Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The search took place on 08.02.2024 during Financial Year 2023-24, and the controversy turned on the computation of the ten-year block for proceedings arising from search. The Court held that Section 153A(1)(b) uses one formula for six assessment years immediately preceding the search assessment year, while Explanation 1 to Section 153A uses a different formula for the extended ten-year period by reckoning from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted. On that construction, the search assessment year is included in the ten-year count. Applying that statutory scheme, Assessment Year 2014-15 fell beyond the permissible ten-year period.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was time-barred and liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the reopening notice was set aside on limitation grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: For search-based reassessment, the six-year and ten-year periods are computed by distinct statutory formulas, and the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search is included in the ten-year reckoning under Explanation 1 to Section 153A.

Issues: Whether the miscellaneous application under section 254(2) could be entertained when it in substance sought review of the earlier Tribunal order rather than rectification of an apparent mistake.

Analysis: The scope of section 254(2) is confined to rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. It does not permit the Tribunal to review its own order, reappreciate facts, or undertake a fresh examination through elaborate arguments and counter-arguments. The miscellaneous application sought reconsideration of the earlier decision on the validity of the approval under section 151 and the consequential reassessment, which amounted to a request for review rather than rectification. No apparent mistake in the earlier order was shown.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable under section 254(2) and was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 for import of tea consignment containing viable seeds in violation of the Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import into India) Order, 2003 was sustainable.

Analysis: The imported tea was not misdeclared as to quantity or description, and the seeds were detected only upon testing by the Plant Quarantine Authorities. The goods were imported for processing and re-export under advance authorization, and the importer relied on certificates indicating that the tea was fit for human consumption and on the asserted prohibition on export of tea seeds from the exporting country. In these circumstances, the import was held to be without wilful intention, and no mens rea was found to justify penal action under the customs law.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a demand of Service Tax can be sustained merely on the basis of a mismatch between Income Tax Returns or Form 26AS and ST-3 Returns without independent verification of the nature of receipts. (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation under the service tax law could be invoked in the absence of evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether a demand of Service Tax can be sustained merely on the basis of a mismatch between Income Tax Returns or Form 26AS and ST-3 Returns without independent verification of the nature of receipts.

Analysis: The demand was founded on third-party income tax data and a perceived difference between the figures in the Income Tax Returns or Form 26AS and the ST-3 Returns. The reconciliation placed on record showed that the apparent mismatch arose from advances carried forward in the books, and the tax liability on advances had already been discharged when received in terms of the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011. No independent verification was undertaken to establish that the disputed amount represented taxable receipt for the relevant financial year. Mere reliance on income tax data, without corroboration of the nature of the service and receipt, was insufficient to confirm the levy.

Conclusion: The demand could not be sustained merely on the basis of the income tax and ST-3 mismatch and was not sustainable on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation under the service tax law could be invoked in the absence of evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The notice invoking the extended limitation period proceeded on the same data mismatch, but the record did not contain material showing suppression of facts or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax. In the absence of substantive evidence supporting the statutory preconditions for the extended period, invocation of the proviso to section 73(1) was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable and the demand was barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service tax demand, along with interest and penalty, was set aside both on merits and on limitation, resulting in complete relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot be sustained solely on the basis of a mismatch between Income Tax data and ST-3 returns without independent verification and corroborative evidence of taxable receipts, and the extended limitation period cannot be invoked without proof of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issues: Whether the transportation of goods undertaken by the appellant using his own vehicles was exempt under the negative list and whether the Service Tax demand, penalties and late fee could be sustained on the basis of Form 26AS and income tax return data without corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The demand was founded on third-party information from Income Tax Returns and Form 26AS, without independent verification of the actual taxable nature of the service or supporting evidence establishing liability. The appellant's material indicated that he was an individual transporting goods with his own vehicles, and no evidence was produced to show that he functioned as a Goods Transport Agency issuing consignment notes. Transportation of goods by road is taxable only where it is rendered by a Goods Transport Agency, whereas transport by road otherwise falls within the negative list under Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994. The absence of consignment notes and the lack of corroborative evidence meant that the demand could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The transportation service was exempt under the negative list, the Service Tax demand was unsustainable, and the penalties and late fee also failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Service Tax demand for transport activity cannot be upheld merely on the basis of Form 26AS or income tax return data unless the Revenue establishes, with corroborative evidence, that the service was taxable and that the supplier acted as a Goods Transport Agency.

Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal could make observations permitting fresh recourse under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 while dismissing an interlocutory application as withdrawn and when such relief was not sought.

Analysis: The application had been withdrawn at the instance of the applicant, and the operative controversy before the Tribunal stood confined to dismissal as withdrawn. In such a situation, the Tribunal could not travel beyond the prayer and make unsolicited observations affecting the settled compromise and the rights flowing from prior orders. Such remarks amounted to judicial overreach, because they introduced a fresh avenue of dispute without any adjudication on a pending claim.

Conclusion: The additional observations were unsustainable and were quashed; the appeal succeeded to that limited extent.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was interfered with only insofar as it contained extraneous observations beyond the scope of the withdrawn application, while the remainder of the order was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal cannot, while disposing of a matter as withdrawn, grant or suggest relief beyond the pleadings or the prayer, since such extra-observations constitute judicial overreach.

Issues: Whether the profit on sale of fixed assets could be credited directly to reserves and surplus in the balance sheet, or had to be routed through the profit and loss account for computation of book profit under section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessees sold fixed assets during the relevant assessment year and credited the sale surplus directly to reserves and surplus without routing it through the profit and loss account. The statutory auditor noted that this accounting treatment deviated from the prescribed accounting framework and understated the year's profit. For the purpose of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, book profit is the net profit shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. The Court held that a company cannot bypass the profit and loss account by straightaway transferring sale proceeds or gains from fixed assets to reserves, because the MAT computation must begin with the correctly prepared profit and loss account. The ruling was supported by the interpretation of the special MAT provisions and the principle that the deeming provision must be applied strictly.

Conclusion: The profit on sale of fixed assets had to be routed through the profit and loss account for arriving at book profit under section 115JB, and the assessee's direct credit to reserves and surplus was impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether settlement of the main party's case under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDRS) absolves co-noticees from penalties imposed under the Central Excise Rules, 2002; and (ii) Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant for abetment in fraudulent availment of Cenvat credit is sustainable on the facts and evidence.

Issue (i): Whether settlement of the main party under SVLDRS relieves co-noticees from penalties.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined precedent and recent decisions including this Tribunal's earlier decisions and CESTAT Allahabad rulings which hold that settlement by the main party does not automatically absolve other noticees; each noticee must independently seek settlement under SVLDRS. The appellate record shows no independent settlement application by the appellant and the impugned order contains findings against co-noticees based on direct and circumstantial evidence linking them to the wrongful availment of credit. The Tribunal considered whether the factual findings and documentary admissions sustain independent liability of co-noticees despite settlement by the principal party.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concludes that settlement of the main party under SVLDRS does not automatically absolve co-noticees; co-noticees must separately approach SVLDRS. This conclusion is adverse to the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant for abetment in fraudulent availment of Cenvat credit is sustainable.

Analysis: The impugned order records that the appellant issued bogus LR(s) and admitted in statements knowledge of diversion and misuse of documents. The Tribunal reviewed the adjudicating authority's findings (paras 96.1 & 96.2) and relied on documentary and statement evidence showing issuance of fake LRs and facilitation of diversion of goods, as well as prior Tribunal precedent upholding penalties where a person played an active role in the modus operandi. The Tribunal found no reason to disturb the factual findings or penalties imposed under the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the penalty imposed on the appellant for abetment in fraudulent availment of Cenvat credit; the appeal is dismissed and the decision is adverse to the appellant (in favour of the Revenue).

Final Conclusion: The decision confirms that liability for abetment in fraudulent Cenvat credit is determined on the facts and evidence against each noticee, and that settlement by the main party does not negate independent liability of co-noticees.

Ratio Decidendi: Settlement of the principal party under SVLDRS does not automatically extinguish liability of co-noticees; each co-noticee must independently establish entitlement to settlement, and where direct or circumstantial evidence (including admissions) establishes a co-noticee's active role in facilitating fraudulent Cenvat credit, penalties under the Central Excise Rules, 2002 are sustainable.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to refund of excess Dividend Distribution Tax paid on dividend remitted to a non-resident shareholder under the India-Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, and whether such refund claim was maintainable without filing a return in accordance with section 139.

Analysis: Dividend Distribution Tax under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is a charge on the profits distributed by the domestic company and not a tax in the hands of the shareholder. On that basis, the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was held not to be triggered in the present situation. Independently, section 239(1) requires a refund claim under Chapter XIX to be made by furnishing a return in accordance with section 139. Since no return of income had been filed for claiming the refund, the claim was held to be not maintainable. The claim for interest under section 244A also could not survive once the refund claim failed.

Conclusion: The refund claim was rejected and the assessee was denied relief.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed in entirety and the orders of the lower authority were sustained for all assessment years.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim for excess Dividend Distribution Tax is not maintainable where the tax is a levy on distributed profits and not on the shareholder, and no return is filed in the manner required for a statutory refund claim under section 239(1) read with section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was barred by limitation in the context of a search conducted on 08.02.2024 and the computation of the ten-year block under the search-assessment scheme.

Analysis: The search took place during Financial Year 2023-24, so the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search had to be identified first for applying the statutory time limits. The language of section 153A(1)(b) provides a six-year block by using the phrase "immediately preceding", while Explanation 1 to section 153A employs a different formula, namely "from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted". That distinction was treated as deliberate and mandatory, requiring the search assessment year to be counted in the ten-year block. The same computational principle was held to govern the extended limitation framework, and the Court followed the earlier view that the search year is included while computing the ten-year period.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was beyond the permissible ten-year period and was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: For computing the extended ten-year period under Explanation 1 to section 153A, the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted must be included in the reckoning, because the statute uses a different formula from the six-year block and that language must be given full effect.

Issues: Whether a Section 95 application against a personal guarantor is maintainable without prior invocation of the guarantee, whether a demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) itself constitutes invocation of the guarantee, and whether a later-produced recall notice not pleaded in the application can be relied upon.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 95 and Rule 7 of the 2019 Rules requires that the guarantee be invoked before service of the demand notice in Form B. The definition of guarantor in Rule 3(1)(e) also proceeds on the basis that the guarantee has already been invoked and remains unpaid. The Deed of Guarantee itself contemplated demand by the creditor before liability of the guarantor would arise. A demand notice under Rule 7(1) is therefore not a substitute for invocation of the guarantee. Since the Section 95 application relied only on the Form B notice and did not plead any prior invocation notice, the creditor could not introduce the alleged recall notice at the appellate stage, especially after having stated before the Adjudicating Authority that it would not rely upon that document. The later decision reiterating the same legal position was treated as declaring the law applicable to the rule from the outset.

Conclusion: The Section 95 application was not maintainable in the absence of prior invocation of the personal guarantee. The order admitting the application was unsustainable and was set aside; the appeal succeeded and the company petition was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: Prior invocation of the personal guarantee is a mandatory precondition to initiation of insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor under the relevant rules, and a Form B demand notice cannot by itself perform that function.

Ratio Decidendi: For proceedings against a personal guarantor, the guarantee must be invoked before issuance of the Rule 7 demand notice, and a creditor cannot cure the absence of such invocation by relying on an unpleaded or disowned document at a later stage.

Outcome: In one set of special leave petitions, notice was issued on limitation as well as on the special leave petitions and the matters were directed to be tagged with a connected diary number. In another special leave petition, the petition was dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits, and pending applications were disposed of.

Outcome: Delay condoned. Special leave petitions dismissed and pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

Issues: Whether the 16-day delay in filing/uploading Form 10B audit report was liable to be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the rectified intimation under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the refusal to condone delay were liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The petitioner was a charitable religious trust claiming exemption under Sections 11 to 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The audit report in Form 10B was available but was uploaded belatedly by 16 days due to inadvertence. The refusal to condone the delay had already been found unsustainable in the earlier round, and the fresh rejection merely reproduced the earlier order without objective reconsideration. The delay was held to be bona fide and the omission was treated as an error of form, not substance. The authority under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was required to adopt an objective approach to remove hardship and not to defeat exemption on such a trivial lapse.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the Form 10B was directed to be treated as filed along with the return, and the rejection of exemption and consequential demand were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained complete relief against the tax demand and the impugned administrative orders were quashed, resulting in restoration of the claimed exemption position.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide and minor delay in furnishing a statutory audit report, when the report existed and the lapse is merely procedural or formal, may be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to avoid undue hardship, and consequential denial of exemption cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be entertained against the adjudication order when a statutory appeal under the GST law was available, and whether the requirement of pre-deposit justified bypassing that remedy.

Analysis: The adjudication order had determined the classification of spare parts and raised differential tax demand under the GST framework. Since an appellate remedy was expressly available, the existence of a pre-deposit condition did not by itself justify invocation of writ jurisdiction. The grievance regarding non-consideration of the reply and the factual or legal merits of the classification dispute were left open to be examined in appeal.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the adjudication order was not adjudicated in writ jurisdiction, and the petitioner was left free to pursue the appeal with all contentions reserved.

Ratio Decidendi: The mere requirement of pre-deposit for filing a statutory appeal is not a sufficient ground to bypass an efficacious alternative remedy.

Issues: (i) whether the mismatch between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B could be treated as an admitted recoverable liability without first allowing the assessee an opportunity to explain the discrepancy and seek rectification; (ii) whether input tax credit for Financial Year 2018-19 could be denied on the ground of delay in filing when the subsequent statutory amendment permitted availment up to 30.11.2021.

Issue (i): whether the mismatch between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B could be treated as an admitted recoverable liability without first allowing the assessee an opportunity to explain the discrepancy and seek rectification.

Analysis: The discrepancy arose from an asserted human error in reporting the tax rate and credit note particulars in GSTR-1, while the corresponding details in GSTR-3B and GSTR-9 were stated to reflect the correct position. The statutory scheme under Section 37 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits rectification of errors in outward supply details within the prescribed framework, and Rule 88C of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 contemplates intimation, reply, and consideration of explanation where there is a difference between liability reported in GSTR-1 and the return under Section 39. Recovery on the basis of Section 75(12) could not properly be sustained without first affording an opportunity to explain the mismatch.

Conclusion: The mismatch could not be straightaway treated as finally recoverable liability against the assessee, and the assessee was entitled to an opportunity to explain the discrepancy.

Issue (ii): whether input tax credit for Financial Year 2018-19 could be denied on the ground of delay in filing when the subsequent statutory amendment permitted availment up to 30.11.2021.

Analysis: The denial of input tax credit was founded on the original time limit under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. That basis was displaced by the insertion of Section 16(5), which extended entitlement for invoices or debit notes pertaining to the specified financial years, including 2018-19, where the return under Section 39 was filed up to 30.11.2021. Since the return for March 2019 was filed on 13.03.2021, the statutory condition introduced by Section 16(5) stood satisfied.

Conclusion: Denial of input tax credit was unsustainable, and the assessee was entitled to claim input tax credit for the relevant financial year.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment order was interfered with, the assessee obtained relief on both the mismatch and input tax credit issues, and the matter was left to be reconsidered only to the limited extent of the explanation on the return discrepancy.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory scheme provides for rectification and intimation of return discrepancies, a mismatch between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B cannot be conclusively fastened as recoverable liability without opportunity to explain, and a later retrospective entitlement provision governing input tax credit must be given effect according to its terms.

Issues: (i) Whether the balance disallowance of purchases/expenses under section 37(1) could be sustained in full on the basis of search statements and enquiry results. (ii) Whether the addition under section 69A on account of alleged ticket-sale receipts was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the balance disallowance of purchases/expenses under section 37(1) could be sustained in full on the basis of search statements and enquiry results.

Analysis: The addition arose from alleged bogus purchases and inflated expenses, supported by search statements, digital material, and notices under section 133(6). The findings distinguished between parties who had responded with confirmations, ledger details, tax returns, and banking/TDS records, and two parties who had not responded and had not furnished returns or confirmations. The retracted statements were treated as having limited evidentiary value unless supported by independent corroboration. Where documentary trails, audited books, accepted sales, and responses to verification notices existed, the expenditure was held to be genuine. For the remaining unverified parties, only a limited disallowance was considered , rather than the entire claim.

Conclusion: The full disallowance was not sustained. The deletion granted by the first appellate authority was upheld for the verified purchases, and only a limited disallowance was retained for the unverified balance.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition under section 69A on account of alleged ticket-sale receipts was justified.

Analysis: The alleged unexplained cash receipts were examined with the supporting material produced by the assessee in both appellate stages. The recorded finding was that the receipts represented ticket sales from public events and that the relevant details had been filed. In the absence of material to dislodge that explanation, the basis for treating the amount as unexplained money was absent.

Conclusion: The section 69A addition was deleted and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The common order resulted in partial relief to the assessee: the major purchase disallowance was substantially reduced with only a small balance sustained, while the unexplained-money addition was deleted in full.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted search statement cannot, by itself, sustain an addition unless it is corroborated by independent evidence, and where purchases or expenses are supported by documentary records, banking trail, tax compliance, and accepted sales, only the unverifiable balance can be disallowed.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's miscellaneous application disclosed any mistake apparent from the record so as to justify rectification under section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The challenge was directed against the earlier appellate order and sought reconsideration of the merits under the guise of rectification. The power under section 254(2) is confined to correcting an obvious, patent and self-evident error and does not extend to a review or a reappraisal of issues already decided. A debatable point of law or an attempt to reopen the merits cannot be treated as a mistake apparent from the record. On that basis, the application was found to be beyond the permissible scope of rectification.

Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was shown, and the miscellaneous application was not maintainable under section 254(2).

Issues: (i) Whether the imported Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Ethernet Switches were eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty under Sr. No. 20 of Notification No. 57/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017; (ii) whether the appeals relating to the remaining assessed Bills of Entry were maintainable before the Tribunal when no appeals were shown to have been filed before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Issue (i): Whether the imported Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Ethernet Switches were eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty under Sr. No. 20 of Notification No. 57/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The disputed goods were identical to goods considered earlier, where the concessional rate under the same notification was held admissible. That earlier order had been upheld, and the basis adopted in the impugned order stood displaced. On the same reasoning, denial of the notification benefit to the present imports could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The goods were held eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty, and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals relating to the remaining assessed Bills of Entry were maintainable before the Tribunal when no appeals were shown to have been filed before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Analysis: Appellate jurisdiction under Section 129A(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 is available against an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128A of the Customs Act, 1962. The record disclosed disposal by the Commissioner (Appeals) only in respect of three appeals, and no documentary proof was produced to show that appeals had been filed before that authority regarding the remaining assessed Bills of Entry. In the absence of any order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on those matters, the Tribunal found no basis to entertain the additional appeals. Payment of duty under protest did not by itself amount to a statutory appeal or a challenged order under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The remaining appeals were held not maintainable and were dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was resolved in part in favour of the assessee on the duty exemption issue, while the additional appeals failed for want of prior appellate orders and were rejected on maintainability.

Ratio Decidendi: Where identical imported goods have already been held eligible for a concessional notification benefit in a binding prior determination, the same benefit cannot be denied on a displaced basis; separately, the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 129A arises only from an appealable order of the Commissioner (Appeals), and an unproven protest payment does not substitute for such an order.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made under section 68 on account of unsecured loans from two creditors was justified.

Analysis: The assessee claimed that the loans were received and repaid through banking channels and that confirmations, PAN details, addresses, e-mail IDs and bank statements were furnished before completion of assessment. The authorities below held that the assessee failed to satisfactorily prove the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the two creditors, and that the material produced did not reconcile the loan transactions. The Tribunal accepted that repayment through banking channel does not, by itself, establish genuineness where the underlying credits are found to be accommodation entries or bogus unsecured loans. The assessee did not discharge the onus cast under section 68 to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the appellate order and sustained the assessment addition relating to the impugned unsecured loans.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee fails to establish the genuineness of unsecured loan credits and the surrounding material indicates that the transactions are accommodation entries, repayment through banking channels does not cure the defect or displace the addition under section 68.