Issues: Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA service used for outward transportation of goods up to the customer's premises was admissible, having regard to the place of removal under the valuation provisions and the definition of input service.

Analysis: The admissibility of credit depended on whether the customer's premises constituted the place of removal on the facts of the sale. Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 links assessable value to the transaction value at the time and place of removal, and the definition of input service in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 covers outward transportation up to the place of removal. The purchase orders and invoices showed delivery on FOR door delivery terms, and payment was to be made only on receipt of goods in proper condition, indicating that the sale was completed upon delivery at the buyer's premises. In such a situation, the outward transportation was within the scope of input service.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on GTA service for transportation up to the customers' premises was admissible, the customers' premises being the place of removal on the facts of the case.

Issues: Whether the addition for unexplained cash credit was sustainable where the impugned receipt was explained as an advance received from a purchaser towards sale of a residential unit.

Analysis: Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the credit was supported by the purchaser's bank record showing debit of the amount and the assessee's bank record showing corresponding credit on the same date. The registered agreement for sale of the unit also substantiated that the receipt represented sale advance rather than an unsecured loan or unexplained credit.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 was unjustified and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reliance on undisclosed third-party statements without effective cross-examination violated principles of natural justice; and (ii) Whether documented sale proceeds from listed shares could be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 and the related long-term capital-gain exemption denied.

Issue (i): Whether reliance on undisclosed third-party statements without effective cross-examination violated principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The addition rested partly on statements of alleged operators, but copies of those statements were not supplied and effective cross-examination was not provided. The applicable requirement of natural justice mandated disclosure and an opportunity to test adverse third-party material relied upon for assessment.

Conclusion: Reliance on undisclosed third-party statements without effective cross-examination violated principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether documented sale proceeds from listed shares could be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 and the related long-term capital-gain exemption denied.

Analysis: The share acquisition was through preferential allotment with payment through banking channels; the shares were credited to the demat account, sold through recognised stock exchanges using registered brokers, and the sale proceeds were received through banking channels. These documentary records remained unrebutted. General investigation reports, abnormal price movement, and alleged suspicious counterparties did not establish any nexus, collusion, prior arrangement, cash trail, or price-manipulation role of the assessee. The securities regulator's findings that no connection was established between the preferential allottees and price-rigging entities were relevant evidentiary material. The test of human probabilities could not override direct, unrebutted documentary evidence in the absence of cogent corroborative material.

Conclusion: The sale proceeds could not be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68, and the addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The documented long-term capital-gain transaction remained uncontroverted, and the consequential alleged-commission addition under section 69C could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for alleged penny-stock accommodation entries cannot rest on general investigation material and suspicion where documentary evidence remains unrebutted and no nexus, cash trail, or collusion with the assessee is established.

Issues: Whether the applicant satisfied the twin conditions for regular bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 45 requires reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of money laundering and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The material, including statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, bank transactions, acquisition of properties through the company, unsecured loans, and financial links with the co-accused, prima facie indicated the applicant's active participation in concealing, acquiring, using, and projecting proceeds of crime as untainted. Statements under Section 50 are admissible material at the bail stage. The pattern of coordinated transactions, multiple accounts, and involvement of associates also indicated a risk of further similar activity if released. The gravity and organised nature of the alleged economic offence warranted application of the statutory rigours.

Conclusion: The applicant failed to satisfy either of the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; the issue is decided against the applicant.

Issues: Whether the denial of a requested video-conferencing hearing in faceless appellate proceedings warranted setting aside the appellate order for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Paragraph 12 of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 requires the Commissioner (Appeals) to allow a requested personal hearing, to be conducted through video conferencing or video telephony. The assessee's request for video-conferencing hearing was undisputedly made but was not considered before the appellate order was passed. This constituted denial of the prescribed hearing opportunity and breach of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside and the matter was restored for de novo adjudication after granting the assessee a video-conferencing hearing; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit of the new tax regime under section 115BAC despite not filing a fresh Form 10IE for the assessment year under appeal. (ii) Whether the adjustment made while processing the return under section 143(1) to deny the new tax regime was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit of the new tax regime under section 115BAC despite not filing a fresh Form 10IE for the assessment year under appeal.

Analysis: The option under section 115BAC(5)(i) for a person having income from business or profession is to be exercised in the prescribed manner and, once exercised, applies to subsequent assessment years. The assessee had earlier opted for the new regime and filed Form 10IE for the preceding year. The Tribunal followed coordinate bench decisions holding that the belated filing of Form 10IE in the earlier year did not invalidate the exercise of option itself, and that no fresh Form 10IE was required for the subsequent year so long as the earlier option had not been withdrawn and the return for the year under appeal was filed within the due date under section 139(1).

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to continue under the new tax regime, and denial of the benefit for want of a fresh Form 10IE was unjustified.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjustment made while processing the return under section 143(1) to deny the new tax regime was sustainable.

Analysis: Since the assessee's option under section 115BAC continued to operate for the relevant year, the computation of tax under the normal regime and the resulting demand were based on an incorrect denial of that option. The adjustment under section 143(1) could not be sustained on the premise that the assessee was ineligible for the concessional regime merely because no fresh Form 10IE was filed for the year under appeal.

Conclusion: The processing adjustment and the consequential demand were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the new tax regime was set aside and the assessment was directed to be modified by allowing the assessee's claim under section 115BAC.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee had validly opted for the new tax regime in an earlier year and had not withdrawn that option, the benefit continues for subsequent years under section 115BAC(5)(i), and the absence of a fresh Form 10IE for the later year does not by itself invalidate the claim.

Issues: Whether the deletion of disallowance for alleged non-deduction of tax could be sustained without verification of the character of the payments, the residential status of recipients, and the underlying transaction documents.

Analysis: Neither the assessment nor the appellate proceedings involved adequate inquiry into the conditions for application of section 194Q, including whether the payments represented consideration for goods and whether they were made to residents. The appellate conclusion was based on sample transactions and presumptions drawn from the names of shipping companies, without a thorough examination of the relevant documents. The co-terminus appellate powers required verification of the transactions, including possible tax-deduction liability under the applicable provisions.

Conclusion: The appellate deletion could not be sustained without proper factual verification, and fresh adjudication by the first appellate authority was required.

Issues: (i) Whether transfer of inherited tenancy rights in an identified residential flat is chargeable to capital gains tax despite absence of proven historical cost; (ii) Whether the claimed fair market value as on 1 April 2001 and consequential indexed cost require verification for recomputation of capital gains.

Issue (i): Whether transfer of inherited tenancy rights in an identified residential flat is chargeable to capital gains tax despite absence of proven historical cost.

Analysis: Sections 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operate as an integrated charging and computation scheme. The tenancy rights transferred were connected with an identified immovable property, were transferred for quantified consideration, and were capable of valuation by reference to the underlying property and market conditions. The inability to establish the cost in the hands of the previous owner creates a question of quantification; it does not cause a failure of the computation machinery. Acquisition through a will does not, by itself, render an otherwise identifiable and marketable capital asset outside the capital-gains charge.

Conclusion: Against the assessee, the transfer of tenancy rights is chargeable under the head capital gains; the plea of complete non-chargeability is rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the claimed fair market value as on 1 April 2001 and consequential indexed cost require verification for recomputation of capital gains.

Analysis: The valuation report furnished for the fair market value as on 1 April 2001 had not been examined on merits, and the earlier non-reference for valuation resulted from time constraints rather than a reasoned assessment of that report. Determination of the applicable fair market value and indexed cost of acquisition requires factual and, where necessary, technical verification under the statutory computation framework.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the limited extent, the valuation report must be examined and the fair market value as on 1 April 2001, together with the consequential indexed cost of acquisition, must be determined in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The capital-gains charge survives, while the taxable quantum remains to be computed upon lawful determination of the fair market value and consequential indexation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tenancy rights connected with specified immovable property are transferable and capable of valuation, absence of an established acquisition cost consequent to inheritance does not make capital-gains computation unworkable or exclude the transfer from charge.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessments under sections 153A/153C could be challenged for absence of incriminating search material in unabated years; (ii) Whether the bank deposits were assessable as unexplained income despite the documented sources; (iii) Whether rough seized salary computations supported additions for undisclosed salary income; (iv) Whether a mobile-phone noting of gold quantity and value supported an addition for unexplained jewellery investment.

Issue (i): Whether the assessments under sections 153A/153C could be challenged for absence of incriminating search material in unabated years.

Analysis: Sections 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 govern search-related assessments. Though completed assessments ordinarily require incriminating search material for additions, the record reflected seized documents having an indirect link with the additions. The challenge based on absence of incriminating material was therefore not accepted on the facts.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge to the assessments under sections 153A/153C is rejected. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank deposits were assessable as unexplained income despite the documented sources.

Analysis: The evidentiary burden shifts after a reasonable explanation of the source of funds is supported by material. Fund-flow details, regular cash withdrawals, salary receipts, savings, transfers, interest credits, recurring-deposit maturity proceeds, provident-fund receipts, property-sale proceeds and advances explained the deposits. The deposits were modest, spread over several years and consistent with the financial profile; deposits in the joint account also reflected the independent sources of both account holders. Suspicion or presumption could not displace this evidence.

Conclusion: The additions for unexplained bank deposits are deleted. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rough seized salary computations supported additions for undisclosed salary income.

Analysis: The evidentiary value of loose papers depends on corroboration by actual transactions or independent evidence. The seized rough calculations represented an estimate or salary-negotiation projection and did not establish actual receipt of the computed amounts. There was no employer confirmation or other corroborative material, and statements recorded during search could not overcome the absence of evidence of actual income.

Conclusion: The additions for alleged undisclosed salary income are deleted. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether a mobile-phone noting of gold quantity and value supported an addition for unexplained jewellery investment.

Analysis: CBDT Instruction No. 1916 dated 11.05.1994 provided relevant norms for jewellery held by family members. The aggregate jewellery found was within reasonable limits having regard to the family composition. The mobile noting did not establish an actual purchase, and no purchase bills, financial trail or other corroborative evidence supported an unexplained investment. An ambiguous noting and conjecture could not substitute proof.

Conclusion: The addition for alleged unexplained jewellery investment is deleted. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The income additions based on bank deposits, alleged salary receipts and jewellery are unsustainable for want of adequate evidence, while the validity of the search-assessment jurisdiction remains intact.

Ratio Decidendi: Additions founded on bank deposits or informal seized notings require an adequate evidentiary foundation; a documented explanation of source or an uncorroborated rough notation cannot, without more, sustain an addition.

Issues: Whether reassessment jurisdiction could validly be assumed by treating the assessee as a non-filer despite a return of income having been filed for the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: Reassessment under Section 147 requires a valid factual foundation and application of mind to the material available with the Assessing Officer. The notice under Section 148A(b), the order under Section 148A(d), and the reassessment proceeded on the premise that no return had been filed, although the return under Section 139(1) was on record. Reliance merely on portal information without verifying the assessee's return record rendered the recorded satisfaction factually erroneous and jurisdictionally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid in law; the jurisdiction assumed under Section 147 and the consequential reassessment order were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under section 147 for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16 was valid; (ii) Whether capital gains on transfers under separate sale deeds were taxable wholly in AY 2014-15 or in the respective years of transfer; (iii) Whether capital-gains computation under section 50C required fresh adjudication, including valuation objections and proportionate computation; (iv) Whether deductions under sections 54D, 54F and 54G could be examined despite absence of a revised return; (v) Whether relief must be granted to prevent double taxation of the same income across assessment years; (vi) Whether penalties under section 271(1)(c) were leviable for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment under section 147 for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16 was valid.

Analysis: The returns for the relevant years had only been processed under section 143(1), without scrutiny assessment. Information obtained during scrutiny for AY 2014-15 regarding transfers effected in other years provided a basis for reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessments for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16 were valid. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether capital gains on transfers under separate sale deeds were taxable wholly in AY 2014-15 or in the respective years of transfer.

Analysis: The property was transferred through independently registered sale deeds executed in different financial years. Under sections 45 and 2(47), each such transfer gives rise to capital gains in the year in which that transfer occurs; the transactions could not be treated as one composite transfer taxable only in AY 2014-15.

Conclusion: Capital gains are taxable in the respective assessment years in which the separate transfers took place. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether capital-gains computation under section 50C required fresh adjudication, including valuation objections and proportionate computation.

Analysis: Objections were raised to adoption of stamp-duty/DVO valuation, the opportunity afforded in valuation proceedings, and computation of the indexed cost. Since the allocation of gains to the respective years was settled, the valuation-based computation required fresh factual examination.

Conclusion: The computation of capital gains and application of section 50C were remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether deductions under sections 54D, 54F and 54G could be examined despite absence of a revised return.

Analysis: The restriction on making a fresh claim without a revised return applies to the Assessing Officer and does not restrict consideration of such a claim in appellate proceedings. The deduction claims consequently required examination on their merits.

Conclusion: The deduction claims under sections 54D, 54F and 54G were restored to the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether relief must be granted to prevent double taxation of the same income across assessment years.

Analysis: Although gains are assessable in the correct years of transfer, the same income cannot be subjected to tax more than once.

Conclusion: Appropriate relief must be granted to eliminate any double taxation. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether penalties under section 271(1)(c) were leviable for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16.

Analysis: The entire transaction had been disclosed, while the dispute concerned the year of taxability. The issue was debatable, and part of the addition resulted from the deeming valuation mechanism under section 50C.

Conclusion: Penalties under section 271(1)(c) for both assessment years were deleted. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment jurisdiction and year-wise allocation of capital gains remain intact, while valuation and deduction issues require fresh determination, any duplicate levy must be eliminated, and the concealment penalties do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Capital gains from independently registered sale deeds accrue for tax purposes in the assessment year corresponding to each respective transfer.

Issues: (i) Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirement of framing of charges in accordance with law? (ii) Whether the defect, if any, in the framing or signing of the charges constitutes an illegality vitiating the trial, or a curable irregularity within the meaning of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C.? (iii) Whether the High Court was justified in directing that the trial be conducted afresh, despite the fact that the trial had substantially progressed and prosecution evidence had already been recorded?

Issue (i): Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirement of framing of charges in accordance with law?

Analysis: The object of a charge is to provide clear notice of the accusation and a meaningful opportunity to defend, rather than to insist upon ritualistic formalities. The contemporaneous record showed that all accused were present with counsel when charges were recorded as framed, after which they participated throughout the trial and extensively cross-examined prosecution witnesses. Their conduct demonstrated knowledge of the allegations, their respective roles, and the defence to be advanced. No prejudice or lack of notice was established.

Conclusion: There was substantial compliance with the legal requirement of framing charges, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the defect, if any, in the framing or signing of the charges constitutes an illegality vitiating the trial, or a curable irregularity within the meaning of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C.?

Analysis: Sections 215 and 464 make the consequence of an error, omission, or irregularity in a charge dependent upon whether the accused was misled and a failure of justice resulted. A defect is jurisdictional or fatal only where it fundamentally impairs the fairness of trial or causes real prejudice. The unsigned formal charge was nevertheless prepared, recorded, read over, and acted upon; the accused had full knowledge of the case and availed effective opportunities to contest it. The belated objection, after extensive evidence had been recorded, did not establish any failure of justice.

Conclusion: The absence of a signature on the charge was a curable procedural irregularity and did not vitiate the trial, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court was justified in directing that the trial be conducted afresh, despite the fact that the trial had substantially progressed and prosecution evidence had already been recorded?

Analysis: A de novo trial is an exceptional remedy, permissible only where serious illegality, lack of jurisdiction, denial of material evidence, or a real failure of justice has rendered the prior proceedings fundamentally invalid. The trial had advanced substantially, with prosecution evidence recorded and witnesses extensively cross-examined. Since the charge defect was curable and no prejudice or failure of justice was shown, a fresh trial was unwarranted. Recommencing proceedings after the death of crucial witnesses would irretrievably prejudice the prosecution and frustrate timely justice.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in ordering a fresh trial, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The prior evidence remains available for completion of the criminal trial from the stage at which it stood before the High Court's intervention.

Ratio Decidendi: An error or omission in framing or signing a charge does not invalidate a criminal trial unless it has misled the accused and occasioned a failure of justice; a de novo trial cannot be ordered for a curable procedural irregularity without demonstrated prejudice.

Issues: Whether exemption for capital gains on transfer of agricultural land was available where the land was cultivated through local villagers and replacement agricultural land was purchased within the prescribed period.

Analysis: The land's agricultural character was established through revenue records, registration details, agricultural subsidy receipts, photographs of mango orchards and agricultural income disclosed in earlier returns. Agricultural use need not involve personal cultivation by the assessee; cultivation through third parties constitutes use for agricultural purposes. The assessee's earlier returns showing agricultural income from the same land had been accepted, and an identical claim of the assessee's brother in respect of the same survey land and transaction was accepted without any material distinction in facts. Absence of bills for agricultural produce or cultivation expenditure did not displace the evidence that local cultivators undertook the operations.

Conclusion: The transferred land was used for agricultural purposes during the two years preceding its transfer, and the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 upon purchase of replacement agricultural land.

Issues: Whether final registration could be refused on the ground that a trust's objects benefited a particular community, despite its charitable and religious objects and activities being available to the public at large.

Analysis: The trust's eye camps providing free medical check-ups and its concessional food-distribution activity demonstrated genuine charitable activities benefiting the public without restriction based on caste or religion. The allegedly restrictive object was not its dominant purpose. A trust having both charitable and religious objects does not attract the statutory bar merely because some objects relate to a particular community; questions concerning application of income or any violation of the statutory restrictions arise at the assessment stage rather than at registration.

Conclusion: The trust was charitable as well as religious in nature, with charitable objects benefiting the public at large; registration under Section 12AB could not be denied and was directed to be granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of employee bonus under section 36(1)(ii) could be sustained without examining the tax auditor's clarification regarding an alleged reporting error. (ii) Whether the addition of interest income, claimed to have been disclosed twice and previously assessed in the hands of another entity, could be sustained without verification.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of employee bonus under section 36(1)(ii) could be sustained without examining the tax auditor's clarification regarding an alleged reporting error.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 restricts deduction of bonus or commission where the amount would otherwise have been payable as profits or dividend. The assessee relied on a tax auditor's clarification that the relevant reporting in the audit report was a typographical mistake and that the bonus was actually paid before the due date under section 139(1), attracting the deduction framework under section 43B. The rejection of the clarification as a cover-up, without enquiry into whether the bonus was in fact payable as profits or dividend, was not justified.

Conclusion: The bonus-disallowance issue is restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of interest income, claimed to have been disclosed twice and previously assessed in the hands of another entity, could be sustained without verification.

Analysis: The assessee claimed that interest income earned before the transfer of the microfinance business had already been disclosed by the transferor entity and was inadvertently reported again in the assessee's return. The relevant facts were capable of verification from the Department's records, but the claim was rejected without such verification. The addition therefore required examination to determine whether the income had been assessed twice.

Conclusion: The interest-income addition issue is restored to the Assessing Officer for re-examination and verification.

Final Conclusion: Both substantive issues require factual verification by the Assessing Officer, who must pass a fresh order in accordance with law after due compliance by the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax claim supported by material requiring factual verification cannot be rejected conclusively without examining that material; the matter must be remanded for fresh consideration where the relevant facts are verifiable from the record.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under section 54F was allowable for investment in construction of multiple residential units under the pre-amendment law applicable to Assessment Year 2009-10; (ii) whether deviation from or absence of approval of the building plan justified denial of the deduction; and (iii) whether non-furnishing of complete bank statements justified rejection of the claim.

Issue (i): Allowability of deduction under section 54F for construction of multiple residential units under the pre-amendment provision.

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2009-10, the provision applicable was the pre-amendment version of section 54F, which referred to investment in "a residential house". The substitution of that expression by "one residential house" was prospective. The pre-amendment provision therefore did not restrict the deduction to investment in a single residential unit, and the principle applicable to section 54 was equally applicable to section 54F.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 54F could not be denied merely because the assessee constructed multiple residential units.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with an approved building plan or deviation from the sanctioned plan prevented eligibility for deduction under section 54F.

Analysis: Section 54F requires construction of a residential house within the prescribed period but does not impose a condition that the construction must conform to an approved building plan or that approval from a statutory authority must be produced for claiming the deduction. The existence of the construction and compliance with the statutory time requirement were material.

Conclusion: Deviation from or absence of approval of the building plan was not a valid ground to deny deduction under section 54F.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to furnish complete bank statements evidencing utilisation of funds justified rejection of the deduction.

Analysis: The valuation report established that construction took place from November 2008 to July 2009, within the prescribed period, and its correctness was not disputed. Non-furnishing of complete bank statements could not, by itself, defeat the claim where the requisite investment within the prescribed period was established. Any independent doubt concerning the source of investment could be addressed under the relevant provisions of the Act.

Conclusion: The deduction could not be rejected merely for non-furnishing of complete bank statements.

Final Conclusion: The assessee satisfied the conditions for deduction under section 54F, and the corresponding addition was directed to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment version of section 54F applicable to Assessment Year 2009-10, deduction is not restricted to a single residential unit, and the provision does not require approved building plans or complete bank statements where construction within the prescribed period is otherwise established.

Issues: Whether service tax was payable under reverse charge mechanism on corporate guarantees issued by the overseas parent company to secure loans obtained by the assessee, when no consideration was paid for such guarantees.

Analysis: The Tribunal followed the binding principle that a service rendered without consideration does not constitute a taxable service. It noted that the assessee had not paid any consideration to the overseas parent company for the corporate guarantees, and the record in the show cause notice as well as the impugned orders did not establish any such payment. In the absence of consideration, the Revenue had no basis to sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The demand of service tax on the corporate guarantees was unsustainable and the impugned orders were liable to be set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the tax demand, together with the connected penalty and interest consequences, did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A corporate guarantee provided without consideration is not a taxable service, and service tax cannot be levied under reverse charge in the absence of payment for the alleged service.

Issues: (i) Whether the loan credit of Rs. 2 crore treated as accommodation entry could be added as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite repayment through banking channels; (ii) Whether the additions towards interest and commission survived once the principal addition was sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the loan credit of Rs. 2 crore treated as accommodation entry could be added as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite repayment through banking channels.

Analysis: The assessment material and statements of the entry operators were accepted as showing a web of shell entities used to route accommodation entries, and the assessee was found to be a beneficiary of one such entity. The mere fact that the money moved through banking channels and was partly repaid during the year did not dislodge the character of the transaction when the credit itself was found to be non-genuine and in the nature of an accommodation entry. Repayment of such a credit was held not to cure the defect in the original unexplained nature of the money.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 2 crore under section 68 was upheld and the relief granted by the first appellate authority was reversed.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions towards interest and commission survived once the principal addition was sustained.

Analysis: The additions for interest and estimated commission were consequential to the principal loan addition. Once the underlying unexplained credit was restored, the ancillary additions based on that credit also remained sustainable.

Conclusion: The additions of Rs. 15,06,164 towards interest and Rs. 6 lakh towards commission were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge succeeded in full and the assessee's cross-objection failed, with the reassessment additions restored in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: Repayment through banking channels does not by itself negate an addition under section 68 where the credit is found, on the basis of surrounding material, to be an accommodation entry and therefore not a genuine loan.

Issues: Whether the imported parts of diesel engines and earth moving equipment, classified under CTH 8483, were liable to IGST at 28% under Schedule IV of Notification No. 01/2017-IT(RT) dated 28.06.2017 or at 18% under Schedule III after insertion of Sl. No. 369A by Notification No. 35/2017-IT(RT) dated 13.10.2017.

Analysis: The imported goods were admittedly classified under CTH 8483. Notification No. 35/2017-IT(RT) inserted Sl. No. 369A in Schedule III for plain shaft bearings under CTH 8483 and omitted the words "plain shaft bearings" from Sl. No. 135 in Schedule IV. The later amendment by Notification No. 43/2017-IT(RT) did not displace the applicability of Sl. No. 369A to the imported goods. The claim of the Revenue that the goods continued to fall under Schedule IV was rejected, and the benefit of the lower rate was held to be available to the importer.

Conclusion: The goods were correctly entitled to IGST at 18% under Sl. No. 369A of Schedule III, and not at 28% under Schedule IV.

Issues: (i) whether the petition under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation on the ground that the guarantee dated 06.01.2017 had become unenforceable before the filing date; (ii) whether the record disclosed sufficient material to establish financial debt and default for admission under Sections 95 and 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (iii) whether the alleged conflict of interest of the resolution professional vitiated the admission order under Section 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): whether the petition under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation on the ground that the guarantee dated 06.01.2017 had become unenforceable before the filing date.

Analysis: A continuing guarantee invoked by demand becomes enforceable on such demand. The demand under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 was issued on 27.02.2019 and default was treated as commencing on 27.04.2019. On that basis, the petition filed on 30.12.2021 was within time.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the record disclosed sufficient material to establish financial debt and default for admission under Sections 95 and 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The guarantee and acknowledgment dated 06.01.2017, the audited balance sheets of the corporate debtor showing borrowings, and the admitted claim in liquidation proceedings constituted adequate material to show the existence of financial debt and default at the admission stage. The difference in amounts across documents was treated as explained by different cut-off dates and stages.

Conclusion: Financial debt and default were held to be established for the purpose of admission under Section 100.

Issue (iii): whether the alleged conflict of interest of the resolution professional vitiated the admission order under Section 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The alleged conflict, even if assumed, could at the highest justify substitution of the resolution professional. It did not, by itself, warrant setting aside the order admitting the petition under Section 100. The allegation was expressly left open on merits.

Conclusion: The objection did not affect the validity of the admission order.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to admission under Section 95 failed on limitation, on proof of debt and default, and on the alleged role of the resolution professional, and the dismissal of the appeal left the admission order undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Sections 95 and 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a continuing guarantee invoked by demand is enforceable from the date of such demand, and an alleged conflict in the resolution professional does not by itself invalidate the admission order.