Issues: Whether the final assessment orders were vitiated for non-compliance with the procedure under section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in that no draft assessment order was issued after the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The additional ground raised a pure question of law arising from the record and was therefore admitted. The remand proceedings were treated as fresh assessment proceedings, and the Assessing Officer, after obtaining approval and making a fresh reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer, proceeded directly to pass final assessment orders. As the statutory procedure under section 144C(1) required issuance of a draft assessment order before passing the final order, the assessee was deprived of the statutory right to approach the Dispute Resolution Panel. Such non-compliance was held to vitiate the assessment proceedings and was not a mere irregularity or curable defect.

Conclusion: The assessments were invalid for breach of section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the additional ground was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where, in a case covered by section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer fails to issue a draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order, the assessment is vitiated because the omission deprives the assessee of a substantive statutory remedy and is not a curable procedural defect.

Issues: Whether gains arising to the assessee from the buy-back of shares by its Indian subsidiary were covered by Article 13(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA and consequently taxable only in the Netherlands.

Analysis: The expression "corporate organisation, reorganization, amalgamation, division or similar transaction" was held to have to be understood in its ordinary legal sense, read in the context of the treaty and the applicable domestic law. Buy-back of shares was treated as capable of constituting corporate reorganisation where it formed part of a transaction within the same corporate group and resulted in a material change in the financial structure of the company. The reasoning relied on recognised legal meanings of reorganisation, guidance materials on corporate restructuring, and the view that a narrow interpretation would defeat the purpose of Article 13(5). On the facts, the buy-back was accepted as a group-level transaction falling within the treaty exception.

Conclusion: The gains from the buy-back were held to fall within Article 13(5) and were not taxable in India; the assessee succeeded.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year was invalid for want of approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax under section 151(ii), and whether the consequential reassessment proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued on 13.04.2022 for Assessment Year 2018-19, which was beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. In that situation, the prescribed sanctioning authority under section 151(ii) was the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or the equivalent higher authority. Approval having been obtained only from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, the sanction did not satisfy the statutory requirement. The reassessment could not be sustained on the basis of approval granted for the earlier stage under section 148A(b), because a separate and valid sanction was required for issuance of notice under section 148 and for the order under section 148A(d). The defect went to jurisdiction and vitiated the entire reassessment process.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid and the reassessment proceedings were liable to be quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether the Revenue's appeal was liable to be dismissed for low tax effect under the CBDT circular; (ii) whether the tax rate under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applicable to the transactions in question for computing tax effect.

Issue (i): whether the Revenue's appeal was liable to be dismissed for low tax effect under the CBDT circular.

Analysis: The tax effect was computed on the basis of the additions made by the Assessing Officer, and on the normal provisions the figure was below the monetary limit prescribed by the binding circular. The assessee's computation was not controverted by the Revenue, and the appeal therefore fell within the low tax effect bar.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable and stood dismissed on the ground of low tax effect.

Issue (ii): whether the tax rate under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applicable to the transactions in question for computing tax effect.

Analysis: The applicability of the higher rate under section 115BBE was treated as confined to transactions on or after 01.04.2017, and the transactions involved in the present case were prior to that date. The tax effect was therefore to be determined under the normal provisions rather than at the higher rate.

Conclusion: Section 115BBE did not apply to enhance the tax effect in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as falling below the applicable monetary limit, and the substantive grounds were left open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the tax effect computed under the applicable normal provisions falls below the CBDT-prescribed monetary limit, the Revenue's appeal is not maintainable; the higher rate under section 115BBE cannot be applied to transactions predating its operative date to enlarge the tax effect.

Issues: (i) Whether the ESOP cross-charge incurred by the Indian entity for shares granted to its employees by the foreign parent company was allowable as a revenue expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The expenditure was treated as employee compensation cost incurred to secure and retain employee services during the vesting period. The binding jurisdictional precedent held that ESOP discount/cross-charge constitutes expenditure for business purposes and that such liability is ascertained rather than contingent. The fact that the parent company issued the shares did not alter the character of the payment in the hands of the Indian entity, and the coordinate bench decisions followed the same view. The pendency of challenge before the Supreme Court did not displace the binding force of the jurisdictional High Court ruling.

Conclusion: The ESOP cross-charge was allowable as revenue expenditure, and the disallowance was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable in the absence of evidence linking the appellant to the offence. (ii) Whether the penalty imposed under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was justified when the appellant had recorded a statement and cooperated with the investigation despite not appearing to the summons.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable in the absence of evidence linking the appellant to the offence.

Analysis: The record showed that the appellant was engaged in business in foodgrains and pulses and had a business relationship with the consignor. No material was brought on record to establish that the appellant had committed any offence attracting penal liability under Section 112.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not substantiated and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was justified when the appellant had recorded a statement and cooperated with the investigation despite not appearing to the summons.

Analysis: Though summons had been issued on more than one date, the appellant's statement was recorded during the investigation. The recorded statement established cooperation, and the circumstances did not justify penal action solely on the ground of non-appearance.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not warranted and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: Both penalties were annulled, and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief as permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty cannot be sustained without evidentiary linkage to the alleged offence, and non-appearance to summons does not justify penalty where the person has otherwise cooperated with the investigation.

Issues: (i) Whether freight and insurance were liable to be added to the declared FOB value under Rule 10(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007. (ii) Whether the notice invoking the extended period was sustainable on the grounds of suppression and wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether freight and insurance were liable to be added to the declared FOB value under Rule 10(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.

Analysis: Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 fixes valuation on the transaction value, and Rule 10(2) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 permits loading where transportation cost is not ascertainable, with freight and insurance additions being attracted on the facts. The declared FOB basis was not supported by cogent documentary material showing that FOB and CIF were identical or that transportation and insurance were nil. The invoice terms indicated ex-works responsibility and risk with the buyer, supporting the departmental case for loading the assessable value.

Conclusion: The addition of freight and insurance was upheld against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice invoking the extended period was sustainable on the grounds of suppression and wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The appellant had disclosed the FOB value and nil freight in the bill of entry documentation, and the Revenue did not establish a conscious withholding of material facts or deliberate misstatement. The dispute was treated as one of valuation interpretation, and the availability of credit rendered the matter revenue neutral. In such circumstances, the ingredients required to invoke the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The invocation of the extended period was held unsustainable in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the demand could not be sustained through the extended limitation route, and the impugned order was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended period of limitation under customs law cannot be invoked unless the Revenue proves a conscious suppression of material facts or wilful misstatement; a valuation dispute supported by disclosure and revenue-neutral consequences does not by itself establish such suppression.

Issues: Whether the enhancement of the assessable value of imported goods was sustainable when the declared transaction value was supported by invoice and banking documents, and whether the duty and interest paid under protest were refundable with interest.

Analysis: Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 gives primacy to transaction value for imported goods. Under Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(2) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, the declared value must be accepted unless there are valid grounds to reject it. Rule 12 requires the proper officer to have reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the declared value before moving sequentially through the valuation rules. The recorded facts showed invoice support, banking remittances, and comparable earlier imports near the declared rate, while the Department relied mainly on a later and isolated comparative entry without first discarding the transaction value on cogent grounds. The enhancement was therefore held to be contrary to the statutory valuation sequence, and the amount paid under protest was treated as not lawfully payable.

Conclusion: The enhancement of assessable value was unsustainable. The duty and interest paid under protest were held refundable with applicable interest.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the enhanced valuation was set aside, and consequential refund relief with interest followed.

Ratio Decidendi: Customs valuation must proceed from the declared transaction value, and it can be rejected only on recorded reasonable doubt under Rule 12 before resorting sequentially to the alternative valuation methods.

Issues: (i) Whether freight and insurance were liable to be added to the declared FOB value for arriving at the assessable value; (ii) whether the demand was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked on the basis of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether freight and insurance were liable to be added to the declared FOB value for arriving at the assessable value.

Analysis: The dispute turned on valuation under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 10(2) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007. The importer claimed that FOB and CIF values were effectively the same for the Bhutan land-border imports and that no transit cost existed between the points of export and import. The Tribunal held that this assertion required documentary substantiation, which was not produced. In the absence of a contractual or record-based demonstration that the transaction was truly on CIF terms or that transportation and insurance were nil and ascertainable, the declared FOB value could not be accepted as the final assessable value. The terms printed on the invoice-cum-challan also indicated buyer's risk and that responsibility ceased when the truck left the factory premises, supporting the Revenue's case that freight and insurance had to be loaded in accordance with the valuation rules.

Conclusion: The addition of freight and insurance to the FOB value was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked on the basis of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The show cause notice invoked the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Tribunal found that the importer had disclosed the FOB value and, in the sample documents examined, had also indicated nil freight and the insurance element in the self-assessed declaration. On those facts, the Department failed to establish a positive act of suppression or deliberate misstatement. The Tribunal also treated the dispute as one of interpretation and noted that the matter was revenue neutral, since any additional duty paid would have been available as credit. In these circumstances, the strict requirements for invoking the extended period were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand was time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on limitation, the impugned order was set aside, and the demand, interest and penalty did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period under customs law cannot be invoked unless the Revenue proves a conscious suppression of material facts or wilful misstatement by positive evidence; a bona fide valuation dispute disclosed in the import documents, especially in a revenue-neutral setting, does not satisfy that standard.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable against a Customs House Agent who permitted use of his licence without due diligence and thereby facilitated attempted export of prohibited red sanders.

Analysis: Section 114 fastens liability on any person who, in relation to goods, does or omits to do any act or omission rendering the goods liable to confiscation under Section 113, and separately refers to abetment. The provision was held to create liability on the basis of the act or omission itself, without requiring proof of conscious and knowing involvement for the first limb. On the findings, the appellant permitted misuse of his CHA licence, had no direct dealings with the exporter, exercised no supervision, and his omissions formed part of the transaction that led to the attempted smuggling of prohibited goods liable to confiscation.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 was upheld and the challenge by the appellant failed.

Issues: Whether the appeal was filed within limitation under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and within the maximum condonable period.

Analysis: The appeal under Section 61(2) had to be filed within 30 days, with a further condonable period not exceeding 15 days. The limitation was held to commence from the date of pronouncement of the order in open court, not from the date of uploading. The order recorded delivery on 21.04.2025, and there was no material to show that it was not pronounced on that date. Uploading was treated as an administrative act and not the trigger for limitation. On that computation, the appeal filed on 10.06.2025 was beyond the outer limit of 45 days, and the Tribunal could not entertain it. The merits of the restoration challenge were not examined because the limitation bar was held to be decisive.

Conclusion: The appeal was time-barred and not maintainable, and the limitation objection succeeded against the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: For an appeal under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, limitation begins from the date of pronouncement in open court, and once the statutory period of 30 days plus the maximum condonable 15 days expires, the appellate tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether a composite contract for supply and laying of electrical wiring and related works in Government buildings could be classified as 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service' for the period prior to 01.06.2007; (ii) Whether demand could be sustained under 'Works Contract Service' for the period after 01.06.2007 when the show cause notice proposed classification only under 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service'.

Issue (i): Whether a composite contract for supply and laying of electrical wiring and related works in Government buildings could be classified as 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service' for the period prior to 01.06.2007

Analysis: The charging scheme under the Finance Act, 1994 as it then stood covered service contracts simpliciter and did not extend to composite works contracts involving both supply of goods and labour. The activities in question were composite electrical contracts involving supply of materials and execution of wiring and related work, and therefore did not fall within the taxable category invoked for the pre-01.06.2007 period.

Conclusion: The classification under 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service' for the period prior to 01.06.2007 was not sustainable and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether demand could be sustained under 'Works Contract Service' for the period after 01.06.2007 when the show cause notice proposed classification only under 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service'

Analysis: The show cause notice formed the foundation of the demand and confined the proposal to classification under 'Erection, Commissioning and Installation Service'. A demand cannot be confirmed under a different taxable category not proposed in the notice. The consequential levy of interest and penalty could not survive once the demand itself failed on this ground.

Conclusion: The demand under 'Works Contract Service' for the later period was beyond the scope of the show cause notice and was not sustainable, with the assessee succeeding on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential reliefs in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Composite contracts involving both supply of goods and execution of work cannot be taxed as service contracts simpliciter for the period before works contract taxation was introduced, and a demand cannot be sustained under a taxable entry not proposed in the show cause notice.

Issues: (i) Whether the amortised value of moulds and dies supplied free of cost by customers or retained in the appellant's factory is includible in the assessable value of aluminium die-cast components; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation and the penalty imposed were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the amortised value of moulds and dies supplied free of cost by customers or retained in the appellant's factory is includible in the assessable value of aluminium die-cast components.

Analysis: Under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the transaction value governs assessable value, but any additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer must be included. Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 specifically brings within assessable value the money value of additional consideration and the value of tools, dies and moulds supplied by the buyer free of cost or at reduced cost. The valuation circular relied upon in the order also treats buyer-supplied moulds as an element of cost to be amortised over production and added proportionately to the value of the finished goods. On the facts, the moulds and dies were essential production tools used for the appellant's die-cast components and their cost formed part of the manufacturing cost of the goods.

Conclusion: The amortised value of moulds and dies is includible in the assessable value of the finished goods, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and the penalty imposed were sustainable.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires suppression of facts, wilful misstatement, fraud or intent to evade duty. The relevant accounting treatment and valuation methodology were reflected in statutory records and had been examined in departmental and audit proceedings, so the material facts were available to the department. The dispute was essentially one of valuation interpretation, and the ingredients necessary for invoking the extended period and for penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were not established.

Conclusion: The extended period was not sustainable and the penalty was liable to be set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The valuation addition was upheld, but the demand was confined to the normal period and the penalty was set aside, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Buyer-supplied moulds and dies, or their amortised cost, constitute additional consideration includible in the assessable value of the finished excisable goods, but the extended limitation period and penalty cannot be invoked absent suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud, or intent to evade duty.

Issues: (i) whether the refund claim relating to the amount paid on 09.05.2019 was barred by limitation under the transitional refund framework; (ii) whether Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 created an independent right to cash refund of credit that was otherwise not availed under the existing law, including on the strength of the COVID limitation exclusion and the export-related refund theory.

Issue (i): whether the refund claim relating to the amount paid on 09.05.2019 was barred by limitation under the transitional refund framework.

Analysis: The claim was treated as a refund of amount paid under the existing law, governed by Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and, therefore, by the limitation applicable under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The relevant date was the date of payment, and the one-year period had already expired before the COVID exclusion period commenced. The exclusion ordered for the pandemic did not revive a claim that had already become time-barred. The amount paid under the 09.05.2019 challan was also treated as one for which credit could have been taken only within the prescribed period under the earlier CENVAT scheme.

Conclusion: The refund claim of Rs.3,94,708/- was time-barred and was not allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 created an independent right to cash refund of credit that was otherwise not availed under the existing law, including on the strength of the COVID limitation exclusion and the export-related refund theory.

Analysis: Section 142(3) was held to be a transitional provision that preserves only claims already maintainable under the existing law and does not create a fresh right to refund where no such entitlement existed earlier or where the right had already been lost. The claim could not be sustained on the basis of the EODC, because the amount paid pursuant to the customs obligation was not shown to be a refund claim under the Customs Act, 1962. The export-based refund route under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was also not applicable on the facts found.

Conclusion: No independent entitlement to refund arose under Section 142(3), and the alternative grounds for refund failed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned rejection of the disputed refund survived judicial scrutiny, and no interference was called for in the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not confer a new refund right; it only preserves and channels claims that were otherwise valid under the existing law, subject to the applicable limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether the State Electricity Regulatory Commission has the power and jurisdiction to consider and factor in a Generation Based Incentive while determining tariff; (ii) what duties and obligations govern tariff determination when the Commission exercises that exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the State Electricity Regulatory Commission has the power and jurisdiction to consider and factor in a Generation Based Incentive while determining tariff.

Analysis: Tariff determination is the exclusive province of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions under the Electricity Act, 2003, and there is no unallocated regulatory residue outside that field. Regulation 20 of the 2015 Tariff Regulations expressly requires the Commission to take into consideration any incentive or subsidy offered by the Central or State Government if availed by the generating company. The existence of a Union grant does not exclude the statutory power of the Commission; it only means that the Commission must consider the incentive in accordance with the governing statutory framework and regulations.

Conclusion: The Commission has the power and jurisdiction to consider and factor in the Generation Based Incentive while determining tariff.

Issue (ii): What duties and obligations govern tariff determination when the Commission exercises that exclusive jurisdiction.

Analysis: The Commission must exercise its tariff power holistically and in harmony with the statutory policy of promoting renewable energy, protecting consumer interests, and ensuring affordability and sustainability. A subsidy or incentive designed to support generators cannot be treated mechanically as a consumer-side deduction merely because tariff fixation lies with the regulator. The incentive must be given contextual and purposive effect so that the policy objective behind the grant is not defeated. Regulatory power must operate as a collaborative enterprise and not in a manner that nullifies the purpose of the policy or grant.

Conclusion: The Commission is obliged to treat the incentive purposively and consistently with the object of promoting renewable generation, rather than by automatic or mechanical deduction.

Final Conclusion: The appeal fails, and the tariff regulator's authority is affirmed, but the impugned treatment of the incentive is rejected because the benefit was intended to remain with the generating company over and above tariff.

Ratio Decidendi: A tariff regulator may consider a government incentive or subsidy only in a manner that is consistent with the statutory scheme and the purpose of the incentive, and the existence of a government grant does not by itself oust the regulator's tariff jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether a non-executive Independent Director, who was not a signatory to the dishonoured cheques, could be vicariously liable under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the absence of specific averments in the complaint showing that he was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time.

Analysis: Vicarious liability under Section 141 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. The complaint must contain clear and unambiguous averments as to how the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the offence. Mere designation as a director is insufficient. Where the accused is a non-executive or Independent Director, liability cannot be fastened unless the complaint specifically alleges direct involvement in the company's business or in the transaction in question. On the pleadings here, the complaints made only general assertions that the petitioner was responsible for day-to-day management, while the record showed that he was an Independent Director, was not a cheque signatory, and had no specific role pleaded in the impugned transactions.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted with the aid of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the summoning orders and consequent criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed qua him.

Outcome: The application for condonation of delay was rejected and the special leave petition was dismissed as time barred.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent contravened the anti-profiteering mandate by increasing base ticket prices instead of passing on the benefit of GST rate reduction, notwithstanding State cinema regulation and alleged permissions. (ii) Whether the Rs. 3 per ticket maintenance charge could be excluded while computing GST and the commensurate price reduction. (iii) Whether the profiteered amount was liable to be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Funds and whether penalty was imposable.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent contravened the anti-profiteering mandate by increasing base ticket prices instead of passing on the benefit of GST rate reduction, notwithstanding State cinema regulation and alleged permissions.

Analysis: The reduction in GST rates on cinema tickets created a statutory obligation under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to pass on the benefit by way of commensurate reduction in prices. The respondent did not reduce ticket prices after 01.01.2019 and instead increased the base prices, thereby neutralising the tax benefit. The State cinema framework was held to operate only as a ceiling on ticket prices and did not prevent reduction of prices for GST purposes. The alleged permissions and pre-GST writ orders did not displace the central anti-profiteering mandate, and no cogent evidence of genuine cost escalation was produced to justify the higher base prices.

Conclusion: The respondent had contravened Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and had profiteered by not passing on the GST benefit commensurately.

Issue (ii): Whether the Rs. 3 per ticket maintenance charge could be excluded while computing GST and the commensurate price reduction.

Analysis: The maintenance charge formed part of the amount collected in connection with the supply of cinema admission and was required to be included in the ticket value for GST computation. No provision of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permitted exclusion of that amount from taxable value for the purpose of determining the benefit to be passed on after the rate reduction.

Conclusion: The Rs. 3 per ticket maintenance charge could not be excluded from the computation.

Issue (iii): Whether the profiteered amount was liable to be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Funds and whether penalty was imposable.

Analysis: The quantified profiteering amount was sustained and directed to be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Funds because the recipients were not identifiable. Penalty under Section 171(3A) was not imposed as that penal provision came into force after the relevant period of contravention.

Conclusion: The respondent was directed to deposit the profiteered amount, and no penalty was imposed.

Final Conclusion: The anti-profiteering allegation was upheld, the quantified profiteered amount was confirmed for deposit, and the proceedings were concluded without penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A supplier must pass on the benefit of GST rate reduction through an actual commensurate reduction in final consumer price, and reliance on State-level price ceilings or permissions does not justify retention of the tax benefit absent cogent proof of genuine cost escalation.

Issues: Whether provisional attachment of mortgaged properties standing in the banks' favour was sustainable when the record indicated that the properties were attached as value of the alleged proceeds of crime and not as property directly or indirectly acquired from proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The attachment power under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires the authorised officer to record reasons to believe, on the basis of material in possession, that the property is proceeds of crime and is likely to be concealed, transferred, or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation. The material on record showed that the relevant properties were already mortgaged to the appellant banks, possession had been taken by the banks, and some properties had already been auctioned. The record did not support the new contention that the properties were themselves direct or indirect proceeds of crime. The tribunal treated the attachment as one made only as value thereof, and found no substantiation for the assertion that non-attachment would frustrate proceedings.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment of the mortgaged properties was not sustainable against the appellant banks, and the impugned order was set aside.

Issues: Whether the declared value of imported second-hand machinery could be rejected and re-determined solely on the basis of the local Chartered Engineer's certificate, despite the existence of a Load Port Chartered Engineer's certificate.

Analysis: The value of imported goods under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 is governed by the transaction value, and rejection of the declared value requires a legally sustainable basis. The Load Port Chartered Engineer's certificate was on record and contained the material particulars sufficient to establish the used nature of the machinery. The local certificate did not create any real dispute on the identity or condition of the goods, and the omission of the year of manufacture in the Load Port certificate was not treated as a fatal defect. The circular governing second-hand machinery valuation contemplated use of a local certificate only where the Load Port certificate was absent or improper, and that situation did not exist here. Rejection of the declared value and enhancement based only on the local certificate was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The declared value could not be rejected on the facts of the case, and the valuation based solely on the local Chartered Engineer's certificate was not justified.