scope of exemption under Notification No.27/2002-CUS (including the question of excess exemption of 15% claimed), which directly and proximately affects the rate of duty and assessment of duty payable.

Conclusion: The appeals are not maintainable before the High Court as the issues involve determination of questions relating to the rate of duty/value for assessment connected with an exemption notification; the proper remedy is an appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeals are closed before this Court.

Issues: (i) Whether a substantial question of law arises for entertaining the appeal against the CESTAT order quashing and setting aside the Order-in-Original which revoked the customs broker licence, where the Order-in-Original travelled beyond the allegations contained in the show cause notice.

Analysis: Regulation 10(a), 10(d), 10(e) and 10(n) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 and related provisions of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2013 were invoked in the show cause notice reproduced in para 4. The show cause notice relied on material drawn from an earlier show cause notice issued under the Customs Act, 1962 (including paras 37-37.4, 38, 38.1, 49 and 50) which pertained to proceedings under Sections 112(a), 112(b), 114AA and 117 of the Customs Act, 1962. The allegations in the show cause notice did not specify how the relied-upon material established prima facie contraventions of the cited licensing regulations or the mode and manner in which the alleged violations were attributable to the licence-holder. The Order-in-Original contained findings based on material and reasoning that extended beyond the scope of the allegations as framed in the show cause notice. Established legal principles require that a notice communicate specific allegations sufficient to enable the noticee to answer; where a show cause notice is vague or an order relies on material not disclosed in the notice, there is a breach of procedural fairness and the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: In favour of Respondent.

Issues: (i) Whether the adjudicating authority was justified in admitting the Section 9 application against the corporate debtor notwithstanding the plea of discharge/novation based on a letter dated 30.06.2018 and alleged transfer of liability to MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd.; (ii) Whether observations in the adjudicating authority's order suggesting initiation of criminal proceedings against the corporate debtor and MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. should be sustained; (iii) Whether the appellant should be granted an opportunity to make payment and the procedural consequence of such payment under Section 12A and applicable CIRP regulations.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 9 admission was unsustainable because the operational creditor had accepted payment or had novated the debt to MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd., invoking principles under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: The admitted facts show supplies were made to and accepted by the corporate debtor and part payments were made; the corporate debtor pleaded transfer of liability based on a Share Purchase Agreement and a letter dated 30.06.2018 which was not part of any tripartite agreement and did not involve the operational creditor as a contracting party to a novation. The letter, even if treated as an agreement, contained no consideration and was susceptible to challenge under the doctrine of consideration. Section 41 requires actual performance by a third party accepted by the promisee to discharge the promisor; the record does not establish such full performance by MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Section 62 requires a valid substituted contract between the parties to effect novation; no enforceable substituted contract involving the operational creditor and MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. is established. Relevant precedents were applied to confirm that unilateral or internal group arrangements and unilaterally written letters not supported by consideration do not constitute a novation or discharge that can defeat an operational creditor's claim under Section 9.

Conclusion: The plea of discharge by acceptance of performance from a third party and the plea of novation are rejected; the adjudicating authority correctly admitted the Section 9 application and there existed debt and default by the corporate debtor (conclusion adverse to appellant).

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicating authority's observation that the directors of the corporate debtor and MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. are liable to be proceeded against under appropriate criminal provisions should be maintained.

Analysis: The impugned order contained an observation suggesting possible criminal liability, but the operative portion of the adjudicating authority's order contained no directions to initiate criminal proceedings or to forward the record to regulatory/criminal authorities. The appellate determination assesses whether such observational language can stand as a direction; absent any specific operative direction, maintaining such a statement would be inappropriate.

Conclusion: The observational finding regarding liability to be proceeded against under criminal provisions is deleted (conclusion in favour of appellant on this limited point).

Issue (iii): Whether an opportunity should be granted to the appellant to make payment and the procedural steps following payment, including the filing and disposal of a Section 12A application under the CIRP Regulations, 2016.

Analysis: Considering the scale of the corporate debtor's business and the admitted existence of debt, equitable relief in the form of a time-bound opportunity to make the claimed payment was considered appropriate. The appellate order provides a 30-day opportunity to pay the amount claimed in Part IV; on payment, the operational creditor may file a Section 12A application for withdrawal of CIRP which the adjudicating authority must decide in accordance with law and Regulation 30A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016. Interim protection granted in the appeal is continued until disposal of the Section 12A application.

Conclusion: Appellant is granted 30 days to pay the amount claimed; on receipt, the operational creditor may file a Section 12A application which the adjudicating authority shall decide expeditiously (conclusion providing procedural relief to appellant but affirming admission).

Final Conclusion: The adjudicating authority's admission of the Section 9 application is upheld; the plea of novation or discharge by third-party performance is rejected, an improvident criminal-observational remark is expunged, and a limited, time-bound opportunity to make the claimed payment with consequent Section 12A remedy is granted.

Ratio Decidendi: A unilateral or internal transfer of liability, an unenforceable letter lacking consideration, or isolated payments by a third party do not legally novate or discharge a corporate debtor's obligation to an operational creditor; where debt and default are established, admission under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is appropriate, subject to lawful procedural remedies including payment followed by a Section 12A application for withdrawal of CIRP.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant for alleged contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 could be sustained when the impugned order did not discuss the evidence said to support the finding against him.

Analysis: The order recorded a conclusion that the appellant had aided and abetted the alleged transactions and had received and passed on money, but it did not show any discussion of the evidence linking the appellant to the alleged contravention. In the absence of an evidentiary analysis supporting the adverse finding, the conclusion against the appellant could not stand.

Conclusion: The finding and penalty against the appellant were unsustainable and were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: An adverse penalty order must be supported by a reasoned discussion of the evidence establishing the alleged contravention; a bare conclusion without such analysis cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether cenvat credit availed on inputs whose value is "written down" in the books of account under accounting standards is required to be reversed under Rule 3(5B) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) Whether demands for periods prior to introduction of the recovery mechanism under Notification No. 3/2013-CE (N.T.) dated 01.03.2013 or prior to introduction of the "partial write off" reversal provision are sustainable, including invocation of extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether 'writing down' of input inventory value for accounting purposes attracts reversal of cenvat credit under Rule 3(5B) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The accounting exercise involves periodic identification of slow moving inputs and reducing their book value while the physical inputs remain in factory stock and are available for future use. Where items are identified as obsolete and written off physically from inventory, proportionate reversal is undertaken. The distinction between a book 'write down' (provision to reflect reduced value) and an actual 'write off' (removal of the item as unusable) is central to the application of Rule 3(5B). Relevant judicial authorities have held that mere reduction in book value under accounting standards does not constitute writing off for the purposes of Rule 3(5B) where inputs remain available for use.

Conclusion: 'Writing down' of inputs for accounting purposes does not attract reversal of cenvat credit under Rule 3(5B) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; reversal is required only when inputs are actually written off and are not available for use. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether demands for the period April 2010 to March 2013 and demands prior to the introduction of the partial write-off reversal provision are sustainable, including applicability of extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The reversal provision for partial write-off under Rule 3(5B) was introduced with effect from 01.03.2011, while the statutory recovery mechanism under Notification No. 3/2013-CE (N.T.) came into force on 01.03.2013. Demands falling in periods before the existence of a recovery mechanism are not sustainable. Further, where particulars were declared in statutory returns and the demand arises from audit objections without evidence of suppression or positive concealment, invocation of the extended period of limitation is not justified.

Conclusion: Demands for periods prior to the applicability of the recovery mechanism and demands based on audit objections without suppression are unsustainable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders confirming demands under Rule 3(5B) are set aside insofar as they relate to inputs merely written down in the books and insofar as they relate to periods prior to the availability of a recovery mechanism; appeals relating to such demands are allowed while ancillary proceedings dependent on the set-aside demands may be rendered infructuous.

Ratio Decidendi: A book 'write down' of inventory value under accounting standards, without removal of inputs from stock or loss of usability, does not constitute a 'write off' under Rule 3(5B) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and therefore does not mandate reversal of cenvat credit; additionally, recovery of cenvat credit requires the statutory recovery mechanism to be in force.

Issues: (i) Whether the finding in the impugned order invoking the extended period of limitation and imposing penalty (Section 11AC) is sustainable where the admitted claim has been settled under an NCLT-approved resolution plan; (ii) Whether proceedings before the Tribunal should continue or abate under Rule 22 of the CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982 after approval of a resolution plan by NCLT and settlement of claims.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority are sustainable after the admitted claim was settled under the NCLT-approved resolution plan.

Analysis: The respondent's demand for duty, interest and penalty was filed as a claim in the insolvency process and the NCLT-approved resolution plan settled admitted claims at a specified percentage; the Department's admitted duty claim was settled and paid by the resolution applicant. The Tribunal examined precedent on whether claims settled by NCLT approval affect continuation of adjudicatory consequences such as interest and penalty, and considered the effect of admitted and settled claims on the demand confirmed by the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the impugned order confirming interest and penalty is unsustainable in view of the settlement of admitted claims under the NCLT-approved resolution plan and the payment made; therefore the finding invoking the extended period and imposition of penalty does not survive.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal and related proceedings continue before the Tribunal after approval of a resolution plan by NCLT or abate under Rule 22 of the CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered Rule 22 and relevant authority holding that once a resolution plan is approved by NCLT and claims are settled as per that plan, proceedings concerning settled claims may abate and reliefs relating to amounts settled by the resolution process cannot be reopened in the appellate forum; the Tribunal noted that the appellant limited its challenge to the finding on extended limitation and penalty while the demand portion was settled by NCLT.

Conclusion: The Tribunal applied the precedent and Rule 22 to hold that the demand as settled by the NCLT need not be reopened and that the appeal, insofar as it challenges interest and penalty relating to settled claims, cannot sustain the adjudicated interest and penalty; accordingly the appeal is disposed in favour of the appellant on those issues.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal to the extent that the impugned confirmations of interest and penalty relating to claims settled under the NCLT-approved resolution plan are set aside, resulting in disposal of the appeal in favour of the appellant on the decided issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where admitted claims have been settled pursuant to an NCLT-approved resolution plan and payment is made in accordance with that plan, corresponding demands for interest and penalty confirmed by revenue authorities in separate adjudications are not sustainable and cannot be reopened by the Tribunal in respect of amounts settled under the insolvency resolution.

Issues: Whether the impugned order dated 20.08.2025 was passed in violation of Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the principles of natural justice by failing to consider the petitioner's additional reply and requests for a personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires that the adjudicating authority afford opportunity of hearing before passing an order that may be adverse to the taxpayer; this statutory entitlement engages the principles of natural justice. The record shows that a personal hearing was held on 11.07.2025, subsequent online submissions and an email dated 21.07.2025 and an additional reply dated 14.08.2025 were submitted and a request for personal hearing was reiterated, but those submissions were not considered by the authority when passing the impugned order dated 20.08.2025. The court examined the sequence of filings and communications and found that the additional material was not taken into account prior to the order; consequently the statutory requirement and the petitioner's opportunity to be heard were not complied with.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 20.08.2025 is quashed and set aside for breach of Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the principles of natural justice. The demand notice in Form DRC-07 dated 04.09.2025 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the competent authority to pass a fresh order after following the statutory provisions and granting a personal hearing. The quashing is on technical/procedural grounds and no expression is made on the merits of the case.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition is maintainable when a statutory appellate forum under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (GSTAT) has not been constituted or made functional; (ii) Whether the writ court can relieve the petitioner from complying with the payment/deposit conditions under sub-section (8) of Section 112 of the GST Act when the GSTAT is made functional and timelines for filing appeals are notified.

Issue (i): Maintainability of writ petition where GSTAT was not functional and later made functional.

Analysis: The Court noted that where a statutory forum for appeal exists, writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not a substitute; however, writ relief has been permitted historically when the designated forum is not constituted or functional and a person would be rendered remediless. The record shows GSTAT has been made functional and the Central Government has notified timelines (S.O. No. 4220(E) dated 17.09.2025) together with user advisory timelines to enable filing of appeals before the GSTAT.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable for adjudication of the dispute on merits now that the statutory appellate forum (GSTAT) is functional and timelines for filing appeals have been notified; the writ petition is disposed directing the petitioner to approach the GSTAT.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ court may relax or set aside the payment/deposit conditions in sub-section (8) of Section 112 of the GST Act so as to enable filing of appeal without compliance.

Analysis: The Court observed that even where the writ jurisdiction is invoked because the forum was non-functional, the writ court cannot ordinarily permit departure from statutory conditions attached to filing appeals. With GSTAT now functional and notification of filing windows in place, the proper course is to ensure strict compliance with sub-section (8) of Section 112 of the GST Act (deposit/payment conditions) and to facilitate filing before the GSTAT in accordance with the notified timelines and portal guidance. The Court therefore directed the petitioner to deposit amounts required under sub-section (8) and to file the appeal within the specified timeline; the Court refrained from expressing any opinion on merits of the first appellate order.

Conclusion: The writ court will not relieve the petitioner from the deposit/payment conditions under Section 112(8); the petitioner is directed to comply with those conditions and file the appeal before the GSTAT within the notified timelines, whereupon the GSTAT shall entertain the appeal if found in order.

Final Conclusion: The dispute raised in the writ petition is to be adjudicated by the statutory appellate forum (GSTAT) now made functional; the writ petition is disposed with directions to comply with statutory deposit conditions and to file the appeal within the timelines notified by the Government and the GSTAT e-filing portal, without any expression on the merits of the underlying appellate order.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appellate forum exists and is functional, the writ court should ordinarily refrain from deciding the substantive dispute and must ensure compliance with statutory conditions for filing appeals; the availability of an effective alternative remedy before the designated tribunal and notified timelines warrants disposal of the writ directing the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 reckons from the date the order is communicated to the person and whether an appellate authority can condone delay beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The Court examined Sub Section (1) of Section 107 which prescribes that the three month limitation period begins from the date when the decision or order is communicated to the aggrieved person; therefore communication is essential to determine limitation. The Court considered the appellant's own admission in the appeal form that the Order in Original was communicated on the date of passing and noted that Section 107(4) permits condonation of delay only within a further period of one month, creating a statutory outer cap beyond which the appellate authority has no power to condone delay. The appellate authority's finding that the appeal was filed beyond that outer limit and therefore could not be condoned was reviewed and found to be consonant with the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: (i) The limitation for filing an appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 starts from the date of communication of the order; and the appellate authority rightly refused to condone delay beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The decision is against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable when an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal exists under the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the assessment order dated 19.03.2024 suffered such violation of principles of natural justice as to warrant exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable when an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal exists under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Income-tax Act, 1961 provides a statutory appellate mechanism including an appeal under Section 250. The assessment was passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B. The matters in dispute relate to factual questions concerning production of invoices and the character of the transactions. Established precedent recognises that writ jurisdiction is a discretionary, extraordinary remedy and ordinarily ought not to be invoked where an adequate and efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists, absent exceptional circumstances.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable in the presence of an efficacious alternative remedy under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order dated 19.03.2024 suffered such violation of principles of natural justice as to warrant exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The assessing authority recorded that opportunity was afforded to produce invoices and that the appellant failed to do so; the respondents asserted the transactions concerned a proprietary concern (HUF) and involved disputed facts. The dispute is fact-intensive and there was no finding of total disregard of statutory procedure or a demonstrated exceptional breach of natural justice in the material on record.

Conclusion: There are no exceptional circumstances or proven violation of principles of natural justice that would justify interference by writ jurisdiction in this matter.

Final Conclusion: The appropriate statutory remedy under the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available and effective; disputed factual questions and the absence of exceptional circumstances preclude exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a self-contained statutory scheme provides an adequate and efficacious remedy for challenging an assessment, and no exceptional circumstances or demonstrable violation of principles of natural justice exist, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised in lieu of the statutory appellate remedy.