Issues: Whether the contempt cases disclosed wilful and deliberate non-compliance of the writ court's order warranting exercise of contempt jurisdiction.

Analysis: The writ court had remitted the matter to the authority to calculate and pay the withheld GST-related amount, and the authority had thereafter determined and paid a quantified sum. In contempt proceedings, the decisive inquiry is whether there is wilful disobedience of a clear command. Where the original order has substantially been carried out and the surviving grievance relates to the quantum calculated by the authority, the contempt court does not sit in appeal over that determination or substitute its own view on entitlement.

Conclusion: No wilful or deliberate non-compliance was established, and contempt jurisdiction was not attracted.

Ratio Decidendi: Contempt lies only on proof of wilful disobedience of a specific direction, and it cannot be used to re-open a dispute on quantum where the underlying order has been substantially complied with and the remaining issue is left to be pursued before the appropriate forum.

Issues: (i) Whether services received for loading and unloading of materials were taxable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service under reverse charge mechanism. (ii) Whether penalty was sustainable in relation to the upheld goods transport agency service demand.

Issue (i): Whether services received for loading and unloading of materials were taxable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service under reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The service recipient was found to have engaged parties for loading and unloading work, with payments made on the basis of the quantum of job performed and not on the basis of manpower supplied. The statutory definition of manpower recruitment or supply agency service contemplates supply of manpower, directly or indirectly, temporarily or otherwise, and the billing pattern was inconsistent with taxation on manpower supply.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax under manpower recruitment or supply agency service was not sustainable and was set aside, along with the connected interest and penalty.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty was sustainable in relation to the upheld goods transport agency service demand.

Analysis: The goods transport agency service demand was accepted, but the record showed registration with the department, regular filing of returns, and assessment based on those returns. No corroborative material established wilful suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, so the penal consequence was not justified.

Conclusion: The penalty relatable to the goods transport agency service demand was set aside, while the tax demand and interest were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the classification dispute and on the penalty question, but the goods transport agency tax liability remained confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A service is not taxable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service when payment is made for the job executed on a quantified-work basis rather than for supply of manpower, and penalty cannot be sustained absent proof of wilful suppression with intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether a sub-contractor providing works contract services to a contractor executing an exempt government contract is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012. (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked in the absence of independent corroborative evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether a sub-contractor providing works contract services to a contractor executing an exempt government contract is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: The services rendered by the appellant were found to be part of the construction work awarded by the Ministry of Defence to the main contractor. The notification grants exemption to specified construction services provided to the Government or governmental authority, and its sub-contractor clause extends the same benefit where the main contractor's service is exempt. Since the main contractor's services for the Ministry of Defence project were exempt, the appellant's subcontracted works contract services also fell within the exemption.

Conclusion: The exemption applied, and the service tax demand on merits was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked in the absence of independent corroborative evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The demand was raised several years after the relevant period on the basis of Form 26AS data without independent enquiry into the nature of the service. No material was produced to establish suppression of facts or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax. In the absence of corroborative evidence, invocation of the extended limitation period was not justified.

Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation, and the extended period was not validly invoked, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service tax demand, interest, and penalty were set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief as permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A subcontractor is entitled to exemption where the main contractor's works contract service is exempt under the notification, and the extended limitation period cannot be invoked absent independent evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issues: Whether the demand and penalties deserved remand for fresh consideration on the issue of limitation in view of the absence of specific findings despite the earlier direction to examine limitation.

Analysis: The appellate order and the original adjudication did not record a specific finding on limitation, although the matter had earlier been directed to be examined with reference to the statutory time limit and the applicability of the extended period under the service tax law. The record showed that the adjudicating authority proceeded ex parte and relied on the allegation of suppression and attempted evasion, but the issue of limitation was not dealt with in the manner required. In these circumstances, the appellate authority found that the matter required reconsideration by the original authority in the light of the earlier judicial direction.

Conclusion: The matter was remitted to the original authority for a fresh decision on limitation, and the appeal was allowed for that purpose.

Issues: (i) Whether the application under Section 233(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 was maintainable and whether the Central Government was required to first form an opinion that the scheme was not in public interest or in the interest of creditors before filing it; (ii) whether the appeal was barred by limitation and whether the delay of 196 days could be condoned.

Issue (i): Whether the application under Section 233(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 was maintainable and whether the Central Government was required to first form an opinion that the scheme was not in public interest or in the interest of creditors before filing it.

Analysis: Section 233(5) permits the Central Government to move the Tribunal only after receiving objections or suggestions, or for any other reason, and forming an opinion that the scheme is not in public interest or in the interest of creditors. The Tribunal found that the application had been filed without recording such opinion and that the prayers went beyond the scope of the provision. The impugned order therefore treated the petition as not maintainable under the statutory framework governing fast-track merger scrutiny.

Conclusion: The application under Section 233(5) was not maintainable as filed without the requisite opinion.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal was barred by limitation and whether the delay of 196 days could be condoned.

Analysis: The appeal was filed far beyond the prescribed appellate period. The governing limitation scheme under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 allows only the statutory period and a further limited extension, and the law does not permit condonation beyond that outer limit. Reliance on Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held not to assist the appellant in the face of the special limitation structure. As the delay exceeded the permissible period, no jurisdiction survived to condone it.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and the appeal was time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the impugned order failed both on maintainability under the merger provisions and on limitation, and the dismissal of the appeal was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a strict appellate limitation with a capped condonable extension, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that outer limit, and proceedings filed outside the statutory scheme of Section 233(5) are not maintainable absent the required prior opinion.

Issues: (i) Whether interim relief could be granted to permit payment to the petitioner without statutory tax deduction or by furnishing security in lieu of deduction; (ii) Whether the petitioner's pending proceedings before the Board for Advance Ruling could be treated as withdrawn and whether the Assessing Officer should complete the assessment for Assessment Year 2018-19 while examining the petitioner's taxability under the Act of 1961 and the DTAA.

Issue (i): Whether interim relief could be granted to permit payment to the petitioner without statutory tax deduction or by furnishing security in lieu of deduction.

Analysis: The requested relief was considered against the statutory scheme governing tax deduction at source. The Court held that no direction could be issued to allow payment without applicable deduction, even on a security basis, unless it were first held that no tax was leviable on the payment. It was also observed that, in the prima facie view of the Court, deduction of tax remained a statutory obligation and no interim protection could be granted merely by offering security.

Conclusion: Interim relief against tax deduction was declined and the petitioner could not be permitted to receive payments without applicable deduction.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner's pending proceedings before the Board for Advance Ruling could be treated as withdrawn and whether the Assessing Officer should complete the assessment for Assessment Year 2018-19 while examining the petitioner's taxability under the Act of 1961 and the DTAA.

Analysis: The Court noted the prolonged pendency of the advance ruling proceedings and the resulting blockage of TDS and uncertainty in the petitioner's tax position. To secure a fact-finding exercise and ensure certainty of tax treatment, the Court directed the Assessing Officer to finalise the assessment for Assessment Year 2018-19 within a specified time and to examine the petitioner's contention that no tax was exigible under the Act of 1961 and the DTAA. The Court also allowed the withdrawal request and treated the pending applications before the Board for Advance Ruling as withdrawn.

Conclusion: The advance ruling proceedings stood withdrawn and the Assessing Officer was directed to complete the assessment and consider the petitioner's taxability on merits.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained withdrawal of the advance ruling proceedings and a direction for assessment on merits, but no interim exemption from statutory tax deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim relief cannot override a statutory tax deduction obligation unless the underlying taxability is first negated, and prolonged uncertainty in tax administration may be addressed by directing assessment on merits and permitting withdrawal of pending advance ruling proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether income tax and other statutory dues existing on the date of approval of the resolution plan, but not filed in the corporate insolvency resolution process, stood extinguished upon approval of the plan; (ii) whether reliefs, concessions and waivers relating to income tax liabilities could be granted without prior approval of the competent authority under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether income tax and other statutory dues existing on the date of approval of the resolution plan, but not filed in the corporate insolvency resolution process, stood extinguished upon approval of the plan.

Analysis: The governing principle applied is that the resolution process is intended to revive the corporate debtor on a clean slate. Once a resolution plan is approved, claims not forming part of the plan and not lodged in the process are frozen and cannot survive against the successful resolution applicant. Statutory dues owed to governmental authorities are treated on the same footing if they were not included in the plan.

Conclusion: The unpaid income tax and other statutory dues that existed prior to approval of the resolution plan and were not filed in the insolvency process stood extinguished and could not be continued against the resolution applicant.

Issue (ii): Whether reliefs, concessions and waivers relating to income tax liabilities could be granted without prior approval of the competent authority under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The reliefs, concessions and waivers sought in relation to income tax were treated as matters to be dealt with by the competent authority under the applicable tax law. The approval of the resolution plan did not itself confer a tax waiver or dispense with the statutory approval mechanism for such reliefs.

Conclusion: The observation requiring the resolution applicant to approach the competent authority for income tax-related concessions and waivers was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that pre-resolution, unfiled income tax and other statutory dues were held to be extinguished, while the tax authority's approval requirement for concessions and waivers remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Upon approval of a resolution plan, all claims and statutory dues not included in the plan and not lodged in the insolvency process stand extinguished, and the successful resolution applicant takes the corporate debtor free from such past liabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition should be entertained when a statutory appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal is available and the Tribunal has been made functional; (ii) Whether the petitioner must comply with the pre-deposit requirement under the GST Act before filing the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition should be entertained when a statutory appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal is available and the Tribunal has been made functional.

Analysis: The availability of a statutory appellate remedy ordinarily displaces writ intervention where the forum is functional. The Court noted that the GST Appellate Tribunal had been put in place and that the appeal period had been extended by the notified timeline, so the dispute could be adjudicated by the designated forum. In such circumstances, the writ court should not keep the matter pending when the statute provides an efficacious avenue of redress.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy before the GST Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner must comply with the pre-deposit requirement under the GST Act before filing the appeal.

Analysis: The appeal provision under the GST regime conditions filing of the appeal on payment of the admitted tax, interest, fine, fee and penalty, together with the prescribed percentage of the remaining disputed tax. The Court emphasised that the existence of a writ remedy cannot be used to bypass the statutory pre-condition attached to the appellate remedy. Accordingly, compliance with the statutory deposit requirement was treated as mandatory for admission of the appeal.

Conclusion: The petitioner was directed to make the statutory deposit before filing the appeal, and the appeal was to be entertained only if the requirements of the GST Act and the relevant rules were satisfied.

Final Conclusion: The matter was disposed of by directing the petitioner to pursue the statutory appellate remedy before the GST Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the prescribed timeline and deposit requirements, without any opinion on the merits of the challenged order.

Ratio Decidendi: When an effective statutory appellate forum is functional, writ jurisdiction should ordinarily yield to that alternate remedy, and the court will insist on strict compliance with the statutory pre-deposit conditions attached to the appeal.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the statutory appeal on the ground of wrong jurisdiction was sustainable and whether the appeal was liable to be restored and transmitted to the appropriate appellate authority.

Analysis: The writ petition challenged the appellate order rejecting the appeal for want of jurisdiction. On the basis of the written instructions placed before the Court, it was noticed that there had been a mistake in rejecting the appeal and that the appellant was being advised to re-file the matter. The record disclosed that the appeal should not have been denied on that ground, and the grievance could be redressed by restoring the appeal and directing transmission to the competent appellate forum. The Court did not enter into the merits of the underlying tax dispute and confined relief to the jurisdictional defect in the disposal of the appeal.

Conclusion: The rejection for wrong jurisdiction was set aside, the appeal was restored to its original file, and it was directed to be transmitted to the appropriate appellate authority for decision in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained restoration of the statutory appeal with a direction for transfer to the competent appellate authority, leaving the merits of the tax dispute open.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate proceeding should not be rejected for wrong jurisdiction where the defect can be cured by transmission to the competent authority and the merits of the dispute remain unadjudicated.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned properties answered the definition of a benami transaction under Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. (ii) Whether the arrangement was excluded from the definition of benami transaction on the grounds of fiduciary capacity or by reason of the explanation relating to possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned properties answered the definition of a benami transaction under Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Analysis: A transaction falls within the statutory definition where property is transferred to or held by one person while consideration is provided by another, and the property is held for the immediate or future benefit of the person providing the consideration. The record showed that the consideration for the agricultural lands was provided by the trusts, the properties were taken in the name of Shri Narendra Lamba, and the arrangement was intended to secure eventual benefit for the trusts. The absence of a continued title-holding by the benamidar after the transfer did not take the arrangement outside the statutory language, because the provision is satisfied once the property is transferred to or held by a person for the benefit of another on consideration supplied by that other person.

Conclusion: The impugned properties were benami transactions within Section 2(9)(A) and the finding of non-benami nature was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the arrangement was excluded from the definition of benami transaction on the grounds of fiduciary capacity or by reason of the explanation relating to possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Analysis: The fiduciary exception applies only where the person standing in such capacity genuinely holds the property for another in the legally recognised fiduciary sense. The materials, including the MoUs and the surrounding conduct, showed that the name of Shri Lamba was used to acquire agricultural land that the trusts could not directly purchase at the relevant time, and the arrangement was structured for the trusts' ultimate benefit rather than as a true fiduciary holding. The explanation linked to part performance under Section 53A was also inapplicable, because the arrangement was not confined to a simple seller-buyer contract and did not satisfy the statutory exclusion conditions in the manner required by the provision.

Conclusion: The fiduciary exception and the Section 53A explanation did not apply, and the properties remained within the scope of the Benami Act.

Final Conclusion: The appellate tribunal held that the impugned orders could not stand, the references were liable to be sustained as benami cases, and the appeals of the Initiating Officer succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A transaction is benami when consideration is supplied by one person and the property is taken in another's name for that person's immediate or future benefit, and the statutory exceptions for fiduciary holding and part-performance possession are available only when their specific legal requirements are strictly satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate debtor had established a genuine pre-existing dispute relating to the invoices for supply of goods, so as to bar admission of the section 9 application; (ii) Whether the section 9 application was maintainable at the instance of a proprietorship concern and whether notice under section 8 could validly be issued through an advocate.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate debtor had established a genuine pre-existing dispute relating to the invoices for supply of goods, so as to bar admission of the section 9 application.

Analysis: The demand notice and the reply showed that the corporate debtor did not dispute receipt of the goods in the notice stage and raised non-supply and invoice-related objections only later. The dispute relied upon by the corporate debtor arose from a separate franchise arrangement with another proprietorship concern of the same proprietor, and the record did not show that this dispute related to the transactions covered by the three invoices. Applying the requirement that the dispute must be pre-existing, genuine, and connected with the operational debt claimed, the Tribunal held that a dispute concerning a different contract cannot be used to defeat the section 9 claim in respect of the invoice debt.

Conclusion: The alleged dispute was not a valid pre-existing dispute against the appellant and could not justify rejection of the section 9 application.

Issue (ii): Whether the section 9 application was maintainable at the instance of a proprietorship concern and whether notice under section 8 could validly be issued through an advocate.

Analysis: The Code applies to proprietorship firms, and the Tribunal treated the proprietorship as competent to pursue insolvency proceedings. It also accepted that a demand notice under section 8 may be issued by an authorised advocate or legal representative on behalf of the operational creditor. The objection founded on the form of the notice and the proprietary character of the creditor therefore lacked merit.

Conclusion: The application was maintainable and the notice was not defective on the ground urged by the corporate debtor.

Final Conclusion: The rejection of the section 9 application was unsustainable, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for fresh consideration by the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: For rejecting a section 9 application, the dispute must be genuine, pre-existing, and referable to the same operational debt in question; a dispute arising from a separate transaction or contract does not bar insolvency proceedings on the claimed debt.

Issues: Whether assets of the corporate debtor discovered after approval of a resolution plan and not disclosed in the information memorandum (specifically fixed deposit receipts held as margin money) belong to the successful resolution applicant who implemented the plan or to the erstwhile committee of creditors.

Analysis: Regulation 36 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 requires the information memorandum to contain assets and liabilities including contingent liabilities, but does not expressly require disclosure of contingent assets. Regulations 37-39 set out the permissible content and obligations in a resolution plan and the approval process, without imposing a rule that assets omitted from the information memorandum vest outside the corporate debtor post-approval. The decision in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt Ltd v. Edelweiss ARC establishes that claims not part of an approved resolution plan stand extinguished and the claims provided in the resolution plan stand frozen. Prior appellate authority recognises that margin money deposited as fixed deposits reverts to the borrower if bank guarantees expire uninvoked. Applying these principles, assets of the corporate debtor that pre-existed the insolvency commencement date but were not included in the information memorandum (such as fixed deposit receipts held as margin money against expired bank guarantees) are properly characterised as assets of the corporate debtor rather than property of the banks that had adjusted or retained them post-approval. The absence of disclosure in the information memorandum does not, by itself, operate to divest the successful resolution applicant of title in assets of the corporate debtor acquired upon implementation of the approved resolution plan. Fraudulent conduct or deliberate concealment to prejudice creditors remains actionable and will not sustain retention of such assets by third parties.

Conclusion: Assets of the corporate debtor discovered after approval and implementation of the resolution plan, which were created by the corporate debtor (including fixed deposit receipts held as margin money for bank guarantees that have expired), belong to the corporate debtor and, following implementation of the resolution plan, to the successful resolution applicant; respondent banks have no right to adjust or retain those amounts post-implementation. The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for further proceedings consistent with this conclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in disbursal of working capital loan or alleged shortcomings in the lending arrangement barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7. (ii) Whether rejection of one-time settlement and pendency of arbitration required pause or restraint on admission of the Section 7 application. (iii) Whether the application was hit by Section 10A and whether non-mentioning of the exact date of default was fatal. (iv) Whether the proceedings were merely recovery proceedings or a valid insolvency action based on established default.

Issue (i): Whether delay in disbursal of working capital loan or alleged shortcomings in the lending arrangement barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7.

Analysis: The defaulting borrower's grievance that working capital was released belatedly was held not to be a valid answer to an established default. Once material showed persistent inability to service the debt, the adjudicating authority was not required to re-open the commercial reasons behind the default or treat alleged fault in disbursal as a bar to insolvency resolution.

Conclusion: The alleged delay in disbursal did not bar the Section 7 proceeding.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of one-time settlement and pendency of arbitration required pause or restraint on admission of the Section 7 application.

Analysis: One-time settlement was treated as a matter within the lender's commercial discretion, and the borrower had no vested right to insist upon acceptance on its own terms. Rejection of settlement did not extinguish the creditor's right to pursue insolvency once debt and default were established. The pending arbitration was also not treated as crystallized relief capable of displacing the demonstrated debt default.

Conclusion: Rejection of the settlement proposal and pending arbitration did not prevent admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (iii): Whether the application was hit by Section 10A and whether non-mentioning of the exact date of default was fatal.

Analysis: The default dates were found to fall outside the protected Section 10A window. The record showed multiple loan facilities and revised repayment dates, with the latest default occurring after the relevant excluded period. Non-disclosure of the exact default date in the application was held not to be fatal where default otherwise stood established on the material before the authority.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by Section 10A, and omission to state the date of default did not invalidate it.

Issue (iv): Whether the proceedings were merely recovery proceedings or a valid insolvency action based on established default.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the account had become NPA, stood restructured, and continued to show default despite subsequent concessions and restructuring. In such circumstances, the filing of a Section 7 application was consistent with the insolvency framework and not a mere recovery measure. The statutory consequence of established default was admission unless the application was incomplete.

Conclusion: The proceedings were a valid insolvency action and not impermissible recovery proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order was sustained because debt and default were established, no statutory bar was made out, and the appellants' objections did not displace the creditor's entitlement to invoke insolvency resolution.

Ratio Decidendi: Once default under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is established and the application is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must admit the matter; alleged lending shortcomings, rejection of one-time settlement, or pendency of collateral proceedings do not by themselves defeat insolvency initiation, and non-mention of the exact default date is not fatal if default is otherwise clear.

Issues: Whether, after the firm's liability under FEMA had been set aside and attained finality, the penalty and confiscatory consequences could continue against a partner invoking Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Analysis: Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 applies the principle of deemed liability to a firm and to the persons in charge of its business, but only where contravention by the firm is first established. The Tribunal noted that the earlier appellate order had quashed the impugned order against the firm and other noticees and that the High Court had dismissed the further appeals, rendering that decision final. On that footing, the partner's liability could not survive independently when the firm itself had been exonerated on the same set of allegations. The Tribunal therefore treated the impugned penalties and confiscation orders against the appellant as unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty and confiscation imposed on the appellant were quashed and the seized amounts and pre-deposit were directed to be released in his favour.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the appellant was relieved from the penalties and confiscatory consequences arising from the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: Liability under Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is contingent on a proved contravention by the firm or company, and once the principal entity's contravention is finally set aside, the derivative liability of the partner or person in charge cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the attached property, though claimed to have been purchased earlier and financed as a loan arrangement, could still be treated as proceeds of crime and subjected to provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the competent authority had material to form the requisite reason to believe under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether the appellant discharged the burden of showing that the property was not involved in money laundering.

Issue (i): Whether the attached property, though claimed to have been purchased earlier and financed as a loan arrangement, could still be treated as proceeds of crime and subjected to provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The property was held liable to attachment because the record showed substantial transfers from the account of the person behind the scheduled offence to the appellant's accounts, and those transfers were found to be linked to cash proceeds generated from the unlawful fundraising activity. The plea that the amounts were mere loans was not supported by credible documentary evidence. Even if the property had originally been acquired earlier, infusion of tainted funds into the property or its upkeep was sufficient to attract the definition of proceeds of crime, which covers property derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The fact that the appellant was not named as an accused did not prevent attachment.

Conclusion: The property was rightly treated as proceeds of crime and the attachment was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the competent authority had material to form the requisite reason to believe under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether the appellant discharged the burden of showing that the property was not involved in money laundering.

Analysis: The authority recorded reasons based on investigation material, including statements and banking trail, showing the generation, layering and routing of tainted funds and the likelihood of concealment or transfer if the property was not attached. That material had a rational nexus with the belief formed, and the sufficiency of the material was not open to challenge at this stage. Once such material was produced, the burden shifted to the possessor of the property to establish that it was untainted. The appellant did not discharge that burden because the alleged loan explanation and source-of-funds explanation were not proved convincingly.

Conclusion: The requisite reason to believe existed, and the appellant failed to rebut the statutory burden.

Final Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation were sustained, and the appeal failed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Property may be provisionally attached under the money-laundering law if material shows a rational nexus between the property and proceeds of crime, including indirect derivation or infusion of tainted funds, and the attachment is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence; once such material is produced, the possessor must prove that the property is untainted.

Issues: Whether the appellants could seek release of the attached property after settlement of the investors' dues and whether the appeals should be disposed of with liberty to approach the Special Court.

Analysis: The attachment related to property treated as proceeds of crime under the PMLA. The order noted the existing mechanism for settlement of investors' claims and recorded that, after such settlement, the concerned party may invoke the statutory remedy before the Special Court for release of property. The Tribunal also relied on the connected order granting similar liberty in comparable matters.

Conclusion: The appellants were permitted to move the Special Court under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 for release of the property remaining after settlement of investors' dues.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of without disturbing the attachment, while preserving the statutory remedy for release after settlement of dues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where attached property is alleged to be proceeds of crime, the person aggrieved may seek release before the Special Court after settlement of investors' dues under the statutory scheme of the PMLA.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit of service tax paid on outward transportation from the place of removal for the period prior to 01.04.2008 is admissible; (ii) Whether Cenvat credit of service tax shown on transporter invoices for inward transportation is admissible; (iii) Whether penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is imposable where credit is questioned.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit of service tax paid on outward transportation from the place of removal for the period prior to 01.04.2008 is admissible.

Analysis: The definition of "input service" as it stood prior to 01.04.2008 expressly included services used by the manufacturer in relation to "clearance of final products from the place of removal". The Court considered binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Andhra Sugars Ltd and Vasavdatta Cements Ltd) holding that "from the place of removal" covers outward transportation from the place of removal up to the depot or the customer's place for the period before the amendment effective 01.04.2008; subsequent amendment by Notification No. 10/2008-C.E. (N.T.) (effective 01.04.2008) altered this position prospectively. Tribunal decisions consistent with the Supreme Court and the statutory wording were applied to the facts.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.4,26,427/- for outward transportation from the place of removal for the pre-01.04.2008 period is admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit of service tax shown on transporter invoices for inward transportation is admissible.

Analysis: Subrule (f) of Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 prescribes an invoice, bill or challan issued by a provider of input service on or after 10.09.2004 as an eligible document for availment of Cenvat credit. Notification No. 32/2004-ST (03.12.2004) exempts 75% of the gross amount for goods transport agencies subject to conditions applicable to the transporter; the restriction on credit of inputs/capital goods applies to the goods transport agency, not the recipient. There was no dispute about the transporter invoices as documents in this case.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.75,407/- on transporter invoices is admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is imposable where credit is questioned.

Analysis: Penalty becomes irrelevant where the substantive demand is unsustainable on merits. Given that both contested credits were held admissible on merits and documents were in order, the precondition for imposing penalty under Rule 15(1) does not survive.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not imposable; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned demand and penalty are set aside to the extent indicated and the assessee's availment of Cenvat credit is upheld, resulting in relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For the period prior to 01.04.2008 the statutory definition of "input service" which included services relating to "clearance of final products from the place of removal" permits Cenvat credit for outward transportation from the place of removal up to depot or customer, and valid transporter invoices meeting Rule 9 documentation requirements permit availment of credit notwithstanding Notification No.32/2004-ST conditions applicable to the goods transport agency.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could refuse to exercise the power under Section 17(7) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 to stay realization during pendency of the appeal on the ground that any consideration of the request would touch the merits of the appeal, and whether the impugned order was liable to be set aside for absence of reasons.

Analysis: Section 17(7) confers power on the Commissioner to stay realization of tax, interest or penalty, in whole or in part, while the appeal remains pending before the Tribunal. The power is meant to operate during the appellate stage and any observation made for deciding the stay application is only tentative and does not bind or prejudice the Tribunal in the merits of the appeal. Refusing to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending, or because some reference to the issues may be made, defeats the statutory purpose. The impugned order, though lengthy, did not record the requisite reasons for declining relief and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The refusal to consider the stay application on the stated ground was unsustainable, and the order was rightly set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers power to grant stay of realization during pendency of an appeal, the authority must decide the application on reasons germane to stay and cannot decline to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending or because the order may incidentally refer to the merits.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, whose GST registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns, was entitled to restoration of registration after filing the pending returns and making the requisite payments.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled under the provision empowering cancellation for continued default in furnishing returns. Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, particularly the proviso to sub-rule (4), permits the proper officer to drop cancellation proceedings where the person furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee. The record showed that the petitioner had filed the pending returns and deposited the penalty amount, and the respondents expressed no objection to grant of similar relief. On that basis, the matter was treated as fit for restoration of registration on compliance with the prescribed procedure.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to seek restoration of GST registration by filing an appropriate application, and the respondent authorities were directed to consider it in accordance with law and restore the registration upon verification and compliance.